bal tigra (II)

Yesterday we saw that the Turei Even understood the Rashba to be saying that failing to fulfill a mitzvah would be a violation of bal tigra.  Turei Even argued that this is incorrect.  It's doing a mitzvah in an incomplete way which is bal tigra, not failing to do the mitzvah at all.

The T.E. raised two questions.  I want to focus on the second one.  He proved his point from a gemara in Sukkah :

אמר מר לא מצא אתרוג לא יביא לא רמון ולא פריש ולא דבר אחר פשיטא מהו דתימא לייתי כי היכי שלא תשכח תורת אתרוג קמ"ל זימנין דנפיק חורבא מיניה דאתי למסרך

The gemara has a hava amina that if there is no esrog available, take some other fruit so that you at least remember that there is a mitzvah of lulav and will do it properly next year.  According to the Rashba, how can you have such a hava amina?  Taking only 3 of the 4 minim does not fulfill the mitzvah, so it would violate bal tigra.  Can you violate a lav just to have a zecher?!

My wife's grandfather quotes a solution to this question in the name of his BIL R' Yosef Holzberg which is echoed by the Sefas Emes in his chiddushim on R"H.  When you have an incomplete mitzvah and are in violation of bal tigra, yesh lachkor the following lomdish chakira: does the issur stem from what you are *doing*, or does the issur stem from what you have *failed to do*?  Is it the mitzvah action which is the problem because it will prove to be defective; or is the piece that you left out which is the issue? 

The answer is black on white if you read the classic case of bal tigra (R"H 28) carefully:

דתנן הניתנין במתנה אחת שנתערבו בניתנין מתנה אחת ינתנו מתנה אחת מתן ד' במתן ד' ינתנו במתן ד' מתן ד' במתן אחת ר"א אומר ינתנו במתן ד' רבי יהושע אומר ינתנו במתן אחת אמר לו ר"א הרי הוא עובר על בל תגרע אמר לו ר' יהושע הרי הוא עובר על בל תוסיף א"ל ר"א לא נאמר בל תוסיף אלא כשהוא בעצמו אמר לו ר' יהושע לא נאמר בל תגרע אלא כשהוא בעצמו ועוד אמר רבי יהושע כשלא נתת עברת על בל תגרע ולא עשית מעשה בידך כשנתת עברת על בל תוסיף ועשית מעשה בידך

 

R' Yehoshua's argument is that bal tigra entails no action:  ועוד אמר רבי יהושע כשלא נתת עברת על בל תגרע ולא עשית מעשה בידך.  If the issue was with what you are doing, the incomplete act, it would be a lav which has a maaseh.  לא עשית מעשה בידך implies that it's what's being left out which is the issue.

 

Coming back to the Turei Even's proof from the gemara in sukkah: Had the issur of bal tigra been the action that will remain incomplete, then taking the lulav, taking the hadas, the arava, would be a problem.  But the issur of bal tigra is in what you are missing, not what you are doing.   In this case, what can you do if no esrog is available?  Ones Rachmana patrei!  Maybe Rashba is right, that missing an entire mitzvah potentially is bal tigra, but in this particular case you would still be off the hook.

I have a thought experiment to help illustrate this point: The halacha says that you only have to spend up to 20% of your money to fulfill a mitzvas aseh and no more, but you have to give up every penny to avoid violating a lav.  Let's say a lulav and esrog will cost more than 20% of my money.  I should be exempt from the mitzvah.  But if I don't fulfill the mitzvah, according to Rashba, won't I be in violation of the lav of bal tigra, and therefore shouldn't I have to give up every penny to avoid the lav?

It must be that since the halacha says that I don't have to spend more than 20%, I'm not in violation of the lav if I don't do the mitzvah.  So too, the same holds true if no esrog is available, I'm not in violation of anything if it is missing because I have a ptur ones.  

 

This chiddush helps us with all kinds of things.  The Minchas Chinuch (see Aruch haShulchan as well) discusses whether there is any value to eating 1/2 a k'zayis of matzah if you don't have enough for a full shiur.  There is a concept of chatzi shiur by issurim.  Is there a similar concept by a kiyum mitzvah?  According to the Rashba, the whole question shouldn't even get off the ground.  If you fail to fulfill the mitzvah, you run the risk of bal tigra! 

 

The Chashmonaim found only enough oil for one day.  The Beis Yosef suggests that having no other choice, they divided what they had into 8 parts.  Miraculously, the oil burned throughout the night on each night even though it was far less than the shiur.  According to the Rashba, what was their hava amina?  Barring the miracle, wouldn't they be violating bal tigra by lighting less than the required shiur and failing to do a proper hadlaka? 

 

The answer is the same for all these examples.  Do what you can because the issur of bal tigra is not in what you are doing, it's in what you are leaving out.  Like in the case of esrog, in these cases you have no other choice than to not complete the mitzvah and leave something out -- you are in a situation of ones.  Therefore, there is no chiyuv bal tigra on what's missing.

 

The final example of the Sefas Emes is wearing tzitzis without techeiles.  There is no bal tigra because you are ones; techeiles is not available.  Therefore, you cannot be chayav for doing an incomplete mitzvah. That argument may have held true in the time of the Sefas Emes, but today, techeiles IS available.  Even if you are not 100% it is the right thing, what's the downside, given that not wearing it might put you in the bind and in violation of bal tigra? 

Turei Even on bal tigra (I)

I'm going to try to do this in two parts this week because the topic is pretty long.

The issur of bal tosif appears both in our parsha and earlier in parshas va'eschanan.  The GR"A (quoted by Torah Temima in va'eschanan) suggests that we have two pesukim because there are two different types of bal tosif: 1) creating/adding a new mitzvah which does not appear in the Torah; 2) changing the parameters of a mitzvah that does appear in the Torah and adding to it, e.g. adding an extra parsha in tefillin. 

 

Rashi does not seem to subscribe to this distinction.  In fact, he seems to not distinguish between the two pesukim at all.  Rashi comments in our parsha (13:1) לא תסף עליו – חמש טוטפות, חמשה מינין בלולב, ארבע ברכות לברכת כהנים and in va'eschanan (4:2) he comments לא תוסיפו – כגון: חמש פרשיות בתפילין, חמשת מינין בלולב, חמש ציציות.  The two comments are *almost* word for word the same.  I highlight *almost* because every stroke of ink in Rashi makes a difference, and here the slight difference in Rashi's words may in fact point to the difference between the two commands.  See Gur Aryeh; the L Rebbe also has a brilliant sicha on this Rashi.

 

Something like 20 years ago I did a post on a machlokes Tos and Rashba with regards to bal tosif.  Tos asks why blowing tekiyos d'meyushav on R"H is not a violation of bal tosif?  Aren't we adding to what the Torah requires?  Tos is mechadesh that that doing a mitzvah repeatedly is not bal tosif.  The Rashba gives what seems a far simpler answer: you can't incur bal tosif when you are fulfilling a takana derabbanan.  The Torah gives license to Chazal (lo tasur -- next week's parsha) to make takanos and gezeiros.  If you are following what Chazal mandate, there cannot be bal tosif.  This is such a fundamental yesod that one has to wonder why Tos did not offer this answer, and for that you can read some of the previous posts.

 

As to why Chazal are not in violation of bal tosif, the Rambam in Hil Mamrim explains that halacha clearly demarcates between Rabbinic law and Torah law.  Since a takana cannot be mistaken to be a Torah law, it is not bal tosif.

 

This year I want to turn to the conclusion of the Rashba and the issur of bal tigra.  Rashba adds that just like a takana to do something cannot be a violation of bal tosif, a takana *not to do something* cannot be bal tigra, e.g. when Chazal mandated that we do not blow shofar on Shabbos, this subtraction from the mitzvah is not a bal tigra problem.

 

The Turei Even asks two questions on this Rashba:

 

1) Bal tigra doesn't mean missing doing a mitzvah once; it means erasing a mitzvah permanently from the list of 613 things to do.  Were that not the case, then any time someone misses doing a mitzvah they would be in violation of bal tigra.  Someone who, for example, neglected to put on tefillin, should get malkos for bal tigra in addition to the bitul aseh.  That obviously can't be. 

 

When Chazal said not to blow shofar on Shabbos, they were not erasing the mitzvah of shofar.  They were telling you to skip it that one time.  Hence, no bal tigra.

 

2) Turei Even argues that bal tigra doesn't mean failing to do a mitzvah.  What it means is failing to do a mitzvah *in a complete way.*  The mitzvah is still valid, just incomplete.  A classic case (R"H 28b):

 

דתנן הניתנין במתנה אחת שנתערבו בניתנין מתנה אחת ינתנו מתנה אחת מתן ד' במתן ד' ינתנו במתן ד' מתן ד' במתן אחת ר"א אומר ינתנו במתן ד' רבי יהושע אומר ינתנו במתן אחת אמר לו ר"א הרי הוא עובר על בל תגרע אמר לו ר' יהושע הרי הוא עובר על בל תוסיף א"ל ר"א לא נאמר בל תוסיף אלא כשהוא בעצמו אמר לו ר' יהושע לא נאמר בל תגרע אלא כשהוא בעצמו ועוד אמר רבי יהושע כשלא נתת עברת על בל תגרע ולא עשית מעשה בידך כשנתת עברת על בל תוסיף ועשית מעשה בידך

 

A korban which requires מתן ד is kosher if you sprinkle only מתן אחת; it just hasn't been performed 100% the way it should have been.  In that case, the issue of bal tigra comes up.  However, let's say you had a korban and didn't do zerikas ha'dam at all.  That's not bal tigra -- that's a pasul korban!  That's a bitul aseh of offering korban. 

