mattan Torah in the present

I hardly have time to write anything, so this will be short. 

1.   וְכָל-הָעָם רֹאִים אֶת-הַקּוֹלֹת וְאֶת-הַלַּפִּידִם, וְאֵת קוֹל הַשֹּׁפָר, וְאֶת-הָהָר, עָשֵׁן; וַיַּרְא הָעָם וַיָּנֻעוּ, וַיַּעַמְדוּ מֵרָחֹק. Not only does the pasuk seem to contain a redundant mention of seeing the kolos of Har Sinai, "ro'im es hakolos," and then again, "va'yar," but it also switches tenses from the present, "ro'im," to the past, "va'yar." What's going on here?

R' Tzadok haKohen explains that mattan Torah did not just happen over 2000 years ago -- it happens again each and every year.  We have the special zechus in the present tense to be "ro'im es hakolos," to see the sounds of Har Sinai with our own eyes, because in the past, "vaya'r... vaya'amdu mei'rachok," our ancestors stood at Sinai and shrunk back in awe at the overwhelming experience.  

2. The gemara (Chagiga 13) darshens from the pasuk we say every morning in pesukei d'zimra, "lo asah kein l'chol goy u'mishpatim bal yida'um," that there is an issur of teaching Torah to an aku"m.  Tosfos asks why we need a new derasha for this din -- since the gemara elsewhere (Sanhedrin 59) already learns that there is an issur for an aku"m to learn Torah, it follows that teaching an aku"m Torah should be assur because of lifnei iveir, as it enables his crime? Tosfos answers with an ukimta -- we are dealing with a case where there is another way for the aku"m to learn (e.g. someone else wants to teach him), so by your teaching him, you have not enabled him to do what he otherwise couldn't.

The Turei Even gives what sounds like a sharper answer.  The source for the prohibition of an aku"m learning Torah is the pasuk, "Morasha kehilas Ya'akov," that refers to Torah as our inheritance.  For an aku"m to learn Torah is a theft of our yerusha, an issur of gezel.  It follows that if a Jew decides to voluntarily teach Torah to an aku"m, he has in effect given permission to the aku"m to take away his portion -- it's just like a family member giving his slice of inheritance to an outsider.  The aku"m has not violated the issur or gezel by taking what is voluntarily offered, and the Jew is not in violation of lifnei iveir.  Were it not for for the new derasha of "mishpatim bal yeda'um" there would be no issur in this case. Tos obviously did not accept the Turei Even's approach -- what's the nekudas hamachlokes between them? 

Perhaps the focus of their dispute revolves around how to understand the concept of "morasha."  There are two types of shared ownership: a partnership and a cooperation.  In a partnership, each partner is the exclusive owner of some percentage of the whole.  In a coorporation, each shareholder has partial ownership over the entire entity.  The Turei Even understood morasha as a partnership.  There is nothing stopping any Jew from "transferring" his portion to an aku"m by teaching him Torah.  Tosfos, however, understood morasha as being like a corporation.  The communal ownership of Torah by Klal Yisrael is greater than the sum of each individual part, and no one individual can surrender any portion to an outside party without the consent of all.  (See R' Yitzchok Sorotzkin's sefer on Shavuos for more on this).  

I was thinking perhaps another approach is possible.  The Turei Even treats morasha exactly like a dinei mamonos halacha, hence, what the aku"m takes, the Jew loses. It could be that Tosfos understood it not as a dinei mamonos halacha, but rather as part of the world of issur v'heter, and that's why there can't be kinyanim or transfer -- Torah is not a tangible object that can be bought/sold. When the gemara says the aku"m violates the issur gezel, all it means is that the gavra has a shem gazlan because what he did is *akin* to theft.