a question that need not be answered

Last week's parsha ended with Moshe questioning Hashem: לָמָה הֲרֵעֹתָה לָעָם הַזֶּה לָמָּה זֶּה שְׁלַחְתָּנִי.

Why, wondered Moshe, did Hashem send him to demand the release of Bn"Y when the time was not yet ripe for that to happen? Why send him now when things are only going to get worse before they can become better?

Our parsha opens with Hashem's reaction and response:

וָאֵרָא אֶל אַבְרָהָם אֶל יִצְחָק וְאֶל יַעֲקֹב בְּקל שַׁדָּי וּשְׁמִי ה׳ לֹא נוֹדַעְתִּי לָהֶם

How does that address Moshe's question of why he was sent prematurely?

We find another question in this week's parsha that also seems to go unanswered. When Bn"Y reject Moshe and his message, he turns to Hashem and makes a kal v'chomer (6:12):

הֵן בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֹא שָׁמְעוּ אֵלַי וְאֵיךְ יִשְׁמָעֵנִי פַרְעֹה וַאֲנִי עֲרַל שְׂפָתָיִם

The parsha then continues:

וַיְדַבֵּר ה׳ אֶל מֹשֶׁה וְאֶל אַהֲרֹן וַיְצַוֵּם אֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאֶל פַּרְעֹה מֶלֶךְ מִצְרָיִם לְהוֹצִיא אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם

What is the answer to Moshe's argument? It sounds like Hashem just reiterates what Moshe's mission is. As Ohr haChaim puts it:

עוד קשה היכן תשובת אל עליון לדברי שלוחו, ומה גם שטען טענה הנשמעת, ולו יהיה שטעה וק״ו אינו ק״ו, היה לו לסתור דבריו,

Rashi sounds like he tries to deal with this issue: לפי שאמר משה: אני ערל שפתים (שמות ו׳:י״ב), צירף הקב״ה את אהרן עמו להיות לו למליץ It's not clear what Rashi means, as already in last week's parsha Hashem had designated Aharon to serve as Moshe's spokesman to help convey his message, and still Moshe complained that he was not being heard (see Malbim).

R' Aharon Soloveitchik writes that in fact Hashem here does not offer any answer Moshe's kal v'chomer. Kal v'chomer is a law of logic. It is one of the 13 midos that a person can darshan without a mesorah, based solely on deductive reasoning. Using the kelim of logic, of reasoning, Moshe's argument makes perfect sense and is entirely justified. Yet, at the same time, his argument is also immaterial. The destiny of Bn"Y transcends logic and reasoning. It takes place on a different plane altogether, as we have seen time and again in our history.

Rav Kook writes in a famous letter (555) to the Ridbaz that there are two forces that guide Jewish  destiny: segulah and bechira

ידע הדר"ג, ששני דברים עיקריים ישנם שהם יחד בונים קדושת-ישראל וההתקשרות האלהית עמהם.

הא' הוא סגולה, כלומר טבע הקדושה שבנשמת ישראל מירושת אבות, כאמור: "לא בצדקתך וגו'" "רק באבותיך חשק ד' לאהבה אותם ויבחר בזרעם אחריהם", "והייתם לי סגולה מכל העמים"; והסגולה הוא כוח קדוש פנימי מונח בטבע-הנפש ברצון ד', כמו טבע כל דבר מהמציאות, שאי-אפשר לו להשתנות כלל, "כי הוא אמר ויהי", "ויעמידם לעד לעולם".

והב' הוא ענין-בחירה, זה תלוי במעשה הטוב ובתלמוד-תורה.

Moshe was looking at the world through the lens of bechira. Would the people choose to listen to him? Would Pharoah choose to listen to him and free Bn"Y? Or as he asked in last week's parsha, would the people deserve redemption? But that is only half the picture. The fate of Klal Yisrael is governed by segulah, but a mystical connection with Hashem that bends history to its arc and goal irrespective of the choices or actions we ourselves make or the choices others make and impose upon us.

Shem m'Shmuel (5671) suggests that this is the answer Hashem was giving Moshe at the opening of our parsha. The Avos sought to reveal Hashem's presence in the material world of teva. "Who is the baal ha'birah, asked Avahram, "The creator of the universe, the world and everything in it?" In other words, Avraham was out to prove that G-d is the one who governs this thing called teva. But, “There are more things in Heaven and Earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.” וּשְׁמִי ה׳ לֹא נוֹדַעְתִּי לָהֶם to introduce Hashem as beyond teva. That was the role of Moshe Rabeinu. The experience of additional suffering by Bn"Y was not in spite of Moshe's arrival, but it was because of Moshe's arrival. The new giluy of Hashem as transcendent, as not just baal ha'teva but l'maaleh min ha'teva, requires tikkun, requires Bn"Y earning that realization, the suffering became more intense rather than less.

why Rashi gives 2 different reasons for 4 kosos

Rashi on the first Mishna in Arvei Pesachim writes that the 4 kosos on leil ha'seder correspond to the 4 leshonos of geulah mentioned in our parsha:

ארבע כוסות. כנגד ארבעה לשוני גאולה האמורים בגלות מצרים והוצאתי אתכם והצלתי אתכם וגאלתי אתכם ולקחתי אתכם בפרשת וארא:

However, on daf 108, commenting on R' Yehoshua ben Levi's din that even women have to drink 4 kosos because שאף הן היו באותו הנס, Rashi there writes that the kosos correspond to the kosos mentioned in the dream of Sar haMashkim:

ארבע כוסות. שלשה כנגד ג' כוסות שנאמרו בפסוק זה וכוס פרעה בידי וגומר ורביעי ברכת המזון

Why does Rashi gives two different reasons for the 4 kosos?

If you were reading this blog close to 20 years ago you know there is a chakira of the Brisker Rav (stencils Archin 3) as to how the principle of af hein works.  Without af hein, women would be exempt from the mitzvah of 4 kosos because it is a mitzvas aseh she'hazman gerama.  Yesh lachkor: does af hein simply lift the ptur of zman gerama, or is it a new mechayeiv, i.e. even though the mitzvah may be zman gerama, in this case there is a new reason for women to be chayavos?  

Tos and Rashbam disagree as to whether af hein means women were part and parcel of the dangers of galus Mitzrayim, or whether it means they were the cause of the geulah (see this post for a nafka mina):

באותו הנס. פי' רשב''ם שעל ידם נגאלו וכן במגילה ע''י אסתר ובחנוכה ע''י יהודית וקשה דאף משמע שאינן עיקר ועוד דבירושלמי גריס שאף הן היו באותו ספק משמע באותה סכנה דלהשמיד להרוג ולאבד 

It could be that this machlokes hinges on the chakira of the Brisker Rav. According to Rashbam, it's not enough to simply equate women with men, to say that they shared the same pains of galus.  Af hein demands coming up with a special reason to be mechayeiv women because af hein is a mechayeiv in its own right.

This could be why Rashi gives two different reasons for 4 kosos.  Rashi on the Mishna is explaining why even a poor person has to have 4 kosos, and so he invokes the reason on ארבעה לשוני גאולה האמורים בגלות מצרים.  However, that's not a good enough reason to be mechayeiv women. These leshonos that are part of בגלות מצרים, which women experienced alongside the men, would just equate them to men, but af hein demands creating a new mechayeiv. Therefore, Rashi on daf 108 refers to the kosos in Saf haMashkim's dream.  Targun Yonasan explains Yosef's interpretation of that dream as follows (Braishis 40:10):

ואמר ליה יוסף דין סוף פושרנא דחלמא תלתי מצוגייא תלתי אבהת עלמא הינון אברהם יצחק ויעקב דמן בני בניהון עתידין למשתעבדא למצרים בטינא ובליבנא ובכל פולחנהא באנפי ברא ומן בתר כדין מתפרקין על יד תלת רעיין     

The three "shepherds" of Moshe, Aharon, and Miriam delivered Bn"Y from galus; they were instrumental in bringing about the geulah. This sounds like Rashbam's approach of seeing women as the cause of the nes, not just participants in the experience.