 

The Turei Even proves his case from the following gemara (Sukkah 31b):

 

אמר מר לא מצא אתרוג לא יביא לא רמון ולא פריש ולא דבר אחר פשיטא מהו דתימא לייתי כי היכי שלא תשכח תורת אתרוג קמ"ל זימנין דנפיק חורבא מיניה דאתי למסרך

 

The gemara has a hava amina that if there is no esrog available, take some other fruit so that you at least remember that there is a mitzvah of lulav and will do it properly next year.

 

Turei Even asks: according to the Rashba, how can you have such a hava amina?  Taking only 3 of the 4 minim means failing to fulfill the mitzvah, which according to Rashba  bal tigra.  You can't violate a lav just so you have a zecher?!

 

It must be that there is no bal tigra in this case because since you are missing the esrog, you are not fulfilling any mitzvah.  It's not just an *incomplete* kiyum; it's a nothing kiyum.  When you are missing the mitzvah entirely, that’s' not bal tigra. 

 

This question is not only a problem for the Rashba, but is a problem in shitas Rashi as well.  Rashi explains that bal tosif is something like adding a parsha to tefillin; bal tigra is the inverse, i.e. taking a parsha away.  That's not an *incomplete* kiyum; it's a nothing, and like the Turei Even proves, there is no bal tigra on doing a nothing. 

Doesn't everyone have free choice? Why does the pasuk call it a gift given just to us?

I'm afraid I don't have much to say this week.

1) נָת֤וֹן תִּתֵּן֙ ל֔וֹ וְלֹא־יֵרַ֥ע לְבָבְךָ֖ בְּתִתְּךָ֣ ל֑וֹ כִּ֞י בִּגְלַ֣ל׀ הַדָּבָ֣ר הַזֶּ֗ה יְבָרֶכְךָ֙ ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ בְּכׇֽל־מַעֲשֶׂ֔ךָ וּבְכֹ֖ל מִשְׁלַ֥ח יָדֶֽךָ׃

R' Ben Tzion Aba Shaul raises a safeik whether וְלֹא־יֵרַ֥ע לְבָבְךָ֖ בְּתִתְּךָ֣ ל֑וֹ is a bracha or an issur. He quotes the Minchas Chinuch (479:3) who writes that the word הַזֶּ֗הIt in the phrase בִּגְלַ֣ל׀ הַדָּבָ֣ר הַזֶּ֗ה is not referring back to the act to giving, נָת֤וֹן תִּתֵּן֙ ל֔וֹ, but rather refers back to doing so b'lev shaleim, וְלֹא־יֵרַ֥ע לְבָבְךָ֖ בְּתִתְּךָ֣ ל֑וֹ. The implication is that this is not a bracha, but a command to the one who gives. It's hard enough to give, but the Torah demands more than that -- you have to feel good about it too.

The Maggid of Dubno told the story of the man who lost $100 and was quite upset. Next day he found $200, but he was still upset because he thought to himself that if he hadn't lost the original $100 he would now have $300, not just $200, in his pocket. Contrast that with the story of the farmer who was carrying a bag with $100 of grain from the field back to his home and didn't realize there was a hole in the bag. By the time he got home the bag was empty, leaving him pretty upset. Not too long afterwards that same farmer noticed all along the path he took home through his fields there were now new stalks of wheat that had started to spring up, promising an even greater crop than he had originally harvested. The sadness at the loss of his original bundle was now replaced by the joy of the prospect of greater abundance.

When we give tzedakah, we often feel like the man who lost that $100. Even if we receive bracha and get something more in return, we still feel like we lost something. ְלֹא־יֵרַ֥ע לְבָבְךָ֖ בְּתִתְּךָ֣ ל֑וֹ means feeling like the farmer. Whatever we gave up was the seed from which sprang the bracha in return.

2) רְאֵה אָנֹכִי נֹתֵן לִפְנֵיכֶם הַיּוֹם בְּרָכָה וּקְלָלָה 

B'shlama according to Rashi who explains that the ְּבְּרָכָה וּקְלָלָה which the pasuk is referring to are the brachos and klalos that will be given on Har Grizim and Har Eival, neicha, that the pasuk is speaking only to us. But not everyone learns like Rashi. Ralbag, for example, explains the pasuk to mean that we have free choice זכר שכבר נתן השם יתעלה לפני ישראל ברכה וקללה והענין הוא בבחירתם וזה שאם ישמעו אל מצות השם יתעלה תבא להם הברכה והקללה אם לא ישמעו אל מצותיו. Well, doesn't everyone have free choice?  Doesn't an aku"m have the choice to do good or do wrong?

The GR"A in Aderet Aliyahu answers this question as does the CH haRI"M. GR"A writes:

ושמא תאמרו הבחירה ניתן לאדם בימי בחרותו אבל לא אחר שהורגל במעלליו הקשים לכן אמר היום בכל יום ויום הרשות נתונה והבחירה בידו לילך בדרך טובים

The key word in the pasuk is הַיּוֹם. Everyone has free choice to some degree, but it gets harder and harder to break bad habits the more time they have to become entrenched. Hashem gives us an opportunity each and every day to start anew, irrespective of the choices of the past.

The Ch haRI"M, quoted in the first piece in Sefas Emes, says that the key word in the pasuk is לִפְנֵיכֶם:

אא"ז מו"ר ז"ל הגיד פי' ראה אנכי נותן לפניכם. שנקבע בכל איש ישראל שיוכל להבחין ולבחור רק בהברכה.

I've written before that choosing right vs wrong is not such a big challenge for most people. True, a person can succumb to temptation, but that amounts to a passing moment of weakness, not a fundamental character flaw. Most people will not deliberatly choose the wrong thing to so.  The real challenge is figuring out in any given situation what the right vs wrong thing to so is. For example, the Jews I wrote about recently who cry about "starvation" in Gaza think they are choosing to do the right thing, but their whole concept of right/wrong is distorted.  They think that are choosing bracha, but they are supporting the enemy, supporting evil. It's not enough to have free choice between right and wrong; a person needs a compass to point them to what the right thing is. Hashem put that compass לִפְנֵיכֶם, inside each one of us. The outside world is like a magnetic field that pulls the compass in a wrong direction, but so long as we remain true to ourselves, it will show us the right path.

R Tzadok haKohen in Pri Tzadik points out that the pasuk uses the word נֹתֵן, meaning that it is speaking about a gift that Hashem gives us. Bracha is of course a gift, but the word  נֹתֵן applies to the וּקְלָלָה as well.  How is that a gift?  If you understand the pasuk like the CH haR"IM's reading, it makes perfect sense. The gift which Hashem gives us is not בְּרָכָה or קְלָלָה themselves, but rather is the ability to discern between them and find the correct path in a muddled, befuddling world of confusion.

the King does things on a Kingly scale; tzedaka on condition; when she'lo lishma detracts from a mitzvah and when not

1) R' Zilberstein tells the following story: There was a Jew who lived close to the home of the parents of the king of Morocco who wanted to say the bracha on seeing the king.  The king would visit his parents occasionally, coming late at night in private when he could go without his whole entourage, and so this fellow asked his neighbors, the king's parents, if he could step in for just a moment when the king was there just to say the blessing.  

One night he gets a knock on his door at 2:00 AM and is told the king is there and to come.  He gets up, wakes his 12 year old son, and they go.  They bow to the king, and the man and his son say the bracha.  As they are about to leave, the king asks the man why he woke up his son and brought him along.  The man answered that his son will be bar mitzvah soon, and so he wants to train him to fulfill the mitzvah of honoring the king with this bracha.  When the king heard that, he took out his checkbook and wrote out a check for a $50,000 bar mitzvah present.  The man was a bit taken aback and said to the king that it was totally unnecessary, and if he wanted to give a gift, a check of a few dollars would suffice.  The king responded that although the man said the bracha on malchus, he obviously doesn't understand what malchus means.  A king doesn't write a check for $10 like an ordinary person.  $50,000 is the minimum gift for a king.  Malchus operates on a different scale.

Said R' Zilberstein: We are standing on the threshold of chodesh Elul.  We are getting ready to approach the King of all Kings.  If a melech basar v'dam won't write a check for a petty amount when he wants to give, kal v'chomer that the Melech of all Melachim who wants so much to be able to give us mi'tuvo v'chasdo will not write us a check for a petty amount.  

Don't daven for petty things.  The King is ready to give.  We just have to ask and to be ready to receive.

2) We have in our parsha the mitzvah of tzedaka and the mitzvah of aliya la'regel. The gemara (Pesachim 8) tells us  הָאוֹמֵר סֶלַע זוֹ לִצְדָקָה בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיִּחְיֶה בְּנִי אוֹ שֶׁאֶהְיֶה בֶּן הָעוֹלָם הַבָּא.  Rashi explains: בדבר זה ולא אמרינן שלא לשמה עושה אלא קיים מצות בוראו שצוהו לעשות צדקה ומתכוין אף להנאת עצמו שיזכה בה לעולם הבא או שיחיו בניו.  The extra kavanah that tzedaka should serve as a merit so that one's son should live or that one should get olam ha'ba does not diminish from the main kavanah l'shem mitzvah.  

Tosfos is bothered by why this does not amount to serving Hashem al menas l'kabel pras.  Tos answers that when a person pledges with an al menas... condition, they do so knowing that their request may not be fulfilled, and in their mind and heart they are prepared to give anyway. I saw one of the Moroccon chachamim, R' Yaakov ben Shabbat, quoted a different answer.  He suggested that the tnai of al menas is problematic only if the basic mitzvah of tzedaka is being done on a conditional basis.  However, if one is giving above and beyond what is required, there is no issue.

