inspiration comes from inside, not outside

The gemara (San 91b) quotes a debate that took place between Rebbi and Antoninus as to when the yetzer ha'ra enters a child -- at conception or at the moment of birth:

ואמר ליה אנטונינוס לרבי מאימתי יצה"ר שולט באדם משעת יצירה או משעת יציאה א"ל משעת יצירה א"ל א"כ בועט במעי אמו ויוצא אלא משעת יציאה אמר רבי דבר זה למדני אנטונינוס ומקרא מסייעו שנאמר (בראשית ד, ז) לפתח חטאת רובץ

Rebbi conceded that it was at the moment of birth and not earlier.

We read in our parsha that Rivka was disturbed by the kicking she felt in her womb:

וַיִּתְרֹֽצְצ֤וּ הַבָּנִים֙ בְּקִרְבָּ֔הּ וַתֹּ֣אמֶר אִם⁠־כֵּ֔ן לָ֥מָּה זֶּ֖ה אָנֹ֑כִי

Rashi quotes from the Midrash:

עוברת על פתחי תורה שם ועבר ויעקב רץ ומפרכס לצאת, עוברת על פתח עבודה זרה ועשו מפרכס לצאת.

If the yetzer ha'ra only enters the child just before birth, why was Eisav kicking when he passed a place of avodah zarah in utero?  How could he already have had a desire to worship avodah zarah when he had no yetzer ha'ra yet?  

I saw this question raised by R' Moshe Yechezkel Tzalach, a sefardic acharon, in his sefer Torat Moshe.  He collects a number of different answers, but I would like to suggest an approach that is not on his extensive list.  

Rashi comments on the opening pasuk of our parsha,  וְאֵלֶּה תּוֹלְדֹת יִצְחָק בֶּן⁠ אַבְרָהָם אַבְרָהָם הוֹלִיד אֶת⁠ יִצְחָק, that the Torah stresses that Yitzchak was born to Avraham because there were scoffers who tried to deny it:

לפי שהיו ליצני הדור אומרים: מאבימלך נתעברה שרה, שהרי כמה שנים שהתה עם אברהם ולא נתעברה הימנו.⁠ מה עשה הקב״ה, צר קלסתר פניו דומה לאברהם, כדי שיאמרו הכל: אברהם הוליד את יצחק. וזהו שכתוב כאן: יצחק בן אברהם היה, שהרי עדות יש שאברהם הוליד את יצחק

It seems incredible that anyone would take these scoffers seriously.  We know that it was Sarah, not Avraham, who was infertile.  Avraham had fathered Yishmael through Hagar.  Secondly, the fact that Sarah could conceive in such old age was a miracle.  Does it make sense that G-d would make a such miracle for a rasha like Avimelech and not Avraham?

On the one hand, maybe there is no rhyme or reason sense to the claims of the scoffers.  People make all kinds of  outlandish claims (if you don't believe me just spend 5 minutes on social media or listen to a Democrat or member of the MSM.)  On the other hand, the Torah sees fit to respond to those claims,  G-d made a miracle and transformed Yitzchak's visage (see Sifsei Chachamim) in order to refute then.  Why bother to refute mishugas if it's just nonsense?

Although the claim that Avimelech physically fathered Yitzchak is too incredible to take seriously, what the Torah might be responding to is the claim that Avimelech was the *spiritual* father behind Yitzchak's birth.

When Yaakov returns from Lavan's home, he sends a message to his brother Eisav telling him  עִם־לָבָ֣ן גַּ֔רְתִּי.  Rashi comments: בָר אַחֵר גַּרְתִּי בְּגִימַטְרִיָּא תרי"ג, כְּלוֹמַר, עִם לָבָן גַּרְתִּי וְתַרְיַ"ג מִצְוֹת שָׁמַרְתִּי וְלֹא לָמַדְתִּי מִמַּעֲשָׂיו הָרָעִים.  If Yaakov kept all 613 mitzvos, does it not go without saying that he did not learn from Lavan's ways?

Sometimes it is hard to get up for davening, especially in the winter when it is still dark and cold and you need to head out early before work.  When I walk down my street on those early mornings, I pass a gym at the end of the block.  Without fail, even if it is 20 degrees, pitch back and only 6-something in the morning, every parking spot on the block is taken up by women who want to get to their gym class before they start the day.  I've said to my wife many times that these women are my inspiration.  If they can get up for the gym, then I can get to minyan.  

Of course Yaakov did not follow Lavan's evil ways, but he still might still have learned from him and been inspired by him.  Like those attending the gym class, Lavan was out of bed first thing in the morning.  He was motivated! He was just motivated for all the wrong things.  He used his zerizus, his intensity, his chochma, to pursue kinah, taavah, and kavod.  Yaakov might have said, "If he can do it, I can do it," and Lavan's behavior might have been his model for good.

