Sunday, December 20, 2015

crying is not enough

"Vayinashek l'kol echav va'yeivk aleihem v'acharei chein dibru echav ito." (45:15)  This is the completion of the story arc, says the Sefas Emes, that began with, "v'lo yachlu dabro l'shalom."  (37:4)  The brothers could no longer communicate with Yosef back then, but now, "v'acharei chein dibru echav ito."
 
In the preceding pasuk the Torah tells is that Yosef cried on the shoulders of Binyamin and Binyamin cried on Yosef.  Rashi explains that Yosef was crying for the loss of the beis hamikdash, which was built in Binyamin’s portion, while Binyamin was crying for the destruction of Shiloh, which was built in Yosef’s portion.  I saw an interesting diyuk: each one cried for his brother's loss, but not for his own. 
 
I would say that this is what makes Klal Yisrael great.  A person can suffer loss him/herself, but be able to put that aside and focus on the suffering of a brother or sister or friend.   
R’ Shaul Yisraeli (in Siach Shaul) suggests another lesson we learn from here: it is often easier to see the churban in someone else's backyard than to the churban in your own.  
Finally, the Lubavitcher Rebbe makes the same diyuk and also tells us something powerful: the purpose of crying is to show empathy; crying, however, can't fix the problem.  When the churban is in someone else's portion, then you need to cry with them and show your support and caring.  When the churban is in your portion, then crying is not enough -- you have to go fix the problem!
 
We are coming up to 10 Teves, a day of ta'anis, a day to mourn for churban.  But mourning, crying, fasting are not enough -- we need to fix the problem in Klal Yisrael that are keeping us in a state of churban.

Thursday, December 17, 2015

mother tongue

Yosef tells his brothers, “Re’u ki pi ha’medaber aleichem.”  Last post I mentioned that Rashi writes that Yosef was trying to prove to the brothers that he was the real deal and not an imposter, so he spoke lashon kodesh to them.  Ramban disagrees and says this would not have proven anything.  Egypt was right across the border from Eretz Yisrael, so there would have been people who knew both languages.  I saw the Chasam Sofer writes that even in galus Bavel, which lasted only 70 years, we find that lashon kodesh was forgotten.  (Even in Sifrei Tanach, Sefer Daniel is writted in Aramaic, as well as parts of Ezra/Nechemya.)  How did they forget their mother tongue so quickly?  Chasam Sofer answers that the lack of kedusha in galus is a block to lashon kodesh.  The two are incompatible.  Since Yosef was able to speak lashon kodesh fluently to his brothers, it proved that he maintained his kedusha throughout the years away from home -- he was the same Yosef haTzadik.  (Maybe it's called lashon kodesh not because the language itself is holy, but because it demands holiness of the speaker.)  Chasam Sofer doesn’t say it, but in light of this maybe we can better appreciate the Chazal that hroughout the galus in Mitzrayim “lo shinu es lishonam,” Klal Yisrael did not change their language.  It’s not just a matter of how they spoke, but it shows a  level of kedusha that was retained.  I would look at it like this: the language you speak is like your passport.  The Jew who went into galus Bavel surrendered his Israeli passport and became a citizen of galus.  That's why lashon kodesh was lost.  The Jews in Mitzrayim may have been in galus, but they still had their passports -- they were citizens of Eretz Yisrael just stuck for an extended stay.  Am I wrong to think that the rebirth of Ivrit as a spoken language in our time is another sign that we are in reishis tzemichas ge’ulasainu?  I wrote this to my daughter in Israel in seminary to encourage her to her to appreciate hearing and seeing Hebrew all around her.  It's enough of a shame that kids go through 12 years of yeshiva and then go to Israel, come down with a cold, and go to the drugstore and say "Ha'af sheli ratz - yesh li kar," if they can even manage to say that much.  While they are there they hear all their shiurim and classes in English, speak to friends in English, and remain foreigners in a foreign land.  It's time to trade in the passport, even if they need to (hopefully only temporarily) come back to galus. 

asher m'chartem osi -- y'yasher kochachem she'm'chartem osi!

When Yosef finally reveals himself to his brothers, "Ani Yosef achichem," he continues and adds, "Asher m’chartem osi Mitzrayma." (45:4) Why did he needs to say that? The brothers had already admitted their guilt in selling Yosef and this was a moment of reconciliation. Why rub it in and remind them of their past wrongdoing?

The Netziv offers a practical answer. How would the brothers know that this was really Yosef and not some imposter? Rashi writes that when Yosef asked the brothers to come close, it was to show that his was mahul and thereby prove his identity (never mind the fact that in last week’s parsha Rashi writes that Yosef had everyone in Mitzrayim do milah.) Rashi also comments on, "Hinei eineichem ro’os ki pi ha’medaber aleichem…" that Yosef spoke to his brothers in lashon kodesh. The implication is that the Egyptians spoke Egyptian and would not have been able to converse in Hebrew (see Ramban). The Radomsker writes that normal speech is heard, but G-dly speech is seen. At Har Sinai we were "ro’im es ha’kolos." Yosef said to his brothers, "eineichem ro’os," you can see my speech -–  that's only be possible when a tzadik is speaking. The Netziv sticks to the plain meaning of the text. There is one fact that only the real Yosef would have known, and that is the fact that he was sold into slavery by his brothers. "Asher m’chartem osi…" was Yosef’s proof that he was the real deal.

