Friday, July 30, 2010

laws vs. values

Perhaps the fundamental error of the Reform and Conservative movements is their (mis)interpretation of halacha as a value system instead of a legal system. For the yeshiva student, Shabbos means 39 categories of forbidden labor, psik reisha, melacha she’eina tzericha l’gufa, etc. For the the non-halachically committed Jew, Shabbos is simply a day to celebrate the values of family, community, rest. “Antiquated” legalisms have been replaced by a commitment to some nebulous set of principles that guide, but do not dictate, behavior.

There is a trend in Orthodoxy to commit the mirror image of this error in interpreting value judgments as legal mandates. It is increasingly fashionable to point to “meta-halacha,” unstated first principles, as the justification behind prohibitions that have no clear source. However, in truth, these meta-principles are no more than value statements being disguised as law. Thus, for example, some might say that playing ball on Shabbos, while not clearly prohibited by any one rule in shulchan aruch, is no less a prohibition than lighting a fire in that it undermines the essence of what Shabbos is all about. Values as distinct from law have been replaced by a flat arena of do’s and don’ts.

Rabbi Meyer Twesky has written, “This latter concern, which we have dubbed axiological, may alternatively be described as hashkafic or public policy. Phraseology and nomenclature per se are unimportant.” But you see, nomenclature and phraseology are critically important, as they reflect (in this case) a substantive distinction. If you want to debate the length a woman’s skirt needs to be with me, we can go through the relevant gemaras, Rishonim, poskim, and see who the sources support. If you want to debate public policy, such as the degree tzniyus should impact a woman’s career choices or participation in public leadership, how are we to measure the precise balance required or determine who is right and who is wrong? It really boils down to a matter of judgment, and while people can exercise better judgment and worse judgment, it is near impossible to say with absolute certainty where the truth lies. That is not to say that anything goes – it simply means that reasonable people who equally cherish Judaism and halacha may differ and the waters are murkier than many would like to imagine.

The problem is particularly acute for modern orthodoxy. The chareidi world assigns substantial value and respect to “da’as Torah,” the value judgments of its leadership. There is no need to refashion these judgment calls into legal dictates because they are respected as-is. However, modern orthodoxy does insist a sharp distinction between “da’as Torah” and halacha proper. What then are Rabbis to do when the value system of halacha is trampled upon while technical fidelity to the law is maintained? The answer of some seems to be to extend the legal system beyond its natural borders, de facto undercutting the right to differ in matters of judgment, while still maintaining this largely fictional distinction between the “da’as Torah” of the chareidi world and that of the centrist movement.

The obvious downside to this approach is evident when the guns of axiological truth become aimed at- instead of by- the meta-halachists. Whether it be on the issue of Zionism, secular education, age of the universe, or other principles, those in the centrist camp refuse to defer to the judgment of chareidi leadership even where the “gedolim” on the right claim that the principles in question are of axiological importance. Clearly, one man’s axiological principle is another man’s bone of contention. If only those in the centrist camp took the message to heart when addressing those to the left of their own viewpoints.

I think it far better to maintain a natural and logical distinction between laws and values instead of blurring the lines. I too sympathize with the need to ensure that we don’t become halachic technocrats, maintaining fidelity to the letter of codes but trampling on their spirit. However, I think the way to achieve that goal is to teach Torah in a way that ensures that those values are meaningfully and forcefully communicated and are given the respect and appreciation they deserve. After learning Rav Tzadok haKohen’s or the Shem m’Shmuel or the Sidduro Shel Shabbos’s beautiful insights into what Shabbos means, I don’t think one can spend Shabbos on the ball field. Telling someone that not playing ball is an axiological principle reduces it to just another rule that can be trampled; teaching someone to love Shabbos is a different ball game.

28 comments:

  1. "However, modern orthodoxy does insist a sharp distinction between “da’as Torah” and halacha proper"

    I'm not a sociologist, but RWMO might be moving closer to charedi world, and the differences less sharp between both communities.

    I recall R. Michael Rozensweig mentioning "Daas Torah" in his recent Torah web shuir regarding the Maharat issue; this was in contradistinction to R. Norman Lamm who was quoted some time ago(see link) that "We don't work on the concept of da'as Torah," he said. "[T]here is no principle of infallibility that we accept."