Sounds like a good strategy, but remember the end of Rashi: וְלֹא לָמַדְתִּי מִמַּעֲשָׂיו הָרָעִים.  The talmidei haBesh"T taught the following yesod: if tzadik is inspired by the deeds of a rasha, that provides a fig leaf, so to speak, for the rasha.  Even if the rasha never intended it, since the rasha become an example for good, they earn some degree of redemption.  Now, I'm not a tzadik, and the gym goers are not really reshaim, so I take a lesson from them, but Yaakov Avinu was a tzadik, and so he did not want to take a lesson from Lavan.  He did not want to give Lavan's wickedness any cover, any positive quality.  Therefore, he said  וְלֹא לָמַדְתִּי מִמַּעֲשָׂיו הָרָעִים.

Rashi on our parsha writes (25:20) about Rivka: בת בתואל מפדן ארם אחות לבן – להגיד שבחה: שהיתה בת רשע, ואחות רשע, ומקומה אנשי רשע, ולא למדה ממעשיהם.  Of course Rivka did not learn to do evil from Besuel, Lavan, and her surroundings.  The chiddush is that she did not take her inspiration from them for good either.  Her motivation came from inside, independently from what she saw as their bad example, and so in no way can they take credit for serving as a positive, motivating force.

What the scoffers were saying about Sarah is is that the years of chessed with Avraham were not enough to earn Sarah the right to conceive.  It was only once she was in Avimelech's home, when she had the negative example of his behavior to inspire her avodah, that she was finally able to merit having a child.  (For those who are not happy with seeing this from the Besh"T, see my son's post for a similar vort from the Beis haLevi and other answers as well.)  This is what the Torah comes to refute and tell us that it all came from Avraham.

Getting back to our original question about Eisav --  עוברת על פתח עבודה זרה ועשו מפרכס לצאת -- where does it say that Eisav wanted to get out to **worship** avodah zarah?  I don't want to give Eisav too much credit, but maybe at this point in his life, in utero, pre-the entrance of the yetzer ha'ra, that was not Eisav's intention at all. The difference between Yaakov and Eisav was where to draw inspiration from.  Yaakov wanted to run out to the beis medrash and derive his inspiration from there.  Eisav wanted to see what was going on in the beis avodah zarah because the zerizus for evil is sometimes even stronger than that for good, and can therefore serve as a better example for what we should be doing in a positive sense.

Rivka, who knew not to draw any inspiration from Besuel and Lavan's actions, thought this a very dangerous road to go down and was therefore troubled by Eisav's behavior.  Inspiration needs to come from inside, not from what we see out in the world.  

so long as the other guy doesn't win

The Yalkut Shimoni writes that the news of Avraham Avinu's passing led Eisav to kerifa:

אָמַר לוֹ עֵשָׂו מַה טִּיבוֹ שֶׁל תַּבְשִׁיל זֶה, אָמַר לוֹ שֶׁמֵּת אוֹתוֹ זָקֵן. אָמַר לוֹ בְּאוֹתוֹ זָקֵן נָגְעָה מִדַּת הַדִּין, אָמַר אִם כֵּן לֹא יֵשׁ מַתַּן שָׂכָר, וְלֹא תְּחִיַּת הַמֵּתִים

If ruchniyus had no meaning for Eisav, why then did he value so much the blessing of a tzadik, his father Yitzchak?  How can you have emunas chachamim in the power of a blessing but not believe in schar v'onesh?  

R' Eliezer Kahan, the menahel of Yeshivas Gateshead, asks this question in his sichos in the sefer Nachalas Eliezer.  I'm not sure that this question is really a question, as plenty of people who are not shomer mitzvos lined up for a dollar and a bracha from the L. Rebbe.  People who don't believe in G-d still believe in a Rebbe : )  

R' Kahan answered that Eisav's belief or lack of belief was not a product of deep philosophical thought, but was motivated by his desires and appetites.  When a person is motivated by desire, then his belief is malleable depending on the whims and desires of the moment.  Serving in the mikdash was not something Eisav cared about, so he happily discarded his beliefs and gave up the bechora for a pot of soup.  When it came time to get the brachos, the promise of reward led Eisav to put his trust in the brachos of his father in order to reap that bounty.

I think one can perhaps draw another distinction.  The butcher of Brisk once came to R' Chaim to pasken a shayla on his cow and R' Chaim declared the animal a treifa.  This was a considerable loss for the butcher, but he took the news with equinimity.  When R' Chaim on another occassion paskened against this same butcher in a dinei mamonos dispute with his neighbor, the butcher raged against the psak and hurled invectives against R' Chaim.  This was a much smaller loss than that of the cow, so why was the butcher so upset?  The answer is that it is not the loss which bothered him -- it's the fact that someone else won.   

When it came to the sale of the bechora, Eisav weighed the gain of a pot of soup against what he thought was the meaningless value of bechora, service in the Mikdash, and he did not feel cheated in any way by the deal.  In fact, he though he got the better end of the deal, as R' Dovid Tzvi Hoffman comments:

ויאכל... ויבז – במלים ברורות מראה הכתוב שלא ידע עשו להעריך נכס רוחני, ושכל שאיפתו לאכילה ולשתיה היתה מכוונת, כך שאפילו אחר שאכל לשבעו, לא התחרט על המכירה הזאת. אדרבה, חשב שעשה כאן ״עסק טוב״, כי אכן מעיד הכתוב – ״ויקם וילך״

It was, in Eisav's eyes, a fair transaction.