The Sefas Emes takes a completely different approach, one that is especially relevant to us. "Ani Yosef" is not just like saying, "Hi, I’m Bob." What Yosef was saying is that even though he is now the second in command of all of Egypt, a man vested with tremendous power who has risen from nothing to the pinnacle of Egyptian society, he is still the same Yosef, still their brother – the same one of the shivtei K-h, the same son who learned the Torah of Ya’akov Avinu. Can you imagine how the brothers felt when they suddenly saw the greatness of who Yosef was? Chazal tell us "oy lanu m’yom ha’din oy lanu m’yom tochacha," and the model of the ultimate rebuke of judgment day is this revelation of Yosef. The meforshim (see Seforno, Beis HaLevi) ask: where is the tochacha here? Yosef did not criticize his brothers and did not give them mussar – at best he just told them the facts of who he is and what they had done. The answer is that this itself in the tochacha. The brothers had deceived themselves into thinking Yosef was a rodef, an enemy, a threat, and they acted accordingly. When Yosef hatzadik revealed who he was and what he had achieved in ruchniyus, that whole illusion fell apart. When the day of real judgment comes Hashem will just show us the truth of who we are and what life is all about, all those illusions we spend a lifetime building up and sustaining will collapse. It won’t be pretty. So the brothers were sitting there thinking to themselves that if this is what Yosef hatzadik has become trapped away from home, surviving for years in the dungeons and prisons of Egypt, faced with temptations and distractions galore, imagine what he would have developed into had we not sold him!

The "Ani Yosef" of pasuk 3 was the shock/tochacha, but the "Ani Yosef" in pasuk 4 is the consolation, a response to the brothers pain, not a repetition. Yosef told his brothers that they had not deprived him of the opportunity for spiritual growth all those years he was away from home. To the contrary -– it wasn’t *in spite* of his being sold to Mitzrayim that he was Yosef hatzadik, but it was *because* he was sold to Mitzrayim that he was Yosef hatzadik. It’s the nisyonos, the challenges, the temptations that he overcame that made him that much greater. "Ani Yosef," said Yosef, and what made me who I am is "asher m’chartem osi."

Imagine a ninth-grader whose algebra teacher works her to the bone (I don't need to imagine -- I can look at one of my kids) leading her to complain nightly to her parents. Fast forward 20 years to when the same kid, after winning a Nobel Prize in math, visits her alma mata and greets her teacher, "Hi Mrs. So and So who worked me so hard in ninth grade!" Is that the same complaint of 20 years ago? Of course not! It's now the biggest praise, because 20 years later the fruits of that supposed hard work are evident. It's a bad mashal but it's the best I can do to give maybe a taste of taste of what's going on in the pasuk here. 

When Hashem spoke to Moshe about the luchos that he broke, "asher shibarta," Chazal darshen "asher shibarta – y’yasher kochacha she’shibarta." Perhaps here too we may darshen "asher m’chartem osi – y’yasher kochachem she’m’chartem." 

Yosef was not criticizing his brothers, but acknowledging that what they put him through was in the end, to his benefit.

Not everyone wants to be or can be a Yosef who can not only survive, but thrive in the outside world while maintaining their identity as a ben Torah. It's a challenge.  But dealing with the challenge should not be seen as a hindrance to growth, a b'dieved, but aderaba, it should be seen as a vehicle through which one grows stronger.

(Thank goodness it's the Sefas Emes giving us the message that dealing with the challenges of the outside world made Yosef a greater, not lesser, person. Sounds like something you would expect from a YU guy like me : )  If you put on a spodek and say it, I guess it's all OK.)

Tuesday, December 15, 2015

beis mishmarchem -- when one brother suffers, all suffer

Yosef imprisons his brothers, but then decides to let them go and only hold back Shimon on the condition that they return with Binyamin.  “Im keinim atem achichem echad yei’aser b’beis mishmarchem…”  (42:19)  Rashi (see Taz on this Rashi) already notes the difficulty with the phrase “beis mishmarchem.”  It wasn’t their prison – they were free to go!  Why does Yosef make it seem like the brothers themselves are still in jail?

The Pardes Yosef answers by quoting a vort from R’ Yitzchok of Vorke.  The gemara (Meg 28) writes that R’ Zeira said that he merited living a long life because (among other things) he never rejoiced in a friend’s downfall.  It seems a very strange thing to boast about.  Surely none of us would be happy to see a friend or colleague have trouble -- this doesn’t sound like a special midas chassidus that would warrant extra praise or extra reward.   What was so special about R’ Zeira’s behavior?
R’ Yitzchok of Vorke explained that we are translating the words wrong.  It goes without saying that R’ Zeira did not rejoice in his friends’ bad luck.  None of us would do that.  What made R’ Zeira special is that he never rejoiced – period – while a friend was in trouble.  His sense of empathy was so great that so long as a friend was in pain, he was in pain. 
Yosef may have held back only Shimon, but all the brothers felt as if they too still remained in prison so long as they were not together.

sometimes the good part of the story is not so good

Generally when a parsha opens with the word “haya” it means something good is going to happen, but “va’yehi” portends bad news (see Megillah 10).  “Va’yehi miketz she’nasayim yamim…”  Yosef is about to get out of prison and rise to become the second in command of Egypt.  Why does our parsha open with the word “va’yehi?”  This is the good part of the story!

One of the answers the Ohr HaChaim gives is that while in the short term things are about to get much better for Yosef, from the perspective of Jewish history, things are about to start going downhill.  Yosef’s rise coincides with a famine that will cause his brothers to come down to Egypt (never mind the pain the famine itself must have caused) and cause his father Ya’akov to enter a galus that will last centuries. 
 
So often we judge events based only on their immediate effect upon ourselves.  That’s human nature.  The Torah, however, takes a longer view and broader view of things.

Sunday, December 13, 2015

zos chanukah -- the training never ends

When Yosef went looking for his brothers, he met a man on the road who told him "nas'u mi'zeh," they have gone away.  Rashi explains that this was an angel telling Yosef that his brothers had departed from that sense of achvah, familial unity, that bound them together.

Obviously the angel gave Yosef no more than a hint, otherwise he would not have continued on to meet his brothers knowing they were plotting against him.  Yet this begs the question: since Yosef did continue on his way, oblivious to the message, what was the point of telling it to him?  What meaning did those words "nas'u mi'zeh" have if they did not deter Yosef from his journey?

Chazal tell us that the prophets used the expression "koh," but Moshe Rabeinu alone received prophecy that used the expression "zeh." The Maharal explains that "zeh" conveys the fact that the message is eternal.  You can at any and every moment point to it -- "zeh" -- and it will be true.   

