Thursday, August 15, 2013

remembering Miriam -- using our talents wisely

The warning /command not to forget what happened to Miriam when she spoke out against Moshe, “Zachor eis asher asah Hashem l’Miriam b’derech b’tzeischem M’Mitzrayim,” (24:9) places the event as having occurred in the context of leaving Egypt.  Since everything in the midbar can be described as having happened on the road from Mitzrayim to Eretz Yisrael, it seems that the emphasis on “b’derech b’tzeischem m’Mitzrayim” has no unique significance here.  So why does the Torah mention it?

Perhaps the Torah is reminding us that Miriam slipped up despite seeing with her own eyes the role Moshe played in bringing about the redemption from Egypt.  If such an error could be made by Miriam, how much more so must we be on guard (see Ramban, R' Bachyei).

Rashbam explains that the Torah is not addressing what Miriam did, but rather is reminding us what Hashem did on her behalf.  Even though Bnei Yisrael was “b’derech b’tzeischem m’Mitzrayim” and anxious to keep moving on the road away from Egypt toward Eretz Yisrael, the entire camp waited on behalf of Miriam and did not travel until her leprosy was cured.  Chasam Sofer makes a similar point, contrasting the command with respect to Amalek, “Zachor eis asher asah lecha Amalek,” where we are told to remember their deeds, with the command here, “Zachor eis asher asah Hashem Elokecha,” where the focus is on G-d’s chessed and not Miriam’s wrongdoing.

The Midrash gives a beautiful explanation:

 רבנן אמרי:
למה הדבר דומה?
למלך שעלה מן המלחמה קילסה אותו מטרונה.
אמר המלך: תיקרי אומן של סנקליטור. לאחר ימים התחילה לערב אוננא של מלך.
אמר המלך: כך עשית?!
תיטרד למטלון!
כך, בשעה שעשה הקב"ה מלחמת הים אמרה מרים שירה ונקראת נביאה, שנאמר: (שמות טו) ותקח מרים הנביאה. כיון, שאמרה לשון הרע על אחיה, אמר הקב"ה תיטרד למטלון! שנאמר: (במדבר יב) ותסגר מרים:
 
According to the Midrash, “b’derech b’tzeischem m’Mitzrayim” is not speaking about the episode of Miriam’s lashon ha’ra.  It is speaking about Miriam singing shirah at Yam Suf.  The Midrash is telling us that when we remember what Miriam did wrong, it must be in context of what Miriam did right; only then do we have the complete picture.  Why was Miriam judged so harshly for just a few words that she said with the best of intentions in private to Aharon?  Because Miriam had the wonderful gift of being able to use words properly and sing to Hashem.  Someone who is given a special talent, someone who can sing shirah, is held to a different standard than those who do not have that special gift.

Wednesday, August 14, 2013

why no eglah arufah after the murderer is caught?

The Rambam explains that the whole process of eglah arufah, which was a massive public spectacle involving leaders of the city and members of Sanhedrin, was designed to create publicity.  The more people hear about the discovery of a murder victim, the more likely someone who saw something or knows something will step forward and provide information that will help catch the murderer.

Chazal explain that the process of eglah arufah was an opportunity for the leaders of the city and judges to confess that they did no wrong.  Of course we do not suspect the leaders of actually having committed murder.  But who would likely fall prey to a murderer other than a lonely soul, perhaps someone passing through town, someone who had no friends or protectors close by?  The city leaders are responsible for seeing that wayfarers have food and lodging; they thereofre had to declare that their city was not hostile to strangers, that a guest would find a welcoming home to stay in and accompaniment on his journey when he chose to leave.


R’ Yehudah Leib Chasman asks: if this is the reason for the eglah arufah ceremony, wouldn’t it make at least as much sense to perform the ceremony after the murderer was found as beforehand?  Let’s say the victim was in fact a traveler killed by a bandit -- wouldn’t there be even more reason to offer an eglah arufah and confess that the traveler was not ignored, that he was made welcome, after knowing that these were the facts?  Yet, the halacha is that once the murderer is known (even if there is but one witness), the eglah arufah ceremony is not performed.  Why?

He answers with a yesod that the ba’alei mussar speak of in many places.  Once the facts of the case are known, it is obvious to all that amends need to be made.  The leaders don’t need an eglah arufah to point a finger at them and remind them that they are the parties responsible to see that strangers are made welcome in their town.  It’s only beforehand, when the facts are unclear, that there is the tendency to dismiss events as random occurrences rather than as symptomatic of any wrong.  Human nature is to sweep the problem under the rug so long as it is possible to do so.  Therefore, precisely in those circumstances, the Torah demands an eglah arufah as a reminder that an accounting is necessary.

Tuesday, August 13, 2013

Meshech Chochma on Lo Tasur

The Rambam holds that violating any din derabbanan constitutes a violation of the d’oraysa of lo tasur.  Ramban asks the obvious question: so why are there distinctions between dinim derabbanan and dinim d’oraysa, e.g. s’feika derabbanan l’kula, s’feika d’oraysa l’chumra?  Behind every derabbanan is the potential d’oraysa of lo tasur?

There are two basic approaches to answer this question:

1)    The answer the Ramban himself anticipates and which other Rishonim affirm: really there is no difference between d’oraysas and derabbanans -- they are categorically equivalent -- but the Chachamim built into their enactments loopholes like s’feika l’kula so that they should not be confused with real dinim d’oraysa.

2)    The answer of the Meshech Chochma (here) and others: lo tasur is a generic issur of rebelling against the authority of Chazal – it does not mean each individual Rabbinic law takes on the character of a din d’oraysa.

Thanks to B. for his mareh makom in the comments to yesterday’s post on asmachta to the PM”G in the pesicha ha’kolleles who explains that there are two types of asmachtos: an asmachta that is just a hint, and an asmachta that functions like a real din d’oraysa. Where did the PM”G get this idea from?  He adopts the first approach to answer the Rambam, that really every derabbanan should be a d’oraysa if not for self-imposed loopholes, and suggests that an asmachta is just a din derabbanan without the loopholes.  If we accept this idea that there are d’oraysa asmachtos, it’s not so puzzling if the gemara (as we saw yesterday from Sukkah 6) creates an asmachta for a halacha l’Moshe m’Sinai.

However, I don’t think that this answer helps answer for the Meshech Chochma, who did not accept the theory that dinim derabbanan and dinim d’oraysa are functionally equivalent.

