hashiveinu

 

From daughter #2 who was emailed this by a friend

That friend commented, "I really want to be in Eretz Yisrael again."

So do I and so should we all. 

Eicha yashvah BADAD = B'chol Derachecha Da'eyhu

Since it is Shabbos Chazon I wanted to point our a Maharasha in Chiddushei Aggados on Baba Basra 60b that's worth taking a look at.  He explains the pasuk, “Im eskacheich Yerushalayim tishkach y’mini tidbak leshoni l’chiki im lo ezkireichi,” as follows: If I forget to make a zecher l’churban in those areas that the halacha demands, e.g. leaving a small area of a new house unpainted, then let the whole paint job be bad – let it look like I painted the house with my left hand instead of my right. That will then serve as the reminder. However, continues the pasuk, that’s not enough. As R’ Soloveitchik explains, aveilus is a kiyum b’lev, the actions halacha demands are a means to engender certain thoughts and feelings. Maharasha writes, “Efshar she’yizaheir adam b’kol zeh V’AIN KAN ZECHER SHE’LO YARGISH HA’ADAM…”  Someone can be scrupulous in leaving that little area unpainted, but accomplish nothing because there is no thought behind it. Does this person who lives in a palatial home really feel any pain because there is no beis hamikdash, or is it just going through the motions? Let my tongue stick to my throat, says the pasuk, if I can’t and don’t verbalize this reminder. I would say it doesn’t necessarily have to be articulated to others, but it has to at least be articulated to oneself – one has to express a sense of loss.

“Eichah yashvah BADAD…” We are isolated and alone, but in truth, we are never really alone. The Torah tells us in Parshas Ha’azinu, “Hashem badad yanchenu…” (32:12) Ramban explains, “Hashem yishkon b’yisrael betach BADAD,” Hashem himself, to the exclusion of the sarei ha’umos, tends to our needs, “ki hu chelko v’nachalaso,” because we belong to his portion alone. Sefas Emes explains that the word “badad” is roshei teivos of B’chol Derachecha Da’eyhu, know Hashem in all of your ways. Sometimes it’s a derech of simcha, sometimes it’s a derech of m’ma’atin b’simcha, but in either case, B’chol Derachacha Da’eyhu. 

ho'il Moshe -- a new beginning

We read right at the beginning of Devarim that in that 40th year, the final year in the desert, “ho’il Moshe be’er es haTorah ha’zos,” Moshe began (Rashi: ho'il = started) to explain the Torah to Klal Yisrael.

 He just began teaching Torah then? What had Moshe been doing for the past 40 years? 

A few week's ago I contrasted the generation that heard Hashem’s words directly at Sinai with this new generation in year 40 who was expounding and explaining Torah through derashos and Torah she’ba’al peh, through their own initiative and process of discovery. There would be no Moshe to dictate answers to them in the future; answers would have to come through their own learning. Sefer Devarim is the boundary marker between the old and the new. Moshe is still there, but he is speaking with his own voice, not merely transmitting what G-d dictated. Moshe created a beginning – a starting point for the process of talmud Torah that we have been engaged in and continuing for over 3000 years since.  He began teaching again in a different way, to a different people than the one's he took out of Egypt.  (Sefas Emes)

The Midrash Tanchuma connects the  אֵלֶּה הַדְּבָרִים  of our parsha with a pasuk in Yeshayahu 43:16  אָשִׂים מַחְשָׁךְ לִפְנֵיהֶם לָאוֹר וּמַעֲקַשִּׁים לְמִישׁוֹר אֵלֶּה הַדְּבָרִים עֲשִׂיתִם וְלֹא עֲזַבְתִּים...:  Just as G-d performed miracles for us in the desert, the "eileh ha'devarim" of our parsha, in the time of the future geulah G-d will do those same miracles, turning darkness to light and bending twisted paths straight, "eileh ha'devarim asisim v'lo azavtim." 

What miracles is the Midrash speaking about that we see in the words "eileh hadevarim?" 

It's the miracle of revealing Torah as it had never been revealed before. 

The end of that pasuk in Yeshayahu is written in past tense, not the future tense (see Rashi).  Shem m'Shmuel quotes the Midrash as explaining that the pasuk is referring to the miracle of Torah being revealed by Rabbi Akiva and his colleagues.  The miracle Yeshayahu is talking about already happened!  It's Torah which transforms darkness to light and guides us on the straight path.  Even Moshe Rabeinu himself was in awe of the brilliance of R' Akiva's learning (Menachos 29) -- it was a miraculous phenomenon. 

It's the same miracle which the "Eileh hadevarim" of our parsha is referring to -- our parsha is the beginning of that miracle unfolding, as Moshe began revealing Torah, giving us insight into how to expound and explain, of how to engage in learning Torah she'ba'al peh.      

We are not Moshe Rabeinus, but we should learn from his life.  The Torah he learned in year 40, the last year of his life, was not the same Torah he learned earlier.  The generation he spoke to needed to hear a different message, be given different hadracha. The way he taught Torah in year 40 was different than the way he taught earlier.   The world around us changes; the people around us change; we need to change as well.  Why should we?  Because that's the only way we can communicate with the next generation and make our message heard.

Techeiles?

(Picture taken from here - it is a real animal.  No, this post is not meant to be taken seriously.) 

simcha from having a thorn in our side

Last week's parsha warns us that if we don't drive the Canaanim out of Eretz Yisrael, "V'haya asher tosiru meihem l'sichim b'eineichem u'l'tzeninim b'tzideichem," they will be like splinters in our eyes and thorns in our side. 

Chazal tell us as a general rule that when a sentence or parsha starts with the word "v'haya" it portends good tidings -- "ain v'haya elah lashon simcha."  What's the simcha in our pasuk?  What kind of simcha is it to be poked in your eye or side?

R' Tzadok haKohen (Pri Tzadik, Matos #5) quotes the Pesikta on the haftarah which explains that when Bnei Yisrael entered Eretz Yisrael, they left alive Rachav, who in turn (through her family) produced seven prophets, among them Yirmiyahu haNavi.  It is the words of Yirmiyahu haNavi that are the thorn in our side!  It is his tochacha and mussar that are painful for us to hear.  Bnei Yisrael were so upset by Yirmiyahu's words that they threw him into a pit to get rid of him.