The Shem m'Shmuel (VaYeishev 5677) writes that the brothers sentence against Yosef was a hora'as sha'ah, but was not strictly in accordance with the letter of the law.  They felt Yosef posed a danger that had to be dealt with, whatever it took, even extra-legal means.  The angel was hinting to Yosef that his brothers were abandoning "zeh" -- they were sacrificing eternal truth for the sake of expediency and the moment.

Yosef did not realize the hint at the time, but in retrospect, he understood the message.  He may find himself in a pit, in an Egyptian prison, in dire circumstances, but his dreams and his vision were the "zeh" that would ultimately be realized.  

The Kozhiglover writes that the expression "zos Chanukah," sharing the same root as "zeh,"  teaches us that the message of Chanukah does not end on the eighth day -- it continues with us long after the candles have gone out and is in fact always there. 

The name Chanukah comes from the word "chinuch," training and preparation.  It's very strange -- normally you prepare for something, some goal.  Every Rocky movie (I haven't seen Creed, but I imagine it's true for this one too :) has the training sequence with it's music and then you have the big fight at the end.  A movie with just training and no climactic ending wouldn't be as fulfilling.  Yet that's Chanukah -- we are always training, always preparing.  "Zos Chanukah" -- there is no end.  Whatever we achieve is just preparation to go on to something bigger and better.

Friday, December 11, 2015

it's not about me: what Yosef taught Pharoah

1) The symbolism of Pharoah's dream doesn't really seem all that hard to figure out.  Why none of his advisor's could  make sense of it seems more of a mystery than why Yosef got it.

The Midrash contrasts "Pharoah omeid al h'ye'or" with "Hinei Hashem nitzav alav."  The Egyptian diety was  subservient to the Pharoahs -- religion was a tool to control the masses and consolidate power; it served an  instrumental good for mankind.  We believe that religion is not meant to serve our needs and wants; we are meant to  yield to its demands.  

The advisors of Pharoah came from this worldview where everything -- even the will of their deity -- revolved around the "me,"  especially in the case of Pharoah.  Therefore, they interpreted the dreams of Pharoah in that light.  It was about  daughters he would have and bury; it was about rebellious cities that had to be put down.  What would happen to the  Pharoah; what would the result to the Pharoah be.   

When Pharoah tells his dream to Yosef, interestingly he is no longer "omeid al ha'ye'or," but he is "al sefas  ha'ye'or."  His perspective has begun to shift, but it takes Yosef to bring him the rest of the way.  "Es ha'Elokim  oseh her'ah es Pharoah" -- what does G-d do?  He does good for mankind; he does not act for his self-interest.   Explains R' Shaul Yisraeli, this is what Yosef was telling Pharoah - he was showing him a worldview where he must  act not for his own self-interest, but for the good his his kingdom and the good of his people, because that is the  only way the famine will be beat.  

2) The meforshim on last week's parsha discuss why the Torah uses double-language, "V'lo zacahr Sar haMashkim es Yosef  va'yishkacheihu."  Isn't "lo zachar" the same thing as "vayishkacheihu?"

The Sefas Emes explains that "V'lo zachar"  refers to the Sar haMashkim forgetting about Yosef; "vayishkacheihu"  refers to Yosef forgetting about the Sar HaMashkim.  Yosef did not think for a moment that the Sar haMashkim would  actually do anything to help, and so the second the words, "zechartani... v'hizkartani," were out of his mouth,  Yosef immediately put the Sar haMashkim out of his mind.  Yosef's complete trust was that Hashem would deliver him  from prison.

The Midrash criticizes Yosef for saying "zechartani... v'hizkartani," but the same Midrash also calls Yosef a ba'al  bitachon (see the archives for a few approaches to this Chazal).  Yosef for whatever reason felt he had to say  "zichartani v'hizkartani," but the "vayishkacheihu" proves where he true bitachon was.

The Chiddushi haRI"M writes that we see that there is an inverse relationship between asking for "zechartani" and  actually being remembered.  The request of "zechartani" of a Sar haMashkim actually causes "shikcha" and led to two  more years of prison of Yosef.  WHen it comes to Chanukah, the decree "l'hashkicham torasecha" led to us having a  zecher to a nes for dorei doros. 

3) When the brothers return to Egypt a second time and see that they are immediately brought to Yosef's home, to the  palace, they are filled with fear.  "Al dvar ha'kesef ha'shav b'amtichoseinu batechila anachnu muva'im..." (43:18).   The Imrei Emes explains that the brothers were not thinking of the money they found in their bags on the way home,  but rather about the original money ("batechila"), the money they took for selling their brother.  They realized  that they were being forced to pay for their crimes.  

It's interesting that we have so much detail describing how they find the money -- "heim m'rikim sakeihem..."  (42:35).  The Imrei Emes sees in this an allusion to a line in mizmor shir chanukas habayis that we've been saying:  over the chag: "Pitachtah saki va'ti'azreinu simcha."  
    
  


Tuesday, December 08, 2015

mitzvah of chinuch for hallel

The Rambam paskens (Hil Brachos ch 5) that a child as an obligation in birchas hamazon based on the din of chinuch.  A child can be motzi an adult who ate less than k'dei sevi'a (i.e. the adult's chiyuv is also only derabannan) because the child's obligation is parallel to that of the adult.  Yet, in Hil Chanukah (ch 3) the Rambam states unequivocally that a child cannot be motzi an adult in kri'as hallel even through the Rambam holds that kri'as hallel is only a chiyuv derabbanan. 

Once upon a time we discussed the machlokes Rishonim whether chinuch is an obligation on the father to train his son, or whether it makes the child chayav m'derabbanan in mitzvos.  It's beyond what I have time now to get into, but it seems the Rambam formulates it different ways in different places, sometimes writing "mechanchin es ha'katan" (or other such terminology), indicating the obligation rests on the parent, other times, like with respect to bentching, indicating that the katan himself is obligated in the mitzvah.  Whether there is any distinction in this regard between bentching and mikra megillah is something worth looking into.