He reads these answers into the pasuk נָתוֹן תִּתֵּן לוֹ וְלֹא⁠ יֵרַע לְבָבְךָ בְּתִתְּךָ לוֹ כִּי בִּגְלַל הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה יְבָרֶכְךָ ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ בְּכׇל⁠ מַעֲשֶׂךָ וּבְכֹל מִשְׁלַח יָדֶךָ (15:10)  The first part of the pasuk נָתוֹן תִּתֵּן means we are not just talking about someone who gives the minimum to fulfill the mitzvah, נָתוֹן, but someone giving more than required, hence the double language, נָתוֹן תִּתֵּן.  Secondly, the pasuk is telling us that when you give, even if you don't get what you want, don't show regrets - לֹא⁠ יֵרַע לְבָבְךָ בְּתִתְּךָ לוֹ.  If you meet those conditions, then your giving can be כִּי בִּגְלַל הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה יְבָרֶכְךָ ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ בְּכׇל⁠ מַעֲשֶׂךָ, for the sake of receiving the bracha that you want and need.  Otherwise, beware of conditions.

On the very next amud the gemara writes with respect to aliya la'regel אָמַר רַבִּי אָבִין בַּר רַב אַדָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק מִפְּנֵי מָה אֵין פֵּירוֹת גִּינּוֹסַר בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יְהוּ עוֹלֵי רְגָלִים אוֹמְרִים אִלְמָלֵא לֹא עָלִינוּ אֶלָּא לֶאֱכוֹל פֵּירוֹת גִּינּוֹסַר בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם דַּיֵּינוּ נִמְצֵאת עֲלִיָּיה שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ.  Hashem deliberately did not make the fruits of Yerushalayim extra delicious because otherwise people would make aliya la'regel just to eat the fruits and not for the sake of the mitzvah.  So what?  If the shelo lishma of בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיִּחְיֶה בְּנִי אוֹ שֶׁאֶהְיֶה בֶּן הָעוֹלָם הַבָּא does not detract from the mitzvah of tzedaka, why should making aliya la'regel for the sake of enjoying the fruit detract from the mitzvah?  

R' Shteinman answered that the bracha that comes from the mitzvah of tzedaka is part of the outcome that Hashem guarantees from the mitzvah.  Therefore, having that in mind does not detract from the lishma.  However, eating fruit is not part of what the Torah says the outcome of aliya la'regel should be.  It is merely a side benefit of the trip.  In that case, having that side benefit in mind diminishes from the mitzvah itself.

Shem miShmuel in the introduction to Eglei Tal discusses whether the enjoyment one gets from learning detracts from the lishma of the mitzvah.  His answers is very similar to R' Shteinman's sevara.  Enjoying one's learning is part and parcel of the process of study.  It is an inherent benefit and outcome of doing the mitzvah, not a side point.  Therefore, it does not diminish the lishma of learning.

ir ha'nidachas -- a sum greater than its parts

The Ramban in this upcoming week's parsha quotes a machlokes between himself and R' Sadya Gaon whether a beis din of 23 is required for the kabbalas eidus in capital cases, or whether the b"d of 23 is required just for the psak and punishment, but the kabbalas eidus can even be done in the b"d of 3.  Do you need the same # of judges for kabbalas eidus as you need to try the case?  

The Minchas Chinuch raises a question on Ramban from the parsha of ir ha'nidachas that we read this past week.  When there are number of cases of idolatry in the city, b"d first sits in judgment of each case as if it was a din on an individual.  After they figure out that it's not just isolated individuals, but it's the majority of the city that is guilty of idolatry, the case is moved to b"d ha'gadol of 71 (Sanhedrin 112) to judge as an ir ha'nidachas.  If kabbalas eidus always has to be done in a court that has the same # of judges as those that will try the case, why is the kabbalas ha'eidus that was originally done in courts of 23 sufficient for ir ha'nidachas?  Shouldn't it require 71 dayanim from the get-go? 

Yesh lachkor whether a city is just a collection of individuals, or whether a city is a new collective unit?  Is the whole greater than the sum of its parts (same chakira with respect to definition of a tzibur)?  

The M.C. treats ir ha'nidachas as a city where, if there were 100 individuals living there, for example, we have 51 dinei torah going on against the population, and those case have to be transferred to a higher court of b"d ha'gadol.  But it could be that what is transferred to b"d ha'gadol is not 51 cases, but rather 1 case, a case against the entity of the city.  (I'm not sure, but it sounds like this is what R' Shmuel Rozovski quoted here means.)  

In the parsha sheet based on the chiddushim of R' Avrohom Genochovski z"l this past week there was a discussion of a question raised by the Chasam Sofer (I wrote about it 10+ years ago as well): since the children as well as the adults of of an ir ha'nidachat are killed, why isn't the testimony against them considered עדות שׁאי אתה יכול להזימה?  After all, we cannot inflict parallel punishment on an eid zomem and kill his children, because, as we learn in first sugya in Makos, לו - ולו לזרעו?  

Here too, the answer could be that the eidim who come to testify are testifying against individual idolaters.  The reason the children of an ir ha'nidachas are killed is because beis din ha'gadol has its din torah against the city as whole -- a whole greater than the sum of dinei torah against its individuals -- and the punishment that applies to the city extends to the children living there as well.

We once discussed the shitas haRambam that seems to say that an ir ha'nidachas can do teshuvah.  Since when can a person simply do teshuvah to get out of misas b"d?  It could be that what the Rambam means is that the city as a whole loses its status of ir ha'nidachas if enough people do teshuvah, but the individual idolaters who comprise most of the city will still be chayav misas b"d for their actions.

enlarging one's boundaries

The simple reading of the pasuk that allows for eating meat for pleasure and not only meat offered as korbanos, כִּֽי־יִרְחַ֨ק מִמְּךָ֜ הַמָּק֗וֹם אֲשֶׁ֨ר יִבְחַ֜ר ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ לָשׂ֣וּם שְׁמ֣וֹ שָׁם֒ וְזָבַחְתָּ֞ מִבְּקָרְךָ֣ וּמִצֹּֽאנְךָ֗ אֲשֶׁ֨ר נָתַ֤ן ה׳ לְךָ֔ כַּאֲשֶׁ֖ר צִוִּיתִ֑ךָ וְאָֽכַלְתָּ֙ בִּשְׁעָרֶ֔יךָ בְּכֹ֖ל אַוַּ֥ת נַפְשֶֽׁךָ, is that it's a concession of sorts, a bdieved.  Ideally, meat should be consumed only in the context of offering a korban in the mishkan or mikdash.  However, unlike in the midbar when the entire nation camped around the Mishkan and could easily bring korbanos at any time, in Eretz Yisrael people will live further away from the Mikdash, from the spiritual merkaz, and could not do so.  Unless the majority of the nation were to become vegetarians, there had to be a mechanism to allow for meat without being able to offer the animal as a korban.

That this is not the ideal is clearly the position of Netziv. Rashi already takes note of the seeming repitition of  כִּֽי־יַרְחִיב֩ ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ אֶֽת־גְּבֻלְךָ֮ and the following pasuk of כִּֽי־יִרְחַ֨ק מִמְּךָ֜ הַמָּק֗וֹם and suggests that the second pasuk refers to the expansion of physical boundaries of the land while the first refers to the expansion of the wealth of the population, allowing more people to want meat and to enjoy meat.   Netziv, however, writes that כִּֽי־יִרְחַ֨ק מִמְּךָ֜ הַמָּק֗וֹם alludes to spiritual, not physical distance.   ריחוק המעלה, שאינך יכול לעמוד בהר ה׳ ולאכול משולחן גבוה.  The ideal is to be close to the makom mikdash, eating korbanos.  Since not everyone can live on the spiritual level demanded by close proximity to the mikdash, we have hilchos shechita to allow meat to be eaten anywhere.

You get a very different perspective in the Midrash, which has a long series of stories, the first of which is as follows:

כִּי יַרְחִיב ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ  אֶת גְּבֻלְךָ – זֶה שֶׁאָמַר הַכָּתוּב (משלי י״ח:ט״ז): מַתָּן אָדָם יַרְחִיב לוֹ וְלִפְנֵי גְדֹלִים יַנְחֶנּוּ. מַהוּ מַתָּן אָדָם יַרְחִיב לוֹ, מַעֲשֶׂה בְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ שֶׁיָּצְאוּ לִגְבוֹת לְעֵסֶק מִצְווֹת רַבּוֹתֵינוּ, הָלְכוּ לְחֵילָתָהּ שֶׁל אַנְטוֹכִיָּא, וְהָיָה שָׁם אָדָם אֶחָד וְהָיָה נִקְרָא אַבָּא יוּדָן, וְהָיָה לָמוּד לִתֵּן לְרַבּוֹתֵינוּ בְּיַד רְחָבָה, נַעֲשָׂה אוֹתוֹ אַבָּא יוּדָן עָנִי, רָאָה רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ שֶׁהָלְכוּ לִגְבוֹת שָׁם, וְהִטְמִין עַצְמוֹ מִפְּנֵיהֶם וְעָלָה לְבֵיתוֹ, וְעָשָׂה יוֹם וּשְׁנַיִם וְלֹא יָרַד לַשּׁוּק, אָמְרָה לוֹ אִשְׁתּוֹ מִפְּנֵי מָה לֹא יָרַדְתָּ לַשּׁוּק, הֲרֵי שְׁנֵי יָמִים, אָמַר לָהּ רַבּוֹתֵינוּ בָּאוּ לִגְבוֹת לְעֵסֶק מִצְווֹת עֲמֵלֵי תּוֹרָה, וְאֵין סִפֵּק בְּיָדִי לִתֵּן לָהֶם, וַאֲנִי מִתְבַּיֵּשׁ לֵירֵד לַשּׁוּק. אִשְׁתּוֹ שֶׁהָיְתָה אוֹהֶבֶת אֶת הַמִּצְווֹת אָמְרָה לוֹ, לֹא נִשְׁתַּיֵּר לָנוּ שָׂדֶה אֶחָת, מְכֹר חֶצְיָהּ וְתֵן אוֹתָהּ לָהֶן. הָלַךְ וְעָשָׂה כֵן, מָכַר אוֹתָהּ חֲצִי שָׂדֶה בַּחֲמִשָּׁה זְהוּבִים וְנָתַן אוֹתָן לְרַבּוֹתֵינוּ, וְאָמַר לָהֶן הִתְפַּלְּלוּ עָלָי, הִתְפַּלְּלוּ עָלָיו וְאָמְרוּ לוֹ הַמָּקוֹם יְמַלֵּא חֶסְרוֹנֶךָ. הָלְכוּ לָהֶן רַבּוֹתֵינוּ לִגְבוֹת בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר, אוֹתוֹ אַבָּא יוּדָן חָרַשׁ בַּחֲצִי שָׂדֶה, וּמָצָא שָׁם סִימָא גְדוֹלָה וְנַעֲשָׂה עָשִׁיר יוֹתֵר מִמַּה שֶּׁהָיָה קֹדֶם, עַד שֶׁרַבּוֹתֵינוּ חוֹזְרִין עָבְרוּ בְּאוֹתוֹ מָקוֹם, אָמְרוּ לְאֶחָד חַיֶּיךָ הַעֲמִידֵנוּ עִם אַבָּא יוּדָן, אָמַר לָהֶם אוֹתוֹ הָאִישׁ, וּמִי יָכוֹל לַעֲמֹד, עִם הַמֶּלֶךְ וְלֹא עִמּוֹ. אָמְרוּ לוֹ אֵין אָנוּ מְבַקְּשִׁין אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹא יֵדַע שֶׁעָבַרְנוּ כָּאן וְלֹא שָׁאַלְנוּ אֶת שְׁלוֹמוֹ. יָדַע אַבָּא יוּדָן וּבָא אֶצְלָם וְנָתַן לָהֶם אֶלֶף זְהוּבִים, אָמַר לָהֶם עָשְׂתָה תְּפִלַּתְכֶם פֵּרוֹת, אָמְרוּ לוֹ אַף אָנוּ הָיִינוּ יוֹדְעִים בְּמַעֲשֶׂיךָ הַטּוֹבִים וְעָשִׂינוּ אוֹתְךָ רֹאשׁ פֶּרֶק, קָרְאוּ עָלָיו רַבּוֹתֵינוּ: מַתָּן אָדָם יַרְחִיב לוֹ וְלִפְנֵי גְדוֹלִים יַנְחֶנּוּ.

Upon which the Midrash comments that you don't need the story to learn the lesson that the mitzvah generates reward, as it can be learned from our parsha, from the smichut of the heter for meat with the previous mitzvah to support the Levi, i.e. to give charity:

אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּהוּ מַה לִּי לְמָקוֹם אַחֵר לְמֹד מִמְקוֹמוֹ, מַה כְּתִיב לְמַעְלָה (דברים י״ב:י״ט): הִשָּׁמֶר לְךָ פֶּן תַּעֲזֹב אֶת הַלֵּוִי, וְאַחַר כָּךְ: כִּי יַרְחִיב ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ אֶת גְּבֻלְךָ כַּאֲשֶׁר דִּבֶּר לָךְ.

The Midrash goes on to explain ה׳ מַתִּיר אֲסוּרִים as referring to this allowance to eat meat, אַף לְהַלָּן אָסַר בְּשַׂר תַּאֲוָה וְכָאן הִתִּירוֹ לָהֶן, מִנַּיִן (דברים י״ב:ט״ו): רַק בְּכָל אַוַּת נַפְשְׁךָ תִּזְבַּח וְאָכַלְתָּ בָשָׂר.  

According to Chazal, we are not talking about a b'dieved situation, but rather a positive reward for doing the right thing.

What is the midash k'neged midah?  What is the relationship between giving charity and the reward of a steak dinner?

What is the nekudash ha'machlokes here between the pshat and the derash?  How can moving away from the Mikdash, moving away from korbanos-centered eating, be something to applaud?

Lastly, what exactly is the reward?  Is it the כִּֽי־יַרְחִיב֩ ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ אֶֽת־גְּבֻלְךָ֮, the expansion of the borders, as implied by the first Midrash's link to the pasuk מַתָּן אָדָם יַרְחִיב לוֹ, or is it the allowance for meat, as implied by the second Midrash's reference to ה׳ מַתִּיר אֲסוּרִים?  Or to put it another way, is the expansion of borders the reward, and the desire for meat an outgrowth of prosperity, or is the reward the steak dinner, and the expansion of the borders and the prosperity just a heichi timtzeh to set the stage, since, as Rashi writes, לימדה תורה דרך ארץ שלא יתאווה אדם לאכול בשר אלא מתוך רחבת ידים ועושר?

What the Midrash is doing is flipping the Netziv's approach on its head.  If the mountain will not come to Muhammad, then Muhammad must go to the mountain.  If you can't come to the Mikdash to offer korbanos, then the solution is not necessarily a b'dieved of meat without Mikdash.  The ideal solution is to bring the Mikdash to the meat, if not in the physical sense, then at least in the spiritual sense.

Both the Midrash and the pshat/Netziv use the redundancy of כִּֽי־יַרְחִיב֩ and כִּֽי־יִרְחַ֨ק as a way to address the conflict between the desire to have meat and the difficulty of being so far from the Mikdash, but they do it in opposite ways.  Netziv places the focus on כִּֽי־יִרְחַ֨ק, on the spiritual distance from Mikdash, and sees having meat as a b'dieved.  The Midrash places the focus on כִּֽי־יַרְחִיב֩ and reads it as spiritual expansion -- enlarging the borders of what we can make holy -- thereby allowing one can have one's spirituality and eat that steak too.  The Sefas Emes writes on  בְּכׇל־אַוַּ֥ת נַפְשְׁךָ֖ תֹּאכַ֥ל בָּשָֽׂר that we read in krias shema every day that we have to love Hashem בּכל לבבך ובכל נפשׁך.  Bring that to the table.  Your eating should be and can be done בְּכׇל־אַוַּ֥ת נַפְשְׁךָ֖, infused and animated by your love for Hashem -- and not be a contradiction to it. 

In the story quoted, the poor man who lost his wealth thought he could no longer give charity.  What did his wife tell him -- and parenthetically, is this not the role of an eishel chayil?  Expand your thinking; reconsider what you think your limits are and go beyond them.  You can give something.  And so the man did, and was rewarded.  That's כִּֽי־יַרְחִיב֩ ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ אֶֽת־גְּבֻלְךָ֮.  Not in a physical sense, but rather in a spiritual sense.  ה׳ מַתִּיר אֲסוּרִים because you are מַתִּיר אֲסוּרִים, releasing yourself from the mental bonds that held you in check and prevented your growth.  That's the midah k'neged midah here.  It's not the piece of steak which is the reward, but it's the ability to enlarge one's spiritual boundaries that the piece of steak, when eaten with this perspective, represents.  

protecting the creditor as well as the debtor

Even though the superficial reading of the parsha of shemitas kesafim sounds like a windfall for borrowers who have overextended themselves and need debt relief, in fact, the Torah is equally concerned with protecting the creditor from financial loss.

Rashi writes that there seems to be a contradiction between the statement (15:4):

 אֶ֕פֶס כִּ֛י לֹ֥א יִֽהְיֶה־בְּךָ֖ אֶבְי֑וֹן כִּֽי־בָרֵ֤ךְ יְבָֽרֶכְךָ֙ יְהֹוָ֔ה בָּאָ֕רֶץ אֲשֶׁר֙ הֹ׳ אֱלֹקיךָ נֹֽתֵן־לְךָ֥ נַחֲלָ֖ה לְרִשְׁתָּֽהּ׃

 and the statement a little later in the parsha (15:11):

כִּ֛י לֹא־יֶחְדַּ֥ל אֶבְי֖וֹן מִקֶּ֣רֶב הָאָ֑רֶץ

It's clear from the question that Rashi read the pasuk אֶ֕פֶס כִּ֛י לֹ֥א יִֽהְיֶה־בְּךָ֖ אֶבְי֑וֹן as referring to those in need.  Ibn Ezra explains (see Seforno, Malbi"M, Abarnanel) understood the pasuk that way as well, and writes that even though the Torah commands that all loans be forgiven during shemitah, potentially wiping out lenders, the Torah wants to reassure:

דע כי זה שצויתיך: שלא תגש לאחיך (דברים ט״ו:ב׳), אין צורך אם היו כל ישראל או רובם שומעין לקול השם, אז לא יהיה בך אביון שהוא צריך אליך להיותך מלוה אותו.

So long as most people are doing mitzvos, there will not be that many people in debt or in need with outstanding loans, and so lenders won't suffer extraordinary losses.  