The same cannot be said about the loss of the brachos.  Here, Eisav did not see the link between the bechora and the brachos and thought that Yaakov took what was rightfully his.  Even if the brachos meant little to Eisav, it's the fact that Yaakov won, the fact that he was bested, which drove him mad. 

We see similar behavior from the Plishtim elsewhere in our parsha (26:18):  

וַיָּ֨שׇׁב יִצְחָ֜ק וַיַּחְפֹּ֣ר׀ אֶת⁠־בְּאֵרֹ֣ת הַמַּ֗יִם אֲשֶׁ֤ר חָֽפְרוּ֙ בִּימֵי֙ אַבְרָהָ֣ם אָבִ֔יו וַיְסַתְּמ֣וּם פְּלִשְׁתִּ֔ים אַחֲרֵ֖י מ֣וֹת אַבְרָהָ֑ם

Stealing the water of wells is understandable, but why stuff up the wells?!  Water is a valuable commodity in the hot climate of Israel.

I recently heard a shiur by the new chief Rabbi Kalman Ber in which he suggested that what motivated the Plishtim was ensuring that the other guy loses.  It didn't matter that they had no water -- so long as the other guy didn't get any either.  This is their attitude ad ha'yom ha'zeh.  It's not enough for them to have a state -- they could have negotiated for that many times.  What bothers them is that we have one.  Therefore, they can never be satisfied and will never achieve their goal.  

the relationship makes the gift

1) Yitzchak blessed Eisav (27:39)

הִנֵּה מִשְׁמַנֵּי הָאָרֶץ יִהְיֶה מוֹשָׁבֶךָ וּמִטַּל הַשָּׁמַיִם מֵעָל.

Rashi comments and explains: משמני הארץ וגו׳ – זו איטליא

Why does Rashi comment here but when those same words appear earlier in the parsha (27:28):

 וְיִתֶּן⁠ לְךָ הָאֱלֹקים מִטַּל הַשָּׁמַיִם וּמִשְׁמַנֵּי הָאָרֶץ וְרֹב דָּגָן וְתִירֹשׁ

 Rashi is silent and offers no explanation?

Taz in Divrei David explains that there are two types of land which we would call blessed: 1) land which is inherently fertile, has a good climate, and abundant resources; 2) land which inherently has none of the above, but through Hashem's hashgacha pratis becomes such a place.

Eisav's bracha, unlike Yaakov's, starts with the word הִנֵּה.  Yitzchak was telling Eisav, "Here it is before you -- a land that has everything you could want, מִשְׁמַנֵּי הָאָרֶץ."  Since he is referring to a specific place that is inherently good, Rashi fills in for us that it is Italy, perhaps alluding to the Roman empire, that he was referring to.

Yaakov's bracha starts off very differently: וְיִתֶּן⁠ לְךָ הָאֱלֹקים מִטַּל הַשָּׁמַיִם.  Yaakov is not being given a land which has abundance, a specific place that Rashi can point to that meets this criteria of משמני הארץ.  Instead, he is being given the bracha of receiving from Shamayim.  It's that which transforms Eretz Yisrael into מִשְׁמַנֵּי הָאָרֶץ. 

In parshas Braishis the snake is cursed to always eat the dust of the ground.  The famous question is what kind of curse is this when dust can be found everywhere guaranteeing the snake easy sustenance forever?  The mefoshim answer that by having everything he needs, the snake loses the opportunity for forge a relationship with Hashem.

Both Eisav and Yaakov receive the blessing of מִשְׁמַנֵּי הָאָרֶץ, but only Yaakov's bracha is the product of having a relationship with Hashem.

"lifnos erev" = birur tov and ra

 וַיֵּצֵ֥א יִצְחָ֛ק לָשׂ֥וּחַ בַּשָּׂדֶ֖ה לִפְנ֣וֹת עָ֑רֶב

Rivka's neshoma was trapped in the home of Lavan and Besuel -- the tov was mixed in with the ra, as is the nature of things in this world after the cheit of Adam.  Yitzchak went out to daven לִפְנ֣וֹת עָ֑רֶב, to ask Hashem to remove a little bit of the תערובת of this world so that the good could come out.

emor me'at -- don't tempt the yetzer ha'ra

According to some Rishonim it was not the akeidah which was the final, greatest test of Avraham Avinu; it was the challenge of buying Me'aras haMachpeila.  Had you asked me, I would have said that after the akeidah, buying Me'aras haMachpeila almost seems like an afterthought.  That gufa may be the hesber of why it was the most challenging test.  Imagine a person who is rushed to the hospital with life threatening pain in his chest.  After a few hours in the emergency room, the doctor comes in and says, "I have some good new and some bad news.  The good news is that your heart is OK, no problem found.  The bad news is there is a hangnail that we need to take care of before you are discharged to go home."  The person would probably be thinking, "What are you bothering me with nonsense for?"  Here too, after the akeidah, Avraham might have just wanted to push aside the bother of the whole back and forth with Efron and not deal with it.  Had Avraham been a lesser person, he would have no doubt lost patience.  He could have argued to Hashem, "I've already proven myself -- what do you want with me already?  Why bother me with these little things now?"  But Avraham didn't do that.  He accepted the small challenges in stride, as trivial and as nonsensical as they might have seemed in light of what he had just been through. 