Rav Wahrman z"l in his sefer She'eiris Yosef (vol 7) offers a different distinction, one that we discussed before as well.  R' Shternbruch (see full post here) is mechadesh that chinuch only obligates a child in mikra megillah but not in the seudah of Purim.  The difference between the two is that mikra megillah is a mechanical act; the reading is an end in and of itself.  The seudah of Purim is a means to fulfill the mitzvah of simcha, which is an emotional state.  The kiyum b'lev is the essential component of the mitzvah.  A child may not understand fully what he/she is doing, but he/she can perform a behavior; however, when the emotions and thoughts are themselves part and parcel of the definition of the mitzvah, the katan has no way to do the mitzvah properly.

Hallel, suggests R' Wahrman, is by definition a reflection and expression of simcha.  Without that kiyum b'lev, it's just words.  That's why on Rosh haShana and Yom Kippur, where, as the gemara says, "the books of life and death are open," we are exempt from hallel.  The recitation would be devoid of the joy that makes the reading into hallel.  A child cannot empathize and feel the same emotional response as an adult; therefore, there is no chinuch on the mitzvah of hallel.

Monday, December 07, 2015

pirsumei nisa - at all costs?

The PM"G writes that ideally an onein should have his wife light ner Chanukah for him, but if that is not possible, he should light himself. Why do we not apply the usual rule that an onein is exempt from all mitzvos?

My first thought was that we see that ner Chanukah is an exception in other areas as well. Normally you don’t have to spend more than 1/5 of your money to fulfill a mitzvas aseh (ha'mevazbez al yevazbez yoseir m'chomesh), yet when it comes to ner Chanukah (O.C. 676) a person needs to even sell the shirt off his back to do the mitzvah. Just like pirsumei nisa does not allow exemptions based on an ones of money, so too, pirsumei nisa does not allow exemptions for the onein either.

Interestingly, the PMG (671:3) is not so clear when it comes to the chiyuv to spend what it takes. He writes that if there would be a monetary penalty for lighting, e.g. the state would fine you something for lighting, a person is not obligated to sacrifice more than 1/5 of his money to do the mitzvah.

The poor person who sells the shirt off his back is giving up more than 1/5 of his net worth, yet we say he is obligated to do so because of pirsumei nisa. Why, asks R’ Akiva Eiger, is paying a penalty that amounts to more than 1/5 of a person’s money any different?

R’ Baruch Mordechai Ezrahi poses the following chakirah: is the monetary cap of spending no more than 1/5 of one’s money for doing a mitzvah a din in the chiyuv of the gavra, or a din in the cheftzah shel mitzvah?

Perhaps this is the machlokes R’ Akiva Eiger and the PM"G. R’ Akiva Eiger understood that 1/5 is a cut off for the chiyuv hagavra – beyond that, a person has a right to claim ones, unless we are speaking about pirsumei nisa. PM"G, however, understood that the 1/5 cap is a shiur in spending on the cheftza shel mitzvah. If, for example, someone was charging $100 for an esrog and all you have is $500 to your name, you are at the threshold. If the same was true of the cost of Chanukah candles (pirsumei nisa), then you have no choice but to pay. It’s a different story, however, if the government decides that whoever lights has to pay a $1000 fine. That has nothing to do with the cost of the cheftza shel mitzvah – it’s simply a penalty on the gavra. In that case, says the PM"G, the rule of oneis still applies.

There may be a simpler explanation why an onein has to light. Ner Chanukah is not a personal obligation, a chiyuv hagavra, the way other mitzvos are, but is a chiyuv on the household. One of the many proofs to this idea is the fact that in hil Chanukah (67:;3) the S"A quotes a view that a child who has reached the age of chinuch may light ner Chanukah to be motzi others, but in hil megillah (689:2) the S"A writes that a katan may not be motzi anyone in megillah reading and does not quote any dissenting view. Both chiyuvim are derabbanan – why in one case does the S"A at least entertain the view that a katan can be motzi a gadol and in the other case not?

The Chacham Tzvi answers that reading megillah is a chovas ha’gavra on each individual; a katan cannot be motzi a gadol in that case. Lighting ner Chanukah, however, is not an obligation on each individual, but is rather a chiyuv on the house, "ner ish u’beiso." There is no personal obligation for the katan to be motzi anyone in – it’s just creating the state of the house having candles lit. (Compare with R’ Chaim’s chiddush discussed here that chiyuv of hadlakas menorah in the mikdash is not a chovas ha’gavra to do the lighting, but is rather a chiyuv in the chefzta shel menorah to be lit.)

Even though the onein has no personal obligation to do mitzvos, just as a katan has no obligation, he still can and should light if that is the only way his home will have the light of ner Chanukah.

Thursday, December 03, 2015

Ya'akov's desire for a little peace

1) "Bikesh Ya'akov lasheves b'shalvah..."  Ya'akov wanted to have  little quiet, but, says the Midrash, that is reserved only for olam ha'ba and is not attainable in this world. 

In this world it's impossible to keep going up and up in constant growth.  It's two steps forward and one step back (hopefully not the reverse).  For tzadikim, they don't take steps back, but even they need to pause between steps on the ladder.  There has to be six days of chol between every day of Shabbos.

Olam ha'ba is a different story -- there the breaks won't be needed and there certainly won't be backsliding.  It will be "yom she'kulo Shabbos" without the need for chol in between.  Kedusha will build directly and immediately upon kedusha; one Shabbos will follow directly on the heels of the next.

Rav Charlap explains that Ya'akov wanted the complete tikun to come about already and for this world to be perfected.  He wanted that state of constant Shabbos, of total "shalvah." 

Unfortunately, the world was not ready. 

2) What's the idea behind Ya'akov giving Yosef a kesones passim?  Was he really blind to the fact that it would be viewed as favoritism?

The gemara (Shabbos 145) says that the talmidei chachamim in Bavel wore fine clothes to look distinguished -- they all had frocks and up-hats -- while the Rabbis in Eretz Yisrael dressed like everyone else.  The gemara explains that in Eretz Yisrael, the talmidei chachaim were respected and distinguished by dint of their Torah and personalities alone.  In Bavel, the same was not true, and they needed clothing to distinguish themselves. 