Is there any proof from the Rambam which of these two theories he adopted?

R’ Chaim (quoted in R’ Elchanan’s Kuntres Divrei Sofrim) quotes the following proof from Hil Sotah ch 2:

 כל איש שבא ביאה אסורה, מימיו אחר שהגדיל--אין המים המאררים בודקין את אשתו; אפילו בא על ארוסתו בבית חמיו, שאסורה מדברי סופרים--אין המים בודקין את אשתו

Let’s say the ba’al did not wash netilas yadayim before lunch – he violated a derabbanan, but that has no effect on whether the sotah waters work or not.  It’s only because we treat an issur derabbanan of arayos not as some generic violation, like the Meshech Chochma learned, but rather as a particular arayos related crime that the sotah waters are prevented from working. 

 Similarly, the same appears to be true from the Rambam in Hil Na’ara Besula ch 1:

  הייתה אנוסה זו אסורה עליו--אפילו מחייבי עשה, ואפילו שנייה--הרי זה לא יישאנה
It's not just any generic derabbanan that prevents the anus from marrying his anusa – it has to be an arayos related issur.  We again see that dinim derabbanan are categorically equivalent to their d'oraysa counterparts and are not considered just some generic type issur.

Monday, August 12, 2013

meshech chochma's definition of an asmachta

Why do Chazal bring asmachtos, hints in a pasuk, to some dinim and not others?  How does having an extra hint in a pasuk add to a din's significance? (I believe the PM”G has a safeik in the pesicha ha’kolleles whether an asmachta is more chamur than a regular derabbaban [sorry, I didn’t double-check], but why should that be the case?) 

The Meshech Chochma in last week’s parsha (in his discussion of “lo tasur” here) explains that Hashem foresaw that due to historical or sociological circumstances, additional safeguards would be required for various mitzvos hamitzvos.  It was impossible to reveal the what and why of those safeguards in the Torah without also revealing something of those future circumstances, which was impossible, as revealing the future would impinge on our bechira.  Therefore, these safeguards were only hinted at but not spelled out.

When the circumstances were ripe for the creation of those safeguards and takanos, Chazal saw in hindsight that the laws they were enacting were already alluded to and present in the Torah itself.  These are the asmachtos given for dinim derabbanan.  An asmachta is a ratification of Chazal’s thinking as being consistent with the ratzon Hashem.

My son pointed out that this idea is already found in Rishonim (see Ritv”a Rosh Hashana 16), but we both had the same question: according to this approach, how do you read this gemara in Sukkah 6a – link?  The gemara there brings a pasuk as being an asmachta to a halacha l’Moshe m’Sinai.  A halacha l’Moshe m’Sinai is not a new law enacted at some future point in time that we need justify in hindsight as having always been inherent in the text -- we know halacha l’Moshe m’Sinai was there from day one given at mattan Torah and by definition exists without any basis in text?!

Friday, August 09, 2013

Prerequisite for being a gadol -- mastery of Rav Kook's torah

From Arutz 7 here -- R' Eliezer Melamed (I am bolding the first sentence for emphasis) writes:

מובן מאליו שמי שלא זכה להבין את תורתו של מרן הרב קוק זצ"ל, לא יכול להיחשב כאחד מגדולי התורה שבדור. הוא יכול להיות מומחה ובקיא בפרטים רבים, בצד הטכני של ההלכה והאגדה. אבל לא ייתכן שיהיה ממש גדול בתורה.
 
וגם בקרב אלה שהבינו את דברי הרב קוק יש שתי מדרגות עיקריות. יש שמקבלים את הוראותיו הכלליות ביחס למקומה של ארץ ישראל בזמן הזה, זמן של קיבוץ גלויות ואתחלתא דגאולה. וכן את הדרכותיו ביחס למדע ועבודה, וביחס העקרוני ליהודים שעזבו תורה אבל הם מקושרים לערכי העם והארץ או לערכים אוניברסאליים (ביחס לפורקי עול רגילים כבר נכתב בעבר רבות). ותלמידי חכמים אלו זוכים ומתחברים נפשית למדרגה השלישית על ידי ההזדהות עם תורתו ודמותו המאירה.

ויש יחידי סגולה שמעמיקים יותר בהבנת הרעיונות, שמאירים ממש את המציאות, וסוללים דרך לגאולה על ידי אור הדרכת התורה.

יש להעיר שבין זקני הרבנים מהדור הקודם, שגם הציבור החרדי מחשיבם כגדולי התורה, היו רבים שזכו לקבל השפעה חשובה ממרן הרב קוק זצ"ל. ואף שלא המשיכו את דרכו בהנהגת הציבור, הם קיבלו כמה מרעיונותיו ונותרו מעריציו ומכבדי דמותו עד יומם האחרון. וביניהם: הרב פרנק זצ"ל, הרב אויערבאך זצ"ל, הרב אלישיב זצ"ל, הרב ולדנברג זצ"ל. וכן יבדל"א הרב עובדיה יוסף שליט"א.

Thursday, August 08, 2013

lav she'ain bo ma'aseh

The Rambam writes with respect to the issur of returning to Mitzrayim (Hil Melachin ch 5):

ובשלושה מקומות, הזהירה תורה שלא לשוב למצריים--"לא תוסיפון לשוב בדרך הזה, עוד" (דברים יז,טז), "לא תוסיף עוד לראותה" (דברים כח,סח), "לא תוסיפו לראותם עוד, עד עולם" (שמות יד,יג). ואלכסנדרייה בכלל האיסור.
ט [ח] מותר לחזור לארץ מצריים לסחורה ולפרקמטיה, ולכבוש ארצות אחרות; ואין אסור אלא להשתקע שם. ואין לוקין על לאו זה--שבעת הכניסה, מותר הוא; ואם יחשב לישב ולהשתקע, אין בו מעשה.

A chiddush: even though it obviously takes action to go live in Mitzrayim, the Rambam considers it a lav she’ain bo ma’aseh and there would be no malkos.  Why?  Because the issur is in making Mitzrayim a permanent home.  If you just went to visit on business, entering Egypt would be OK.  Since it’s remaining there, not entering the country that is assur, no action is involved in violating the lav. 
 