The gemara (BM 87) contrasts the behavior of Avraham in welcoming guests with the behavior of Efron:

 כתיב ואקחה פת לחם וכתיב ואל הבקר רץ אברהם אמר רבי אלעזר מכאן שצדיקים אומרים מעט ועושים הרבה רשעים אומרים הרבה ואפילו מעט אינם עושים מנלן מעפרון מעיקרא כתיב ארץ ארבע מאות שקל כסף ולבסוף כתיב וישמע אברהם אל עפרון וישקל אברהם לעפרון את הכסף אשר דבר באזני בני חת ארבע מאות שקל כסף עובר לסוחר דלא שקל מיניה אלא קנטרי דאיכא דוכתא דקרי ליה לתיקלא קנטירא

Avraham offered only a simple meal of bread, but overdelivered and brought out a whole fleishig seudah.  Efron originally offered to give Avraham the Me'aras haMachpeilah for free, but in the end he charged full price paid only in top currency.  

Chazal in Pirkei Avos (1:16) teach us this same lesson: אמור מעט ועשׂה הרבּה.  

What is this idea of speaking less and doing more?  If the idea is that a person should not promise too much lest he break his word, then we already have halachos that tell us that a person should keep his word.  There is the idea of הין צדק; there is the idea of מי שׁפּרע that once you give your word to an agreement you should keep it even if the transaction is technically not yet binding.  

Furthermore, it would seem that Avraham's behavior is a poor proof to this idea.  Perhaps Avraham offered only a small meal because he was afraid that if he offered too much, the guests would shy away so as to not bother him.  Maharasha comments on that gemara that this is exactly what was going through Avraham's mind: והטעם מפני שלפעמים ימנע האורח מלהכנס והמקבל מלקבל כדי שלא ירבה לטרוח את המקבל והנותן.  It's not a general סיג to prevent a person from failing to keep his word, but a limited din by hachnasas orchim.  So how do we get from here to a general principle?

In the Shiurei Daas R' Bloch (this shiur was written over by by wife's grandfather R" Dov Yehuda Schochet) sees the idea here as not just about keeping or failing to keep one's word, but the relationship between speech and action is a siman as to a person's attitude.  The tzadik is all too aware of both the difficulties and obstacles that the yetzer and life can throw in his way and of the limits of his own abilities.  Therefore, he is wont to promise too much.  Once the tzadik gets going, however, he manages to find within the strength to overachieve.  The rasha, in contrast, consistently underestimates the difficulties that stand in his way and he overestimates his own ability.  He therefore feels free to promise the world, thinking it will be easy to deliver, only to have his efforts end in failure and frustration.

The gemara in Sukkah (52a) describes the reaction of the tzadikim and reshaim to the future destruction of the yetzer ha'ra:

כִּדְדָרֵשׁ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לֶעָתִיד לָבֹא מְבִיאוֹ הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא לְיֵצֶר הָרָע וְשׁוֹחֲטוֹ בִּפְנֵי הַצַּדִּיקִים וּבִפְנֵי הָרְשָׁעִים צַדִּיקִים נִדְמֶה לָהֶם כְּהַר גָּבוֹהַּ וּרְשָׁעִים נִדְמֶה לָהֶם כְּחוּט הַשַּׂעֲרָה הַלָּלוּ בּוֹכִין וְהַלָּלוּ בּוֹכִין צַדִּיקִים בּוֹכִין וְאוֹמְרִים הֵיאַךְ יָכוֹלְנוּ לִכְבּוֹשׁ הַר גָּבוֹהַּ כָּזֶה וּרְשָׁעִים בּוֹכִין וְאוֹמְרִים הֵיאַךְ לֹא יָכוֹלְנוּ לִכְבּוֹשׁ אֶת חוּט הַשַּׂעֲרָה הַזֶּה

R' Bloch writes that this gemara parallels our sugya of אמור מעט ועשׂה הרבּה.  The tzadikim see the yetzer as Mt Everest.  Who can say if anyone will make it to the top?  Their caution serves them well.  Reshaim, however, see the yetzer as just a thread, a minor obstacle.  They are therefore unprepared for the challenges that befall them and fail to deliver the goods.

While R' Bloch sees אמור מעט ועשׂה הרבּה as a siman of a person's character, R' Yehuda Deri explains that it is a sibah, that talk itself can be the cause of failure. 