(See the Kli Chemdah on our parsha who also discusses this stira in Rashi.)

recovering our identity

Very short of time this week, but did not want to skip writing something on the parsha.  Right after Hashem commands Moshe and Aharon (6:13) to go to Pharoah again and demand the release of Bn"Y,  וַיְדַבֵּר ה׳ אֶל מֹשֶׁה וְאֶל אַהֲרֹן וַיְצַוֵּם אֶל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאֶל פַּרְעֹה מֶלֶךְ מִצְרָיִם לְהוֹצִיא אֶת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם., the Torah then gives us a genealogy lesson:  ...אֵלֶּה רָאשֵׁי בֵית אֲבֹתָם בְּנֵי רְאוּבֵן בְּכֹר יִשְׂרָאֵל חֲנוֹךְ וּפַלּוּא חֶצְרֹן וְכַרְמִי אֵלֶּה מִשְׁפְּחֹת רְאוּבֵן etc.  Rashi is already bothered by what the connection between these parshiyos is, and comments:

  מתוך שנזקק לייחס שבטו של לוי עד משה ואהרן בשביל משה ואהרן, התחיל לייחסם דרך תולדותם מראובן. ובפסיקתא הגדולה (פסיקתא רבתי ז׳) ראיתי: לפי שקינתרם יעקב אביהם לשלשה שבטים הללו בשעת מותו, חזר הכתוב לייחסם כאן לבדם, לומר שחשובין הם.

The Kozhiglover offers his own answer.  Chazal compare the Jewish people in galus Mitzrayim to embryo trapped in the womb. We know that עובּר ירך אמו הוא.  A embryo is like part of the mother, it has no real identity.  What Chazal are telling us is that in galus the Jewish people had become an adjunct of Egypt, they lost their sense of self, their identity. 

The chain of yichus recorded here is to remind Klal Yisrael of who they are -- a people who have a connection to the shevatim, a people who have their own forefathers and Avos distinct from the Pharoahs, distinct from the families and society of Egypt.  

We see all around us these days so many Jews who had identified as Americans, as Progressives, as part of one group or another, have woken up and started to remember their yichus, that they are part of Am Yisrael.  The first step to geulah is recovering one's own identity.  

the connection between "kotzer ruach" and avodah zarah

The problem with the kal v'chomer (6:12) of הֵ֤ן בְּנֵֽי־יִשְׂרָאֵל֙ לֹֽא־שָׁמְע֣וּ אֵלַ֔י וְאֵיךְ֙ יִשְׁמָעֵ֣נִי פַרְעֹ֔ה וַאֲנִ֖י עֲרַ֥ל שְׂפָתָֽיִם is that just four pesukim earlier the parsha tells us that Bnei Yisrael did not listen to Moshe because  וְלֹ֤א שָֽׁמְעוּ֙ אֶל־מֹשֶׁ֔ה מִקֹּ֣צֶר ר֔וּחַ וּמֵעֲבֹדָ֖ה קָשָֽׁה, they were overburdened with hard work.  Pharoah did not face the same challenge of being overworked; he could carve out time to listen csrefully.  Why was Moshe convinced that just because Bn"Y did not listen, Pharoah would not listen either?

Ramban contrasts the reception Moshe got from the people this time around with their reaction to his words in last week's parsha.  There, the Torah tells us that (4:31) וַֽיַּאֲמֵ֖ן הָעָ֑ם, they believed the message.  Here, they seem deaf to what he has to say.

Ramban argues (see Rashbam who disagrees) that we should not conclude that the people no longer believed in Moshe or his message.  He writes:

לא בעבור שלא יאמינו בי״י ובנביאו, רק שלא הטו אוזן לדבריו מקוצר רוח, כאדם שתקצר נפשו בעמלו, ולא ירצה לחיות רגע בצערו, מדעתו שירוח לו אחרי כן.

The people did believe.  However, the promise of the 4 leshonos of geulah, the promise of a future in Eretz Yisrael, seemed a distant dream that had no bearing on the harsh reality of their day to day burden of work and the oppression they labored under.  

This also seems to be the view of Rashi, who explains ולא שמעו אל משה – לא קיבלו תנחומין.  The people did not doubt the truth of Moshe's words; however, the message provided little consolation to them in their present situation.  

The Midrash Rabbah, however, writes that וְלֹא שָׁמְעוּ אֶל משֶׁה וגו׳ – הָיָה קָשֶׁה בְּעֵינֵיהֶם לִפְרשׁ מֵעֲבוֹדַת כּוֹכָבִים.  The people rejected Moshe's words because they remained attached to their belief in idolatry.

The Midrash seems to be not only at odds with Ramban/Rashi, but at odds with the words of the pasuk itself.  The pasuk tells us that it was  מִקֹּ֣צֶר ר֔וּחַ וּמֵעֲבֹדָ֖ה קָשָֽׁה, because of the burden of work that the people did not listen.  Why does the Midrash attribute their not listening to avodah zarah?

My wife's grandfather, R' Dov Yehudah Shochet, quoted from the Baal haTanya that avodah zarah does not simply mean prostrating onself to an idol.  Avodah zarah means having an identity, a will, apart from G-d's.  When all that exists for a person is G-d's will, then no matter how difficult the task, no matter what burdens and obstacles there are, a person will make an effort to get the job done.  When all that exists is ratzon Hashem, then קֹּ֣צֶר ר֔וּחַ and עֲבדָ֖ה קָשָֽׁה  don't get in the way. 

There is no contradiction between the plain meaning of the pasuk and the Midrash's interpretation. The pasuk is telling you the surface symptom; the Midrash is telling you the root cause, the underlying disease.

This approach, I think, also resolves our original question and explains the kal v'chomer Moshe drew.  If Bn"Y, who came from the lineage of the Avos and had a tradition about geulah, still did not listen because the attraction of avodah zarah pulled them in the wrong direction, then surely Pharoah, chief and leader of a culture steeped in avodah zarah, would never listen. 

morasha, not yerusha

At the end of the leshonos shel geulah, Hashem promises Eretz Yisrael to us as a "morasha," וְנָתַתִּ֨י אֹתָ֥הּ לָכֶ֛ם מוֹרָשָׁ֖ה.  Netziv explains:

לא לשעה שאתם תהיו בה לבד, אלא אפילו בשעה שאתם גולים ממנה הרי היא שלכם, וכמו שאדם הפורש משדה ירושת אבותיו, לעולם דעתו עליה, ומשים לב שלא לשכוח הליכות אותה אחוזה אולי יזכהו ה׳ לשוב אליה. כך ארץ ישראל היא לנו ״מורשה״ לעד,

Eretz Yisrael remains ours, whether we are physically present there or not.  

I don't know why the Netziv does not say it there, but Torah is also described as a "morashsa,"  מוֹרָשָׁ֖ה קְהִלַּ֥ת יַעֲקֹֽב.  A Jew has a portion in Torah no matter what.  What he does with that portion, whether he/she chooses to develop it or not, is a different story.

Ohr haChaim asks: קשה כי דברי אל עליון דברו טהור הוא כי יוצאי מצרים הם הנכנסים לארץ דכתיב והבאתי אתכם אל הארץ ולא מצינו שכן היה אלא ואת בניהם הביא שמה אבל כל דור יוצאי מצרים מבן עשרים שנה נפלו פגריהם במדבר  Where is the promise of וְהֵבֵאתִ֤י אֶתְכֶם֙ אֶל־הָאָ֔רֶץ if those who left Egypt died in the midbar?

HaKsav vhaKabbalah (see R' Bachyei as well) writes that the answer in a word is this idea of "morasha." 

לא אמר ירושה לרמוז שלא יהיו יורשים אותה, לפי שעתידין היו יוצאי מצרים למות במדבר, אבל יהיו מורישים אותה לבניהם אשר יכנסו לארץ לכן אמר מורשה

A yerusha is something you inherit; a morasha is something you pass on to others to inherit. Chazal tell us that when it came to divide Eretz Yisrael among tribes/families, it was a unique process of המתים יורשׁים את  החיים.  The land was apportioned based on the census of families who left Egypt and only then redistributed to their descendants who actually took possession of the land. 