A similar idea in the beginning of Hil Chagiga ch 1 (as noted by the Sha'agas Aryeh):
 
מי שבא לעזרה ביום ראשון, ולא הביא עולה--לא דייו שלא עשה מצות עשה, אלא שעבר על מצות לא תעשה:
שנאמר "לא ייראו פניי, ריקם" (שמות כג,טו; שמות לד,כ). ואינו לוקה על לאו זה, שהרי לא עשה מעשה
 
Even though it obviously takes action to enter the azarah, the Rambam says there is no malkos for the lav of “lo yer’a’u panay reikam.”  Here too, entering the azarah is not the problem – the problem is being there without a korban.
 
What makes life difficult is that there seem to be other Rambams that point in the other direction, i.e. so long as an action was involved in bringing about a lav, you get malkos, even if at the moment of the issur you are totally passive.  An example at the end of Hil Kilayim:

במה דברים אמורים שהוא חייב אחת על כל היום, בשהתרו בו התראה אחת; אבל אם התרו בו ואמרו לו, פשוט פשוט, והוא לבוש בו, ושהה כדי לפשוט וללבוש אחר שהתרו בו--הרי זה חייב על כל שהייה ושהייה שהתרו בו עליה,
ואף על פי שלא פשט
 
Even though the person is passively wearing clothes that contain kilayim and not doing any action, there is malkos because it took some action to get those clothes on in the first place. Similarly (and this may be a better example), the Rambam in Bi’as Mikdash ch 3 writes:

. ואם שהה, או שיצא בארוכה, אף על פי שלא שהה, או שהחזיר פניו להיכל והשתחווה, אף על פי שלא שהה--חייב
כרת; ואם היה שוגג, מביא קרבן.

Even though when the person entered the mikdash he was tahor and did no issur, if the person became tamei inside and just passively remained there without leaving, he gets malkos. Why is this different than the lav of returning to Mitzrayim? There too, entering Mitzrayim was done b’heter, and the lav is violated by remaining there (permanently) – and in that case there is no malkos because there is no action involved in remaining in a place. 
 
It's not so easy to come up with a rule here -- something to think about.

Wednesday, August 07, 2013

seudas Rosh Chodesh

The Shem m’Shmuel makes the interesting observation that we never see in Tanach a portrayal of a Shabbos meal or a Yom Tov meal, but we do see a Rosh Chodesh meal (Shmuel I ch 20).  It’s not just coincidence.  He explains that each month corresponds to a particular sheivet [i.e. each sheivet embodied a particular type of avodah and that particular type of avodah is most easily achievable at a specific time of the year].  In truth, each Rosh Chodesh should be celebrated only by members of the sheivet that corresponds to the particular month.  If it’s not your month, you can’t relate to this type of avodah, so why are you celebrating?  However, Ya’akov Avinu, after blessing each sheivet individually, blessed them all together and gave them as a group the talents emphasized in each individual.  The achdus of Klal Yisrael brings to the tzibur as a whole the gifts of each individual member. 

There is nothing like a good meal to bring people together.  The seudah of Shabbos or of Yom Tov is a siman, something that makes us more aware of the intrinsic holiness of the day.  The seudah of Rosh Chodesh is a sibah, it is the active ingredient that creates the achdus that transforms the day from one of private celebration of a particular sheivet into a day of celebration for all of Klal Yisrael. 

Tuesday, August 06, 2013

the neshoma and the guf (II)

Yesterday we were discussing R’ Yosef Engel’s question on the Maharal.  The Maharal writes that the neshoma enters the body on day 40 after conception.  R’ Yosef Engel quotes from Sanhedrin 91b that this very issue was debated by Antoninus and Rebbi and Rebbi conceded to Antoninus that the neshoma enters the body on day 1, at conception, not at day 40.  We also had a diyuk in Rashi there who comments limdani Antoninus = m’devarav lamaditi, which seems to add little outside what the gemara itself says.

Fortunately, we have an advantage that R’ Yosef Engel did not.  In the early 1950’s the Maharal’s Chiddushei Agados was discovered (most of it, at least – some masechtos are still missing) and printed.  Now we can see what the Maharal himself had to say on that gemara.  Here’s a link.  The Maharal takes as a given that a neshoma needs a container.  The few cells that are there at conception cannot possibly hold a neshoma.  What is there at conception, says the Maharal, is the “koach” of the future neshoma.

In other words, according to Maharal the gemara does not conclude, as the simply reading would indicate, and as R’ Yosef Engel understood, that the neshoma enters the body at conception.  What the gemara means is that since the potential for the neshoma to enter the guf at day 40 exists at the moment of conception, that potential is enough to sustain the guf until the neshoma actually arrives.

Based on this reading, Rashi is beautifully meduyak.  Rebbi heard Antoninus’ argument and “m’devarav lamaditi,” concluded on his own, not that the neshoma is there at conception as Antoninus held, but rather that the koach of the future impact of the neshoma is sufficient to sustain the guf. 

Just as the future entrance of the neshoma 40 days later already has an effect on the guf from the moment of conception, the impact of Yom Kippur 40 days hence already impacts on our lives now, from Rosh Chodesh Elul, creating a climate of eis ratzon.

Monday, August 05, 2013

when the neshoma enters the guf (part I)

I heard a wonderful shiur from R’ Yehoshua Hartman on Shabbos, the highlight of which (at least for me) was a teirutz to a question of R’ Yosef Engel.

We once discussed the beautiful hesber of the Maharal as to why beis din gives 39 malkos when the Torah says to give 40, but I actually wrote it a little backwards back then in 2009, so a little chazarah: It takes 40 days from conception until a person counts as an existing fetus.  On day 40, after the body has been formed, the neshoma comes into the person.

When a person sins, it is as if they have corrupted the core of their existence.  We need to go back to the roots, to what happened in those first 40 days, and straighten things out. 

Each lash of malkos straightens out one day. Since the neshoma remains pure – it’s only because the guf shleps it along on its misdeeds that the neshoma ever gets into trouble – only 39 malkos are needed to fix the 39 days in which the guf was formed.  Day 40, the day the neshoma entered, needs no fixing.

The Torah uses the expression of 40 malkos because the unit of guf/neshoma as a whole sinned and needs fixing.  However, l’ma’aseh, to accomplish that goal, once we attack the component parts, only 39 lashes are needed. 

R’ Yosef Engel (Beis ha’Otzar here) points out that there seems to be an open gemara against this Maharal.  The gemara (Sanhedrin 91b) writes that Antoninus asked Rebbi when it is that the neshoma enters the body: at conception or after 40 days.  Rebbi answered that it happens on day 40.   Antoninus asked how this could be so – wouldn't the body, an inanimate piece of flesh, just rot if it had no neshoma in it for 40 days?  Rebbi was forced to change his mind and even quoted a pasuk that supported Antoninus' argument.  The gemara  concludes that Rebbi said that Antoninus taught him this idea.