    I'm sure there are still some differences from the RW world, but it's more subtle. An example might be the homosexual discussion in YU. After the RY and President came out with their position, there still was some discussion in the student newspaper and by R. Billet on the radio, but it was more muted; I think the tendency in the charedi newspapers would be not to have any back and forth once the gedolim speak(although a semi-charedi forum like Cross Currents might be different).

    http://www.tzemachdovid.org/amechad/daastorah.shtml

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  2. I'm not a sociologist either, but my feeling is that many in the MO camp would deny that da'as Torah holds as much sway in their community as it does in a chareidi community (would that not be an accurate statement regarding the RCA?), yet still say Maharat or a women's minyan is assur because of "metahalachic" reasons. To me, that's wanting have your cake and eat it too -- embracing da'as Torah under a different name when it suits your purpose but denying it when it works against you.

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  3. 1) I think the leadership is less interested in the philosophy being 100% consistent, as you address, than in practical direction of the community.

    If you think of the external forces impacting on the community, there are a few: Orthoprax or divisive aspects caused by aspects of blogs(not yours :) and by the secular world in general , marriage/chinuch/impact of secualar-world promiscuity issues, women's roles(feminism), homosexual question.

    The leadership I think is trying deal with exsitential communal issues which would overide pristine philsophy. R Yosef Blau was quoted in an article on the West Side Singles scene that" Modern Orthodoxy is an experiment that started 50 years ago. It was this attempt to bridge the gap between observant life and secular life... But flash-forward to 2009. You still have the idea of this observant branch that can interact fully with the secular world, but the values of the secular world are completely different."

    (Obviously MO also has it's roots in Germany)

    2) Both the MO and Charedi camps have their different groups which are held together, the RCA not being monolithic, and neither the Agudah world.

    3) I saw on Torah Web that in September, R Meyer Twerki will be speaking about "Surrendering to the Will of Hashem" and R Rosensweig on "What Does Hashem Want from Men and Women". I think those will address contemporary sociological issues as well.

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  4. >>>I think the leadership is less interested in the philosophy being 100% consistent

    I admit that not having the practical burden of a congregation or administration to answer to frees me to shoot for "pristine" philosophical truth, while those in the trenches fighting for the survival of Judaism on a practical level must do what it takes to get the job done, leaving philosophical niceties aside. Those engaged in that battle deserve much credit, and I don't mean to dimish or attack them.

    That being said, Orthodoxy in all its flavors needs better intellectual leadership. The Rav was not just a posek -- he was a philosophical beacon. His essays and talks speak of paradigmatic typologies (Ish Halacha, Ish Rosh Chodesh, etc.) which he left to his audience to translate into practical life. Where is the next leader who can step up and articulate not just a practical roadmap, but a vision?

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  5. It's a good question, but here are two references to relatively recent visions I found.

    1) R. Pam's comments at end of article re Shuvu, based on a remark he heard in the 1950's("This,' said HaRav Zaidel, is the story of Bnei Yisroel")

    http://chareidi.shemayisrael.com/archives5761/terumah/ashuvu.htm

    2) Article by R. Berel Wein in the first published in the Jeruslem Post a few weeks ago:

    “I have often been asked by friends as to what my opinion is as to what comparable era in Jewish history we are now living through... The Book of Shoftim/Judges is but a prelude to the book of Shmuel and its story of Jewish greatness in the Land of Israel thousands of years ago.”

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  6. Link to R. Wein's article:

    http://www.yeshiva.org.il/midrash/shiur.asp?id=13839

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  7. I just wanted to let you know. I was learning the Asvan Dioraysa (Rav Yosef Engel), he says in klal 11 that the Orech Chaim in Siman 17 sief 2 the haga (Rama) writes that if women want to wear tzitzis and make a bracha on them they have permission to do this like other mitzvos shezman gerama. However, it looks like haughtiness, therefore, they should not wear tzitzis, since it is not an obligation for a man, since a man does not have an obligation to buy a talis in order to make himself obligated in tzitzis.

    Rav Engel then says: Since it is also by men not a compelling obligation, therefore, if women do it, it looks like haughtiness.

    I would go ahead and apply this to Rav Shechter's idea and then you see a basis in shulchan orech for Rav Shechter's thoughts. Now does his idea make sense to you?

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  8. That is a specific din by tztiztis, as obvious from the fact that it does not apply to other mitzvos aseh she'hazman gerama. The exception cannot prove the rule.