Torah is מוֹרָשָׁ֖ה קְהִלַּ֥ת יַעֲקֹֽב because what's important is not just what you receive, what you get out of Torah, but also what you give over to the next generation to inherit.  

Agra d'Kallah expands on the link between the morasha of Torah and the morasha of Eretz Yisrael:

תורה וארץ ישראל ירושה הם לנו בלא הפסק, כשם שהגוים אי אפשר להם להתבונן בסודי התורה, כן אין להם נחת בארץ ישראל ואינם מתבוננים בטובה, כענין ושממו עליה אויביכם היושבים בה (ויקרא כו לב), התורה אינה מגלה מסטוריה אלא למהולים (חסר ב' תיבות), כענין שנאמר בנתינת התורה (שמות יט ה) ועתה אם שמוע וכו' ושמרתם את בריתי והייתם לי סגולה מכל העמים, שהוא בדרך סגולה ביותר מכל העמים להבין מסטורין (שלי, כענין) שפירשנו במקומו, כך ארץ ישראל.  

lost legacy

There is a lot written to try to explain Rashi's comment on  וָאֵרָ֗א אֶל־אַבְרָהָ֛ם אֶל־יִצְחָ֥ק וְאֶֽל־יַעֲקֹ֖ב that וארא אל האבות.  We know Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov are the avos.  Why is that relevant to pshat in this pasuk?

My son dealt with this question last week on his blog and quoted, among other ideas, the L Rebbe who explained that Rashi is highlighting the fact that Hashem appeared to Avraham not only because he embodied the midah of chessed, and to Yitzchak not only because he personified gevurah, and to Yaakov not just because he was an exemplar of tiferes.  Hashem appeared to them because they were avos, they were the forefathers of our nation, they passed those  midos down to future generations.  אבות מכלל דאיכא תולדות  (Bava Kama 2)  R' Meir Goldvicht in his shiurim always likes to say that maaseh avos siman la'banim means the maaseh avos are part of our genes, our spiritual DNA.  Hashem was telling Moshe that it was not time to deal with abstract questions about why the galus was so difficult.  He had to try to connect with the people in a more direct way, in a more emotional way, so that they would be receptive to his message.

It's interesting that the Sefas Emes (last piece in 5637) goes in nearly the opposite direction.  Rashi later in the parsha (pasuk 9) quotes from Chazal that these opening pesukim are a response to Moshe's question of why Bnei Yisrael had to suffer:

ורבותינו דרשוה לעניין של מעלה, שאמר: למה הרעתה וגו׳ (שמות ה׳:כ״ב). אמר לו הקב״ה: חבל על דאבדין ולא משתכחין. יש לי להתאונן על מיתת האבות, הרבה פעמים נגליתי עליהם בקל שדי, ולא אמרו לי: מה שמך, ואתה אמרת: מה שמו מה אומר אליהם

Simple pshat is that Moshe is being told that he is not on par with the avos.  Sefas Emes, however, interprets the point as speaking about Bnei Yisrael, that theywere not connected to the avos.   חבל על דאבדין ולא משתכחין -- the avos are gone and cannot be found because Bnei Yisrael failed to carry on their legacy and live up to it.  The spiritual DNA may be there, but it is not expressing itself.  Therefore, the galus is a harsh one.

Moshe Derangement Syndrome

Pharoah's reaction to makkas barad is interesting.   וַיִּשְׁלַ֣ח פַּרְעֹ֗ה וַיִּקְרָא֙ לְמֹשֶׁ֣ה וּֽלְאַהֲרֹ֔ן וַיֹּ֥אמֶר אֲלֵהֶ֖ם חָטָ֣אתִי הַפָּ֑עַם. This time -- הַפָּ֑עַם -- he admits he got it wrong.  What's so special about this particular makkah?  Malbi"m explains that Pharoah was warned before barad to take the livestock in and seek shelter.  It's one think to refuse to release Bnei Yisrael from slavery; it's another thing to be so stubborn as to not even take precautions that can save lives and $.  Even Pharoah realized he had gone to far.  Pharoah clearly had MDS -- Moshe Derangement Syndrome. He rejected anything Moshe said, no matter that doing so was cutting off his own nose to spite his face.  R' Baruch Sorotzkin reads הַפָּ֑עַם as indicative of the approach of Pharoah and other reshaim to admitting guilt.  It's always only הַפָּ֑עַם, this one time, this one detail that is wrong. There is no consideration that the prat maybe is melamed on the klal, that being wrong this time may reflect a broader misconception.  That's why once the moment passes, it's back to the usual routine.  (See HaKsav v'haKabbalah who learns the pasuk as meaning exactly the opposite.)   

Moshe comes to Pharoah and tells him that although he knows Pharoah will return to his old ways, makkas barad will come to an end.  The Torah then gives what seems to be a damage report:

 וְהַפִּשְׁתָּ֥ה וְהַשְּׂעֹרָ֖ה נֻכָּ֑תָה כִּ֤י הַשְּׂעֹרָה֙ אָבִ֔יב וְהַפִּשְׁתָּ֖ה גִּבְעֹֽל

וְהַחִטָּ֥ה וְהַכֻּסֶּ֖מֶת לֹ֣א נֻכּ֑וּ כִּ֥י אֲפִילֹ֖ת הֵֽנָּה

And then continues and tells us that Moshe davened for barad to be removed.  

You would expect the damage report to come after the plague was removed, yet the Torah sticks it in before even telling us that Moshe davened for the plague to stop.  Why break up the narrative this way?  As we discussed once before, Ramban and Sadya Gaon explain that these pesukim are not third party narration, but rather are part of the dialogue between Moshe and Pharoah.  Moshe was telling Pharoah that the wheat crop has not yet been ruined, so if he repents now, he can salvage something.

R' Baruch Mordechai Ezrachi brilliantly explains that there was a symbolic message for Pharoah in these particular crops being spared.  Pharoah was stiff necked.  He refused to buckle to Moshe's demands.  He thought that remaining inflexible was the ultimate sign of strength and would lead him to prevail.  Moshe therefore told him to take a look at which crops remained.  Rashi explains כי אפילת – מאוחרות, ועדיין היו רכות ויכולין לעמוד בפני קשה.  Because the wheat crops ripen later, their stalk is not stiff and hard, and therefore, they were were not crushed by the barad.  Sometimes the ability to bend, to show flexibility and give a little, is actually a strength. 

don't wait for a crisis

 וְגַ֣ם׀ אֲנִ֣י שָׁמַ֗עְתִּי אֶֽת־נַאֲקַת֙ בְּנֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל אֲשֶׁ֥ר מִצְרַ֖יִם מַעֲבִדִ֣ים אֹתָ֑ם 

So which is it -- was Hashem moved by the cries of Bnei Yisrael, in which case  אֲשֶׁ֥ר מִצְרַ֖יִם מַעֲבִדִ֣ים אֹתָ֑ם is extraneous, or was Hashem moved by the injustice of the Egyptian persecution, irrespective of whether anyone else cried out or objected to it, in which case אֶֽת־נַאֲקַת֙ בְּנֵ֣י יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל is extraneous?

The Oheiv Yisrael (also R' Liebele Eiger) explains the pasuk as follows: many people go through life ho-hum without thinking too much about G-d, until one day when the going gets tough, and then suddenly its time to break open the Tehillim and rediscover what avodas Hashem means.  Klal Yisrael in Egypt was pushed until their backs were against the wall, and so they cried out to Hashem for help.  But what they cried about is more than the pain of slavery.  What they cried about is the fact that it took a crisis to bring them to that point.  They cried because  אֲשֶׁ֥ר מִצְרַ֖יִם מַעֲבִדִ֣ים אֹתָ֑ם -- the Egyptians were the ones that drove them to avodas Hashem.  It shouldn't take a crisis to bring the children of Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov to speak to their Father upstairs.

a hashkafa of "lo nachon" vs a hashkafa of "assur" -- should we have an innate sense of right and wrong?