Ya'akov thought to himself that if the brothers think that he is sharing special Torah with Yosef and making him a bigger talmid chacham, the way to show that this is not true is to give Yosef special clothes, as if to say that he needs clothes to distinguish himself and the Torah alone won't do it.

3) One Chanukah question to get warmed up: the Pri Megadim (quoted in M"B as well) writes that an onein on Chanukah should preferably ask his wife to light for him, but if that is not possible, the onein should light for himself.  He does not explain or address the obvious question: an onein is exempt from all mitzvos -- why is ner Chanukah any different?

I have no time now and it's not Chanukah yet anyway, so you have a head start in coming up with an answer and bl"n will come back to it.

Tuesday, December 01, 2015

"achartem osi" vs. "klei chamas m'cheiroseihem" -- Ya'akov's rebuke

Whatever the reason for Ya’akov’s disapproval of Shimon and Levi’s actions (see Friday’s post), one thing we can say: his reaction is incredibly muted. Rashi interprets "achartem osi" as meaning no more than "you disturbed my concentration" and took me away from my avodah -- hardly an expression of anger. Contrast that with Ya’akov’s words to Shimon and Levi in Parshas VaYechi, where he lets them have it, telling them, "Klei chamas m’cheiroseihem," (49:5) that they stole the tools of Eisav (see Rashi) in order to commit murder. Why the change in attitude? Why the harsh reaction to what earlier had passed by with no more than mild criticism?

Rashi writes that the Torah stresses that Shimon and Levi were "achei Dinah" to give them credit for putting their necks on the line to stick up for their sister. The Midrash, however, gives us a different perspective: "achei Dinah -- v’lo achei Yosef."

At the time Shimon and Levi went to battle with Shchem, they claimed they were acting only to protect Dinah -- a noble expression of brotherly love. Fast forward to the events of our parsha and it is Shimon and Levi who act as ring leaders in the effort to get rid of Yosef. "Shimon v’Levi achim" (49:5) – united in their desire to do their brother in (see Rashi ibid).

R’ Shaul Yisrael (printed in Siach Shaul al haTorah) explains that at the time the fight with Shchem, Ya’akov had to give Shimon and Levi the benefit of the doubt and he could not impugn their motives. However, in retrospect, after what they did to Yosef, that was no longer the case. Brotherly love cannot serve as the justification for battle with Shchem when that same brotherly love is so easily pushed aside when it came to dealing with Yosef. Shimon and Levi's own behavior called their actions and motives into question and gave Ya’akov cause for his harsh words later in life.

Thursday, November 26, 2015

what the people of Shchem did wrong


Our parsha opens with Ya’akov worried about his upcoming encounter with Eisav.  He says to G-d, “Atah amarta heiteiv eitiv eimach v’samti es zaracha k’chol ha’yam…”  You promised, G-d, that things would be good!  Flip back a few parshiyos to the akeidah, and you won’t find there a similar pasuk – you won’t find Avraham saying to G-d, “You promised ‘ki b’Yitzchak yikarei lecha zarah’ and now I have to kill him?!”  Why the difference? 

I haven’t really seen anyone ask this question.  Maybe it’s not a good question -- what do you think?  (See Sefas Emes at the end of 5637)

In past years I think I’ve written a lot about the opening of the parsha but never got around to discussing the episode with Shechem.  The story presents a few problems, chief of which is m'mah nafshach: can it be that Shimon and Levi are guilty of duplicitousness, or worse, unjustly killing the inhabitants of Shchem?  If not, why is Ya'akov critical of their behavior?  The stronger your answer to question #1 and your defense of Shimon and Levi, the harder the second question is to answer, and vica versa.

Rambam famously writes that the residents of Shchem were guilty of violating the ben noach obligation of dinim because they had no court to bring Shchem to justice.  Ramban rejects this view.  Why focus on dinim, asks Ramban, when the Canaanite societies were guilty of so many other ben noach violations -- e.g. idolatry, arayos, etc.  Secondly, and this brings us back to the point above, if they were indeed guilty of some issur ben noach, why did Ya'akov himself not mete out justice?  Thirdly, writes Ramban, a ben noach is chasyav misah only for violating a negative commandment, but not for failure to fulfill a positive commandment like dinim. 

Ramban disagrees fundamentally with the Rambam’s whole definition of the mitzvah of dinim.  The mitzvah, writes Ramban, is not about creating a court system to enforce law, but rather is about creating the system of law.  I imagine Rambam might argue that laws sans a mechanism of enforcement are essentially meaningless.

Ramban offers a different, simpler reason to justify killing the inhabitants to Shchem: it was a wicked place.  Idolatry, arayos, and more -- it was a corrupt society, much like the rest of Canaan.  Ya’akov protested only because the people of Shehem had committed to doing milah, which, in his estimation, raised enough of a doubt in his mind that perhaps they were on the road to teshuvah.  I think this particular point in the Ramban is significant.  Achronim debate whether there is a concept of teshuvah for an aku”m, or whether Yonah’s message to Ninveh was a propehtic hora’as sha’ah.  It would seem from the Ramban that teshuvah is possible.

Later meforshim point out a few linguistic nuances in the story that they use to address these same issues:

When Chamor speaks with Ya’akov, he reports that his son “chashkah nafsho,” for Dinah (34:8).  However, when Shchem actually does the milah, the Torah says “ki chafeitz b’bas Ya’akov.” (34:19) Malbim explains that “cheshek” is a personal desire, a lust; “cheifetz” is a utilitarian want.  Shchem’s desire had cooled off, but he realized that hooking up with Ya’akov’s family was a good idea for pragmatic reasons – wealth, prominence, etc.  There was no “lishma” to his actions; it was a superficial and false conversion.