R' Deri points out that Efron's intentions from the get-go may indeed have been to give Me'aras haMachpeilah as a free gift to Avraham.  Notice the repetition 3x of variations of  נָתַתִּי in Efron's declaration:

 לֹא⁠ אֲדֹנִי שְׁמָעֵנִי הַשָּׂדֶה נָתַתִּי לָךְ וְהַמְּעָרָה אֲשֶׁר⁠ בּוֹ לְךָ נְתַתִּיהָ לְעֵינֵי בְנֵי⁠ עַמִּי נְתַתִּיהָ לָּךְ קְבֹר מֵתֶךָ.

And Efron deliberately says this in public, to ensure that if he retracts, he will suffer embarrassment.  He put himself in a situation where the pressure was on to keep to his word. 

How then does a person go from promising so much to delivering so little?  

R' Deri explains that היא הנותנת!  Precisely because Efron talked a big talk, his words led to his downfall.

There is another gemara in Sukkah on that same daf (52a) quoted by R' Bloch: 

כל הגדול מחברו יצרו גדול הימנו

The greater the person, the greater the yetzer ha'ra that fights against them.

We are introduced to Efron with the words וְעֶפְרוֹן יֹשֵׁב בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי⁠ חֵת (23:10).  Rashi comments: אותו היום מינוהו שוטר עליהם. מפני חשיבותו של אברהם  Efron became a big man in town overnight.  He made big promises.  He became through his position and his talk a גדול מחברו.  

A big man who makes big promises makes a big target for the yetzer ha'ra.  

Chazal advise אמור מעט ועשׂה הרבּה not just as a סיג lest you fail to deliver.  Chazal are teaching is that אמור מעט because otherwise you WILL fail to deliver.  Too much talk invites the yetzer/tempts fate, which leads inevitably to failure.

The advice of אמור מעט ועשׂה הרבּה is preceded in Avos with the command of עשׂה תורתך קבע.  What is the connection between these two ideas?  The Sefer Chareidim writes that a person needs to set a fixed portion to learn each day, e.g. daf yomi, mishna yomi, etc.  There has to be a seder kavu'a.  However, says the Sefer Chareidim, best to keep that commitment in the back of your mind, or in your heart, and not verbalize it.  אמור מעט ועשׂה הרבּה  Once you verbalize the commitment, you are making yourself into a target for the yetzer ha'ra and you won't then be able to succeed. You don't need to pit a "Do the Daf" bumper sticker on your car or baseball hat.  You don't need to advertise that you are גדול מחברו because you have a seder kavu'a.  Don't become a target for the yetzer.  Don't talk about it -- just do it (see R' Chaim Elazari's Nesiv Chaim who says a slightly different pshat in this Sefer Chareidim, but I think it fits R' Deri's approach.)

Our mission is to be like Avraham Avinu, to under promise and overdeliver.  R' Shmuel Birnbaum notes that every morning we say in Baruch she'Amar נְגַדֶּלְךָ וּנְשַׁבֵּחֲךָ וּנְפָאֶרְךָ וְנַזְכִּיר שִׁמְךָ נַמְלִיכְךָ.  That's the minimum bar that we set for ourselves -- that the "emor me'at" part!  We are supposed to do even more.  Ha'levay that we should at least strive to do so.  

akeidas Yitzchak - all a big misunderstanding?

A hypothetical question: If I think that there is a mitzvah to walk barefoot to shul every day, and I fulfill that mitzvah with great mesirus nefesh, with blisters on my feet in the summer, and even at the cost of getting frostbite in the winter, do I get schar for a kiyum mitzvah?

This should not require much thought to answer.  How can I get schar for a mitzvah that's not a mitzvah?  Yes, there is schar for good intentions: אפילו חשב אדם לעשות מצוה, ונאנס ולא עשאה, מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו עשאה (Kid 40a), but that's where the good intentions were to do a mitzvah.  In this case, there is no mitzvah!  

Seems like an obvious point, but it also seems to fly in the face of our tefilos and our understanding of this week's parsha.  We call upon Hashem to remember the zechus of akeidas Yitzchak.  We view akeidas Yitzchak as the greatest act of mesirus nefesh and ahavas Hashem; it was the greatest test Avraham was called upon to pass, and which he did with flying colors.  Yet Rashi comments on G-d's command וְהַעֲלֵהוּ שָׁם לְעֹלָה עַל אַחַד הֶהָרִים אֲשֶׁר אֹמַר אֵלֶיך that:

 לא אמר לו: שחטהו, לפי שלא היה חפץ הקב״ה לשחטו, אלא יעלהו להר לעשותו עולה, ומשהעלהו, אמר לו: הורידהו

G-d told Avraham to bring Yitzchak up to the mountain, but not to actually sacrifice him. There was never such a mitzvah!  

Does this mean that Avraham chopping wood, taking a knife, preparing to sacrifice his son, was all a big mistake and misunderstanding?  Did Avraham misinterpret the dvar Hashem?  