According to the Maharal, the neshoma enters the body after the guf is ready on day 40; it’s the culmination of the process – exactly like the hava amina of Rebbi.  The gemara’s conclusion, however, is that this is wrong - the neshoma enters on day 1.  Even Rebbi admitted to this fact.  What did the Maharal do with this sugya?

Tremendous question and R’ Yosef Engel does not have an answer.

For some icing on the cake, take a look at the Rashi there in Sanhedrin d”h limadtani Antoninus = m’devarav lamaditi.  What is Rashi adding ?  Isn't that what the gemara says? 

R’ Shlomo Freifeld explained that Rashi’s point is that Rebbi was able to draw a conclusion from Antoninus’ argument ("m'devarav"), but there was no rebbe-talmid relationship between Rebbi and Antoninus the person even for this one item.  Such a thing cannot exist.  R’ Hartman said that R’ Hutner was so impressed with his vort that he said he would give R’ Freifeld smicha on that basis alone (guzma or not, I can’t tell you.)

Anyway, now you have what to think about.  I hope bl”n later to get to the teirutz for R’ Yosef Engel’s kasha, which will also give us an unbelievable insight into this Rashi, so come back later.

Friday, August 02, 2013

tzedaka by giving to the rich?

My son gets credit again for this diyuk (I must be slacking off).  The gemara (B.M. 71a) darshen that if you are going to give a loan to the needy and have to make a choice between recipients, the rule is that a Jew takes precedence over an aku”m, a poor person takes precedence over a rich person, and those in your city take precedence over outsiders.  Ostensibly the gemara is speaking about the mitzvah of charity – “Im kesef talveh es ami es he’ani imach…”  - and yet, the gemara implies that while the needs of the poor take precedence, there is a kiyum mitzvah in giving to the rich as well.  What kind of mitzvah is it to give charity to a rich person?

Maharal (end of Nesiv haTzedakah) explains that tzedakah is not just about providing the needs of the poor – it’s not about the recipient.  The purpose of the mitzvah of tzedakah is to engender a feeling of camaraderie within Klal Yisrael; we are all brothers and sisters.  The way to do that is by giving to each other.  If there are no poor to give to, then give to others who may not need it as much – just keep giving to each other.

There is another strange halacha in hil. tzedaka that we learn from our parsha.  Chazal (quoted in Rashi) tell us that if a person was rich and then is forced to accept charity, it’s not enough to give him what it takes for bare bones survival.  You need to give him what he was used to having.  The millionaire who loses it all in a stock market crash needs to be given a limo with a driver, a nice suit, etc., not be forced to take a bus and buy his clothes at Walmart.  How can it be that someone who is taking charity gets to live better than most of us who are working?

Rav Wolbe in his Alei Shor explains that this din reveals to us that true tzedakah is all about empathy.  Of course a person can survive taking the bus to the shopping center and wearing clothes from Walmart.  He doesn’t really suffer physical or material want.  But think about what that millionaire who used to have a limo and wear $2000 suits feels when he is forced to do that!  For you that pair of Walmart pants may be perfectly fine, but that millionaire feels completely crushed when he puts them on.  Tzedakah means being able to put yourself in that millionaire’s shoes and feel his pain.  It’s not just about physical want.  Even if you would not feel lacking were you in the same situation, since he feels lacking, since he feels crushed, you have a mitzvah to help him. 

The last point I want to touch on is the amazing din of “lo yeira levavcha b’titcha lo,” that you can’t give tzedakah begrudgingly, with a sour face.  R’ Shapira in his ma’amarim on the parsha points out that there is an idea of doing all mitzvos b’simcha.  Why do we need a special din here not to feel bad about giving?  Apparently here it’s just an added hidur on top of the mitzvah, but it is part and parcel of the tzurah of the mitzvah itself.  Here’s how R’ Simcha Bunim m’Peshicha fulfilled this din:

R' Simcha Bunim once told his chassidim that he wanted to spent Shabbos at a certain poor person’s home.  So the chassidim got to work and it was like an episode of Bob Villa’s “This Old House.”  They cleaned up that poor person’s house, they replaced his table with a table that a Rebbe could use for a tisch, they replaced his plates and utensils with plates and utensils fit for a Rebbe, they overturned his whole house until it became like palace.  After Shabbos, R’ Bunim came to this poor Jew and said he wanted to give him some money for the mitzvah of tzedakah.  The poor person was in shock.  He said, “Dear Rebbe, since you decided to spend Shabbos here my home has been turned into a new home, my table is a new table, my dishes, my furniture, my silverware are all new – everything is beautiful.  You now want to give me tzedakah on top of that?!” 

R’ Bunim told him yes.  He told this poor Jew that all that was done before was because every time he saw this person in poverty, he felt bad.  “None of that was for you,” said R’ Bunim.  “It was for me, so I wouldn’t feel troubled when I saw you.  But now that you have a proper home, a proper table and chairs, proper silverware and dishes, I no longer feel bad.  Now that I've fulfilled ‘lo yeira levavcha,’ now that it’s no longer about me and my feeling bad, I can fulfill the ‘b’titcha lo’ and give you real tzedakah.”

Thursday, August 01, 2013

R' Soloveitchik on kedusha of the klal vs. kedusha of the individual

I recently read what I think is the newest title in the “Meotzar HaRav” series, entitled Vision and Leadership: Reflections on Joseph andMoses.  Before getting to something about the parsha, two observations on the book.  Firstly, the book is based on tapes of lectures and some unedited manuscripts the Rav left behind.  While I understand that the editors may have wanted to preserve the Rav’s expressions and language as much as possible, I still cringe when I see words like “ontological” being thrown around in what seems like every other paragraph.  It’s not that I object to big words per se; I just object when they seem to add little to the ideas being conveyed.  Why the Rav spoke or wrote that way?  Beats me.  That's who he was and how he conveyed his ideas.  But the text of the Rav’s speeches is not halacha l’Moshe m’Sinai, and I don’t see why the editors don’t take a stronger hand in cutting and simplifying the language. 