When Pharoah finally gave in a little bit and told Moshe that he can offer korbanos provided he do so in Mitzrayim, Moshe turned him down.  "Lo nachon la'asos kein ki toavas Mitzrayim nizbach..." (8:22).  Chasam Sofer notes Moshe's choice of words -- "lo nachon," it's not the right thing to do.  The Egyptian people don't want to see us sacrificing their gods.  It's not menchlishkeit.  Pharoah, you think we are a bunch of barbarians, but that's not who we are.

This diyuk of Chasam Sofer I think speaks to the difference between my father's generation and my children's generation.  The vast majority of Jews of my father's generation were not yeshiva educated and did not think in terms of assur or mutar, what it says in a seif katan somewhere in the mishna berura.  But those old timers knew the words, or the concept, of "lo nachon."  Certain things were just not done because it was not right.  Today, baruch Hashem our kids all know how to dig up all kinds of obscure chumros brought down in all the latest seforim, but the concept of "lo nachon" seems to have vanished.  Too many people seem to have no inner moral compass, no innate sense of right and wrong, no thought as to what is proper before they even get to what it says in Shulchan Aruch.

The Yerushalmi in B"M (8a) relates (I'm quoting the Sefaria translation):

Shimon ben Shetah was dealing with flax [as his profession]. His students said to him: ‘Master, leave it behind and we will buy you a donkey and you won’t need to work so much,’ and they bought him a donkey from an Arab, and it had a jewel hanging from it[s neck]. They came to him and said him: ‘from now on you won’t have to work again.’ He said to them: ‘why?’ They said to him: ‘ We bought you a donkey from an Arab and it had a jewel hanging from it[s neck]!’ He said to them: ‘Did the owner know?’ They said to him: ‘no.’ He said to them: ‘go return it.’ [Later students objected to this story:] But didn’t Rav Huna Bibi bar Gozlon say in the name of Rav, said they responded before Rabbi, even according to the one who says an item stolen from a gentile is prohibited, all agree that an item lost by a gentile is permitted!?’ ‘What, do you think Shimon ben Shetah is a barbarian? Shimon wished to hear ‘blessed be the God of the Jews’ more than all the wages of this world.

The difference between Shimon ben Shetach and his students is the difference between a world view of assur/mutar and a world view of lo nachon.

So which is better -- to know something is wrong and refrain from doing it out of instinct, or to always have to look up the din in Shulchan Aruch to know good from bad?

Sounds like this is exactly the question the Rambam addresses in Shmoneh Perakim (ch 6).  Rambam asks: the Torah is supposed to shape a person to be moral, to not want to steal or harm people, etc., yet Chazal tell us that a person should not say that he doesn't want to eat pig because it is not healthy or tastes bad, but rather because Hashem said not to eat it.  In other words, don't refrain because you think it is wrong, just obey because of what it says in Shulchan Aruch!

The Rambam distinguishes between mitzvos sichliyos and other mitzvos.  It makes rational sense to not steal, so a person should not want to do so.  It makes no sense not to eat pig, so we obey simply because G-d said so.

The distinction is not as clear cut as it seems.  R' Amital in this piece, based on R' Kook, greatly expands the category of rational mitzvos to include things like observing Shabbos.  The Shem m'Shmuel (Parshas Tzav) goes a step further (I recall seeing my wife's grandfather also took this same approach, but can't track down where at the moment):

האומנם כי לכאורה יקשה על הנחה זו מהא דאל יאמר אדם אי אפשי בבשר חזיר אלא אפשי ואבי שבשמים גזר עלי, וידוע דעת הרמב"ם שיצא לחלוק בין עבירות השכליות והשמיעיות, ולדידי הפי' עפ"י דברי הא"ע בלאו דלא תחמוד שרבים תמהו איך אפשר שאדם לא יחמוד לדבר יפה ונחמד לעיניו ונתן משל לזה שהוא כמו שלא יתאוה האיש להיות לו כנפים לעוף למעלה כי דבר הנמנע לא יתאוה לו הטבע, ככה צריך איש הישראלי לידע שכל דבר שלא ניתן לו מן השמים לא שייך אליו כלל כמו כנפים לאיש ולא יכול לקחתו בתחבולותיו והוא נמנע ממנו ע"כ לא יתאוה לו כלל ודפח"ח, ואף אנו נאמר שכ"ש דבר שאסרה תורה היא עוד יותר נמנע מפחמין לאכילה, ומה שאמרו ז"ל אבל אפשי ואבי שבשמים גזר עלי, היינו שבאם לא הי' גזר הי' באמת דבר טוב כי הביט בתורה וברא את העולם, ואם עפ"י התורה הי' זה מותר ומאכל לאיש הישראלי אז הי' לו צורה אחרת והי' באמת טוב, אבל עכשו שהתורה אסרה אין זה רק רע וכפחמין לאכילה ואי אפשר להתאוה לו כלל, וע"ד זה תקיש לכל העבירות שבאם לא אסרה תורה בהכרח שהי' לו צורה אחרת והי' טוב וראוי, אבל עתה שאסרה תורה שוב נמאס ואין ראוי להשתוקק אליו, וע"כ המשתוקק אליו הוא חוטא וצריך כפרה:

The only difference, says Sm"S, between a mitzvah sichlis and a mitzvah like not eating pig, is whether the mitzvah a priori makes sense.  However, once G-d commands us not to eat pig, we have to view eating pig as repugnant, as something we would never want to do.  

He draws an analogy to the Ibn Ezra's interpretation of lo tachmod.  Ibn Ezra asks how the Torah can command a person not to desire something -- can a person control his heart?  You see you neighbor has a nice car and nature takes over and you want it.  Ibn Ezra answers that a pauper would never dream of marrying a princess -- his mind places it so far outside the realm of possibility that it's unimaginable.  It would be like having a desire to flap your arms and fly.  So too, once G-d commands us not to eat pig, to us that act has to become like some unimaginable fantasy, a thought we would never entertain, much less struggle to overcome.

Ibn Ezra is speaking on a psychological level as to what drives a person's attractions and desires.  Sm"S is going a step further: It's not just that psychologically we must view eating pig as unimaginable (irrespective of whether there is really any harm in doing so), but that once G-d commanded it, it actually becomes morally so.

a band-aid or a vision?

1) Last week's parsha ended with Moshe's poignant question: Why have things become so much worse for Klal Yisrael because of his shlichus?  Why has he been a cause of suffering instead of a cause of redemption?

The opening of our parsha contains the 4 leshonos of geulah.  Those learning daf yomi should remember the gemara (Brachos 5) that lists a number of things that can be acquired only with yisurim, among them Eretz Yisrael and Torah.  This is Hashem's response to Moshe.  Why must Klal Yisrael experience such suffering?  Because their destiny is "v'lakachti" = kabbalas haTorah, "v'hei'veisi" = Eretz Yisrael.  (Chasam Sofer)

Despite such lofty dreams and promises, Klal Yisrael didn’t listen to Moshe's message  -- “V’lo sham’u el Moshe m’kotzer ruach u’mei’avodah kasha.”  Moshe came back to Hashem and asks how he can possibly deliver the demand to liberate Klal Yisrael to Pharoah if even Klal Yisrael won’t listen to him.  Hashem responded: “Vayidaber Hashem el Moshe v’el Aharon v’yitzaveim el Bnei Yisrael v’el Pharoah melech Mitzrayim l’hotzi es Bnei Yisrael mei’Eretz Mitzrayim.”  (6:13) 

 

Meshech Chochma explains that Hashem is not simply reiterating his command to Moshe to deliver the original message.   In fact, the message has changed. 

 

Originally Moshe came to Klal Yisrael with this glorious vision of a wonderful future --  not only did he promise freedom from the backbreaking drudgery of slavery, but he promised independence in their own beautiful country, not to mention kabbalas haTorah, spiritual salvation.   A person who is in pain doesn’t want to hear lofty dreams and promises.  All they want is immediate relief.  When a person is suffering, that suffering becomes their all consuming focus.  They don't have the patience to listen to anything else.  Hashem therefore told Moshe to go back to the people with one message alone: “Va’yitzaveim… l’hotzi es Bnei Yisrael mei’Eretz Mitzrayim.”  For now, it’s enough to talk about and work on getting out of slavery.  The dream and the fulfillment of those 4 leshonos of geulah could come later.