If there was never such a mitzvah, why do invoke the schar Avraham's deed forever after?  It's not schar for just carrying Yitzchak up and down the mountain, but schar for the willingness to sacrifice Yitzchak that we are asking Hashem to remember.  If that was never a mitzvah, why should it be worth any more reward any more than my walking to shul barefoot?  

R' Shmuel Birnbaum (in Tiferes Shmuel on the parsha) answers this question with a yesod developed by the Ketzos in his introduction.  The gemara (BM 86a) writes that there was a machlokes in heaven about a din in hil negaim:

 קָא מִיפַּלְגִי בִּמְתִיבְתָּא דִרְקִיעָא: אִם בַּהֶרֶת קוֹדֶמֶת לְשֵׂעָר לָבָן – טָמֵא, וְאִם שֵׂעָר לָבָן קוֹדֵם לַבַּהֶרֶת – טָהוֹר.

סָפֵק – הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא אוֹמֵר: טָהוֹר, וְכוּלְּהוּ מְתִיבְתָּא דִרְקִיעָא אָמְרִי: טָמֵא. וְאָמְרִי: מַאן נוֹכַח? נוֹכַח רַבָּה בַּר נַחְמָנִי. דְּאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר נַחְמָנִי: אֲנִי יָחִיד בִּנְגָעִים, אֲנִי יָחִיד בְּאֹהָלוֹת

כִּי הֲוָה קָא נָיְחָא נַפְשֵׁיהּ, אֲמַר: טָהוֹר, טָהוֹר. יָצָאת בַּת קוֹל וְאָמְרָה: אַשְׁרֶיךָ רַבָּה בַּר נַחְמָנִי שֶׁגּוּפְךָ טָהוֹר, וְיָצָאתָה נִשְׁמָתְךָ בְּטָהוֹר

How could Rabbah bar Nachmaini resolve a machlokes between G-d himself and the mesivra d'rekiya!?  Isn't it obvious that G-d knows the right answer?

The Ketzos quotes the Derashos haRan as explaining that built into the Torah is the allowance for different possible interpretations.  "Eilu v'eilu divrei Elokim chaim."  In an absolute sense there is no one "right" answer.  So how do we figure our what to do?  The Torah resolves the problem with the principle of "lo ba'shamayim hi" - the final arbiter of what is "correct" is whatever the chachmei ha'dor think is correct.  It's in our hands to determine the "right" answer.  Therefore, the heavens had to turn to Rabbah bar Nachmeini, the posek ha'dor in hil negaim, to determine exactly what the psak should be.  It's not what's "right" in heaven that matters, but rather what we think is "right" on earth.

The Midrash (B"R 8:5) writes that there was a debate among the angels as to whether or not it was worth it to create man:

אָמַר רַבִּי סִימוֹן, בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁבָּא הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא לִבְרֹאת אֶת אָדָם הָרִאשׁוֹן, נַעֲשׂוּ מַלְאֲכֵי הַשָּׁרֵת כִּתִּים כִּתִּים, וַחֲבוּרוֹת חֲבוּרוֹת, מֵהֶם אוֹמְרִים אַל יִבָּרֵא, וּמֵהֶם אוֹמְרִים יִבָּרֵא, הֲדָא הוּא דִכְתִיב (תהלים פה, יא): חֶסֶד וֶאֱמֶת נִפְגָּשׁוּ צֶדֶק וְשָׁלוֹם נָשָׁקוּ. חֶסֶד אוֹמֵר יִבָּרֵא, שֶׁהוּא גּוֹמֵל חֲסָדִים. וֶאֱמֶת אוֹמֵר אַל יִבָּרֵא, שֶׁכֻּלּוֹ שְׁקָרִים. צֶדֶק אוֹמֵר יִבָּרֵא, שֶׁהוּא עוֹשֶׂה צְדָקוֹת. שָׁלוֹם אוֹמֵר אַל יִבָּרֵא, דְּכוּלֵיהּ קְטָטָה. מֶה עָשָׂה הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא נָטַל אֱמֶת וְהִשְׁלִיכוֹ לָאָרֶץ, הֲדָא הוּא דִכְתִיב (דניאל ח, יב): וְתַשְׁלֵךְ אֱמֶת אַרְצָה,

What does it mean that G-d threw emes down to earth?  How does silencing truth's voice, removing his platform, address the issue raised?  

R' Yaakov Kaminetzki (in Emes l'Yaakov) explains that there are two different levels or standards of truth: there is absolute truth, and then there is the relative truth that we humans are used to dealing with.  When you sing "kallah na'ah v'chasudah" at a wedding (Kesubos 17), it doesn't matter whether or not the kallah is really beautiful as measured on some absolute scale of beauty.  All that matters is that in her chosson's eyes she is beautiful.  As far as he is concerned, relative to his frame of reference, it's the truth.  When the Midrash says that Hashem kicked the midah of emes down to earth, it doesn't mean that Hashem chose to disregard truth.  What it means is that the standard of truth for mankind is not absolute truth as it exists in heaven, but is relative truth as it exists for us on earth.  