It’s worth nothing that the Bnei Ya’akov did not just ask the people of Shechem to do milah.  What they asked is, “Im ti’hiyu kamonu l’himol lachem.” (34:15) Become like us -- milah is a symbol of their willingness to adopt the culture of Bnei Ya’akov as their own, not just a surgical operation.  Rashi comments on the word “b’himol – l’hiyos nimol.”  Sefas Emes explains that Rashi is shifting our focus from the act of milah, the operation, to the state of being after the milah, this attitudinal and cultural shift that Shchem would have had to undergo.  That is what the people of Shchem failed to accept.

Rashi explains that the Bnei Ya’akov attacked specifically on the third day after milah, “b’heyosam koavim,” because on that day the pain was most intense and the people would be unable to fight back.  The Rishonim (e.g. see the Tur) prove from sugyos in Mes. Shabbos that the pain on the first two days is no less intense than on the third day (nafka minah for chilul Shabbos).  So why did Shimon and Levi wait?  The Ksav v’Kabbalah answers that the key word is “koavim.”  What kind of pain are we talking about?  “Yosif da’as yosif machov” – the same root as “koavim.”  A person doesn’t feel physical pain from too much knowledge -- what he/she feels is psychological pain, worry.  On the third day after the milah the people of Shechem were in no more pain than on the first two days, but their attitude, their psychology, changed.  They were now “koavim” because they had buyer’s remorse and regretted the whole deal.  Shimon and Levi were attuned to this shift in attitude that proved the whole conversion was false, and therefore they attacked.

The common denominator to all these ideas: the people of Shchem were not serious in their commitment to the culture of morality required by the Bnei Ya’akov.

One final point: The She’eiris Menachem quotes that the Rebbe of Biala asked what Ya’akov was thinking when he heard his sons tell Shchem that they would have to do milah.  Did he not realize that this was a ruse, that there was no way his sons would turn over Dinah to Shchem after what he had done?  Did he have a hava amina himself of turning her over?  The Rebbe explained that of course Ya’akov was not prepared to do that.  The Ibn Ezra famously gives a mashal to explain the mitzvah of “lo tachmod”: a pauper entertains no illusions of being able to marry the king’s daughter; in reality, the beast knows he will never marry the princess.  The knowledge that it can never happen curbs any desire.  The same is true of all desires and wants – they can be controlled.  Ya’akov thought that this concept is true for his children, but what could one expect from the people of Shchem, who lived in an immoral, debased society?  How could they be expected to realize that in ruchniyus, his daugther is like a princess and they are on a different level entirely?  The answer is through the mitzvah of milah.  Ya’akov’s intent was that through the mitzvah of milah, Shchem would come to taste just enough spirituality so that he would realize who Dina was, who he was, and how impossible and ridiculous the suggestion that they remain together was.  Such is the power of milah, of just one mitzvah, to awaken a person and cause him/her to see the world in a different way!

Tuesday, November 24, 2015

ain somchin al ha'nes -- praying for a miracle

Rashi quotes from Chazal that Leah was supposed to have another son, but given that there were going to be only 12 shevatim, she realized that if she has a baby boy, it would mean that Rachel would be the mother of even fewer shevatim than the shefachos. Leah therefore davened that her baby be switched to become a girl, and Dinah was born.

The gemara asks how such a thing is possible. The Mishna in Brachos writes that a person who says a ye’hi ratzon and asks for his pregnant wife to give birth to a boy is wasting his breath. Once the fetus’ sex is fixed, there is no going back. The gemara gives two answers: 1) what happened to Leah was a miracle; 2) the sex of the fetus is fixed only after 40 days from conception and Leah davened within the 40 day window.

The Midrash Tanchuma raises the same issue but gives a very different answer. Nothing is impossible for G-d, says the Midrash (a very frum answer!) – even changing the sex of the fetus in utero.

Some of the meforshei Rashi understand that the gemara and Tanchuma are at odds. The Mishna holds that what Leah asked for was impossible; the Midrash holds that G-d can do anything. There must be some braysa or other Tanna out there that the Tanchuma relies on in contradiction to the Mishna. (It would be interesting to speculate what the nekudas hamachlokes here might be. Is this like the question of whether G-d can make a square circle? It doesn't sound like the same question.)

The Taz (here), however, writes that there is no contradiction. The gemara in Brachos, explains the Taz, is addressing the question of how it is possible for the sex of a baby to change – a practical question. To that, the gemara answers that it must have been a miracle (or before 40 days). But there is another question that the gemara does not address: given that what Leah was asking for could only come about through a miracle, how could she ask for it? Why was it not a tefilas shav, a waste of breath, like the case in the Mishna? It must be, says the Taz, that there is a difference between saying a ye'hi ratzon for the baby to be born a boy when you know the fetus is a girl vs. asking Hashem to change the sex of the fetus. One is a request for a square circle -- a girl that is a boy. The other is a request for the circle to be transformed into a square -- a different metziyus. True, that would take a miracle -- but, explains the Tanchuma, there is nothing that says you can't pray for a miracle.   

Ain somchin al ha'nes, says the Taz, only applies to the realm of action. When it comes to tefilah, you can shoot for the stars, even if it would take a miracle to get what you want. (See Maharasha in Kidushin 29b as well).

One other point on tefilah: "Vayizkor Elokim es Rachel vayishma eileha Elokim..." (30:22) At first glance you would expect the two clauses to be reversed, i.e. first "vayishma," Hashem would hear Rachel's tefilah, and then "vayizkor," he would remember to do something for her. But that's not how it works. The Ohr haChaim explains that first there is the "vayizkor," Hashem "remembering" that he wants to do something for Rachel. But, as we discussed back here also from the Ohr haChaim, even when Hashem wants to give a person something, it's not a freebie -- the person still has to earn the gift. Hashem helps out by providing the opportunity to do so. Rachel still had to do her part, in this case davening, so that "vayishma eileha..."

Monday, November 23, 2015

Rachel stealing the terafim: afrushei m'siursa by a ben noach

I ended off before Shabbos with the following question: the Meshech Chochma (and the Ohr haChaim learns this way as well) explains that when Ya’akov said that whoever stole Lavan’s terafim should die, it was not just a kelala, but it was a psak din -- a ben noach is chayav misa for gezel.  If so, how could Rachel have done it?

