R' Moshe Amiel wrote an interesting sefer called "HaMidos l'Cheiker HaHalacha" ( 3 volumes available on hebrewbooks.org) which I wish I had time to read. The only comparable I am aware of is R' Kasher's "Mefa'aneiyach Tzefunos". Just like R' Kasher takes various chilukim and chakiros of the Rogatchover's and traces them through tens of sugyos to show how the Rogatchover applied them, R' Amiel tries to isolate certain logical principles and demonstrate how they apply across multiple sugyos, along the way explaining the central points of various machlokesin, resolving questions of Achronim, etc. As he writes in the introduction to one of the volumes, what makes the sefer unique is that instead of being organized around a masechta or around the Rambam, it is organized around these "midos", these logical constructs. My small critique after a cursory glance is that there are many, many sub-principles which he creates which makes things a bit complex, and he also has exceptions on top of the rules. That being said, the sefer is a tour de force of lomdus, for what is lomdus if not the translation of case-law into conceptual and logical principles.
Case in point as an illustration: Achronim ask why we never say aseh doche lo ta'aseh on an issur like gezel. For example, if you ate your friend's matzah so that the eating and theft were simultaneous, the halacha does not say that the mitzvah of matzah is doche the lav of gezel -- you are instead not yotzei. Why should this be so? R' Amiel's answer to this particular problem interestingly differs from that of his rebbe, R' Shimon Shkop, but at the same time is consistant with yesodos which R' Shimon sets down in other places. But before posting an answer let me leave the question out there and give people time to ponder.