 

It's a beautiful diyuk in the pesukim, but I have one simple question: Hashem certainly knew that Klal Yisrael wouldn't listen to the whole speech and just wanted that message of relief.  So why did he send Moshe to tell the people the 4 leshonos of geulah in the first place?  Why not just deliver the short and sweet message up front?

 

I think the answer is (I think I touched on this once before) that even though the dreams and the lofty vision will not be listened to or absorbed quite yet, they still have to be articulated.  A mission without a dream, a vision, is a band-aid.  Band-aids don't inspire.  Band-aids get you though the here-and-now, but don't give you a reason to look forward to tomorrow.  Moshe had to first define to Klal Yisrael what geulah is -- not a band-aid, but rather a vision, an ideal.  Once the goal was defined, then he could come back and give out band-aids to deal with the here-and-now. 

 

We've been through this in recent history as well.  Do we want a Jewish homeland as a band-aid for anti-Semitism and suffering in galus?  Or do we want a homeland because we have a vision of a future that goes beyond escaping the pain of the moment?  The former may be what we need right now, but the latter is what defines our ultimate goal.

 

2) When Pharoah came running to Moshe to ask him to get rid of the frogs plaguing Egypt, Moshe asked Pharoah when he should pray for the plague to end.

 

Moshe was made a shliach of Hashem to bring makkos.  Who ever said anything about praying for the enemy? 

 

This question is discussed by R' Bunim m'Peshischa and made it ways into the torah of Sefas Emes as well.  Last week we discussed the emunas chachamim of Klal Yisrael in Mitzrayim.  I used the word "emunah" in that post and not some other term primarily because that is the term R' Chatzkel Levenstein used, but it actually fits better than other terms because emunas chachamim is an extension of emunah in Hashem.  "Es Hashem Elokecha tira" -- "es" comes to include yirah of talmidei chachamim. 

 

The whole point of the makkos was to establish that Hashem is the one in control, not some Egyptian diety, not natural forces, not Pharoah.  Moshe davening to remove a makkah and it happening  is not a contradiction to that mission but aderaba, a fulfillment of its purpose.  Moshe as an eved Hashem was an extension of the yad Hashem.  His control was a reflection of Hashem's control over Mitzrayim.

win them over with kindness

Three short ideas:

1) On Jan 1 we had the privilege in the 5Towns of hearing a shiur from R' Baruch Simon.  One idea he quoted from R' Zecharya Gelly (of Breur's) b'shem R' Yonasan Eibshitz: Chazal tell us that the Egyptians did not enslave sheivet Levi.  Why should they have done such a thing?  It certainly was not out of the goodness of their hearts -- people with good hearts don't go around drowning babies and enslaving the rest of the population.

The Egyptians knew that that the go'el would come from the special sheivet of Levi that kept the mesorah of Yaakov Avinu alive.  They figured that if they don't oppress sheivet Levi, the sheivet will never feel the real pain of galus and shibud and therefore will never really be motivated to produce that go'el who will rescue the rest of Klal Yisrael from their plight.

What they did not count on was the tremendous empathy that Moshe Rabeinu had for his brothers.  What they did not count on was someone like Moshe who felt the pain of each Jew as it if was his own, to the point that Moshe would even argue with Hashem himself, "Lamah ha'reiosa la'am ha'zeh..."  Even if he was not personally subject to the shibud, Moshe suffered because he was nosei b'ol im chaveiro.

2) The Midrash (in P' Naso) writes that for every action Avraham took when he welcomed guests into his home, Hashem rewarded his children in kind.  In the zechus of "yukach na me'at mayim," the little bit of water Avraham offered his guests we were zocheh to "v'lakachti eschem li l'am" in our parsha.

Is this just a play on words -- just because the word "yukach" is used to describe what Avaraham did, we get rewarded with "v'lakachti...?"  What is the underlying connection between the action and reward? 

R' Shimon Sofer explains that they key is the one word Avraham used when he offered water that he did not use when he offered food, a seat under his tree, or anything else.  The magic word is PLEASE -- "yukach NA..." 

What was this water used for?  Rashi tells us that Avraham suspected his guests of being idolaters and worshipping the dust on their feet, and therefore he requested that they wash their feet before entering his home.

What Avraham Avinu is teaching us is that if you want people to wash away their avodah zarah, their materialism, their anti-Torah lifestyle, you need to say "Please."  You need to do it with kindness, with love, with chessed. 

So too, Hashem did not simply coerce us and demand that we follow him.  Rashi translates "kach es Aharon" in Parshas Tzav (VaYikra 8) as "kacheihu b'devarim u'mashcheihu" -- persuade him, draw him in.  ("Lakach" when speaking of objects means to take, but you don't pick up a person and take him/her like you pick up a chair. See also Rashi on "VaYikach Korach.")  "V'lakachti eschem li l'am": The overt miracles, the record of the yichus of the shevatim to remind us that we are free, proud people, the declaration "bni bechori Yisrael" -- Hashem showered us with love and kindness to make us feel special.  

The kindness Avraham showed those guests that attracted them to Torah became the kindness and love Hashem showed to us to draw us out of Mitzrayim to avodas Hashem.

3) V'lo sham'u el Moshe m'kotzer ruach u'mei'avodah kasha...  The majority of meforshim explain that it was Klal Yisrael who suffered "kotzer ruach" because of the burden of work.  However, Sivan Rahav Meir points out an amazing Ralbag who writes that it was Moshe, not Klal Yisrael, who the pasuk is referring to.  Moshe had kotzer ruach because he had not invested enough time into thinking about how to present his message to the people. 

Ralbag explains that Moshe was coming from a background of spending hours searching for G-d, being misbonen and misboded.  The way he understood things, the way he thought about G-d and communicated about G-d, was on a completely different level than that of Klal Yisrael.  And so he struggled to get the point across and translate it down to the level the people were on.

Moshe's struggle here is our struggle.  How do we as parents (or Rabbis, teachers, etc.) make ourselves understood, make our message clear and meaningful, to our friends, our families, to our children, who may not be holding where we are and may not see the world the same way we do?  Es chatai ani mazkir -- I plead guilty to making this error myself and watching my kids eyes glaze over as I say over what seems to me to be a perfectly beautiful shtikel Torah but which they don't relate to at all.  It's not that the shkitel Torah is bad -- it's my kotzer ruach in not figuring out how to present it properly to their ears on their level. 

Something important to keep in mind.

Mesech Chochma on the "matarah Elokit" of yetzi'as Mitzrayim

The gemara (Sanhedrin 111) links "v'lakachti eschem li l'am" with "v'hei'veisi eschem el ha'aretz" and teaches that just as only Yehoshua and Kaleiv, 2 out of 600,000 of those who left Egypt, made it to Eretz Yisrael ("...v'hei'veisi"), so too, only 2 out of 600,000 actually left Egypt ("v'lakachti") -- the rest died in makas choshech.  Meschech Chochma writes that Chazal are trying to tell us that quantity does not matter to G-d.  All the makos and all the miracles done for Klal Yisrael in the desert were worth it if even just 2 out of 600,000 people would achieve the "matarah Elokit," the Divine purpose and end goal.  He adds that therefore one should not grow despondent when seeing how the masses remain unresponsive to the dvar Hashem.  That's just the way things work -- it is a few individuals who are truly inspired and committed, but in their merit, G-d protects our entire nation.

R' Moshe Tzuriel in his Derishat Tzion calls attention to the Meshech Chochma's phrase "ha'matarah ha'Elokit."  What indeed was the purpose and end goal of yetzi'as Mitzrayim?  Wasn't it mattah Torah?  Didn't the entire nation, all 600,000+, not just 2 people, merit standing at Sinai and hearing the dibros?   Clearly that's not the "matarah" the Meshech Chochma was speaking of.  The Torah is a blueprint, but what good is a blueprint, a plan, which is never brought to fruition?  The end goal, the "matarah," was building a nation in Eretz Yisrael.