"Lo ba'shamayim hi" means the same is true of halacha.  The "right" answer is the one that appears correct to us, not what is "right" in some absolute sense.

R' Shmuel Birnbaum is mechadesh that the same principle applies to nevuah.  What the prophet sees or hears is subject to his interpretation, and that is what determines the meaning of the nevuah.  When Avraham was commanded הַעֲלֵהוּ שָׁם לְעֹלָה, since Avraham interpreted that to mean that Hashem was asking him to sacrifice Yitzchak, the act of literal sacrifice became a mitzvah.  It doesn't matter in an absolute sense what Hashem meant or didn't mean, because that is not the standard by which we determine what halacha or nevuah means.  The standard of truth is our perception (by "our" I mean the chachmei ha'mesorah or the navi) of what is meant. 

We say in the bracha before the haftarah אֲשֶׁר בָּחַר בִּנְבִיאִים טוֹבִים, וְרָצָה בְדִבְרֵיהֶם הַנֶאֱמָרִים בֶּאֱמֶת.  R'SB explains that when we say the words הַנֶאֱמָרִים בֶּאֱמֶת, we are not thanking Hashem for giving us prophets that don't c"v lie -- that should go without saying.  What we are affirming in our bracha is this principle that the navi's interpretation of the dvar Hashem -- his perception of what Hashem meant -- is true, נֶאֱמָרִים בֶּאֱמֶת, because that is the only truth that is relevant and that counts. 

no substitute for a parent

Avaraham made his way to Eretz Yisrael and wandered around until he reached Shchem (12:6):

 וַיַּעֲבֹ֤ר אַבְרָם֙ בָּאָ֔רֶץ עַ֚ד מְק֣וֹם שְׁכֶ֔ם עַ֖ד אֵל֣וֹן מוֹרֶ֑ה וְהַֽכְּנַעֲנִ֖י אָ֥ז בָּאָֽרֶץ

Why did he stop there?  Rashi explains עד מקום שכם – להתפלל על בני יעקב כשיבאו בשכם  He stopped to daven for the children of Yaakov.

Later in the parsha, Avraham tells Hashem that gifts don't mean anything so long as he does not have any children (15:2-3):

וַיֹּ֣אמֶר אַבְרָ֗ם ה׳ אלקים מַה⁠־תִּתֶּן⁠־לִ֔י וְאָנֹכִ֖י הוֹלֵ֣ךְ עֲרִירִ֑י וּבֶן⁠־מֶ֣שֶׁק בֵּיתִ֔י ה֖וּא דַּמֶּ֥שֶׂק אֱלִיעֶֽזֶר

וַיֹּ֣אמֶר אַבְרָ֔ם הֵ֣ן לִ֔י לֹ֥א נָתַ֖תָּה זָ֑רַע וְהִנֵּ֥ה בֶן⁠־בֵּיתִ֖י יוֹרֵ֥שׁ אֹתִֽי

Sifsei Chachamim asks: If Avraham stopped to daven for the Bnei Yaakov at Shechem, then he must have known that he would have children and grandchildren and great grandchildren!  How are we to understand Avraham's complaint?

Netziv says a beautiful pshat in those pesukim later in the parsha which answers the Sifsei Chachamim's question.  The words of Avraham's complaint are out of order, as the Ohr haChaim points out: אומרו הן לי - היה לו לומר הן לא נתת לי.  Netziv explains that Avraham deliberately put the word  לִ֔י first.  What Avraham was saying is that even if I have children, what good is it at this point in my life?  How can I in my old age, when my best years are long past, raise them and transmit to them my values, my ideology, my torah?  In what sense will those children be MY children, given to ME - לִ֔י - if I cannot fully experience raising them?  

Netziv's pshat begs the question of why was this was of such concern to Avraham Avinu.  In those very pesukim Avraham refers to Elizer as דַּמֶּ֥שֶׂק אֱלִיעֶֽזֶר.  Chazal tell us that Eliezer earned this title because he was דולה ומשקה מתורתו לאחרים, Eliezer was capable of teaching to others all the torah of Avraham.  Eliezer was such a tzadik that he went alive straight into Gan Eden at the end of his life.  Couldn't Avraham have charged Eliezer with the task of teaching his child torah, just like Eliezer taught it to others? Couldn't he have sent the child to cheider, to yeshiva, to learn there?

We see from here, writes R' Chaim Elazari in his Nesivei Chaim, is that no matter how good the yeshiva or cheider or Beis Yaakov, it's no substitute for a parent.  You don't become Avraham AVINU through shlichus.  Chinuch is a mitzvah she'bigufo, it requires direct interaction between parent and child.  When Avraham davened for a child, it is this experience that he pined for.  

2) Another great point from R' Chaim Elazari: Avraham did not want to accept any gifts from the King of Sdom lest people say that Sdom, not Hashem, made him rich  אִם⁠־מִחוּט֙ וְעַ֣ד שְׂרֽוֹךְ⁠־נַ֔עַל וְאִם⁠־אֶקַּ֖ח מִכׇּל⁠־אֲשֶׁר⁠־לָ֑ךְ וְלֹ֣א תֹאמַ֔ר אֲנִ֖י הֶעֱשַׁ֥רְתִּי אֶת⁠־אַבְרָֽם (14:23). Why did Avraham not have the same compunctions about taking gifts from Pharoah earlier in the parsha?