Moving beyond how the ideas are transmitted to the content itself, boy, do I feel sorry for you uber-Litvaks.  For those who know the Rav's biography and other writings, the fact that he would use an idea he took from his Chabad melamed is already to be expected.  The Kotzker vort thrown in to make a point can be dismissed as a rhetorical aid; the R’ Nachman story about the heart and the river the Rav references is well known and I would not make too much of it.  Yet aside from these references, many of the ideas the Rav uses are already found in sifrei chassidus.  For example: his interpretation of the burning bush as the flame within can be found in Sefas Emes; the idea of “Vaeschanan” being a lonely prayer that might have been accepted had Klal Yisrael joined in is in the Ishbitzer; the idea of “boker” as signifying clarity and not just a time is in the Shem m’Shmuel.  Do I think the Rav borrowed the ideas from these sources?  No, not at all.  I would be shocked if someone told me the Rav read Ishbitzer torah.  I think the Rav independently arrived at the same ideas.  The point is that one cannot be dismissive of chassidus while at the same time accepting the same ideas just because they came out of the mouth of the Rav.  And instead of waiting for techiyas ha'meisim to hear similar ideas presented by the Rav in his own special style, if one wants more of the same (albeit in different language and style) one can broaden one's horizons and dive into the Sefas Emes, the Shem m'Shmuel, etc. in the here and now.  It won’t hurt – trust me.

Along the same lines, what does the modern Orthodox community make of the Rav's  assertion that the authority of Torah scholars is even greater than malchus?  Sounds like a position I would expect the staunchest adherents of da’as Torah to argue!

Getting to something from our parsha, the Rav suggests that there are two different aspects to kedushas yisrael: there is kedusha that is generic and covers equally everyone who associates with the Jewish nation, and there is a kedusha that is unique to each individual.  He reads the pasuk in our parsha, “Ki am kadosh atah… u’becha bachar Hashem l’heyos lo l’am segulah,” (14:2) as defining this multi-tiered kedusha: Bnei Yisrael is a holy nation, i.e. there is a kedusha to the collective group, but also, “becha,” you, the individual, has been chosen to make (l’heyos=create) the nation special by contributing your unique talents. 

The Rav connected this dual-kedusha to the two steps in the process of geirus, milah and tevilah.  Milah associates the individual with the nation; tevilah is a process of personal kabbalah.

The Rav saw Korach’s rebellion as a failure to realize these two levels.  Korach argued, “Ki kol ha’eidah kulam kedoshim,” everyone is holy, everyone is equal.  If one looks at the collective unit of the nation, than indeed, we all are equal members.  But what Korach did not realize is that in addition to the collective holiness of the group, each individual Jew has a personal level of kedusha that is unique.  Moshe Rabeinu does not in that regards share the same kedusha as Moshe the woodchopper.

Wednesday, July 31, 2013

clothes make the man -- shoes do not

Rashi comments on the pasuk, “Simlascha lo balsa alecha v’raglecha lo batzeika…” that the feet of Bnei Yisrael did not swell up like we would expect to happen to someone walking around barefoot.  The Mizrachi understands Rashi to mean that unlike the clothes of Bnei Yisrael, which grew with them and remained clean throughout the 40 years of travel in desert, the shoes of Bnei Yisrael wore out and they travelled barefoot.  Yet, asks the Mizrachi, we know this is not true, as we read in Ki Tavo that “Na’alcha lo balsa m’al raglecha…” 

Maharal in Gur Aryeh answers that of course Bnei Yisrael had shoes.  Rashi means exactly the opposite of how the Mizrachi understood him -- *because* Bnei Yisrael had shoes, their feet did not swell up like would happen to someone walking barefoot. 

So if they had clothes and they had shoes, why does the pasuk use two different clauses to tell us that?  Why not combine the two into one sentence, e.g. “simlascha v’na’alcha lo balsa…” or something similar?

Maharal says a yesod: the pasuk separates clothes from shoes because clothes are for polish, for kavod, for a person’s image; shoes are a necessity. 

When we wake up in the morning and get dressed we say the bracha of “malbish arumim.”  When we put on shoes, it’s a differnet bracha: “sh’asah li ko tzorchi.”  Shoes are a “tzorech,” a need – not a want. 

R’ Yochanan (Shabbos 113a) called his clothes “mechabdusi” – that which gives me kavod.  “Clothes make the man.”  There is no cliché that says “shoes make the man” because shoes serve a purely functional purpose.  Clothes express who you are and what you think of those around you; shoes are just there to protect your feet from blisters (your wife and daughter will undoubtedly argue - I’m just reporting what Maharal says.  He obviously never hear of Imelda Marcos.)   

This is why we find that when a person comes to a makom kadosh (Moshe by the sneh, entering the har ha’bayis) he must remove his shoes.  The need for shoes’ functionality is not something you want to boast about in these contexts.  You can’t even walk around on your own two feet without help and you want to come closer to Hashem? 

R’ Hartman in his footnotes calls our attention to the Yerushalmi (Shabbos 6:2) that writes that it is not usual for a person to have two pairs of shoes, one for during the week and one for Shabbos.  If a person is obligated to have a different suit and a different hat for kavod Shabbos, why should a person not have a second pair of shoes for Shabbos?  Based on what we have discussed, the difference is clear: what suit or hat you wear is depends very much of what you want to say about yourself and your social context.  Is this a formal occasion or a casual meeting?  Are you sitting around with friends or going to a job interview?  Wearing shoes is purely a functional matter - it’s not about getting or giving kavod.

My son pointed out to me that how to read this line in the Yerushalmi is actually a machlokes between the Pnei Moshe and Korban HaEidah – here’s a link.  R’ Hartman’s pshat fits according to the Korban haEidah, but the Pnei Moshe reads the Yerushalmi as a rhetorical question (b’tmiha) – “Does a person not have two pairs of shoes, one for weekdays and one for Shabbos?!”  Whether or not there an inyan of having special Shabbos shoes may depends on which of these two readings is correct.

Monday, July 29, 2013

100 brachos each day and shome'a k'oneh

Chazal darshen from the pasuk of “Mah Hashem Elokecha shoel…” that a person has to say100 brachos every day (mah = me’ah, 100.  Tosfos offers a few explanations as to why/how Chazal read the pasuk that way).  The gemara (Menachos 4b3) writes that on Shabbos and Yom Tov where the amidah has only 7 brachos, compared with 19 in the weekday davening, R’ Chiya would eat extra snacks to reach the total of 100. 