Netziv, however, read the pasuk as referring to the lender:

שלא תגרום השמטת כספים שתהיה (אתה) אביון,

He does not mean there is some supernatural protection against falling into poverty as a result of forgiving debt, but rather he sees this as an encouragement to Beis Din to institute takanot like pruzbul that protect creditors.  כי ברך יברכך ה׳, G-d wants to bring them blessing as well, not destroy the economy or their livelihood.

where were Har Grizim and Har Eival

 וְהָיָ֗ה כִּ֤י יְבִֽיאֲךָ֙ הֹ׳ אֱלֹקיךָ אֶל־הָאָ֕רֶץ אֲשֶׁר־אַתָּ֥ה בָא־שָׁ֖מָּה לְרִשְׁתָּ֑הּ וְנָתַתָּ֤ה אֶת־הַבְּרָכָה֙ עַל־הַ֣ר גְּרִזִ֔ים וְאֶת־הַקְּלָלָ֖ה עַל־הַ֥ר עֵיבָֽל׃

הֲלֹא־הֵ֜מָּה בְּעֵ֣בֶר הַיַּרְדֵּ֗ן אַֽחֲרֵי֙ דֶּ֚רֶךְ מְב֣וֹא הַשֶּׁ֔מֶשׁ בְּאֶ֙רֶץ֙ הַֽכְּנַעֲנִ֔י הַיֹּשֵׁ֖ב בָּעֲרָבָ֑ה מ֚וּל הַגִּלְגָּ֔ל אֵ֖צֶל אֵלוֹנֵ֥י מֹרֶֽה׃

You would think that once Bn"Y crossed the Yarden they could just ask for directions, but maybe anticipating the male reluctance to do such things, the Torah has to spell out in exacting detail just where Har Grizim and Har Eival stood.

The chapter then continues and ends

 כִּ֤י אַתֶּם֙ עֹבְרִ֣ים אֶת־הַיַּרְדֵּ֔ן לָבֹא֙ לָרֶ֣שֶׁת אֶת־הָאָ֔רֶץ אֲשֶׁר הֹ׳ אֱלֹקיכֶ֖ם נֹתֵ֣ן לָכֶ֑ם וִֽירִשְׁתֶּ֥ם אֹתָ֖הּ וִֽישַׁבְתֶּם־בָּֽהּ׃

וּשְׁמַרְתֶּ֣ם לַעֲשׂ֔וֹת אֵ֥ת כׇּל־הַֽחֻקִּ֖ים וְאֶת־הַמִּשְׁפָּטִ֑ים אֲשֶׁ֧ר אָנֹכִ֛י נֹתֵ֥ן לִפְנֵיכֶ֖ם הַיּֽוֹם

Repeating again that Bn"Y will be entering the land to conquer it, but this time adding that we will be crossing the Yarden, another unnecessary detail that could have been mentioned earlier, before וְהָיָ֗ה כִּ֤י יְבִֽיאֲךָ֙ הֹ׳ אֱלֹקיךָ אֶל־הָאָ֕רֶץ אֲשֶׁר־אַתָּ֥ה בָא־שָׁ֖מָּה לְרִשְׁתָּ֑הּ

There is a strange gemara in Sanhedrin 44 that faults Yehoshua for delaying the giving of brachos on Har Grizim and Har Eival the time it takes to travel 60 mil:

 ויאמר ה' אל יהושע קום לך דריש ר' שילא א"ל הקב"ה שלך קשה משלהם אני אמרתי והיה בעברכם את הירדן תקימו ואתם ריחקתם ס' מיל 

Tos on the spot asks the obvious question: Our parsha gives directions to the mountains to give the brachos on.  Yehoshua had no choice other than to wait until they got there before fulfilling Hashem's command!

In a nutshell (I am oversimplifying), Tos answers that there is a Har Grizim and Har Eival location that is close to the Yarden, and one that is further away.  Yehoshua erred in going to the further one rather than giving the brachos and kelalos at the closer one.

Chasam Sofer suggests a different answer, one that also resolves the difficulties in the pesukim.  There is only one set of mountains called Har Grizim and Har Eival.  However, whether it is one day's journey from the Yarden or not depends.

 כִּ֤י אַתֶּם֙ עֹבְרִ֣ים אֶת־הַיַּרְדֵּ֔ן לָבֹא֙ לָרֶ֣שֶׁת אֶת־הָאָ֔רֶץ, if YOU cross the Yarden of your own accord, intent on the conquest of Eretz Yisrael, committed to Torah and mitzvos, then וּשְׁמַרְתֶּ֣ם לַעֲשׂ֔וֹת אֵ֥ת כׇּל־הַֽחֻקִּ֖יםשְׁמַרְתֶּ֣ם לַעֲשׂ֔וֹת אֵ֥ת כׇּל־הַֽחֻקִּ֖ים וְאֶת־הַמִּשְׁפָּטִ֑ים אֲשֶׁ֧ר אָנֹכִ֛י נֹתֵ֥ן לִפְנֵיכֶ֖ם הַיּֽוֹם you will fulfill the chok and mishpat of giving the brachos and kelalos immediately, that same day.  You will get to Har Grizim and Har Eival, even if they are 60 mil away, right away.  

On the other hand, וְהָיָ֗ה כִּ֤י יְבִֽיאֲךָ֙ הֹ׳ אֱלֹקיךָ אֶל־הָאָ֕רֶץ, if Hashem is the one bringing you into the land willy nilly, not because of your zechuyos, not because you are motivated, but in spite of the fact that you don't really deserve it, then הֲלֹא־הֵ֜מָּה בְּעֵ֣בֶר הַיַּרְדֵּ֗ן אַֽחֲרֵי֙ דֶּ֚רֶךְ מְב֣וֹא הַשֶּׁ֔מֶשׁ בְּאֶ֙רֶץ֙ הַֽכְּנַעֲנִ֔י הַיֹּשֵׁ֖ב בָּעֲרָבָ֑ה מ֚וּל הַגִּלְגָּ֔ל אֵ֖צֶל אֵלוֹנֵ֥י מֹרֶֽה׃, you have a long way to shlep to get to those mountains.

It is not the 60 mil delay per se that the gemara is faulting Yehoshua for, but rather it is what those 60 mil represented -- a lack readiness and motivation to fulfill the dvar Hashem, for otherwise, it would have been a minor one day journey (see Chasam Sofer d"h v'haya because I am simplifying a lot.)

"this is still the best route"

1) Sefer Devarim is the mussar talk Moshe gave to Klal Yisrael before his death.  "R'ei anochi nosein lifneichem bracha u'klalah" is not something to cheer about; it's part of the mussar.  A little kid needs a lollipop as a motivation to do something he may not like.  He doesn't need the lollipop to go and play because that's something he enjoys.  If we loved avodas Hashem, why would we need brachos and klalos to motivate us to do the right thing?

2) Yesterday I was on the highway and was using Google Maps for directions and it unfortunately multiple times gave me messages like "30 minute delay ahead, but this is still the best route."  (I used Waze to check if it really was the best route -- am I paranoid for thinking that the machine just keeps saying "this is still the best route" because it wants to preserve its own credibility even when there is a better way to go?)  

My wife said that we were getting this message in Elul because it is telling us mussar.  So many times in life you hit slowdowns, bumps in the road, and you think that maybe if you change course and veer off in one direction or the other things will be better, but it's usually not true.  Despite the slowdowns, Hashem put us on what is "still the best route" to get us where we need to go. 

navi sheker -- issur gavra or cheftza

There is a din that a navi cannot add any mitzvos to the Torah.  Therefore, if a navi tells us that G-d commanded a new mitzvah, we know he is lying and we should not believe him. Ramban has a safeik whether such a navi would be chayav misah as a navi sheker or not (13:4):

ונראה, שאם מתנבא בשם י״י לצוות מצוה שיחדש, כגון שהיה במקרא מגלה (בבלי מגילה י״ד.) שאינו חייב מיתה, אלא שאין לנו לשמוע אליו, דכתיב: אלה המצות (ויקרא כ״ז:ל״ד) – אין נביא רשאי לחדש בהן דבר מעתה. ואולי כיון שלא נאמין לו, הנה הוא נביא השקר ומיתתו בחנק.

What's the safeik?  If the navi is telling us nevuah that cannot possibly be the dvar Hashem, why would he not be chayav as a navi sheker?

In next week's parsha, where the Torah spells out the onesh misah for the navi sheker, the Torah tells us (18:21-22):

וְכִ֥י תֹאמַ֖ר בִּלְבָבֶ֑ךָ אֵיכָה֙ נֵדַ֣ע אֶת־הַדָּבָ֔ר אֲשֶׁ֥ר לֹא־דִבְּר֖וֹ ה׳

 אֲשֶׁר֩ יְדַבֵּ֨ר הַנָּבִ֜יא בְּשֵׁ֣ם ה׳  וְלֹֽא־יִהְיֶ֤ה הַדָּבָר֙ וְלֹ֣א יָבֹ֔א ה֣וּא הַדָּבָ֔ר אֲשֶׁ֥ר לֹא־דִבְּר֖וֹ ה׳ בְּזָדוֹן֙ דִּבְּר֣וֹ הַנָּבִ֔יא לֹ֥א תָג֖וּר מִמֶּֽנּוּ׃

How do we know whether the navi is a liar or not?  The Torah tells us that the navi will give a sign or a prophecy that will fail to come true and that will give the game away.

R' Gifter quotes R' Ahron Shechter, R"Y of Chaim Berlin, as explaining that this is the Ramban's safeik.  Maybe the navi is chayav misah only where you can point to empirical evidence that proves he is a liar -- the sign he promised failed to materialize; the miracle he promised failed to happen.  But maybe in a case where the navi invents a mitzvah, where it's only because we have a din that tells us that this is something a navi cannot do that we know he is lying, he would not be chayav.