At the same time, "v'haya," there is great simcha in shamayim from those words, because it is through those words of tochacha that we will eventually get out of galus.  Had they penetrated back when they were delivered, maybe there would not have been a galus, but even if we didn't listen then, we've had 2000 years to hear them again and again, and eventually they will sink in.

parshas nedarim -- closure on Moshe's life

Why is the parsha of nedarim placed at the end of Sefer BaMidbar? Ramban explains that the previous parsha, which deals with the korbanos musafim of the yamim tovim, ends with a mention of nidrei gavoha, the korbanos that a person voluntarily pledges to bring (29:39). The Torah now tells us that there are additional nedarim, nidrei hedyot, that don’t pertain to korbanos and which have their own laws.

Abarbanel suggests that these last few parshiyos in BaMidbar all involve things Moshe had to do before leaving this world. Moshe was the chief justice, and in that capacity was the go-to man when people needed a neder absolved. He now had to teach the roshei ha’matos, the leaders, the halachos of nedarim to empower them to fill that role.

I would like to follow in the Abarbanels footsteps – the parsha relates to Moshe's impending exiting of the scene – but in a different way than he suggests.

In the very next parsha Moshe is given the command to take revenge on the Midyanim, “V’achar tei’asef el amecha,” after which he will die.  Why did G-d include this detail?  Was it a challenge to see if Moshe would fulfill the mitzvah even knowing that doing so would bring about his own end?  Ksav Sofer answers that this was not the case.  It was not a test, but rather an opportunity. Hashem wanted to give Moshe a chance to redeem his past sin at Mei Merivah, and in doing so, be able to die in peace. Moshe's error at Mei Merivah was in not showing empathy to Klal Yisrael. He responded to the people’s request for water with anger instead of compassion. Here, Hashem commanded, “N’kom nikmas Bnei Yisrael,” avenge the Jewish people. Show that you feel their pain at being dishonored, and in this way, undo the damage done earlier.  This way you can leave the world with a clean slate.

Perhaps the parsha of nedarim is also a rectification of the Mei Merivah episode and a means of bringing closure to Moshe's past. By hitting the rock instead of speaking to it Moshe failed to teach the people the power words can have. Teaching the parsha of nedarim gave Moshe the opportunity to convey that lesson.  “Lo yacheil devaro” – words cannot be treated lightly. 

Later in the parsha, when the Bnei Gad and Reuvain promise that they will make pens for their sheep and cattle and build homes for their children, Moshe accepts their word, but is reiterating the promise, he  reverses the order --- first, a home for the children, then a place for the sheep. Moshe concludes, “v’ha’yotzei mi’pichem ya’asu.” R’ Shaul Yisraeli writes that this is not just a warning to the Bnei Reuvain and Gad to keep their word – it’s an explanation of why the seemingly trivial detail of the order of their words mattered. What difference does it make if the Bnei Gad and Reuvain first spoke about the sheep and then their children or the other way around?  Either way, they would have to take care of both?  The answer is that how a person speaks influences what they do and who they are.  How you put it is important because, "v’ha’yotzei mi’pichem ya’asu," a person does, acts, becomes, what comes out of their mouth.

why hold the kohen gadol responsible for other's crimes?

Someone who murders b’shogeg must stay in an ir miklat until the death of the kohen gadol. The Mishna writes that the mothers of the kohanim would deliver food to the arei miklat to prevent those inside from praying for their son’s demise . What does the kohen gadol have to do with the plight of the murderer? The gemara explains that the kohanim are to blame for the murderer being there, as they should have davened for rachamim.

How does the gemara know that the kohen did not daven? Maybe the kohen did his part and davened, but it's the zechuyos of the murderer and/or the nirtzach that are wanting? If I daven all day for the Mets to win, it could be that they lose because my davening is not good enough, but it could also be that the Mets just don’t have anyone on the team who can hit or field! (Yankee fans, please substitute Yankees in that sentence.) 

Secondly, the gemara says that even if the kohen gadol is appointed just before the verdict on the murderer is announced, he is still to blame for not davening that the court rule in the murderer's favor.  What good will his prayers do at this point?  It’s like a kid in school who takse a test and then davens that he/she will get a good grade. The answers are on the paper already – tefilah is not going to change the facts. Beis din has to pasken based on the events that occurred. Is the kohen supposed to daven for beis din to make an error and rule incorrectly?

The underlying assumption of these questions is that beis din works like a computer – you plug in the facts, and out comes the psak based on some formula. It doesn’t work that way. The Mishna in Makkos writes that R’ Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon boasted that they could completely do away with capital punishment.  They would ask detailed questions of the witnesses that they would inevitably be tripped up and have their testimony impugned.  Rabban Gamliel responded that this approach would inevitably encourage crime.  Surely R' Akiva would not want to free the guilty and surely Rabban Gamliel did not have in mind that the innocent should be handed a death sentence!  R' Shaul Yisraeli explained the machlokes here based on Tosfos' view that in addition to the required derishos v’chakiros, beis din has a right to further question witnesses.  The witnesses are not bound to answer these additional detailed queries, but if they do, they must answer correctly.  There is no machlokes between R’ Akiva and the other Tanaim – it is a matter of what circumstances allow for.  Where society was as a whole ethical and crime, especially a heinous crime like murder, was an aberration, beis din could seek to avoid capital punishment knowing that this would not lead to an increase in immoral behavior.  But when society was plagued by social and moral ills,  a tough stance on crime was needed and beis din could not afford to not mete out capital punishments.

The kohen gadol, as a leader in Klal Yisrael, is responsible for the moral state of society as a whole.  That is what he should be davening for and working to improve.  Had society been more just and more ethical, it would be possible for beis din to interrogate the witnesses more fully and see that no penalty of ir miklat or capital punishment is ever carried out.  But because society is not on that level, the murderer must suffer a more severe penalty for his deeds.

(Side note: isn't R' Akiva's position fascinating?  Even though there is a clear mandate of u'bi'arta ha'ra mi'kirbecha and testimony to incriminate the wrongdoer, he uses a loophole of sorts [that's probably too charged a word to use] to circumvent the seemingly inevitable outcome of death because of his belief that justice would not be served in that way.  Isn't that allowing a subjective value judgment of what the "right" outcome should be to enter into the equation?  Isn't that deliberately tilting the scales one way?  Something to ponder.
Side note #2: see Michtav m'Eliyahu vol 3 p. 87 for a different approach to understanding the power of the kohen's tefilah and his responsibility.)