To put what I think R' Tzuriel is saying a little more starkly, yesh lachkor: is the purpose/matarah of Klal Yisrael to learn and keep Torah, and having Eretz Yisrael is just a means to that end, or is the goal/matarah to build a nation, which means having our own country, and the Torah is a means, an instruction book, on how to go about doing that? 

"Eretz Yisrael einena davar chitzoni, kinyan chitzoni la'umah, rak b'tor emtza'i l'matarah shel ha'hisagdut ha'kelalit v'hachzakat kiyuma ha'chomi oh afilu ha'ruchani..."  (First sentence in Rav Kook's Orot)

Without "v'hei'veisi," the goal remains incomplete and the "matarah" is not achieved.

nevuah that's guaranteed

My wife asked me the following question, which I don't really know the answer to: there is a group of women who get together regularly to daven shacharis together and say tehillim.  Does the place that they daven have the din of a beis knesses? 

My wife had a hava amina that since there was no minyan, it could not be a beis knesses, but I don't know if the two ideas go hand in hand.  You can have a minyan held even semi-regularly in a place that does not have the status of a beis knesses (in some communities where people live far from shul there are something Friday night minyanim in people's homes), so why can't you have a place that has the status of beis knesses but has no minyan?  It's just the other side of the same coin. 

Any thoughts?

Turning to the parsha, the sefer Nesivei Chaim raises the following question: The Rambam in peirush hamishnayos writes that if a navi says something good is going to happen, you can take it to the bank -- Hashem will never go back on that promise.  (The Meshech Chochma quotes this in a number of places which I posted about already here and here.)  In the beginning of our parsha, Hashem tells Moshe to tell Bnei Yisrael that he will bring them to Eretz Yisrael, "V'hai'veisi eschem el ha'aretz..." (6:8)  Based on the Rambam, that promise should be irrevocable, guaranteed 100%.  Yet, that promise was in fact never fulfilled.  The generation that left Egypt (at least those over 20) all died in the desert and never made it to Eretz Yisrael.  Doesn't that contradict the principle the Rambam sets out?  (See Ohr haChaim, Ibn Ezra, Seforno)

Rav Elezri answers by quoting the Rambam's reasoning for his principle.  How can you tell a true prophet from a false one?  Simple: a true prophet can make claims that are 100% guaranteed.  The Rambam's principle serves as a check against doubt and as a means of testing the veracity of nevuah.  

Such a test and check may be necessary for all other nevi'im, says Rav Elezri, but not so for Moshe.  "V'gam becha ya'aminu l'olam," the Torah promises.  Belief in the prophecy of Moshe is a cardinal tenant of our faith.  Therefore, since no check against doubt is needed, there is no guarantee of every promise spoken by Moshe coming true.

I think you can make the same argument with a slight twist.  In our parsha, Moshe complains to Hashem that if Bnei Yisrael did not listen to him, surely Pharoah will not listen either, "v'ani aral sefasayim," not to mention that he also has a lisp.  Why does Moshe bring up his lisp here?  Didn't he already make the argument in last week's parsha, and Hashem had already responded that he gives the power of speech and will help Moshe.  Why are we revisiting the same argument all over again?

The Techeiles Mordechai, R' Schwadron, explains that Moshe was unique in that "Shechina m'daberes b'toch grono," it was as if G-d was speaking from his mouth.  Moshe thought this was the help Hashem would give to overcome Moshe's lisp.  However, there is a downside to this type of help.  The Rambam's principle only works for a promise made by a navi, not a promise made by Hashem himself. 

Moshe thought that if Bnei Yisrael could ignore him, it must be because he is guilty of some cheit, and that cheit is interfering with the message.  If so, perhaps Pharoah would not listen.  Perhaps the geulah itself would be in jeopardy.  "Ani aral sefasayim" -- the words aren't my words, thought Moshe -- they are G-d's words.  Therefore, the Rambam's principle that guarantees the words of a navi will come true doesn't apply, and who knows what will happen?

So maybe this is also why the Rambam's principle does not apply to the promise of "V'hei'veisi..."  When Moshe made that promise, it was not words of a navi that Bnei Yisrael heard, but rather it was "Shechina m'daberes m'toch grono." 

carrot or stick?

One quick follow up on the post I did last week re: kaddish.  My wife noted that given that kaddish is just one small ingredient in what can be done l’aliyas neshoma, there is no reason for women to feel deprived of anything just because they cannot say kaddish.  There is much that they can do that is just as meaningful.  (Aside from issues of mingag and possibly migdar milsa, the question of whether a woman may say kaddish hinges on whether there is a tziruf to the minyan from someone standing in the ezras nashim.  See R’ Wahrman in his Kol Avinoam siman 53 who presents the case against; see R Henkin's grandson in Shu"T Bnei Banim 2:7 for a defense of his grandfather, who took the opposing view.)

 

After reporting that Moshe told Pharaoh that he will go and pray that makkas barad stop, the Torah tells us that the flax and barley crops had been destroyed, but not the wheat and spelt, as they had not yet fully grown.  The Torah then continues that Moshe went out and davened for the plague to stop (9:29-33).

All the mefoshim are bothered by the placement of this “damage report” here.  Wouldn’t it make sense to place it beforehand or afterwards, not right in the middle of Moshe’s conversation with Pharaoh and the tefilah that followed?

Ramban and R’ Sadiah Gaon both answer that the damage report was in fact part of what Moshe told Pharoah, not an aside by the "narrator."  The quote marks that get opened in pasuk 29 with Moshe telling Pharoah that he will daven don’t get closed until after pasuk 32, after Moshe tells Pharaoh that the crops that had not yet grown were spared.  Ramban and R”SG differ, however, on what the meaning of the message to Pharaoh was.  According to RS”G, Moshe was telling Pharaoh that even though part the barley and flax had been destroyed, if he did teshuvah now he would at least have something left.  Ramban reads the words as a threat, not a promise of hope.  Moshe was telling Pharoah that if he reverts to his old ways, the late growing crops will be destroyed just as the early ones were. 

Perhaps there is a philosophical nekudas hamachlokes underlying the parshanut issue.  According to RS”G, it sounds like Moshe was presenting a risk/benefit calculation to Pharoah – the upside to teshuvah would be sparing any damage to the wheat; there would be very little downside at this point because Bnei Yisrael were clearly not going to remain as slaves.   Perhaps Ramban held that Pascal’s wager – risk/benefit calculations – don’t count as a commitment.

Or perhaps more simply, the neukdas hamachlokes is psychological.  Which is more effective – the carrot or the stick?  RS”G reads Moshe as stressing what Pharaoh has to gain; Ramban sees the stress on what he has to lose.

4 kosos and 4 leshonos of geulah

I don’t know if it’s fair to be madayeik in 2 works of the Netziv in Ha’amek She’eilah – I’ll write and you can decide. Rashi on the first Mishna in Arvei Pesachim writes that the 4 kosos correspond to the 4 leshonos of geulah in our parsha. (Rashi later on daf 108 interestingly gives a different reason and says the 4 cups correspond to 4 times cups are mentioned in the dream of the Sar haMashkim.) The Mordechai asks: why 4 cups and not 4 matzos? (Not a question according to the Rashi on 108). Mordechai answers that cups are mentioned in pesukim that relate to geulah, e.g. kos yeshu’os esa, so we use cups of wine. The Netziv just slightly rephrases the Mordechai’s question. The way he puts it is why 4 cups and not 4 matzos or 4 pieces of meat u’k’domeh. In other words, if all we are interested in is representing the number 4, who cares what we use or how we do it. That’s a very broad way to read the Mordechai. You could read the question more narrowly: why did Chazal institute a new mitzvah of 4 kosos instead of building the representation of number 4 into an existing mitzvah, e.g. matzah. The Netziv’s reading is more like a derush/philosophical/ta’amei hamitzvos question; the more narrow reading is a “lomdish” question regarding the structure of the din.