I would like to suggest another sevara.  Minchas Chinuch asks why any time a person transgresses any issur he/she is not also liable for the issur of violating the words of a navi, given that Moshe Rabeinu was a navi.  R' Soloveitchik answered that there is a difference between the cheftzah of nevuah and the cheftza of Torah.  Moshe the gavra was a navi, but the commands he gave (or at least 613 of them) have the status of Torah, not nevuah; they are qualitatively in a different, unique category unlike other prophecies (see this post.)

When a navi tries to introduce a new mitzvah, he altering the cheftza shel Torah, not just saying false words of prophecy.  Perhaps the safeik of Ramban is whether the issur of navi sheker is an issur on the gavra, in which case no matter what the prophecy is, the navi is chayav, or whether the issur navi sheker is one of presenting a false cheftza shel nevuah, in which case changing the cheftza shel Torah is a different matter entirely.

why mourning for a parent extends beyond shloshim

1)Hard to believe that Elul is upon us already!  The Targum on the pasuk שְׁלַח־לְךָ֣ אֲנָשִׁ֗ים וְיָתֻ֙רוּ֙ אֶת־אֶ֣רֶץ explains the word וְיָתֻ֙רוּ֙ as וִיאַלְּלוּן -- the same letters as Elul.  The spies were sent to investigate the land and see what's what.  R' Schwadron in Techeiles Mordechai quotes from the Belzer Rebbe that this is our mission in Elul -- to investigate ourselves and see where we are holding.   The L Rebbe in HaYom Yom for 27 Av calls Elul   חדש החשבון. Just like a businessman needs to take stock and asses the the direction of the business, what is working and what is not working, so too in avodah and person has to do the same  דעל ידי הכנה טובה זו.. זוכים לשנה טובה ומתוקה בגשמיות ורוחניות.

2)  בָּנִ֣ים אַתֶּ֔ם לה׳ אלקיכם לֹ֣א תִתְגֹּֽדְד֗וּ וְלֹֽא־תָשִׂ֧ימוּ קׇרְחָ֛ה בֵּ֥ין עֵינֵיכֶ֖ם לָמֵֽת׃

כִּ֣י עַ֤ם קָדוֹשׁ֙ אַתָּ֔ה  לה׳ אלקיך

Is the reason for the issur of lo tisgodidu because בָּנִ֣ים אַתֶּ֔ם לה׳ אלקיכם or because כִּ֣י עַ֤ם קָדוֹשׁ֙ אַתָּ֔ה?

Simple pshat in the pasuk is that lo tisgodidu is an issur of cutting oneself out of grief while in mourning, but Chazal derive a secondary meaning and explain that it prohibits having different minhagim in the same community.  Maharal, as we once discussed, shows how these two issurim are related.  

Most of the meforshim explain that בָּנִ֣ים אַתֶּ֔ם לה׳ אלקיכם is the reason the  issur of cutting oneself, either as Rashi explains לפי שאתם בניו של מקום, ואתם ראויים להיות נאים ולא גדודים ומקורחים, or like Seforno explains  שאין ראוי להראות תכלית הדאגה והצער על הקרוב המת, כשנשאר קרוב נכבד ממנו במעלה ובתקות טוב. לפיכך ״אתם״ ״בנים לה׳⁠ ⁠״, שהוא אביכם קיים, but that begs the question what's כִּ֣י עַ֤ם קָדוֹשׁ֙ אַתָּ֔ה doing here.  See Ramban, Ibn Ezra.

Netziv suggests that the two reasons parallel the two issurim.   בָּנִ֣ים אַתֶּ֔ם לה׳ אלקיכם is why we should avoid having different minhagim in one community.  Because we are all "banim" and children of Hashem, we should behave harmoniously and each person not follow a different path (see Ksav Sofer as well).   כִּ֣י עַ֤ם קָדוֹשׁ֙ אַתָּ֔ה  לה׳ אלקיך is the reason to not harm onself in an outburst of grief like the anccient pagans used to do.  

In the sefer Meged Yesharim, R' Sorotzkin relates that he heard that when RYBS was sitting shiva for his wife, R' Hutner and R' Pinchas Teitz came to be menachem avel and the three began to discuss why it is that when a father or mother r"l passes a way, there is a full year of aveilus, but for other relatives the aveilus is limited to 30 days.  Shouldn't you expect the opposite?  Usually a parent is elderly, and so it's not such a shock when their time comes, but for other relatives, the same is not true.  Therefore, wouldn't it make more sense to allow for a more extended period of grief/mourning for the younger relative and less time for the elderly parent?

R' Hutner answered when one loses a parent, one has lost a generation that was closer to Sinai, and that is cause for greater aveilus. Rav Teitz answered that other relatives are replaceable -- one can have another child, find another spouse, one's parents can have more children.  A parent, however, can never be replaced.  R' Soloveitchik himself answered that davka because the death of a parent is the more natural occurrence, Chazal allow mourning for a year.  When death strikes a younger person, there is greater likelihood of the relatives being overcome by grief -- exactly what our pasuk warns against -- and so Chazal curtailed the aveilus to avoid that danger.  By a parent, where the death is expected, there is no such danger.  R' Sorotzkin suggests his own sevara as well, ayen sham.   

how could Yeshayahu haNavi resolve a machlokes Amoraim?

The second pasuk in the haftarah describes

שַׂמְתִּ֚י כַּֽדְכֹד֙ שִׁמְשֹׁתַ֔יִךְ

how the windows (according to most meforshim; see Rashi,) of Yerushalayim will be made of "kodkod."  Ibn Ezra writes that this word "kodkod"  אין רע למלת כדכד במקרא but from the context it appears to be some type of precious stone.

The gemara (Baba Basra 75a) brings an aggada to explain this strange word:

שמתי כדכד שמשותיך א"ר שמואל בר נחמני פליגי תרי מלאכי ברקיעא גבריאל ומיכאל ואמרי לה תרי אמוראי במערבא ומאן אינון יהודה וחזקיה בני רבי חייא חד אמר שוהם וחד אמר ישפה אמר להו הקב"ה להוי כדין וכדין ושעריך לאבני אקדח

There was a machlokes Amoraim, or according to a different tradition, a machlokes among the malachaim, what stones to use for the windows: shoham or yashfeh.  Hashem therefore said let it be made like this and like that, "k'dein u'k'dein" = "kodkod" in short.

Tosfos quotes Rabeinu Tam who took out this whole girsa :

ר"ת ל"ג לה ואית דגרסי ומפרשי דקאי אכתוב דלעיל הנני מרביץ בפוך אבניך ויסדתיך בספירים פירוש כדין וכדין היינו פוך וספיר דלעיל

It's not so clear from Tos what was bothering R"T, but Rashbam spells out the difficulty:

 ואע"פ שמקרא זה קדם לבני ר' חייא טובא יש לומר שכך נתנבא ישעיה שכדברי כל המפרשים עתידה להבנות:

The simple reading of the gemara sounds like there is a machlokes Amroraim what to make the windows out of, and Yeshayahu comes and resolves the machlokes "kdein u'kdein." That's impossible -- Yeshayahu lived hundreds of years before these Amoraim!  How could he resolve a machlokes that would happen hundreds of years ahead in the future? 

Rashbam solves the problem by saying that Yeshayahu was aware of the machlokes though nevudah, but R"T chose to remove the whole girsa.

I am bothered by this R"T.  To me it seems obvious that Yeshayahu is not addressing the historical machlokes Amoraim, but rather is addressing himself to the principle behind it.  Maharal in Ch Aggados basically suggests a similar hesber: the Amoraim were not arguing over what the windows were made of, but were arguing over which stone was the better stone.  Yeshayahu described the windows as made of both because there is something to be said for both views.  The same basic idea is articulated very clearly in the introduction to the Chasam Sofer al haTorah as a general principle regarding derush.  How it is possible to suggest, to take one random example, that the disagreement between Moshe and Pharoah boils down to a machlokes Rambam and Raavad -- what did Pharoah know from Rambams and Raavads?  The answer, again, is that the disagreement is over principles, and abstract principles are accessible to all people at all times. 

This presupposes that the disagreement about whether the stones used were shoham or yashfeh is not just a matter of interior design preference, but in fact reflects some deeper principle (maybe R"T did not see it that way?)  Maharal suggests that the disagreement is din vs rachamim.  Many meforshim point out that these two stones were the two stones on the choshen that represent Yosef and Binyamin.  Yosef is rescued from the clutches of Eishes Potifar because he receives a vision of his father = is'aruse dl'eila.  Binyamin is described as "chofeif alav kol ha'yom" wanting to grab back that section of the mizbeiach not built in his portion = isarusa d'letata.  See Shem m'Shmuel 5679. 

every road has thorns

(רְאֵ֗ה אָנֹכִ֛י נֹתֵ֥ן לִפְנֵיכֶ֖ם הַיּ֑וֹם בְּרָכָ֖ה וּקְלָלָֽה(11:26

וְנָתַתָּ֤ה אֶת־הַבְּרָכָה֙ עַל־הַ֣ר גְּרִזִ֔ים וְאֶת־הַקְּלָלָ֖ה עַל־הַ֥ר עֵיבָֽל׃(11:29

It's fascinating that Hashem tells us at the beginning of our parsha that we will be getting a bracha/klala, but the bracha/klala does not actually appear here in our parsha.  You have to wait until Parshas Ki Tavo (27:12 and onward) for the bracha/klala to be spelled out.  We are in effect being told here, "Heads up and get ready -- here's what's coming."  The word "re'ei" usually means not just to look at something, but to contemplate (e.g. see Shmos 31:2 and Seforno, Netziv there).  There is a mitzvah of talmud torah to learn and pay attention to every parsha, but apparently with respect to the parsha of bracha/klala there is a demand for extra hisboninus.