On a completely different note, apropos of the 9 days, the Tiferes Shlomo derech derush comments on the pasuk describing the boundaries of Erertz Yisrael, "V'hisavisem lachem l'gevul keidmah...." (34:10), literally translated, "You will turn the border..." that perhaps the word "v'hisavisem" is an allusion to the word "ta'avah," desire.  We have to have a ta'avah for Eretz Yisrael -- to want to be there, to want the Shechinah to return there.

ki na'ar anochi -- is there an age requirement to becoming a navi?

In the haftarah to Parshas Pinchas, Yirmiyahu says to Hashem that he is unfit to be a prophet because he is a “na’ar.” Most of the translations I’ve seen render this as “a lad” or “young boy“ or something similar. There are two problems with this translation:

Binyamin is called a na’ar by his brothers, but when he appeared before Yosef he was already married and had 10 children. Yosef is called a na’ar (“v’hu na’ar es bnei Bilha v’es bnei Zilpah…”) even though at that time he was a teenager. Yehoshua (“u’meshorso Yehoshua bin Nun na’ar lo yamish m’toch ha’ohel”) must have been a middle aged man and he is still called a na’ar.

Even granting the possibility that na’ar here means young man, why should Yirmiyahu’s age have been a barrier to nevuah? Radak points out that Shmuel was able to receive nevuah when he was very young -- why not Yirmiyahu?

Radak explains that the word na’ar means an apprentice or someone in training. Yehoshua was Moshe’s apprentice; Yosef may have been serving his older brothers, bnei Bilha and Zilpah. Yirmiyahu’s argument was not simply that he was too young to be a navi. What he was saying is that he was still merely an apprentice navi – there was someone above him, greater than him, who G-d should have chosen. This echoes Moshe’s argument that since Aharon was an experienced, established navi, there is no reason to select him to deliver G-d’s message.

I wanted to just add that this may not just be a practical argument, but it may be a halachic argument. The gemara (Meg 14b) asks how Chuldah could prophesize while Yirmiyahu, who was a greater navi, was around. (I’m not 100% sure I understand the gemara’s question – if G-d starts speaking to you, how can you not prophesize, regardless of how much greater others may be? I assume what the gemara means is that receiving nevuah requires some kind of prior preparation. If there is someone greater already acting as a navi, that bars others from making those necessary preparationsto receive nevuah themselves.) The gemara answers that since she was a relative of Yirmiyahu’s, he was mochel. It sounds like there is a din similar to that of moreh halacha b’makom rabo with respect to nevuah. Maybe this is what was bothering Yirmiyahu – as a talmid, or apprecntice navi, he was in a similar position as Chulda and al pi din had to defer to the greater navi.

tikrivun eilei u’shemativ -- why Moshe did not have an answer for Bnos Tzelafchad

Rashi in Parshas Devarim (1:17) writes that because Moshe said to Bnei Yisrael that any problem too difficult for the judges that he appointed “tikrivun eilei u’shemativ,” should be brought to him and he will hear what Hashem has to say, he therefore was forced to acknowledge that he did not in fact know what the din was when the Bnos Tzelafchad came to him and it was through them that this parsha was revealed.

Sefas Emes asks: how could it be that Moshe Rabeinu, the biggest anav who ever lived, was guilty of outright boasting?

Even before we get to that question, we should first maybe ask whether “tikrivun eilei u’shemativ” is a boast at all. Moshe is not saying that he would know the answer – he is saying that he will listen, and Hashem will give answers. For this Moshe is punished?

In order to understand what Rashi is telling us, we need to take a broader look at what is going on in these parshiyos. The Netziv in his introduction to Sefer Bamidbar asks why it is that Chazal and the Geonim call this book Sefer Pekudim, the Book of Numbers ("counts" would probably be a better translation). Of all the episodes that occur in the sefer, why do Chazal focus on the count that opens the sefer and the count in our parsha, Pinchas, as capturing its essence? 

The Netziv answers that these two counts are emblematic of the dramatic shift that occurred between the first and the 40th year in the midbar. On the surface, we are dealing with two identical events – two tallies of Bnei Yisrael. Yet, there are marked differences between the two. To take one example, in the first count the Menashe-Ephraim-Binyamin group was led by Ephraim. In the second count, Menasheh is counted first. Netziv explains that during the first year in the desert, Bnei Yisrael’s needs were tended to miraculously by G-d. Therefore, Ephraim, the son of Yosef who devoted himself exclusively to Torah, is given primacy.  In year 40, at the threshold to entering Eretz Yisrael, Hashem was weaning Bnei Yisrael off of miracles and teaching them to fend for themselves. (Netziv develops this theme in his discussion of Mei Meriva and many other episodes in the latter half of the sefer.)   Their needs would have to be realized through their own work and efforts. Menasheh, the practical son who helped Yosef manage affairs of state, was now primary.

Sefas Emes similarly draws a distinction between the early travels in the desert, where Bnei Yisrael were led by Hashem's instructions as dictated to Moshe, is’arusa d’l’eila, and the final year, when things began to change. It was not Hashem dictating anymore -- people began to express their own thoughts and ideas of what should be done and how. Or, perhaps to put it better, Hashem allowed and encouraged people to express their own thoughts and ideas as way to achieve spiritual fulfillment -- isar’usa d’l’tatta. We see example after example of this: in next week’s parsha we will have the story of the tribes of Reuvain and Gad asking for land in Eiver haYarden. They were not content with being told where to settle and having a portion assigned to them by lottery – they wanted to determine their own fate. We will have the members of Menasheh causing new rules of who can marry whom be created based on their complaint that their tribe could potentially lose land if Bnos Tzelafchad marry into a different tribe. “Tzeror is haMidyanim v’hikisem osam” – it is not enough in year 40 to go to war for the sake of fulfilling G-d’s command, but war is now predicated on first feeling animosity for the enemy, on feeling that it’s *your* fight. The punishment of Zimri and Kuzbi is not dictated by Beis Din, but rather occurs because Pinchas could not restrain himself, kana’im pogim bo.  His zealousness drove the outcome; there was no formal psak din from a court.   Last but not least, we have the Bnos Tzelafchad, who, through their argument that they deserve nachalah, causes a new parsha to be revealed.