    Secondly, what mitzvah would you bar women from because of yuhara -- talmud torah? You see that poskim have never said such a thing. Poskim even allow women to answer shaylos, as the Birkei Yoseg notes on the basis of the Chinuch.

    Thirdly, R' Shachter pointed to tzniyus, which is a different din than yuhara.

    (You don't need R"Y Engel for tzitzis -- it's mefurash in the Rama. R"Y Engel's chiddush is making the connection to the M.C. by sukkah l'inyan bracha).

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  9. Correct, you do not need him. I was hoping you would look up the source and see that he takes it even further.

    "That is a specific din by tztiztis, as obvious from the fact that it does not apply to other mitzvos aseh she'hazman gerama. The exception cannot prove the rule. "

    No, this is specific for any mitzva that is a kiyum aaseh, meaning it does not have to be done. The two examples in Rav Engel's sefer were Succah and tzitzis. Both, because if you do not eat bread, you don;t need to eat in the succah and tzitzis because if you do not have a four cornered garment you do not need tzitzis.

    So too, it would make sense to apply this idea in this case where a man does not NEED to be a rabbi and compromise his tzniyus. Therefore, it appears like Yehora (rav engel takes this idea even further and says it is mamesh assur by tzitzis) for a woman to try and take this role.

    Anyway, this whole thing is moot. Rav Epstein, the Orech Hashulchan, already ruled like the Rambam. Can you find any achronim that argue against him?

    In Judaism, the way halacha works is mesorah. If you have Rishonim and achronim that hold a specific way, then a rav can decide to poskin like that opinion because there is a mesorah for it. If, however, there are no achronim that hold of that opinion, then how can you hold of it? Are there any achronim that hold like ANY rishon that says a woman can hold a position of authority? Find me one and then I will agree with you.

    The age of the universe and other such HASHKAFIC arguments, for at least my opinions, all have basis in rishonim and achronim. If you would like to see any sources on views that you think I have that do not have backing I would be happy to show them to you. But I would love to see ANY achron that argues with the Orech hashulchan in this case.

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  10. If you would like to look up the orech hashulchan:

    Orech Hashulchan choshen mishpat siman 7 sief 4. He poskins like the Rambam.

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  11. >>>No, this is specific for any mitzva that is a kiyum aaseh,

    Wrong, as obvious from the cases of shofar and lulav and talmud torah and many others where women do not NEED to do the mitvah but are permitted to.

    >>>Anyway, this whole thing is moot. Rav Epstein, the Orech Hashulchan, already ruled like the Rambam. Can you find any achronim that argue against him?

    R' Moshe, the Mishpitei Uziel (did you bother to read what I wrote before commenting? These sources are in the post.), the Birkei Yosef, and others (see R' Daniel Sperber's tshuvah for a full array of sources) all pasken against the Rambam. Sorry to put it so bluntly, but if you really are unaware of these sources (as you obviously are, since you don't even know "one acharon" who argues on the Rambam) you are completly out of touch with the issue.

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  12. The A.H. accepts the sevara of 'kiblu alayhu,' which many contemporay poskim hold applies to appointments done democratically. A Rabbi chosen by a board -- he is not appointed by some outside authority, like a melech who was appointed by a sanhedrin.

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  13. >Wrong, as obvious from the cases of shofar and lulav and talmud torah and many others where women do not NEED to do the mitvah but are permitted to.

    YOU ARE SO WRONG, PLEASE LOOK AT THE ASVAN DIORAYSA. First off, these mitzvos are not kiyum assehs so I do not know what the heck you are talking about. Second of all, he specifically says lulav is not included in these mitzvos that if women do them they are considered yehora. I don't know what the heck I am wrong about. You are not making any sense buddy.

    >R' Moshe, the Mishpitei Uziel (did you bother to read what I wrote before commenting? These sources are in the post.), the Birkei Yosef, and others (see R' Daniel Sperber's tshuvah for a full array of sources) all pasken against the Rambam. Sorry to put it so bluntly, but if you really are unaware of these sources (as you obviously are, since you don't even know "one acharon" who argues on the Rambam) you are completly out of touch with the issue.