The Midrash at the beginning of the parsha presents a mashal:

משל לזקן שהיה יושב על הדרך, והיו לפניו שתי דרכים: אחת תחילתה קוצים וסופה מישור, ואחת תחילתה מישור וסופה קוצים, והיה יושב בראש שתיהן ומזהיר העוברים, ואומר להם: אף על פי שאתם רואים תחילתה של זו קוצים, לכו בה, שסופה מישור.

וכל מי שהיה חכם שומע לו והיה מהלך בה ומתייגע קמעא. הלך בשלום ובא בשלום.

אבל אותן שלא היו שומעין לו, היו הולכים ונכשלין בסוף.

כך היה משה, פירש לבני ישראל ואמר להם: הרי דרך החיים ודרך המות, ברכה וקללה, ובחרת בחיים למען תחיה אתה וזרעך:

What in the parsha is the Midrash trying to clarify?

In the mashal, there are two paths: one that appears overgrown with thorns, but which down the road will become clear and easy to travel; one that appears easy to travel, but will lead to an impassable, thorn covered end. 

There is no path that is thorn free.

The choice we have in life is not bracha OR klala -- the parsha does not say "bracha OH klala," but rather "bracha U'klala" -- even the path of bracha has thorns in the road.  Life is not meant to be easy.  Even if you make the right choices, you might suffer scratches.  That's part of life in olam ha'zeh -- "asher anochi nosein lifneichem HA'YOM."   

The Ishbitzer goes a step further and writes:

ראה אנכי נתן לפניכם היום ברכה וקללה. היינו בכל מקום שהקב"ה ינחיל טובה לאדם ילבישה בלבוש הנראה כפי ראות העין הפך מהטובה, (וכמו שנתבאר בפ' קרח בפסוק ואשים דברי בפיך), בכדי שעל ידי פעולות האדם שיברר א"ע ויוציא לאור את הטוב מעומק, ועי"ז יקרא יגיע כפיך

Whenever Hashem wants to give a person something good, a bracha, it comes wrapped in a package that looks like klala, the exact opposite.  Bracha U'klala.  Why?  Because the biggest tovah is one that is earned, not received as a free gift.  Everything Hashem gives us is l'tovah, but we have to do the work of recognizing it and seeing it as such.  That's the avodah of "re'ei" -- seeing the tovah at the end of the road in what looks like just another path of thorns.  That's the chiddush of our parsha and why just giving us the bracha/klala in Ki Tavo is not sufficient.

feel good about giving - havtacha or mitzvah?

 Nason titein lo v'lo yeira livavcha...ki biglal ha'davar ha'zeh yivarechicha Hashem Elokecha (15:10)

R' Ben Tzion Aba Shaul questions whether this is a havtacha that if you give, Hashem will see to it that you are taken care of, or whether it it is issur, i.e. you are not permitted to feel bad when you give.  

He quotes from Minchas Chinuch 479:3 that the schar mitzvah Hashem gives is for giving with joy, which implies that this is not a havtacha but a command.

haftarah of shabbos rosh chodesh - 7 nechemta

The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 425) paskens that when rosh chodesh Elul falls on Shabbos we still lein the haftarah "aniya so'ara" of the 7 d'nechemta cycle and not the haftarah of rosh chodesh.  The Rama disagrees and writes that minhag ashkenaz is to read the haftarah of rosh chodesh.

I was wondering what the din should be if you are in a shul that follows minhag ashkenaz but they get mixed up and read aniya so'arah. 

When discussing this halacha over our Shabbos meal I pointed out the reason given by the Mishna Berura for the psak of the Rama: since the haftara of rosh chodesh contains pesukim that refer to the nechama of Yerushalayim, by reading it we in effect cover all our bases -- we cover the theme of nechama, as well as the theme of rosh chodesh.

My wife pointed out that there is another possible reason to lein the haftarah of rosh chodesh: it is more tadir than that of "aniya so'arah."  (We then had a debate whether this is indeed true.)  Indeed, there are poskim who cite this justification as well.

Perhaps my question hinges on which of these two reasons in correct.  According to the M.B.'s reason, the Rama agrees in principle that the chiyuv is to read a haftarah of nechama -- he just holds that if you can cover the extra base of rosh chodesh, why not do so.  B'dieved, I would say that if you read "aniya so'arah" and only covered the theme of nechama, since that is the ikar chiyuv, you are yotzei.  However, if the reason to read the haftarah of rosh chodesh is because of tadir, then that is the real chiyuv -- the chiyuv of reading a haftarah of nechama is pushed off.  You would accomplish nothing even b'dieved by reading "aniya so'arah."

Check the notes in the Dirshu M.B. and they tell you to treat the b'dieved case like any case where you read the wrong haftarah -- you have to correct it and read the right one.  I guess my reasoning is wrong.

makom asher yivchar Hashem -- a player to be named later?

"Lo ta'asun kein l'Hashem Elokeichem" (12:4)  What is the "kein" that we are not supposed to do in our avodas Hashem?  The previous pesukim told us to destroy the altars, the asheirot, the matzeivot from all the many places where idolaters worshipped.   Tzror haMor explains that it is the multiplicity of places and types of worship that the Torah is warning against.  For us, there is one place.  We are one nation, united in one type of avodah directed to one Beis haMikdash.

Speaking of the Beis haMikdash, interestingly it is never mentioned in the parsha.  Instead, the parsha refers to "...ki im el ha'makom asher yivchar Hashem Elokeichem m'kol shivteichem," the place that Hashem chose from among the shevatim.  (12:5)  Again, a few pesukim later, "V'haya ha'makom asher yivchar Hashem..." (12:11)  And again, "Ki im ba'makom asher yivchar Hashem b'achad shevatecha..." (12:14)  There was a mesorah from the days of the Avos as to where the Beis haMikdash would be; Moshe Rabeinu surely knew where it would stand.  Why then not name the place?  Why couch it in terms of a place to be chosen (like saying a player to be named later), as if there was some mystery, some doubt as to where exactly that would be?

I saw in R' Reisman's discussion on the parsha he raises this question and offers an answer and refers to the Kli Yakar who asks it as well. I don't know if R' Reisman has a taste for chassidishe seforim, but the same question is asked by the Tiferes Shlomo as well, and it's his answer that I will leave you with.  Rashi already points out that in 12:5 the Torah refers to the Mikdash coming "m'kol shevatecha," from all the shevatim, but in 12:14 the Torah tells us "b'achad shevatecha," that the Mikdrash was built on the land of only one sheivet.   The Tiferes Shlomo answers that geographically, the land of the Mikdash may have belonged to one sheivet; however, it was the desire for a Mikdash on the part of the all the shevatim that brought it into being -- the "mem" in "m'kol shevatecha" is being used in the sense of "because of."  "Kol zman she'lo hayu ha'retzonos v'hatefilos b'shleimus al binyan Beis haMikdash," writes the Tiferes Shlomo, "Lo haya klal ba'olam ha'makom shel Beis haMikdash."  The Har HaBayis is just a mountain, just a point on a map.  What makes it the makom Mikdash is our desire to have a Mikdash there.  When Moshe Rabeinu was addressing the Jewish people, that desire had not yet come to fruition -- it was still just a place that Hashem will choose, but not yet in existence.  It took all the years of Yehoshua, of the Shoftim, of Shaul, until David haMelech finally brought that desire for a Mikdash to its culmination and the place became a reality. 

In our time yet again, Hashem awaits our tefilos for a Mikdash.  When we arouse that desire though our derishat Tzion, then instead of a point on the map, instead of a mountain with a golden dome travesty on it, we will once again have a makom Mikdash.

be careful with your shabbos candles

After telling us to destroy the altars and asheirot of idolaters and obliterate any trace of avodah zarah, "v'ibadtem es shemam min ha'makom ha'hu," the Torah tells us not to do the same to Hashem, "lo ta'asun kein l'Hashem Elokeichem." (12:4)

It sounds strange -- we need to be told not to go into the mikdash and start smashing things?!

Rashi explains in his first pshat that "lo ta'asun kein" is not speaking about the act of destroying things, but is a continuation of the earlier pasuk which describes the many places in which idolatry was worshipped and needs to be rooted out from -- on the mountains, in the valleys, across the fruited plains (whatever).  Don't worship G-d like that, the Torah tells us.  There is one central place of worship -- a beis ha'mikdash. 

Sefas Emes suggests that "lo ta'asun kein" is a continuation of the end of the pasuk, "v'ibadtem is shemam."  When avodah zarah is destroyed, it is gone and forgotten.  Does anyone worship Zeus on Mt Olympus any more?  There are a lot of crazy people in NY, but I have never heard of anyone who carves little statutes out of wood or stone and then starts bowing down to them.  The avodah zarah is gone and no one even cares.  Klal Yisrael is not like that.  "Lo ta'asun kein" is followed by "...l'shichno tidrishu u'basa shama."  Sefas Emes writes that the pasuk is not talking about when we have a mikdash, when we are living in peace in our land.  It is talking about after the churban, after we have experienced destruction.  We don't forget.  There is no "ibud shemam" by us.  "Im eshkacheich Yerushalayim tishkach y'mini."  We long for the mikdash, we long for avodah.