Sefas Emes explains that this is what Rashi is teaching us. Moshe was like a robot which cannot deviate from Hashem’s command. The Meshech Chochma in his intoduction to Shmos goes so far as to say he even lost bechirah. The Netziv sees Moshe’s leadership period as a constant experience l’ma’alah min ha’teva, i.e. events were controlled by Hashem’s direct intervention. “Tikrivun eilei u’shemativ” is not a boast, but rather simply a statement of fact.  While human intellect of beis din hits a brick wall and fail to come to a solution, Moshe can go l’ma’alah min ha’brick wall and hear Hashem’s answer directly.

But therein lies the rub. When the hanhaga of Bnei Yisrael switched from the domain of l’ma’alah min ha’teva to the domain of teva, from the domain of crises solved by Hashem’s intervention to crises being solved by man’s intervention, from the domain of answers being dictated by G-d to the domain of people being forced to grapple with issues and come up with the own solutions, that switch meant a move away from the domain of Moshe’s leadership to new leadership and new direction. Moshe not having an answer for the Bnos Tzelafchad is not a punishment for saying “tikrivun eilei u’shemativ,” but is simply a consequence. Precisely because Moshe was so close to Hashem and could utter those words with complete sincerity and humility meant he could not address the messy, unclear world of those who are not so close and must struggle to work things out themselves.

what do we expect kids to walk out of yeshivah knowing?

A follow up post on education:

We spend thousands of dollars and invest hundreds of hours of classroom instruction in educating our kids. After 12 or more years, what do we expect them to know? What are we getting for our money?

My question assumes that, like E.D. Hirsch argued, there is certain “core knowledge” that is essential. It’s not enough for students to have some vague set of skills or good “midos” or hashkafos. They need to have real facts and information at their fingertips.

Here is what I consider the bare minimum, at least for girls:

1) Knowing all of chumash with rashi;

2) Familiarity with the text all of all nevi’im rishonim and basic content of nevi’im achronim;

3) Knowing orach chaim halachos as found in Chayei Adam or Kitzur;

4) Understanding basic principles of belief (this point needs a post of its own to define better).

That’s it.

Sounds simple, but I challenge you to test your average Beis Ya’akov graduate and see if she has mastered the items on my list.  My own kids have gone to what is considered a more academic B.Y., one which comparatively speaking does provide a decent education, and they complain to me that I’m being unfair when I expect them to know a pasuk and Rashi that they never learned in school.

(If you think boys education is any better, you're kidding yourself. A kid can walk out of 12th grade knowing 60-70 blatt gemara (in some cases, ha’levai that much) and the reid a rebbe said over to them for 4 years and that’s it – no knowledge of navi, chumash, hashkafa (outside of mussar shmuzen), and a smattering of Mishnah Berurah at best. Of course you have boys who become masmidim and excel – but those are the ones who are above average. What about the guy in the second level shiur in MTA, in DRS, in Chofetz Chaim, NIRC, or YFR?  What do they really know after 12 years of school?)

What is worse than girls not having learned this stuff in school is the fact that they never given the message that they have to learn it on their own, not because of the mitzvah of talmud Torah (which of course does not apply to girls), and not because they will do some kind of aveirah if they don't know a Rashi somewhere in Sefer VaYika (a very unlikely prospect), but simply because how can you live as a thinking Jew, a Jew who wants to connect with Torah = with G-d, if you don't even know chumash and Rashi? 

I should get back to posting on Torah only topics before I get myself too worked up or into hot water  : )

an "educational strategy" that undermines getting an education

I want to offer a quick comment on the attempt to draw conclusions regarding “educational strategy” from the fact that a high percentage of BMG/Lakewood students who took the CPA exam passed on the first try.

I think this would be wrong for the simple reason that the ability to score a passing grade on an exam that measures ability in a narrow subject area has nothing to do with being educated.

Steven Pinker, writing in the New Republic, once described an educated person as follows:

I think we can be more specific. It seems to me that educated people should know something about the 13-billion-year prehistory of our species and the basic laws governing the physical and living world, including our bodies and brains. They should grasp the timeline of human history from the dawn of agriculture to the present. They should be exposed to the diversity of human cultures, and the major systems of belief and value with which they have made sense of their lives. They should know about the formative events in human history, including the blunders we can hope not to repeat. They should understand the principles behind democratic governance and the rule of law. They should know how to appreciate works of fiction and art as sources of aesthetic pleasure and as impetuses to reflect on the human condition.

On top of this knowledge, a liberal education should make certain habits of rationality second nature. Educated people should be able to express complex ideas in clear writing and speech. They should appreciate that objective knowledge is a precious commodity, and know how to distinguish vetted fact from superstition, rumor, and unexamined conventional wisdom. They should know how to reason logically and statistically, avoiding the fallacies and biases to which the untutored human mind is vulnerable. They should think causally rather than magically, and know what it takes to distinguish causation from correlation and coincidence. They should be acutely aware of human fallibility, most notably their own, and appreciate that people who disagree with them are not stupid or evil. Accordingly, they should appreciate the value of trying to change minds by persuasion rather than intimidation or demagoguery.

Rabbi Adlerstein on the Cross Currents blog asks, “Are some kids wasting years of time because they could learn material much more quickly when a bit older?” The answer is “yes” only if all you expect them to do is cram into their heads the necessary facts needed to pass a few courses and tests needed to obtain a job.  If you expect them to become educated along the lines of Pinker’s definition or anything close, then 2 years or even 20 years is barely enough time to make a start of it.

 

Sadly, the pervasive ads in community newspapers for post-seminary/yeshiva diploma mills that offer degrees that can be attained by combining CLEP tests, yeshiva credit, study at home courses, etc. all so that one can maximize one’s time doing other things prove that an “educational strategy” that de-emphasizes education is becoming the norm.  It's the equivalent of high school students who have goofed off for 4 years enrolling in a crash course before the SATs to bring up their score.  They are not getting 4 years of education in a few months -- they are getting test taking skills and strategies and certain key facts necessary to do well on a test. 