R' Elazari answers that Hashem's promise that He would make Avraham rich applied only in Eretz Yisrael.  Therefore, he did not want Sdom to get any credit.  In chu"l, however, Avraham had no guarantee, and could therefore could accept the gifts of others.

In galus, accepting hand outs is acceptable. In chu"l we live in a state of dependency on others for protection and sustenance.  Not so in Eretz Yisrael, where we are meant to stand on our own two feet, reliant only on Hashem for our needs.  We may not be there yet, but it's important to keep the goal and ideal in mind.

l'chaim - to life!

The gemara (Sanhedrim 108) tells us that Noach found a certian bird sitting quietly in a room in the ark not bothering anyone or anything.  He asked the bird, "Don't you want food?" to which the bird replied, "I saw you were busy and didn't want to bother you."  In response to this act of kindness Noach blessed the bird that it should live forever.

Maharasha asks: this gemara seems to contradict a different Chazal.  The Midrash teaches that this bird lived forever because it was the only animal that did not listen to Chavah and eat from the Eitz ha'Daas:

מהכא משמע דמברכתו של נח זכה לכך אבל בב״ר אמרו ותקח מפריו ותאכל הכל שמעו לה ואכלו חוץ מעוף א׳ ושמו חול הה״ד וכחול ארבה ימים אלף שנה הוא חי ובסוף אלף שנים גופו כלה וכו׳ וחוזר ומגדל אבריו וחי ע״כ וק״ל

One possible simple answer is that not eating from the Eitz ha'Daas prevented natural death, but there was always the chance that the bird might be hunted and killed.  Noach's blessing prevented even that from occurring.

Rav Pincus in Tiferes Torah suggests a different answer.  We've in the past discussed the gemara (R"H 32) that teaches that on Rosh haShana that angels are perplexed as to why Bn"Y are not saying hallel -- R"H is still a yom tov after all?  Hashem answers that it is impossible to sing hallel and be joyous when the Book of Life and Book of Death stand open before us:

אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ אָמְרוּ מַלְאֲכֵי הַשָּׁרֵת לִפְנֵי הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא רִבּוֹנוֹ שֶׁל עוֹלָם מִפְּנֵי מָה אֵין יִשְׂרָאֵל אוֹמְרִים שִׁירָה לְפָנֶיךָ בְּרֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה וּבְיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים אָמַר לָהֶם אֶפְשָׁר מֶלֶךְ יוֹשֵׁב עַל כִּסֵּא דִין וְסִפְרֵי חַיִּים וְסִפְרֵי מֵתִים פְּתוּחִין לְפָנָיו וְיִשְׂרָאֵל אוֹמְרִים שִׁירָה.

B'shalama the Book of Death being open, asks Rav Pincus, neicha that we should be trembling in our boots.  But why does the gemara also mention the fact that the Book of Life is open?  Why is our trepidation on Yom haDin related to that book as well?  

We see from this Chazal a tremendous yesod: Life means more than the absence of death.  It's not enough to hope you are not inscribed in the Book of Death on Rosh HaShana and m'meila, if nothing bad happens, life will continue as-is ad infinitum with no need to do anything more.  A person needs to have a reason to live; a person needs to strive for fulfillment, for growth.  This is especially true on the Yom haDin, especially on Rosh haShana when the entire world has a chance to renew itself and be reborn.  If a person is not part of that, what is life for?  We are beyond the days of Rosh haShana, but this shabbos is also Rosh Chodesh, a time of hischadshus.  It's not enough to slide into the new month maintaining status quo.  We have to renew ourselves, renew our reason for being here, or what are we living for?  

That's why we are shaking in our boots when the Book of Life is open.  If you just skate by by avoiding the Book of Death without a Book of Life, you don't really have a life after all.  

Unless we also make it into that Book of Life, our existence will be a futile exercise and will inevitably draw to a close. 

Think for a moment about the two special trees in Gan Eden, the Eitz haDaas and the Eitz haChaim.  If being alive means no more than avoiding death, then why was there an Eitz haChaim?  Avoiding the Eitz haDaas alone would do the trick of guaranteeing eternal life?  Al korchacha life must be about more than cheating death.  We need an Eitz haChaim, we need a Sefer haChaim, meaning and reason for being here, or all the years in eternity don't really matter.

This the lesson Chazal are teaching us in this story about Noach's magical bird.  True, the bird did not eat from the Eitz ha'Daas and therefore had the potential to live forever, but what a sad, meaningless existence that would be. Such a life would come to nothing and ultimately fizzle out on its own. It was by doing an act of chessed that this bird demonstrated that its existence had positive meaning, and that is the secret to the bracha which Noach gave it of true eternal life.