Just for the record, the Netziv answers that the idea of the 4 leshonos is that geulah is a gradual process. You don’t go from being a slave to a free man overnight. Even if the shackles are off, there is a psychological adjustment, a social adjustment that has to take place. Chazal used 4 cups to represent this gradual shift because when a person drinks, there is a gradual change that happens as the person drifts closer to (or deeper into) inebriation.

R’ Tzadok haKohen (Pri Tzadik, Pesach 5) adds an extra twist to the question and formulates it like this: the 4 kosos are a din derabbanan; matzah is a din d’oraysa. Why would Chazal incorporate the representation of 4 into a derabbanan when they could have incorporated it into a d’oraysa?

R’ Tzadok (k’darko) sees the difference between d’oraysa and derabbanan as not just a technical distinction, but as representative of the difference between what is ingrained in a person’s neshoma vs. what can be achieved through avodah. The 4 steps of geulah are 4 stages in defining who we are as Jews. The pinnacle of all these stages is the permanent banishment of the yetzer ha’ra from within. We got to that level at mattan Torah, but lost it almost immediately – it did not become permanently ingrained in us. 3 of the 4 leshonos of geulah were, but we missed the final step. Therefore, when it comes to matzah d’oraysa, reflecting what is innately part of us, we only take 3, but not 4 matzos. When it comes to kosos, we take 4 as a symbol of what we hope to achieve by dint of our efforts, through torah sheba’al peh. Matzah, 3, is about who I am now; kosos, 4, is about where I am going and what I want to become.

the strength to have hope

Right after Moshe told Hashem that even Bnei Yisrael were not listening to him, the Torah takes what seems like a detour from the story of yetzi’as Mitzrayim into a discussion of the yichus of the shevatim and their families (6:14-27).  What is this discussion of lineage doing here?  Rashi has an answer, but I wanted to share a classic Ishbitzer.

Sometimes we see people who are really suffering but somehow they never lose hope and never stop davening.  Where does that strength come from? The Beis Ya’akov writes that when Hashem wanadiants to help a person, Hashem gives them the strength not to despair; Hashem inspires a person to turn to Him.  I think I’ve posted the Mei HaShiloach before: “terem nikra’u ani e’eneh” means that even before we start davening, Hashem responds to us by giving us the desire and strength to daven.

Bnei Yisrael thought they were the lowest of the low.  There was no point to listen to Moshe because whatever he said, it wasn’t going to make a difference.  Hashem therefore taught Moshe this parsha about their yichus.  Hashem reminded Bnei Yisrael that slavery did not define who they were – what defined who they were was their yichus to the Shivtei K-h, the greatest of the great.  Hashem restored their belief in themselves, gave them hope, and as a result they were able to believe in the possibility of redemption and daven to make it happen.

Moshe's question and the law of noncontradiction

One of the three classic laws of logic is the law of noncontradiction: something cannot be A and not A at the same time.  I can’t be at work writing this and not be at work at the same time.  I don’t think we need to get into proofs – most everyone reading this will accept that this law is true and makes sense.

Does G-d obey the law of noncontradiction?  Can G-d make something that is A and not A at the same time? 

My goal is not to get into a debate about whether G-d can make a rock that he can’t lift or how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.  My goal is to explain a parsha in chumash. 

Moshe Rabeinu at the end of last week’s parsha questioned why the shibud had grown more intense as a result of his coming to Pharoah to ask for Bnei Yisrael’s release.  M’mah nafshacha: if it was time for Bnei Yisrael to be let out, then why is the oppression increasing?  And if it’s not time for them to leave, why was he sent?

The opening of our parsha is presumably a response, but if it is, it’s an ambiguous one.  Moshe is told that G-d revealed himself to the Avos as K-l Shakai, but not with the shem Havaya.  What does that mean and how does it answer the question?

The Netziv explains that the K-l Shakai defines the purpose of creation: to reveal G-d’s glory.  Whenever G-d intervenes in the world to further our awareness of his greatness and his presence, that’s K-l Shakai.

The shem Havaya simply means that G-d is immanent and in control of everything.

The problem is these two names seem to contradict each other.

M'mah nafshach: If G-d interacts with the world as K-l Shakai, then things that happen that hide G-d’s presence cannot be attributed directly to Him.  Those are roadblocks to K-l Shakai’s revelation, obstacles to seeing his glory.  

But if G-d interacts with the world as Havaya and everything is governed by hashgacha, then hashgacha can’t have to do with G-d’s glory because it means he is behind things that disguise his glory and presence and even cause it to be diminished.

As the Netziv writes, “Im shemi ‘K-l Shakai,’ aino hakol b’hashgacha.  V’im hakol b’hashgacha, al korchach aino choshesh l’kvodo v’ain zeh ‘Shakai.’”

Does the law of noncontradiction hold true when we are talking about G-d?

What Hashem was telling Moshe is that even the Avos could not fathom how Hashem could be both “Shakai” and “Havaya” at the same time, but they knew not to ask.  We cannot imagine the law of noncontradiction not holding true, but G-d is an exception.  For Him, both “Shakai” and “Havaya” can both be true at the same time.  Hashem can b’hashgacha be behind the oppression of the shibud increasing, and at the same time, that very same event which seems to contradict everything we would associate with G-d’s glory, is itself a manifestation of K-l Shakai, the revelation of his glory.    

The Netziv writes that this parsha was not just an answer to Moshe, but is a “limud l’doros.”  We can’t understand it all, and will never have all the answers.

the removal of Pharoah's ability to do teshuvah

Last week I quoted a Midrash that Hashem sent Moshe to stop Pharoah from davening so as to not give him the opportunity to do teshuvah.  I assumed the Midrash was echoing the idea found in the Rambam (Hil Teshuvah 6:3):

  ואפשר שיחטא האדם חטא גדול או חטאים הרבה, עד שייתן הדין לפני דיין האמת שיהיה הפירעון מזה החוטא על חטאים אלו שעשה ברצונו ומדעתו, שמונעין ממנו התשובה ואין מניחין לו רשות לשוב מרשעו, כדי שימות ויאבד בחטאים שעשה.

Rambam says that as a punishment for repeated transgressions G-d can deny a person the ability to do teshuvah, as we see from the fact that G-d hardened Pharoah’s heart and did not let him repent. 

However, some of the meforshim on the Midrash learn that Pharaoh could not do teshuvah for a different reason.  The Y'fei To’ar writes that because Pharaoh’s cheit was bein adam l’chaveiro, a sin against his fellow man, his teshuvah could not come through an appeal to G-d, but could only come through his asking Bnei Yisrael for forgiveness.

Recall that in Parshas Lech Lecha Avraham was forced to go down to Mitzrayim, where Sarah was taken captive.  Pharaoh had to ask Avraham for forgiveness and he sent him away with riches.  Ramban writes that that episode is ma’aseh avos siman l’banim for the enslavement and release of Bnei Yisrael.  Perhaps the need for Pharaoh to ask mechilah of those he harmed is also part of the process that must repeat itself.

The Koshiglover (Eretz Tzvi, Va'Eira) writes that Pharoah was punished with his bechira being taken away midah k’neged.  After Moshe’s first visit, Pharaoh cracked down on Bnei Yisrael and demanded that they produce the same quota of bricks without being given the straw necessary to do the job.  Bricks without straw is a contradiction in terms – it’s an impossible task to achieve.  Pharaoh was setting up an inevitable pretext to dish out more severe punishment.  The same was now dished out to him.  Moshe demanded that Pharaoh free Bnei Yisrael, but Pharaoh was not given the means to exercise his bechira to do so.  Pharaoh was asked to do the impossible as a pretext to deliver greater punishment.