 

What I regard as a flaw others regard as a virtue.  Few people want an education -- they want a degree that ultimately leads to a well-paying job.  Let's not kid ourselves -- no one is learning in 2 years or 18 months what takes years of schooling to master.  They are simply cutting out the pretense of getting an education and getting a degree / profession instead. 

My wife reminded me that she once posted on this same topic and related the story that her grandfather, R' Dov Yehudah Shochet, one of the tamidim muvhakim of R' Yosef Leib Bloch, was given permission by R' Bloch to attend university on the condition that he immediately return to yeshiva in Telz when instructed.  When he was just short of finishing his degree, R' Bloch sent word that it was time for him to come back, and so he did (side lesson: that's real hisbatlus to one's rebbe).  When he asked R' Bloch why he called him just then to return, R' Bloch explained that he allowed him to go to university in order to get an education.  That he already had done -- the degree was just a piece of paper. 

Fast forward to our times v'na'hapoch hu -- the tables have been turned.

"l'hatoso ba" -- did G-d want to cause Bilam to go astray?!

Commenting on Hashem’s question to Bilam, “Mi ha’anashim ha’eileh imach?” Rashi writes, “l’hatoso ba,” Hashem caused Bilam to err. By asking such a question, G-d gave Bilam the impression that He is not all knowing. Bilam therefore thought that he could curse Bnei Yisrael without Hashem being aware and get away with it.

It sounds like Rashi is telling us that Hashem stacked the deck and set Bilam up for failure. “L’hatoso ba” doesn’t mean G-d was ambiguous and allowed Bilam to err. It means G-d deliberately wanted to cause Bilam to err. How could G-d do that? How is that fair? Since when does G-d want people to fail?

Secondly, Rashi’s comment here seems at odds with an earlier comment of his. Rashi (Braishis 3:9) comments that when G-d asked Adam, “Ayeka?” he did so in order to initiate conversation. It’s terrifying to be addressed by G-d, so G-d made it a little easier by opening the dialogue with some innocuous question. Why didn’t Rashi offer the same explanation for Hashem’s question here? (See Mizrachi)

R’ Chaim Hirschensohn in his Nimukei Rashi answers as follows: just as a chacham derives whatever he knows about G-d through his own thought process, the navi derives his perception of G-d through his neshoma. Knowledge of G-d is by definition subjective, as no human being can ever apprehend the objective reality of what G-d is. The brains or personality/neshoma of the individual becomes the prism through which everything is filtered. That’s why Chazal tell us that nevuah is given over only to someone who is wise, rich, happy, etc. -- in other words, a complete and fulfilled person, one who is not likely to distort or skew the message because of his own failures or biases.

That being said, sometimes an exception to the rule is called for. If there is a message that G-d wants to get out, even though the conduit does not measure up, he/she experiences nevuah. When Hashem “spoke” to Kayin right after he murdered Hevel, it’s not because Kayim was worthy of nevuah – it’s because Hashem needed to get a message to him. When Hashem gave nevuah to Bilam, it was not because Bilam met all the qualifications needed to deserve nevuah, but rather because at that time and place Hashem needed a navi la’goyim.

The downside to that happening is that just as the perfect navi interprets the experience of nevuah through the prism of his holy personality, the Bilams of the world interpret nevuah through the prism of their twisted personality.   To Adam haRishon, "Ayeka?" was an innocent question.  To Bilam, there was no such thing as an innocent question.  Since his own speech was filled with hidden meanings designed to deceive and conceal, he interpreted other's words -- even G-d's -- in the same way, and therefore assumed there was a message that was not there.

Of course, writes R' Hirschensohn, G-d did not come to trip up Bilam.  The subject of the verb "l'hatoso ba" is not G-d, but rather G-d's question, the words of nevuah.  What Rashi is telling us is that the simple question experienced prophetically that could have been understood differently was the cause of Bilam's downfall, as, when filtered through his debased heart, they led him astray.

the one thing that mattered most to Bilam

“Lo sa’or es ha’am ki baruch hu…” (22:12) Rashi comments that Hashem first told Bilam that he cannot curse  Bnei Yisrael, to which Bilam responded that that's no problem, he will go and bless them. Hashem answered that he shouldn’t do that either, as “bauch hu,” they are already blessed and don’t need Bilam’s brachos.

At first glance, it’s hard to understand Bilam’s thinking. He jumps from extreme to extreme, first expressing the desire to curse  Bnei Yisrael destroy them, and then, when that was not allowed, expressing a desire to bless them. Why would he want to give brachos to the same nation that a second ago he wanted to curse and destroy?

What the Torah is showing us is that only one thing really mattered to Bilam: being the center of attention. Curses, blessings, whatever – none of that really mattered.  Bilam was flexible when it came to ideology and principle. What he was not flexible on was missing out on having a starring role in whatever was happening.

dear Ramaz graduates...

From a petition:

Rabbi Lookstein, all the good work you’ve done in your life – everything you’ve done for your community, for the plight of Soviet Jews – will be flushed down the toilet for ten minutes on stage in Cleveland. This is the single action history will remember you by, and history will not be kind.

Dear Ramaz Graduates,
 
I originally was going to begin this post by saying that this single petition, which a few hundred misguided souls put your signatures on, is the action history will remember you by, and history will not be kind.  However, I think that is as wrong as saying that Rabbi Lookstein's speech would have defined his career. 
 
You espouse the rhetoric of tolerance, protesting for the Mexicans and Muslims who you claim Trump will harm, but in truth, you stand for intolerance.   You stand against the right of free speech, the right of Rabbi Lookstein to simply to deliver an invocation at a political gathering. You speak of celebrating diversity, but want to silence views that you disagree with.
 
You stand against giving the leader of your community the benefit of the doubt, something he undoubtedly has earned through decades of service to the Jewish community, and instead would judge and condemn him for taking a position at odds with your own.  
 
If you reject Trump, with whom do you stand?
 
Do you support the Democrat party, which considered labeling Israel an "occupying force" and whose committee charged with formulating policy includes BDS supporters like Cornell West?
 
Perhaps you forgot this scene from the last DNC convention?
 

 
Or perhaps you forgot the DNC and Hillary Clinton's support of eliminating sanctions on Iran, allowing them to develop weapons that can be used against Israel and giving them access to funds that are used to support terrorism?

