Comment to a previous post submitted anonymously:
"he thinks chazakas represent onotological realities and cant change."
Quite a striking claim to make! It is one thing to say chazakos are static (as R' Soloveitchik was known to hold) because the Torah defined a fixed legal reality in which halachic rules operate (e.g. like doing geometry with perfect right triangles which exist nowhere in nature other than in rough approximation), but it is quite another thing entirely to say that chazakos represent ontological reality. Is this really so? Doesn't it depend on what type of chazakah you are talking about?
If a kosher mikveh is measured and found to be missing water, the chazakah d'm'ikara tells us that the mikveh is assumed to have been kosher until the moment before it was measured and found lacking (see Nidda 2-3 for a full discussion). Is that because there is some magic ontological rule of evaporation that places its occurance at a moment before measurement, or simply a legal fiction that tells us to assume a status quo is maintained until we have definitive proof otherwise, even though in reality the water might have been missing for days?