Some of the Rishonim (e.g. Shibolei haLeket) discuss whether there were other solutions R’ Chiya could have utilized to make up the bracha shortfall.  What about answering amein to the brachos of kri’as hTorah, the haftarah, etc.?  Would that count towards the total of 100?  Aside from the issue specific to these brachos of whether there is an obligation on the listener to recite them, which is then fulfilled through shome’a k’oneh, or whether the bracha belongs to the person getting the aliya (see R’ Yosef Engel in Tziunim laTorah), the more general question is whether one can fulfill the obligation to recite 100 brachos by listening and answering amein.  Some Achronim opine that since R’ Chiya chose to eat snacks rather than rely on this option proves that one must recite 100 brachos – shome’a k’oneh will not work.  Others suggest that R’ Chiya was in a situation where there may not have been a kri’as haTorah and he was therefore forced to avail himself of snacks, but had he been able to do so, he would have relied on shome’a k’oneh.

The Tur (O.C. 46) writes that even though the shaliach tzibur recites the birchos ha’shachar in shul, one should independently recite them as well.  The Tur then goes on to quote this din of reciting 100 brachos.  The Ba”CH suggests that the Tur quotes the din of 100 brachos here as the justification for each individual reciting the birchos ha’shachar.  Shome’a k’oneh, just hearing the brachos from the chazzan, is not enough to meet the quota of 100 – one must recite the brachos independently.  The Beis Yosef, however, learns that when the Tur writes that the brachos must be recited by the individual he simply means to tell us that they are not a chovas ha’tzibur, but must be said by each individual even where no tzibur and chazzan are present.   

What’s the lomdus behind whether shome’a k’oneh should or should not work here?  You could say that the question hinges on the general issue of how shome’a k’oneh works: is it as if the listener has really said words, or is it an alternative mechanism to being yotzei even without saying words?  The machlokes Rashi/Tosfos (Brachos 21) as to whether one can pause and listen to keduah in the middle of one’s own shomeh esrei is generally assumed to depend on this question.  Does listening to kedushah constitute a hefesk because it is as if one has interrupted one’s own davening with speech, or is shome'a k'oneh a mechanism to be yotzei even without speech and therefore is no hefsek?

Perhaps we don’t need to deal with the broader question of how shome’a k’oneh works and can limit our scope to the particular takanah of saying 100 brachos.  The gemara quotes the source for saying 100 brachos as a derasha/asmachta from the word “me’ah,” as we saw above, but there is a tradition quoted in the Geonim (quoted in Tur 46) that David haMelech instituted saying 100 brachos to avoid deaths from a plague.  If we look at the takanah as just some formal rule, then shome’a k’oneh may work just as well as actually saying a bracha.  But if the point is to ward off a plague, then it would seem likely that it is the closeness to Hashem that results from having made the effort to recite 100 brachos and not the formal recitation itself which is key.  It is the personal effort to actually recite the brachos, not merely to hear others engage in saying brachos, which is crucial, and therefore shome’a k’oneh would not suffice.

Friday, July 26, 2013

the connection between Eretz Yisrael and birchas hamazon

Chazal tell us that Moshe Rabeinu instituted the bracha of “hazan es ha’kol” in bentching and then when Bnei Yisrael entered Eretz Yisrael Yehoshua added the second bracha of “al ha’aretz v’al ha’mazon.”  The Midrash adds that this second bracha is the most beloved of the brachos. 

The mitzvah of saying birchas hamazon has to do with thanking Hashem for our food.  What does entering Eretz Yisrael have to do with it?  We had to eat even before we got to Eretz Yisrael.  Why should the bracha have changed then and why davka is that part of the bentching the most beloved bracha?

The Sefas Emes explains:

As a result of the sin of Adam the earth was cursed, “arura ha’adamah…,” and man was told that he would have to eat food grown by the sweat of his brow.  “B’itzavon tochalna” – eating was never the same again. 

We have a rule that “ain arur misdabek b’baruch,” something cursed and something blessed are like oil and water – they just don’t go together and can’t combine.  Hashem wants to bring bracha into the world, but a cursed earth needs to be redeemed first.

The first blessing of birchas ha’mazon was said over the man, food that fell from the sky, not food that was grown from the ground.  It’s no wonder that Moshe and Klal Yisrael were able to say brachos over it.

The far greater chiddush is that a bracha can be recited over plain old bread and fruit.  Eretz Yisrael is described in our parsha as “eretz tovah,” a good land.  It is a land where the curse of “arura ha’adamah” can be overcome, where food untainted by the cheit of adam ha’rishon and the punishment of “b’itzavon tochalna” can be grown.  Bnei Yisrael's conquest was not just a battle of physical might, but it was a spiritual transformation of the land known as Eretz Canaan, land which belonged to the grandson Canaan which Noach cursed, into Eretz Yisrael, a land which could attach itself to bracha. 

Wednesday, July 24, 2013

tefilah as a response to crisis vs. tefilah as a relationship

R’ Aharon Kotler in Mishnas R’ Aharon on Va’eschanan asks rhetorically why we need a mitzvah of tefilah – calling out to G-d is almost instinctive; it is built into our nature.

R’ Aharon’s point is very true if one adopts the view of the Ramban that tefilah, at least on a d’orasya level, is a response to tzarah.  “There are no atheists in a foxhole,” goes the saying.  According to Rav Soloveitchik, even the Rambam, who holds that m’doraysa tefilah is obligatory every day, agrees in principle, philosophically, with the Ramban.  Rambam differs only in that he holds that man is  existentially in a perpetual state of need and tzarah, and hence must daven every day.

There is another approach to tefilah that both the Sefas Emes and Shem m’Shmuel touch on and which is borne out by the following Midrash (Shmos 21:5):
 
אמר רבי יהושע בן לוי למה הדבר דומה למלך שהיה בא בדרך והיתה בת מלכים צועקת לו בבקשה ממך הצילני מיד הלסטים שמע המלך והצילה לאחר ימים ביקש לישא אותה לאשה היה מתאוה שתדבר עמו ולא היתה רוצה מה עשה המלך גירה בה הלסטים כדי שתצעוק וישמע המלך כיון שבאו עליה הלסטים התחילה צועקת למלך אמר לה המלך לכך הייתי מתאוה לשמוע קולך

The Midrash speaks of a princess who is ambushed by thieves and cries out for help in distress.  She is rescued by her prince charming, who then decides to marry her.  Much to the prince’s chagrin, the incident was soon forgotten and the princess no longer communicated with her savior.  What did the prince do?  He arranged for the thieves to come back so that he would once again hear the voice of his beloved princess.