    These people are talking about women holding authority over the congregation of Israel? I didn't see that quoted in your source, all I saw was this

    >In the tshuvah by Rav Uziel I cited in the previous posts ( Mishpitei Uziel C.M. 6, link) he notes that women on a day to day basis engage in commerce without anyone objecting. “Al tarbeh sicha” restricts only frivolous, unnecessary speech, not professional interaction. If we do not limit women’s professional pursuits because of concerns for tzniyus, kal v’chomer we need not impose limitations when they are involved in klei kodesh, in activities that aim to strengthen Torah.

    No where does rav uziel say women can hold authority over the congregation of Israel.

    Also, where are these other sources you speak of? Just quoting names is wothless, I would like sources. This is mainly because I see that you misread the Orech hashulchan.

    He QUOTES the rambam in the source that I gave you. He says women can not hold any position which gives them authority over the Jewish congregation. I am not sure where you get the fact that he says only to be a judge. He says ALL positions of authority.

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  14. Here is the Aurech Hashulchan, check him out. http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=9103&st=&pgnum=19

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  15. Also, I found this source: http://text.rcarabbis.org/?p=931 that says the Mishpatei uziel actually held even according to the Rambam. Because he held: former Rishon Lezion Rav Uziel writes in Resp. Mishpatei Uziel: ”לא נאמרה הלכה זו אלא במינוי הנעשה על ידי סנהדרין.” The whole issue of serara is only when the appointment is made by the Sanhedrin.”אבל בשאלתנו, אין כאן מינוי אלא קבלה, שעל ידי בחירות מכריע רוב הקהל את הסכמתו לאותם הנבחרים שיהיו באי כוחו לפקח על כל ענייניהם הציבוריים.”. Rav Uziel says that democracy is different – even the Rambam would agree.

    That is, he would explain the Rambam differently, not hold against the Rambam.

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  16. Where did you get that Rav Moshe holds that women can hold serara? The same source that I quote above: Rav Moshe Feinstein, on the issue of women being president of Medinat Yisrael, writes (source 7, סימן מ”ה, page ס”א on the left side of the page, at the very beginning): “הנה מה שכתב כבוד תורתו הרב, שמצד תשובתי בזה שהקשיתי על הרמב”ם שפוסל נשים אף לכל משימות, שלא ידוע לי בעניי מקור לדבריו, וגם שמשמע לי שלא כולי עלמא סברי כן – יוצא מכשול שימנו נשים לפרעזדענט במדינת ישראל. אין אנו אחראין להנהגת המלכות דשם, שהיא בעוונותינו הרבים אצל כופרים ומומרים, ואין מתחשבין עם דעותינו כלום.” He says that nobody from the Israeli government has asked me a she’ela on this, and we are not responsible for their actions. “ולשמא ימנו אשה להבתי כנסיות שבמדינתנו אמעריקע, נמי לא שייך שיוצא מזה מכשול, דהבתי כנסיות והמוסדות שמתנהגים על פי דרך התורה לא יעשו כן בלא הוראת רב מובהק, וממילא סגי לזה גם שיטת הרמב”ם שלא למנות אשה.” Regarding women as shul presidents, most shuls have rabbis. The rabbis are fully aware that the Rambam is against it, so that it’s not a default position. Therefore, they will not allow women to be president of the shul.

    Thus, you can clearly see that although Rav Moshe was fully aware that there are other Rishonim who may disagree with the Rambam, nevertheless, he felt that the Rambam is in a strong enough position that his view has to be taken into consideration. Therefore, women would not be appointed presidents of shuls. But at the very bottom of the page he was asked the following: “וברור שאם יזדמן באיזה מקום שרוצים למנות לאיזה מינוי רק או איש שהוא כופר ובעל עבירות או אשה כשרה” – What if it is a choice between a frum woman and a man who’s a mehalel Shabbat … [And if you think this is strange, this is because you weren't in America the 1950s. These are real life scenarios that have come up repeatedly, even through the 1990's – as you will hear shortly] “ואי אפשר לפעול שלא ימנו שום אחד מהן אלא איש כשר, שודאי צריך לסייע שימנו את האשה הכשרה ולא את האיש הכופר והרשע.” He says that that’s a situation which is a she’at ha-dehak, and that you could clearly rely on the other opinions and allow a woman to be elected president.

    Only in a bishas hadchak are they allowed.