I would suggest that perhaps it was also Pharaoh’s declaration that he was a deity that contributed to this specific punishment being given.  In the parsha of shiras ha’yam Rashi comments on the pasuk, “Yemincha Hashem ne’edari ba’koach yemincha Hashem tir’atz oiyev,” (15:6) that G-d can use the very same hand he is using to have mercy and save his people to also strike and punish their enemies.  In other words, mercy and justice can exist simultaneously – the law of non-contradiction does not apply to G-d.  Pharaoh was thrust into a position where the law of non-contradiction hit him full force – he was pressed to allow Bn”Y to leave, but was denied the ability to choose to do so.  G-d with a capital G can bypass the law of non-contradiction; Pharaoh, a self-declared god with a little g and no real power, cannot.

Hashem tells Moshe at the beginning of Parshas Bo that the next makkos will be something For Bnei Yisrael to speak about to their children and grandchildren (10:2) and, “v’yedatem ki ani Hashem,” they will now know that G-d is in charge of everything.  What was significant about this makkah, about this point in time, that caused Hashem to make that promise?  Ksav Sofer writes that no matter how incredible the wonder of the makkos, it was always possible for the stubborn to argue that it was just magic or illusion.  However, there is one thing that everyone agrees that a magician cannot control – that is the human heart.  After the complete decimation of the food and water of Egypt, for Pharaoh to still not relent and not release Bnei Yisrael could only be because of yad Hashem.  That is the miracle that will cause “v’yedatem ki ani Hashem.”

The Mabi”T holds that denial of the ability to do teshuvah is a punishment meted out only to aku”m.  However, it is clear that the Rambam disagrees and applies the idea to all sinners, as his example indicates:

 וכן ישראל בימי אלייהו לפי שהרבו לפשוע, מנע מאותן המרבים תשובה, שנאמר "ואתה הסיבות את ליבם, אחורנית" (מלכים א יח,לז), כלומר מנעת מהן התשובה.

That being said, the Sefas Emes reminds us that midah tovah is always greater than punishment.  True, Hashem will slam closed the door on those who repeatedly ignore the opportunity to do teshuvah, but He will also open new doors for those who make the effort to come closer.  Even if it looks like there is no door, Hashem is “ha’posei’ach sha’ar l’dofkei b’teshuvah.”

what if Pharoah listens?

1) Normally history is a byproduct of events.  The Revolutionary War happened for whatever reasons it happened, and now, after the fact, on July 4 we eat hot dogs and watch baseball and remember those events. Sefas Emes explains that when it comes to yetzi’as Mitzrayim, the opposite is true.  “…V’yedatem ki ani Hashem,” (6:7) knowing G-d is not a byproduct, something that comes after the fact as the zeicher -– it is the cause.  Mitzrayim, galus, is hester panim.  If there is “v’yedatem ki ani Hashem,” there is no galus. 

2) Why it is that when Pharoah asked Moshe to daven to Hashem to remove the plague of frogs from Egypt, Moshe complied and did as he was asked?  Why didn’t Moshe just leave it to G-d, or tell Pharoah to daven for himself if he wants the plague removed?  Who ever said it was Moshe’s job to remove the makkah? 

Yesterday I suggested that the power of tefilah is built into nature, just like the force of gravity.  R’ Simcha Bunim m’Peshischa says the same here with respect to power of the tzadik.  There is a parallel between the story of creation and the story of Yetziyas Mitzrayim.  Both events teach us that G-d creates nature and is it’s master; He is not subject to it’s laws.  Yetziyas Mitzrayim is, “sod chidush ha’olam,” in the words of the Kol Simcha.  (The Sefas Emes speaks at length about the parallel between the 10 makkos and the 10 ma'mamaros used to create the world.)  The Torah therefore sets precedent here, at the foundation of creation, for Moshe to act not only as G-d’s messenger to bring the makkos, but also for his having the power to remove them.  The tzadik’s dominion over nature is built into creation; it’s not something that is imposed after the fact.    

3) Moshe argued that if Bnei Yisrael did not listen, “Aich yisma’eini Pharoah?”  (6:12) Rashi explains that Moshe was using logic and making a kal v’chomer: if Bn”Y won’t listen, certainly Pharoah won’t .  The Imrei Emes, however, explains that Moshe was saying to G-d that if Bnei Yisrael refused to listen, then how can he go to Pharaoh – what if Pharoah **does** listen?  How could he create such an embarrassment for Klal Yisrael that they refused to listen, but Pharoah did!  This is the same argument Yonah used when he ran away rather than go to Ninveh. 

4)  The answer to Moshe’s question of “Lamah harei’osa?” is ”Vayidaber Elokim… Ani Hashem.”  What we perceive as Elokim, the midas hadin, is really the midas harachamim disguised in a way that is impossible for us to recognize.

Pharoah's missed "shacharis"

The Midrash writes:

ורבי פנחס הכהן בר רבי חמא אמר הדא הוא דכתיב (איוב לו, יג) וחנפי לב ישימו אף לאחר שהקדוש ברוך הוא מצפה לרשעים שיעשו תשובה ואינם עושין אפילו הם רוצים באחרונה הוא נוטל את לבם שלא יעשו תשובה ומהו וחנפי לב אותן שהם באין ומחנפים בראשונה בלבם הם מביאים עליהם האף באחרונה ומהו (שם שם, שם) לא ישועו כי אסרם אף על פי שהם רוצים לשוב להקדוש ברוך הוא ובאין לעסוק בתפלה אינן יכולים למה כי אסרם שנעל בפניהם כך היה פרעה רוצה לעסוק בתפלה ואמר הקדוש ברוך הוא למשה עד שלא יצא לך והתיצב לפניו:

Pharaoh had finally decided that he would daven to Hashem and really do teshuvah.  Hashem therefore told Moshe, “Hashkeim baboker,” go to Pharaoh first thing in the morning -- interrupt Pharoah by appearing before him.  Don’t let Pharaoh daven.  At some point it is too late to do teshuvah, and so Hashem took the opportunity away from Pharoah.

Why did Moshe have to rush to stop Pharoah from davening?  If Hashem did not want Pharoah’s tefilos, he simply could have not listened and responded!   And so what if Moshe got to Pharaoh first thing in the morning – there was still the rest of the day?

Two of my children are procrastinators.  I once took out of the library for them the book Eat That Frog!: 21 great Ways to Stop Procrastinating and Get More Done inLess Time by Brian Tracy, but they dilly-dallied over reading it, so it did not make much difference.  The title of the book has nothing to do with culinary matters – it’s a time management strategy.  There are things we know we have to get done, but we really don’t want to do.  Imagine you have a big, green frog sitting in front of you that you have to eat.  You know it’s going to be a miserable experience, but you have to do it.  What would most of us do?  We would put off getting it done.  We would leave that frog sitting on the plate in front of us and ignore it for as long as possible.  We would hope the frog vanishes.  The tasks we find unpleasant are just like that big green frog – we push them off and procrastinate.  Mark Twain said that if the first thing you do each morning is eat a live frog, you know the rest of the day can’t get much worse.  If you tackle the things you are tempted to put off first, the rest of the day goes by much faster and easier. 

Davening and doing teshuvah was Pharoah’s frog.  Pharoah did not really want to do teshuvah, but he knew he had to.  Therefore, Hashem made sure to send Moshe first thing in the morning.  Once Pharaoh pushed the frog out the way, the procrastination process would take over and he would not get back to it.  Human nature would see to it that there would be no davening later in the day. 

Why did Hashem care if Pharoah davened?  The Shem m’Shmuel explains that at that time Bnei Yisrael had no zechuyos to speak of. They needed to rely completely on Hashem’s chessed, on getting a free pass without having earned it. Once the highway of pure rachamim is opened between "upstairs" and our world, then it is opened for everyone – even Pharoah can use it. If Bnei Yisrael’tefilos would be listened to without regard to whether they were up to snuff in piety, then the same standard has to apply across the board and Pharaoh's prayers would get through as well. Therefore, Hashem sent Moshe to stop Pharoah from davening.

 

I would like to suggest a different answer.  The reason Moshe had to stop Pharaoh is because tefilah is not some miraculous process – it is something built into nature.  Just like if you toss a ball up it falls down because there is a force called gravity that G-d built into the world, so too, if you daven, there are results that come about because that’s the way G-d built the world.  It may not be the results you want, it may not happen immediately – but there will be results.