Rashi has a second pshat in which he explains that the Torah is warning not to do aveiros that will cause the mikdash to be destroyed.

R' Sorotzkin in his Oznayim laTorah asks: the Torah in so many places warns not to do avodah zarah, not to do aveiros chamuros.  These crimes have severe punishments and penalties.  If that's not enough to stop people from violating those issurim, how is telling them that it will cause churban ha'bayis going to make a difference?

Just posted on hebrewbooks.org is a sefer called L'Ma'alah l'Maskil by R' Avraham Yitzchak Kook (the contemporary Rosh Yeshiva in Rechovot).  He relates (p.491-492) that there was a certain R' Mordechai Weinstein who was zocheh to be meshamesh the Chofetz Chaim and who later came to live in Bnei Brak.  R' Mordechai's "thing" was kedushas Shabbos.  One day he hung up fliers in the Lederman shul reminding people to tell their wives to light neiros Shabbos early because otherwise they do not get credit for lighting Shabbos candles and they violate Shabbos.  Apparently in Bnei Brak people are medayek even in the shul announcements.  People came over and asked a kasea: obviously chilul Shabbos is far more severe than missing lighting Shabbos candles.  Why on the sign did R' Mordechai first warn that the women who lit late would not get credit for lighting, and only after that mention chilul Shabbos?

R' Mordechai answered that he had a kabbalah for that specific "nusach" for his sign from the Chofetz Chaim himself years ago.  And he had asked the Chofetz Chaim the same kashe everyone was asking him.  The Chofetz Chaim answered that to the simple, pious women, it was unthinkable to have Shabbos without Shabbos candles.  They did not know from 39 melachos, from zmanin -- they knew from Shabbos lights.  So you have to speak their language.  First, you have to explain that lighting after the zman was not lighting -- it was as good as no Shabbos candles.  After that, after you have their attention, you can mention by-the-way, it's also chilul Shabbos.

To a Jew living b'zman ha'bays, the mikdash was his Shabbos candles.  A Jew might do aveiros galore, but it would have been inconceivable to him for there not be avodah in the mikdash.  You have b'zman ha'zeh, to use R' Sorotzkin's example, Jews who are mechelel everything under the sun, but then they have a baby boy and suddenly want a traditional bris milah (unfortunately even this is growing less common).  This attachment to the mitzvah does not come from logic; it comes from some deep vestigial connection within the Jewish heart and soul. 

The Torah therefore warns that issurim would inevitably take away the mikdash.

I hate to end on a negative note, so let me just throw in a Chasam Sofer: "l'shichno tidrishu v'basa shama," he writes, is a guarantee.  If we are doresh the makom haShechina, then the result will be "u'basa shama," we will be zocheh to get there. 

So we have our work cut out for us. 

 

don't give tzedaka because it's a mitzvah

Last week's post generated some comments in response to my having written that someone who observes mishpatim simply because it's the right think to do still can call on  zechus avos because he/she is doing the right thing.  Since I opened that can of worms, let me continue on the same theme.  R' Simcha Zisel of Kelm makes a striking claim with respect to the mitzvah of tzedaka mentioned in this week's parsha.  It's davka not the person who gives to charity because it's a mitzvah who fulfills tzedaka to its fullest.  Rather, it's the person who empathizes with the poor and gives because he is moved by their needs who fulfills tzedaka to its fullest. 

R' Simcha Zisel sees tzedaka as an extension of v'ahavta l'rei'acha kamocha.  Most of us don't eat because it's a mitzvah -- we eat because we feel hungry.  Says R' Simcha Zisel, treat your fellow Jew in need the same way.  Don't feed your friend because it's a mitzvah.  Feed your friend because you empathize with his pain to such a degree that if he is hungry, you are hungry, and when you are hungry, you eat. 

R' Ya'akov Naiman in his Darkei Musar uses this yesod of R' Simcha Zisel to answer a question posed by the Maharasha.  The gemara in Kesubos (67) relates that Nakdimon ben Gurion was punished for not fulfilling the mitzvah of tzedaka properly.  Asks the gemara: Nakdimon ben Gurion was rich and give a fortune to tzedaka; how is it possible to say he did not fulfill the mitzvah properly?  The gemara gives two answers: 1) as much as he gave, he could have done more; 2) he gave for the kavod of giving.  Maharasha on the spot questions this second answer.  We know that someone who gives charity "al menas she'yichyeh b'ni," with ulterior motives, because he wants the zechus of tzedaka to bring a refuah to his child, is called a tzadik gamur.  So who cares of Nakdimon ben Gurion did it for the kavod!?  He should still go down on the books as a tzadik gamur!

Yes, says R' Naiman, someone who gives with ulterior motives is a tzadik and fulfills a mitzvah -- but that mitzvah is not the mitzvah of tzedaka.  When you giving is motivated by any reason other than empathy, other than truly identifying with the needs of another, that's not true tzedaka. 

The point of the mitzvah of tzedaka is not the ma'aseh nesina -- the act of giving -- but rather it's the chalos in the gavra of becoming a person who is sensitive to the needs of others.
Rashi quotes a derush that the Torah juxtaposes "aser te'aser" with "lo tevaseh g'di b'chaleiv imo" because G-d is telling us that if we don't give ma'aser he will be forced to be "mevashel gedi'im shel tevuah" = cause the grain to rot in its husk before it is fully ripe and ready to harvest.  OK, it's talking about ma'aser, ma'ser sheni, and not tzedaka, but Chazal learn ma'aser kesafim from this pasuk, so derech derush you can give me some leeway and in turn I will give you a tremendous Ishbitzer (from Ne'os Desheh, the Mei HaShiloach's son).  Someone who does not give properly is like that grain rotting in it's husk -- on the outside, everything looks OK, but when you peel back the shell, the husk, there is nothing there on the inside.  A person who lacks empathy, who is not moved by others needs to want to help them, is just an empty shell of a person.   

aseh doche lo ta'aseh

1. Our parsha (16:8) tells us that matzah is eaten for six days; another pasuk tells us it is eaten for seven days.  Rashi (in his first answer) explains that matzah made from chadash can be eaten for the last six days of Pesach, but not on the first day before the korban ha'omer is offered. 

Gur Aryeh writes that Rashi is alluding to the chiddush din quoted in Tosfos (Kiddushin 38) that we do not say that the mitzvas aseh of matzah can be doche the lo ta'aseh of chadash.  Tosfos gives two reasons why not: 1) mitzvas matzah was commanded before matan Torah and therefore has a special status; 2) if you allow a person to eat a k'zayis for the sake of the kiyum mitzvas aseh he might eat more than that, which would not be allowed.  (It sounds like this second answer holds that m'dorasya matzah would be doche chadah, but m'derabbanan we do not allow a person to chance it.  It also assumes that if you eat more than the shiur required to fulfill the mitzvah, there is either no kiyum mitzvah at all, or that a kiyum mitzvah without a tzivuy is not enough to be doche a lav.)  The Gur Aryeh offers his own reason.  The only time we say aseh doche lo ta'aseh is when it is impossible to fulfill both -- there is a direct clash between the two.  For example, it is impossible for there ever to be a scenario of yibum that does not also entail a clash with the issur of eishes ach (whether yibum works through aseh doche lo ta'aseh or some other mechanism is a topic for some other time).  Here, even if a person only has one matzah and it happens to be made of chadash, the Maharal does not see that as a clash.  I think what he means is that the mitzvah of chadash does not logically preclude fulfilling the mitzvah of matzah.  You may run into a scenarios where practically you cannot fulfill one without violating the other, but a practical roadblock is not enough. 

I am a little confused by one point: is the fact that we don't say that matzah can be doche chadash derived from the fact that the pasuk says to eat matzah for six days?  The rule the Maharal invokes, i.e. that you only say dechiya when there is an inevitable clash. is not unique to matzah -- it is a general rule that applies in every case of aseh doche lo ta'aseh.  So why do we need a special limud here to tell us that matzah is not doche chadash? 

2. The gemara (Sanhedrin 71) quotes R' Eliezer's view that if even one mezuzah is found in an ir ha'nidachas it is enough to salvage the city and spare it from destruction.  (There is a view in Chazal that there can never be an ir ha'nidachat.  The L. Rebbe is quoted as saying that if he heard a city was going to be declared an ir ha'nidachat, he would go there and put a mezuzah up on someone's door, so the city would never be destroyed.  There is a lesson there that goes beyond the halachos of ir ha'nidachas.)   The Toras Chaim and many other Achronim ask why don't we apply the rule of aseh doche lo ta'aseh?  Why does fulfilling the mitzvah of destroying the city allow for the burning of the mezuzah? 

One approach is that you only say aseh doche lo ta'aseh when the entire aseh is being fulfilled.  Here, burning the single mezuzah is just part of the larger mitzvah, which is to destroy the entire city.  (Whether this chiddush is true and why it is true is something to look into.)

Once upon a time I did a post on the Ohr Sameiach hil chameitz ch 6 who writes that you only say aseh doche lo ta'aseh on an issur gavra, not an issur cheftza.  The question of Tos quoted above regarding matzah being doche chadash must assume, as the Ohr Sameiach discusses, that chadash is not an issur cheftza -- chadash is inherently heter, just cannot be eaten before the korban ha'omer is brought.  The lav of "lo ta'aseun kein l'Hashem Elokeichem" which prohibits burning the mezuzah is an issur cheftza.  Based R' Eliyahu Baruch Finkel suggests that therefore is not pushed aside by the chovas hagavra of destroying the ir ha'nidachas.