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  17. Mike S.8:39 PM

    There is also danger in treating judgment calls as though they they were received on Sinai. Often we see with hindsight that even the greatest gedolim make the wrong call sometime. For example, I am certainly not on the level of R. Chaim Ozer, and I hope never to have to make a decision like his attempt to decide whether asking Stalin's NKVD for exit permits to Japan was a greater or lesser risk than a Nazi invasion of Soviet occupied Lithuania, but with hindsight we are 100% certain he was wrong. The veneration of "da'as torah" often means we fail to learn from history.

    I think that is, in part, what the Rav was driving at in his "Joeseph and His Brothers" drasha to the Mizrachi.

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  18. Not only that, I looked in the very next siman in Iggros Moshe. How can you possibly say Rav Moshe was against the Rambam?????? He clearly says that there is no way that a female can be president of a SHUL. How could you even think she could be a Rabbi? He holds like the Rambam 100% Take a look at Iggros Moshe Yoreh Deiah chelek 2 siman 45. How can you make such an untrue statement as Rav Moshe held against the Rambam????????????

    For more info on Rav Moshe's opinion see http://markset565.blogspot.com/2010/08/does-rav-moshe-feinstein-think-women.html

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  19. >>>I think that is, in part, what the Rav was driving at in his "Joeseph and His Brothers" drasha to the Mizrachi.

    I don't have a copy of "5 Addresses" at home, but what always stood out in my mind from that collection is the Rav's explanation of his about-face from R' Chaim's anti-Zionism to his own pro-Israel position. Is that the "Joseph and his Brothers" essay?

    This is probably a waste of time: If a women holding a position of serara was assur m'ikar hadin, then a woman could not even serve as a mashgiacha. You can't eat a cheeseburger, no matter what the sha'as ha'dechak is. What R' Moshe held (he writes this black of white, so I don't know what the confusion is) is that m'ikar hadin we pasken like the majority of Rishonim against the Rambam. (See also, for example, the klalei hora'ah in R' Ovadya's Yechaveh Da'as -- where a posek expresses reservations and writes to be matir only b'sha'as hadechak or l'halacha v'lo l'amaseh, it means bottom line the act is permitted m'ikar hadin.) However, absent a need, the Rambam is not a view to be trifled with (as I wrote in the post as well). Rabbis Weiss, Sperber, Riskin and others would argue that social conditions have created a need for change, much in the same way that Rav Soloveitchik accepted the need to teach Talmud to women despite long-standing tradition not to do so. Whether you accept their argument or not is a matter of judgment, not a matter of law.

    I should just add focussing exclusively on what R' Moshe or the Rav held is really asking the wrong question. The question is whether the matirim have a right to their own views. In that regard, in all areas of halacha a posek generally may rely on the majority views of Rishonim against a minority opinion where there is reason to do so.

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  20. Believe me, I think I have wasted my time a lot here, but you are clearly saying things that are not accurate.If Rav Moshe Truly holds that a woman Rabbi is OK why does he say in the VERY NEXT siman that a female president is against the Torah? Please look it up. I beg you. Here, I will quote it for you so you don;t have to bother yourself. (yoreh Deiah chelek 2 siman 45)A rav is complaining to Rav Moshe that since he said many rishonim argue with the Rambam people will appoint a female as prime minister of Israel and they will appoint women to be presidents of shuls.

    הנה מש"כ כתר"ה שמצד תשובתי בזה שהקשתי
    על הרמב"ם שפוסל נשים אף לכל משימות שלא
    ידוע לי בעניי מקור לדבריו, וגם שמשמע לי שלא
    כו"ע סברי כן יוצא מכשול..........

    ולשמא ימנו
    אשה להבתי כנסיות שבמדינתנו אמעריקא נמי לא
    שייך שיוצא מזה מכשיל, דהבתי כנסי.ת והמוסדות
    שמתנהגים ע"פ דרך התורה לא יעשו בלא הוראת
    רב מובהק וממילא סגי לזה גם שיטת הרמכ"ם שלא
    למנות אשה, ולאלו שסרו מדרך התורה הרי גם אם
    הוא איסור ברור ומפורש שבתורה לא ישגיחו ע-ז
    ואין אנו אחראין עליהם. וממילא נמצא
    שליכא שום
    מכשול ח"ו מברור ההלכה שכתבתי שלא כו"ע מודו
    להרמב"ם

    Does he not CLEARLY say that it is against the Torah to appoint a female as president of the shul?