My initial thought was that that Rachel was acting to prevent Lavan from doing an issur of avodah zarah (this assumes that terafim were an avodah zarah, but not all the meforshim accept that) and therefore she had license to do what she could l’afrushei m’isura.  What I wasn't sure about was whether there is a concept of afrushei m’isura by a ben noach.  The gemara says explicitly that that there is an issur of lifnei iveir to trip up a ben noach and cause him/her to violate an issur, but lifnei iveir only applies where you are the sole means by which the individual in question has the means to do the issur, e.g. you are the only avodah zarah salesman in town.  If the aku"m has other means of getting his idols, your selling him one is not lifnei iveir.  It would, however, pose a problem of the issur derabbanan that says you should try l'afrushei m'isura.  Shach in Y.D. 151:6 says that there is no requirement of being afrushei m'isura by an aku"m, but the Gilyon Maharasha on the spot sends you to a MG”A that disagrees.  (I don't know whether this hinges on whether the derabbanan of afrushei m'isura is an extension of lifnei iveir or a separate din.)

That being said, I’m not sure the cases are comparable.  The Shach is speaking about avoiding doing something which would enable an aku”m to do issurim, like selling him an idol.  The case of Rachel stealing the terafim is a case of her violating an issur misa to prevent another ben noach from a different issur misa.

I saw the following quoted in the name or R’ Chaim: when Ya’akov originally paskened that whoever stole the terafim was chayav misa, he assumed that one of the servants, a ben noach, was the thief.  The pasuk continues and tells us that Ya'akov got it wrong because, “V’lo yada ki Rachel ganavasam,” and Rachel has a din of a yisrael, not ben noach, and therefore there is no chiyuv misa.
 
Yes, saying it was an aveira lishma solves everything, but you can use that to explain away any apparent misdeed on the part of on of the Avos or Imahos.

Thursday, November 19, 2015

v'haya Hashem li l'Elokim --- ain v'haya elah lashon simcha

Apologies, this is going to ramble a bit : (  Too long a week and too little time, yet again. If you get bored, skip to the question at the end.



At the end of last week’s parsha Rivka realized that Ya’akov needed to escape from Eisav, so she told Yitzchak to send him off to Lavan’s house to find a wife.  Ohr haChaim explains that she did not tell Yitzchak directly about Eisav because of the issur rechilus (is there an issur rechilus on a rasha?), and instead used wanting to get Ya’akov married as an excuse to send him off.  How long was Ya’akov supposed to stay away?  Rivka first says “ad asher tashuv chamas achicha” (27:44) and then adds “ad shuv af achicha mimcha…” (27:45)  Why the double-language?   R’ Yitzchak m’Volozhin explains that the barometer that reveals whether someone is mad at you is your own feelings about that person.  He suggests derech derush that Rivka was telling Ya’akov to look inside himself and see whether “shuv af achicha *mimcha,*” mimcha=from within you, and then you will know whether the anger has passed from Eisav.

So Ya’akov departs and on the way (after a 14 year pit stop) he dreams and sees “hinei Hashem nitzav alav” and angels are going up and down.  Ya’akov is the focal point of the universe – everything going on in shamayim, all the malachim, revolve around him; they go up from him and come back down to him, because where he is the Shechina is (Netziv).  “V’hinei Hashem nitzav alav” is not an introduction to the bracha that will follow, explains the Ishbitzer, but is itself a bracha.  "Nitzav,"as opposed to "omeid," implies permanence – always there and always will be there.  Omeid means to arise at that moment (homework assignment: does this fit other pesukim where nitzav vs omeid is used?  I honestly don’t see how this fits in other contexts.)  The kedusha of Ya’akov, like the kedusha of Shabbos, is “keviya v’kayma”– it is always present, irrespective of what was done or what will be done.  Yom Tov requires sanctification (of the month) by Beis Din.  Shabbos happens, whether you prepare for it or not, whether you are ready and accept it or not.  Beis Din doesn’t make it happen.  We don’t forge or create a relationship with Hashem; the relationship is “nitzav” and already there – we just discover and reveal it (hopefully).

"Ha'aretz asher atah shocheiv aleha..."  Do we need a reminder that Ya'akov was sleeping there on that piece of land?  Why not just say, "ha'aretz...?"  Because the pasuk is not just speaking to Ya'akov -- it's speaking to us.  We are asleep!  Oblivious most of the time to what our chovos b'olamo are, what we need to do and should be doing. Daughter #1 bought me a sefer by R' Chaim Kohen, the "chalban," called "Hakitzu v'Ranenu," based on the pasuk "hakitzu v'ranenu shochnei afar."  We are only slowly waking up from galus.  And yet, even though we are asleep, Hashem has given us Eretz Yisrael.       

Hashem promises to keep Ya’akov safe, and in turn Ya’akov makes a neder that if he indeed has food to eat and clothes to wear and returns home safely, “v’haya Hashem li l’Elokim.”  It sound c”v like Ya’akov is making a pledge of faith contingent on G-d doing stuff for him, which is impossible.  Faith has to be an unconditional commitment.  There are two basic approaches in the Rishonim: Rashi interprets what Ya’akov is saying not as a pledge on his part, but as part of the condition he is setting up, part of what G-d will do for him.  Rashi brings a derush that Ya’akov was asking for his offspring to not have a psul (it’s hard to see how the words lend itself to this reading).  Ramban does read the phrase as a pledge on Ya’akov’s part, but not as a commitment to faith, but rather to a higher form of avodah, the avodah that can only be done in Eretz Yisrael and not chutz la’aretz.  Seforno interprets the sheimos of Hashem in the phrase in their technical sense: at the end of the journey, Hashem, the midas ha’rachamim, would be able to act as Elokim, the midas ha’din, because Ya’akov would have earned the rewards promised and given.  See Netziv who tries to have his cake and eat it and interpret the phrase both as a pledge by Ya’akov and a promise by Hashem – it is about creating a relationship, which needs two to tango.