You seem to confuse bombastic rhetoric, which Mr. Trump is perhaps guilty of, with bombastic policy and actions that have led to the death of your fellow Jews, and indeed, to the death of thousands the world over. 

why complain now?

Why did Bnei Yisrael in last week’s parsha start complaining about the man after 40 years in the desert, right on the threshold of entering Eretz Yisrael? For close to 40 years the menu had been the same – man for breakfast, man for lunch, man for supper – and no complaints (aside from at the beginning of the 40 years). If the menu was good enough day in and day out for all that time, why start complaining now?

Chasam Sofer answers (and my son pointed out that R’ Bachyei says something similar) that when Bnei Yisrael first entered the desert, there were complaints because that generation had grown up eating regular food and the switch to man was a shock to the system. The generation that grew up during the 40 years in the desert had never known food other than man. For them, this was the norm! When after 40 years they reached the outskirts of civilization and tasted real food, they suddenly realized what they had been missing.

This explains, writes the Chasam Sofer, the midah k’neged midah of the punishment of nechashim ha’serafim. For 40 years the ananei ha’kavod had smoothed out the road and eliminated any danger from snakes, scorpions, and other creatures of the desert. Hashem was telling Bnei Yisrael that if they don’t like the miracle-food of man – they want the real thing – then they would get reality. The reality is that snakes bite and sting, as they would discover.

When I said this over on Shabbos, my wife added a chiddush of her own. The man freed Bnei Yisrael from having to deal with the kelala given to Adam of “b’zey’as apecha tochal lechem,” having to toil for one’s bread. By transcending the cursed state of Adam, Bnei Yisrael were also freed from having to deal with “v’eivah ashis beincha u’bein ha’isha,” the curse of animosity between the snake and man. Once Bnei Yisrael expressed a desire to come back down to earth and have real bread, i.e. have the “b'zey’as apecha tochal lechem.” Hashem showed them that it was a package deal, and they would now have to deal with the nachash as well.

Speaking of the Chasam Sofer, he is the only source I think I have found that addresses the question of why Miriam deserved to die in the desert and not enter Eretz Yisrael. He quotes from Chazal that lashom ha’ra hurts the one who does the speaking, the one who it is spoken to, and the one spoken about. It was the sin of speaking against Moshe that did Miriam in. Moshe and Aharon, the ones spoken to and about, were also guilty, but they were given a chance to redeem themselves by speaking to the rock. Had they done so, it would have demonstrated to Bnei Yisrael the power of speech, and the danger that comes with misusing words. Since they failed, they too were subject to the punishment that came from Miriam’s lashon ha’ra.

you and I can be as great as Eliyahu

1) Ramban writes (Shmos end of ch 15) that the Hashem is “mamtik mar b’mar.” Lemons are bitter so we add sugar to make lemonade; Hashem makes the lemonade sweet by using the bitter items themselves. When Bnei Yisrael left Mitzrayim and came to Marah, a place with bitter undrinkable water, Hashem showed Moshe how he could sweeten the waters by using a bitter tree. Normally, as Ramban on our parsha writes, a person bitten by a snake would not be able to tolerate even the sight of a snake, but Hashem arranged things so that looking at the nechash he’nechoshes would cure the bite. I would argue that we take advantage of this same miracle in our lives. The very same germs that cause all kinds of diseases can be injected into a person to protect them from those same illnesses – vaccination.

Yet that’s not how the Mishna in Rosh haShana (3:8) seems to present how things work. The Mishna rhetorically asks, “Is it the snake [the nachash he’nechoshes] that kills or cures”? Of course not. Rather, looking up at the snake caused people to direct their eyes toward heaven and remind themselves that they need to accept ol malchus shamayim – that’s what cured people.

M’mah nafshach: if the cure came through looking to shamayim, i.e. through tefilah, then why did Moshe need to make this precise tool of the nechash nechoshes? Why not just point toward the sky? But if the nachash he’nechoshes really had the power to cure, then why do Chazal tell us that it was looking heavenward that did the trick?

The Mishna in Pesachim writes that King Chizkiyahu did away with the “Book of Cures.” Rambam quotes that some explain that this was a book of medicine that Chizkiyahu chose to hide because people relied on it for cures instead of trusting in G-d. Rambam rejects this as ridiculous. Going to a doctor or taking medicine does not prove a lack of trust in G-d any more than eating when one is hungry does. Ramban, on the other hand, writes in Parshas Bechukosai that when the nation will reach a high enough spiritual level there will be no need for doctors. True bitachon means relying on G-d alone.

Sefas Emes (5636) answers our question regarding the nachash ha’nechoshes by trying to have his cake and eat it too when it comes to this machlokes. The nachash, the tree that made the water drinkable, vaccines, all really do work, and Hashem wants us to use these tools. You can’t just point to the sky and hope for a miracle. The Rambam is right -- we live in a world of teva and Hashem wants us to play by its rules.  That being said, what Chazal in the Mishna are telling us is that we also have to realize that this is not the ideal.  We need to look up to heaven and at least dream of a time and place where we are not constrained by the rules of teva.  Ramban is right not in a practical sense, but in an ideal sense. 

2) “Rosheich alay k’Karmel v’dalas roseich k‘argaman…” (Shir haShirim 7:6) The Midrash reads this pasuk as describing the beauty in G-d’s eyes of even the worst members of Klal Yisrael. “Rosheich” is read by the Midrash as “reishech,” from the word “rash,” meaning poor person – not poor financially, but poor in good deeds; “dalas” is taken by the Midrash as a hint to the word “dal,” another synonym for a person who is wanting. The Midrash writes that the poorest miscreant in Klal Yisrael is as valuable in G-d's eyes as Eliyahu haNavi who davened for rain and was answered; the poorest no-goodnik is as great as David haMelech and Daniel.

Three years ago I posed the question of how this makes sense. It’s like saying that since I can swing a bat I am as good a baseball player as Derek Jeter. Obviously, it’s not true.  So what do Chazal mean?

Back then I outlines two approaches: 1) Shiurei Da’as: the distance between man and G-d is infinite. When you travel down an infinite road, it’s true the person who has progressed 2 miles has gone much further than the person who has gone 2 yards, but relative to the road as a whole, both are in about the same position; 2) my own thought: l’fum tza’ara agra. G-d measures our achievement on a scale relative to our abilities, not as an absolute. 