It may sound like a fairy tale, but there is an important point here.  When we are ambushed by thieves, when we are in physical, spiritual, or even existential crisis, we cry out, just as the princess did in the story.  That is the tefilah of the Ramban, the tefilah that R’ Aharon thought was innate to man’s nature, the tefilah the Rav saw even in the Rambam.  However, the Midrash points us to another dimension of tefilah – the communication between the princess and her prince even not in times of crisis.  Tefilah in those times shows that the bond between parties goes beyond the needs of the moment.  It redefines the relationship between the prince and princess from savior and saved, master and servant, to that of partners in marriage, a relationship of sharing between equals. 

I haven’t looked at it in awhile, but if I am not mistaken this basic theme is developed by R’ David Hartman in his discussion of prayer in his Living Covenant.  (As problematic as much of his philosophy is, let’s not throw the baby out with the bathwater.)  R’ Aharon’s point regarding prayer being innate seems less compelling if one understands prayer as part of a process of relationship building.  Indeed, we see from the Midrash that once rescued, the princess forgets all about her rescuer – communication is not second-nature when there are no pressing needs that elicit it.  I would argue that perhaps this is the model of prayer that the Rambam had in mind when he formulated the mitzvah of tefilah as one that must be undertaken daily.  A relationship requires constant care and maintenance, constant renewal and nourishment. 

What’s the difference between prayer as a response to distress and prayer as a means of deepening a relationship?  The former is marked by emotional outburst, a torrent of words and feelings that heighten in proportion to the degree of crisis.  The latter comes at moments of calm and is the result of reflection and appreciation.  The Shem m’Shmuel speaks of tefilah of the lev and tefilah of the moach, prayer of the heart and prayer of the intellect.  Perhaps these two models overlap with his categories.

Tuesday, July 23, 2013

tremendous question of the Chasam Sofer on the mitzvah of kesivas sefer Torah

The Chasam Sofer (Shu”T Y.D. 254) writes that he asked many gedolim the following question and he never got an answer that satisfied him: the gemara (Gitin 60) has a machlokes whether Torah was given in one chunk or was given parsha by parsha.  Nafka minah: is whether one is permitted to write a single parsha of Torah or must Torah be written as one whole, in its entirety, all or nothing?

If, as we pasken, the Torah must be written as a whole and not in units of parshiyos, how can we possibly fulfill the mitzvah of tefillin or the mitzvah of mezuzah?  Don’t these mitzvos require writing specific parshiyos?

The obvious answer is that by definition the mitzvah of tefillin or mezuzah includes a matir to write individual parshiyos.

The Rambam (Hil Sefer Torah 7:1) formulates the mitzvah of writing a sefer Torah as follows:
 
מצות עשה על כל איש ואיש מישראל, לכתוב ספר תורה לעצמו: שנאמר "ועתה, כתבו לכם את השירה הזאת" (דברים לא,יט), כלומר כתבו את התורה שיש בה שירה זו--לפי שאין כותבין את התורה, פרשייות פרשייות.

The word “shirah” used in the command “kisvu lachem es ha’shirah ha’zos” technically refers only to parshas ha’azinu.  However, explains the Rambam, since one is not permitted to write individual parshiyos, m’meila the command requires of us to write the entire Torah.

Why, asks the Chasam Sofer, is the mitzvah of “kisvu lachem es ha’shirah ha’zos” different than the mitzvah of tefillin or mezuzah?  Just like in the latter cases we understand that the mitzvah by definition allows the writing of individual parshiyos, so too, perhaps “kisvu lachem es ha’shirah ha’zos” allows by definition the writing of ha’azinu as an isolated parsha? 
 
(The Chasam Sofer gives an answer, but I don't want to spoil your enjoyment of puzzling over the question.)

Monday, July 22, 2013

the dual name "Hashem Elokim" in Moshe's tefilah

Rashi interprets the double shem Hashem that Moshe used in his tefilah at the beginning of VaEschanan, “Hashem Elokim,” to mean that G-d is rachum m’din, merciful in judgment.  It seems that Rashi understood the first shem as referring to the attribute of mercy, and the second shem of Elokim as referring to Divine justice (see the meforshei Rashi). 

Ramban disagrees and brings many proofs that the second shem, the Y-K-V-K, refers to Hashem’s attribute of mercy. 

Maybe the machlokes here is whether the shem should be interpreted based only on how it is read, i.e. Elokim=justice, or whether it should be interpreted in light of how it is written, i.e. Y-K-V-K = mercy.

This is reminiscent of (though not exactly parallel to) the machlokes between Mechaber and GR”A in O.C. siman 5 regarding kavanah when reading shem Hashem.  According to the Mechaber, when saying the shem Hashem one must have kavanah for the midah of the shem as written, not just as pronounced.  Even though the shem Y-K-V-K is read as the shem of Adnus, according to the Mechaber one must also have in mind the meaning of Y-K-V-K, that G-d is eternal and is in past, present and future.  According to GR”A, one need only have in mind the idea of Adnus, the name as pronounced, not the Y-K-V-K as written.

The chakira raised by both the Rav and the Brisker Rav regarding what the gemara means when it darshens that we are supposed to pronounce the shem Adnus when we see Y-K-V-K may hinge on this issue.  Does the gemara mean that since we can’t read Y-K-V-K, we ba’al peh substitute the shem Adnus when we see those letters, or does the gemara means the shem Adnus is the way to read/pronounce Y-K-V-K?  

Thursday, July 18, 2013

v'dibarta bam -- v'lo devarim beteilim

The gemara (Yoma 19) darshens from the words of shema, “v’dibarta bam – v’lo devarim b’teilim.”  Tucked away in his Mei Marom on Avos (5:22, link) R’ Ya’akov Moshe Charlap raises this safeik: what about a person who is not learning, but is not speaking devarim b’teilim either – is that a violation of this mitzvah d’oraysa? 

We could formulate the safeik as follows: is “v’dibarta bam” a positive aseh commanding limud haTorah, or is it an issur aseh that prohibits devarim b’teilim? 