The Midrash writes that the statement, “V’haya Hashem li l’Elokim,” is the key to geulah.  The promises of geulah  all start with “v’haya,” e.g. “v’haya bayom ha’hu yitaka b’shofar gadol,” and these all come as a reward for this phrase of "v'haya Hashem li l'Elokim."  This seems to only makes sense if you read the phrase as a pledge on the part of Ya’akov, like Ramban and Seforno.  If it is part of what G-d was promising to do, like Rashi understands, why would Ya’akov receive reward for using these words?    

Putting aside the pshat in the phrase, what are Chazal in the Midrash trying to tell us?  Obviously saying the word “v’haya” is not a magic spell that triggers geulah.  So what is it about Ya’akov’s words that are significant?

R’ Shimon Sofer, the Ksav Sofer’s son, writes that Hashem had promised Ya’akov that he would be protected in his journey and would make it home safely.  Had Ya’akov just been echoing Hashem’s words and pledging in return to take ma’aser and establish a “beis Elokim,” he would have mentioned food and clothing and safety and stopped there.  But Ya’akov chose to add something additional – “v’haya Hashem li l’Elokim.”  What worried Ya’akov perhaps more, and certainly not less, than concern for his physical living conditions -- his food, clothes, and shelter -- was his ruchniyus.  How would that remain intact during his stay with Lavan?  Therefore, he asked Hashem in addition to physical wellbeing to help him with ruchniyus wellbeing.  Chazal are telling us that when we are in galus, if above and beyond thinking about our physical wellbeing, which is so often in danger,  we also are show concern for our ruchniyus, which is so often in danger and we don’t even realize it, then we will be worthy of redemption. 

It’s a nice pshat that takes the phrase as a whole into account, but the focus of the Midrash seems to be on that one word, “v’haya,” as all the geulah pesukim quoted share that common phrase.  What is it about that one word that is so key?  The Shem m’Shmuel reminds us of the rule of thumb that “ain v’haya elah lashon simcha.”  Galus, whether in Lavan’s home or elsewhere, is tough.  We are tough too, and that’s why so many of us remain committed despite all the challenges.  But commitment to avodas Hashem and joy in avodas Hashem are two different things.  Take a look at your average high school kid going to yeshiva – he or she goes, but it’s like a jail sentence that can’t end soon enough.  Ya’akov was asking Hashem for help not just to remain committed, but to remain b’simcha in his commitment.  That’s the key to survival in galus and ultimately to geulah.

Jumping to the end of the parsha, I have a question but no answer yet.  Ya’akov, not realizing that Rachel was the thief, tells Lavan that whoever stole his terafiim should die.  Meshech Chochma points out that this is not just a kelala-curse by Ya’akov, but it’s a halachic statement.  A ben Noach is chayav misah for theft.  So I don’t understand.  Even if Rachel’s motives were pure and she wanted to take these avodah zarah tools away from her father, still, how could she violate an issur gezel, an issur misah? 

Thursday, November 12, 2015

Yitzchak's blindness

The parsha tells us that Yitzchak could not see who he was giving a bracha to because “va’tichena einav mei’re’os,” his eyes were dim and he could not see.  Seforno points out that Avraham and Ya’akov did not suffer the same loss of vitality in old age, but we find that Eli haKohen grew blind because he did not admonish his children properly.  Seforno seems to be suggesting that Yitzchak had too soft a hand in dealing with Eisav and therefore suffered blindness as a punishment -- interesting that he would attribute guilt to Yitzchak where, as far as I know, Chazal do not.  Netziv suggests that Yitzchak’s blindness was b’hashgacha so that Ya’akov would be able to take the brachos meant for Eisav.  Similarly, the Midrash suggests that the blindness was not a punishment, but was for Yitzchak’s benefit.  The word “mei’re’os” in the pasuk is extra – obviously someone with dim vision cannot see.  The Midrash darshens that the pasuk is alluding to the reason for Yitzchak’s blindness: so that he would not be able to see and be disappointed by the bad deeds of Eisav.  According to another view Yitzchak’s blindness prevented him from going out of his home – from being seen in public – sparing him the embarrassment of hearing people remark that this was the father of that rasha Eisav.  (I guess it’s human nature for that people remark on his being the father of Eisav the rasha while ignoring the fact that he was also the father of Ya’akov the tzadik.  It's much more fun to focus on the negative.)   

Assuming that Yitzchak’s blindness is not a punishment for any wrongdoing on his part, then I think we have to assume the benefit of his not being the subject of public gossip or the benefit of his not seeing Eisav doing wrong outweighed the cost of his suffering blindness.  Sometimes bad things happen and the reason why is because they are better than the alternative, which the person suffering may not even imagine.  What bothers me is that Chazal tell us “suma chashuv k’meis,” blindness is equivalent to death.  Is being the focus of gossip or feeling bad because your kid is OTD a fate worse than death?  How can anything outweigh death in the cost/benefit analysis?

Let me suggest an answer (and I hope someone has a better one).  When Chazal equate being blind with death, it is metaphorical.  Built in to the nature of a Jew is the desire to show chessed and rachmanus.  What Chazal are telling us (as R’ Eliezer Eisenberg summarizes from R’ Chaim Shmuelevitz here) is that when a person is blind and cannot see the pain of others and cannot react and respond, he has lost something of his humanity.  It’s much harder to do chessed under those circumstances, and without the ability to do chessed, something essential is lacking from life.  Perhaps what the Midrash means is that when you have to deal with an Eisav ha’rasha, showing rachmanus may make things worse (see the Seforno above).  When people you are the subject of gossip in the street, maybe it’s not worth going out and doing chessed for those people.  The eyes are a kli for doing kindness.  The removal of Yitzchak’s sight so he would not have to see Eisav, or not have to go out and be exposed to slander, is a “ptur,” so to speak, granted by Hashem, so that Yitzchak would not be able to or required to extend chessed to those who were not deserving of it.