Fast forward three years and I found the Netziv in the Harchev Davar on this week’s parsha  addresses this same Midrash and suggests that the Midrash is equating the avodah of Joe-ordinary with Dovid, Daniel, and Eliyahu only with respect to the power of tefilah. The need for tefilah is built into the teva of the world.   Parshas Braishis tells us that Hashem wanted to bring rain for the plants to grow, but he waited until Adam was there to daven for it. Hashem wants it to rain, he wants the plants to grow, he wants teva to operate as it should.  All that stands in the way is for someone -- like you or me -- giving the word.  The bar of what is required, at least in ensuring that our needs are met b'derech ha'teva, is so low that no matter who you are, you can accomplish what needs to be done.

This is why, says the Netziv, the Midrash uses the example of Eliyahu davening for rain.   Hashem had already promised to lift the drought before Eliyahu davened. His words didn’t cause the rain to fall – they were just necessary as a trigger to bring about what Hashem already said would happen. David’s tehillim, Daniel’s daily tefilah – these were the same prayers that you and I say, not extraordinary requests for extraordinary things. 

Chazal see the end of the pasuk in Shir haShirim, melech asur b'rehatim, as a reference to Moshe Rabeinu's sin at Mei Meriva.  Hashem wanted Moshe to speak -- to daven, and show that the needs of the people could be met not through the supernatural, but through tefilah, which is part of the natural way the world works.   This lesson was necessary as a prelude to life in Eretz Yisrael -- a life of farming, working, etc., a very different existence that life in the midbar.  This hanhaga was not the midah/character of Moshe, and therefore, he did not meet Hashem's expectations.

I don't think I captured the Netziv's point as well as I could have, so please see it inside if you can.  It's well worth it.

what Korach the aron bearer should have learned from his job

1) The Midrash asks, “What motivated Korach, who was one of the carriers of the aron, to rebel against Moshe?” Why does the Midrash focus specifically on the fact that Korach helped carry the aron? Chazal tell us that the aron was “nosei es nos’av,” it carried those who were carrying it. Someone who didn’t know better might look at a kohen and say, “There is no way that guy is strong enough or big enough to carry the aron!” That assessment may be right, but it didn’t matter – those selected to do the job were given the ability to do it. The aron schlepped them; they didn’t have the schlep the aron.  Korach should have realized that even though when he looked at Moshe, at Aharon, he thought that there is no way they are qualified, it doesn’t matter. “Aron nosei es nos’av” – it’s all about siyata d’shemaya.

2) The Midrash tells us that the wife of On ben Peles sat by the doorway of their tent washing her hair so that no one could enter and involve her husband  in the rebellion of Korach.  R’ Ya’akov Kamentzky points out an amazing thing. Here you have people leading a rebellion against Moshe Rabeinu, a rebellion that in effect undermined Torah itself by calling Moshe’s credibility into question, and they are makpid not to see a woman's hair uncovered -- they are medakdek on something that plenty of "frum" people would not be so concerned about, while at the same time being kofrim in fundamentals.

The problem with Korach was not a lack of frumkeit. The problem was his vested interest in pursuing his own agenda. When there was no vested interest, he had no problems with dikdukei halacha.  The ba'alei musar would tell you that this is no exception to the rule -- it's human nature.  All too often  rationalizations are just a means to advance an agenda driven by underlying negi'os.  The general populace, however, sees a guy who they know is nedakdek on every kutzo shel yud making an argument and so they assume this too is l'shem shamayim and has validity.  It's hard to tell the difference.  

3) Moshe’s reaction to Korah and his camp is “Rav lachem bnei Levi.” When Moshe davened to enter Eretz Yisrael, Hashem echoed those same words, saying (Devarim 3:26), “Rav lach…” and denied Moshe’s request. What kind of midah k’neged midah is this? The camp of Korach followers wanted to overturn the system and take authority and position that was not theirs. Moshe Rabeinu, as the gemara (Sotah 14) tells us, wanted to enter Eretz Yisrael simply to be able to do more mitzvos. Why should Hashem throw back at him the words he used against Korach?

There was a lot to criticize about Korach’s rebellion, but the one silver lining was that at least some of the participants may have really wanted to be on a higher level of ruchniyus. Sometimes aspirations cannot be fulfilled; sometimes there are boundaries to what one can achieve; however, having she’ifos and dreams of greatness is itself only positive. When Moshe said “rav lachem,” the message he was sending was that you can’t even dream.  He shut down the aspirations of those involved without trying to redirect it to some healthier channel.  That was what Hashem found unacceptable, and therefore Moshe’s own dreams were held back.

techeiles (an interesting textual emendation by the Meshech Chochma)

A few notes on Rashi in last week's parsha on the topic techeiles:

1) Color: Rashi (15:38) writes that techeiles is a “tzeva yarok,” which we would translate as green, or maybe greenish blue. Later in the parsha (15:42) Rashi quotes from R’ Moshe haDarshan that techeiles is a reminder of makkas bechoros, which took place at night, and therefore techeiles is a dark color like the night sky (midnight blue?) Chazal famously tell us that “techeiles domeh l’yam…,”suggesting it is a sea blue or sea green color, though the statement may be a figurative association rather than a literal description of the color. Rambam writes that the techeiles is the color of sky blue during midday.

2) Knots: Rashi quotes from the Tanchuma writes that tzitzis is a reminder of taryag mitzvos because tzitzis is gematriya 600 (Rashi is counting two yud’s in the word even though in the Torah it is spelled without those yud’s – see Gur Aryeh and others) + 8 strings and 5 knots = 613.

A little background to set the stage for what is difficult here: the gemara (Menachos 39) tells us that each set of tzitzis should have between 7 and 13 sets of windings (chulyos) with 3 windings of string (krichos) per set (this is how most Rishonim read it). The gemara also writes that one should have a knot between each chulya.

So how do you get 5 knots? There should be at least 8 knots if not more?

The simplest answer is that we don’t pasken like this Tanchuma (the Rambam does not quote it). Some Rishonim hold that the chulyos alternated between techeiles and white. If you leave off the three chulyos of techeiles and do only four of white, you would end up with five knots. Alternatively, the techeiles and white chulyos may have been paired together.