R’ Charlap ends off by saying tzarich iyun l’halacha (this is not a derush question!)

one step at a time

Hopefully it’s not too late in the week to sneak in one more thought about Parshas Devarim and Tisha b'Av.  If you interpret the first pasuk in Devarim, as Rashi does, as a list of the places Bnei Yisrael rebelled, then things are completely out of order.  “Ba’aravah,” the second item on the list, is a hint to the sin of running after the idol Ba’al Pe’or, which took place in Arvos Moav.  That sin occurred chronologically long after the next item on the list, “Mul Suf,” the rebellion that took place at Yam Suf.  It certainly also took place (as did some of the other events mentioned) long after “Di Zahav,” which which refers to the cheit ha’eigel.  For some reason that is put off till the very end of the list even though it chronologically took place early in the journey through the midbar.  Why?

I can’t figure out how it works out for the entire order, but I like the Maor vaShemesh’s answer at least with respect to explaining why “Di Zahav,” the cheit ha’eigel, comes at the end.  I think there is a psychological truth to his answer, even though in pshat there may be better approaches.  He suggests that had Moshe focussed on the cheit ha’eigel first, the conversation with Bnei Yisrael would have ended pretty quickly.  The sin was so overwhelming that to even think about a tikun was outside the scope of what anyone could imagine.  Therefore, Moshe left it for last.  First, start by doing teshuvah for the “little” stuff –- “bamidbar, ba’aravah…” etc.  Bite off what you can manage.  Chew slowly and digest.  Eventually, when the time is right and enough positive momentum has built up, the really big problems, the “Di Zahav,” can be addressed. 

I was thinking of this idea on Tisha b’Av.  To approach Tisha b’Av with the idea that, “OK, now let’s do teshuvah and we can rebuild the Beis haMikdash,” is not going to go anywhere.  “Let’s abolish sinas chinam and lashin ha’ra” – it’s not going to work.  It’s too overwhelming a task and bound to lead to frustration and failure.  Moshe Rabeinu's tochacha teaches us that it's best to start small, with little things.  Do what you can one step at a time.  We'll get to the big things eventually, but it has to come as part of a gradual process.

Wednesday, July 17, 2013

chush makchish

The Netziv in Matos-Masei writes that the greater the level of kedusha, the greater the yetzer ha’ra’s efforts to undermine it.  Why does the Torah warn so many times against worshipping idolatry in Eretz Yisrael?  Because Eretz Yisrael is the place of greatest holiness; therefore, it is subject to the greatest temptation to go the opposite way.

The development of Torah she’ba’al peh, says the Netziv, reached its peak during the time period of the Second Temple.  Therefore, the yetzer ha’ra made its presence known davka in evil speech, gossip, and slander which was spread by and effected even talmidei chachamim.  This is the sinas chinam that led to the churban.
 
I guess when you combine the kedusha of Eretz Yisrael with the kedusha of limud haTorah you get a double-whammy dose of yetzer ha’ra (is that maybe why it says "Nachamu, Nachamu..." 2x?), which may be why the discourse over the current issues in Eretz Yisrael has degenerated to the point of farce.

B’shlama the usual so called “frum” websites, which in my view are worse for your neshoma that even the NY Times because you know it is acheinu Bnei Yisrael writing every dig and every silly comment, neicha that there are those commentators who use the most warped sevaros and “thinking” to defend any statement, no matter how repulsive and outrageous, given that it came out of the mouth of someone that people identify as a gadol.  With enough “lomdus” you can justify any conclusion.  Everyone knows that most of the chatter is stam am ha’aratzus. 

But yesterday I was sitting at another Tisha b’Av kinus (not the one from the previous post) and I had to check with my wife (who was also there) afterwards to make sure I heard one of the speakers straight.  This chashuv Rosh Yeshiva quoted R’ Elchanan’s Ma’amarim as explaining that anyone who wages war against Torah, as is currently happening in Eretz Yisrael, is following Amalek, as that is Amalek's agenda.  Maybe he had something else entirely in mind (I am still trying to be dan l'kaf zechus), and I am obviously only paraphrasing here, but coming a few days after another Rav in Eretz Yisrael called anyone who wears a kipa seruga Amalek, one cannot help but draw the connection.  The original comment from earlier in the week has since been “clarified” – it’s not everyone who wears a kipa seruga, it’s just some of those folks – as if somehow that makes it better.  Is this what things have come to?!?!  We are not talking about a shverr Tosfos that you say a sevara from a Koveitz Shiurim to be meyasheiv – we are talking about using R’ Elchanan’s words (and hopefully I am not crossing a line myself in saying that there is no shortage of kanu’us in the Koveitz Ma’amarim) as a means of labeling members of Klal Yisrael as equal to our greatest enemies.  And so what (as some have suggested) if it is meant as a derasha and not as a provocation to commit genocide – do the words used derech derush have no meaning anymore?

Maybe I should say baruch Hashem?  Yes, baruch Hashem that we in the Five Towns, not always thought of as the most yeshivishe community, have now risen to a level of ruchniyus that allows us to call other Jews “Amalek.”  An achievement indeed. 

Again, hopefully this particular Rosh Yeshiva meant something else entirely.  At least let me pretend that he did.  But why play even close to the third rail?  Why are we speaking of Amalek when discussing these issues?  Why should we even have to debate who said what and what they meant?

In my not humble opinion, if you are reading R’ Elchanan’s Mamamarim for insight into current events, you miss the picture entirely.  Eretz Yisrael of 2013 is not the Eretz Yisrael of 80 or 90 years ago.  Religious Zionism is a reality that has proven itself.  It may have been possible to speculate back then that a synthesis of Zionism with a Torah outlook would fail, but today, chush makchish, anyone with eyes can see that it has not happened.  I remember once reading on R’ Aviner’s blog that a relative of his learning in a right-wing yeshiva came to Merkaz haRav for a visit and was shocked to see guys learning in the beis medrash at 1:00AM (and he would have seen the same in Gush, in KBY, and in so many other places.)  His whole life he had been told that the dati-leumi don’t have Torah, and here his eyes told him otherwise.  Chush makchish – it is very hard to maintain the illusion that religious Zionism is ma’aseh satan, that its adherents are Amalek, when the talmidei chachamim, the committed  bnei Torah produced by the system, prove otherwise.  Similarly, you can scream about breaches of tniyus all day long, but when you see a Youtube video of people throwing rocks are little girls who are wearing skirts and blouses that would pass muster in any of our Beis Ya’akovs in the US, then chush makchish.  Is a person supposed to ignore his eyes and mind and say “afilu omrim al yemin she’hu smol,” that it’s all a false illusion designed to mislead? 

I have no idea how things ultimately will play out in Eretz Yisrael.  The journey, however, is making for a very bumpy ride.