    Also, if you read the full teshuva in the previous siman (44), Rav Moshe really comes up with another reason why he is matir her to become a mashgiach. Namely, that really she wouldn't be the person that is ultimately in charge of the hashgacha and she would work for a male who is working for the baal habus.

    If this is a clear cut Majority (other rishonim) vs minority(rambam), why do the vast majority of Achronim hold like the minority? Especially in a halachik issue like this?

    Sure, focusing on the Rav and Rav Moshe would be a narrow view. However, there is rav Kook, Mahzikei Dat, Aruch Hashulchan (If you would look up the aruch Hashulchan inside he says a women can not be appointed to ANY role of leadership Choshen Mishpat 7:4)אשה, פסולה לרון מפני שהיא פסולה לכל התמנות
    שנאמר שוס תשים עליך ונו׳ מקרב אחיך כל שימות
    שאתה משים היינו כל מיני התמנות לא יהא אלא איש
    [רמב׳׳ס פ״א ממלכים] דהא מקרב אחיך כתיב ולא
    מקרב אחיותיך ומה שרבורה שפטה את ישראל לא
    היתר, רנה אלא מלמרת להם שידונו כך ובך ועוד רעל
    פי הדיבור היה [תום׳ יבמוח מ״הז] ועוד רכל ישראל
    קבלוה עליהם שתדון אותם :

    and so on.

    However, you are right about one thing, there are clearly poskim that would allow for female Rabbis, but Rav Moshe is definitely not one of them. There is Responsa Piskei Uziel Siman 43, Rabbi Bakshi Doron, Responsa Binyanav, 1:5, Responsa Piskei Uziel Siman 44 and so on.

    However, for someone who argues against people believing in the world being older than 6000 years, I think it is sooo disingenuous to say women can be Rabbis. There are clearly many rishonim and achronim that hold against that opinion (that the world is only 6000 years old), but no, women can be Rabbis according to you, but the world must not be older than 6000 years. Interesting......

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  21. Just to clarify my point. You assume "What R' Moshe held (he writes this black of white, so I don't know what the confusion is) is that m'ikar hadin we pasken like the majority of Rishonim against the Rambam. (See also, for example, the klalei hora'ah in R' Ovadya's Yechaveh Da'as -- where a posek expresses reservations and writes to be matir only b'sha'as hadechak or l'halacha v'lo l'amaseh, it means bottom line the act is permitted m'ikar hadin.)"

    The Rav Moshe in the very next siman that I quote and show you BLACK AND WHITE (as you like to say) says that women becoming presidents IS against the Torah. So your assumption is CLEARLY incorrect.

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  22. Mike S.10:02 PM

    1) Yes, that is the Joseph and his Brothers speech.

    2) I was not addressing women rabbis or any other specific issue. I was trying to point out that treating a judgment about policy issues the same a a p'sak about basar v'chalav poses two serious risks: not learning from hindsight, and not recognizing that any such judgment, by however great a chacham, depends on his assessment of social conditions which can change. The t'shuva of the Sridei Aish permitting (actually, he comes close to requiring) Bas Mitzvah celebrations is very much on point. He specifically discusses the changed societal conditions requiring the introduction of a new practice.

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  23. The very nature of Oral Torah is that it eludes complete codification and depends on the character, knowledge, and judgment of the rabbonim who transmit and interpret it.

    Someone deficient in one or more of these qualities can easily miss subtle but critically important shades of meaning, differences among similar situations, and differences among people.

    These same qualities are needed to provide appropriate advice and direction about anything important in life.

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  24. These qualities help one develop a proper approach to the sources -- but are not a substitute for them. Were that not the case all debate would simply be reduced to ad hominum attacks or appeal to authority.

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  26. Wherever sources exist, they are primary. In the gray area where sources are fragmentary, lacking, or only partially applicable, or appear to conflict with one another, the named qualities become essential for sorting out the situation.

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  27. I am not sure where you are going with this. Does anything I or anyone else here has written indicate to you that poskim do not need "character, knowledge, and judgment," or are you simply making a general observation?

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  28. My point is that any valid characterization of a person's Daas Torah (or lack of it) has to be based on that person's character, knowledge, and judgment. These are also the qualities of a posek.

    Daas Torah is not some kind of mystique or religio-political tool.

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