3) Number of strings: Rashi and Tosfos (Menachos 38) hold that two of the 4 complete strings (that are doubled to make 8) should be techeiles. Rambam holds only one string of eight is techeiles; Ra’avad says it is one complete strong of the 4.

Rashi (15:41) on our parsha quoting R’ Moshe haDarshan writes that tzitzis have eight strings corresponding to the eight days that passed from yetzi’as Mitzrayim until kri’as Yam Suf. Everyone asks the same question: kri’as Yam Suf took place seven, not eight days after yetzias Mitzrayim!

Meshech Chochma gives a simple answer: there is an error in our text of Rashi -- instead of 8, it should say 7. But don’t tzitzis have 8 strings? He explains that R’ Moshe haDarshan held like the shitas haRambam, that 1 of 8 strings is techeiles, leaving 7 that are white – these are the 7 strings that correspond to the 7 days that Rashi is talking about.

Meshech Chochma does not bring any proof for his textual emendation, but there may be evidence that he is right if you read Rashi on the first pasuk in Parshas Korach carefully. Rashi quotes from the Midrash that Korach’s followers dressed themselves in garments made entirely of techeiles and challenged Moshe to explain why these garments were obligated in tzitzis. “If ONE thread of techeiles is sufficient when the garment is of some another color,” they argued, “Then surely if the entire garment is made of techeiles there should be no need for tzitzis.” Unlike Rashi on the gemara, who writes that 2 techeiles strings are required, here Rashi seems to indicate that one string is enough.

laws for thee, not for me

A few months ago I wrote that I no longer think dina d'malchusa applies to the current banana republic-like country in which we live in.  I beat Kurt Schlichter by a few months, but his article is worth reading.  He puts it bluntly: "The idea of the rule of law today is a lie. There is no law. There is no justice. There are only lies."  And he wrote this before today's ridiculous outrage by James Comey.  About that, I refer you to the Observer, which had this to say:

Today, the FBI sold out the Rule of Law in America. After describing clear evidence of extensive mishandling of classified national security information, FBI Director James Comey announced that the FBI will not recommend indicting former secretary of state Hillary Clinton. This is naked crony government, ugly and exposed. Comey’s decision will go down as one of the government’s worst assaults on truth in its War on Honesty.

I could not have put it better.

On a similar note, maybe someone can explain to me why the same people  hyperventilating over a little six-sided star in a Trump ad have no problem with anything  their party and their President giving billions to Iran so they can arm Hezbollah and Hamas and eventually get a nuke to threaten Israel with.  Isn't that a little worse than a star in an ad?  But what do I know.

Yehoshua and Kalev's irrational argument

1) Parshas Shelach opens with a "machlokes" between the majority of scouts and the minority of Kalev and Yehoshua. The majority delivered a report saying the land was unconquerable – the inhabitants were too mighty, the cities too fortified, there were giants living there. Kalev presented the dissenting view – “Aloh na’aleh v’yarashnu osah,” we can go up and conquer. We can imagine the same scene being played out in any number of other contexts: before battle, generals gather, plans are presented, risk are weighed. Do we invade? Can we succeed? It doesn’t matter if we are speaking about Canaan, D-Day, or Fallujah, it’s all the same story. 

The debate seems to end with the majority view winning the day, and the people reacting with tears and complaints to Moshe as to why they left Egypt. But the debate was apparently not over. A few pesukim later Yehoshua and Kalev speak up again, saying the land is good, and, “Im chafeitz banu Hashem v’havi osanu el ha’aretz ha’zos… eretz asher hi zavas chalav u’devash.” (15:8) If G-d desires, he can bring us to the land of milk and honey. The generals/scouts had already sat down at the table and debated, assessed, and came to a conclusion. The people had reacted and weighed in as well. What were Yehoshua and Kalev adding? Why did they think these words would carry any more weight than Kalev’s previous impassioned speech?

Shem m’Shmuel explains that they key to Yehoshua and Kalev’s argument is one word – “chafeitz,” desire. You can argue with me from today till tomorrow that vanilla ice cream is better than chocolate, that the Yankees are better than the Mets, that Picasso is better than Rembrandt, but it won’t make any difference. Reason is irrelevant when you are talking about a like, a desire, a cheifetz. This is what I like – I can’t explain why, I can’t justify why, and I don’t need to.

The generals sitting around the table before any battle in history can weigh the merits of “go” vs. “no go, ” but the fight for Eretz Yisrael is different. In this argument, the side arguing “go” always holds the winning trump card because in this argument, it’s not about risk/benefit analyses or tactics or strategy. B’derech ha’teva all those play a role, but only in so far as determining the “how” – not the “if.” At the end of the day, the conquest of Eretz Yisrael is about one thing: “im chafetz banu” – Hashem's desire. Yehosua and Kalev were telling the people that ain hachi nami, based on logic and reason and strategy their argument may appear to be weaker than that of the majority view – they can even concede that part of the debate -- but their point of view is still right, because logic and reason go out the window when the issue is “im chafetz banu Hashem,” what Hashem wants. Even the question of whether or not we deserve it goes out the window.

2) Many meforshim read the parshiyos of mitzvos that follow the cheit ha’meraglim as a response to their sin. Seforno explains that originally, no korbanos needed nesachim. After the cheit ha’eigel, Bnei Yisrael were given the mitzvah of bringing nesachim with korbanos tzibur to make these offerings acceptable. Now, after cheit ha’meraglim, nesachim were needed even with korbanos yachid to make then acceptable.

Shem m’Shmuel sees the nesachim not as a corrective measure for some deficiency or failure, but as an opportunity. Pre-mattan Torah, korbanos did not have the power to include the ingredients of nesachim in their tikun. After mattan-Torah, Hashem gave us a bonus and we were given the privilege of bringing nesachim. Because the tzibur was united, the nesachim of korbanos tzibur worked on behalf of everyone. The cheit ha’meraglim splintered the community and that unity was lost. Therefore, nesachim had to be brought by each individual on his own behalf.

He doesn't spell it out, but it seems that what broke the unity of the nation was the rejection of Eretz Yisrael.  One of the defining features of a nation is having a homeland.  Since Klal Yisrael rejected Eretz Yisrael, they were reduced to a collection of individuals, a bunch of tribes wandering around together.  Erertz Yisrael is the glue that binds us together as one.