Thursday, September 12, 2024

it all depends on context - the ptur of chaburah shel mitzvah for ben sorer u'moreh

  כִּי⁠ יִהְיֶה לְאִישׁ בֵּן סוֹרֵר וּמוֹרֶה אֵינֶנּוּ שֹׁמֵעַ בְּקוֹל אָבִיו וּבְקוֹל אִמּוֹ וְיִסְּרוּ אֹתוֹ וְלֹא יִשְׁמַע אֲלֵיהֶם (22:18)

1) The Tiferes Banim (son of the Bnei Yisaschar) writes that it's what a parent does which matters more than what a parent says.  The ben sorer u'moreh ignores his parents, וְיִסְּרוּ אֹתוֹ וְלֹא יִשְׁמַע אֲלֵיהֶם, when they tell him to daven or tell him to learn.  Why?  Because his parents talk the talk but don't walk the walk. אֵינֶנּוּ שֹׁמֵעַ בְּקוֹל אָבִיו וּבְקוֹל אִמּוֹ, he doesn't hear the kol of his parents learning or the kol of their davening.  Their lecture is not reflected in their own behavior.

2) The Mishna in Sanhedrin (70) writes that a ben sorer u'moreh who eats in a chaburas mitzvah is ineligible to become chayav because this type of eating does not draw a person to become zolel v'sovei and rebel.  The gemara (70b) writes that even eating a meal of tanchumei aveilim, which is only a chiyuv derabbanan, is included in this ptur.  Rashi explains the chiddush as follows:

דאע"ג דתקנתא דרבנן בעלמא הוא דאי מרישא הוה אמינא חבורת מצוה היינו כהנים שאוכלין קדשים או פסחים

The Rogatchover asks how Rashi can possibly suggest that there is a hava amina that eating korban pesach is the pradigmatic case of chaburah shel mitzvah.  The gemara on the previous amud has a din that a person can become a ben soreh u'moreh only if he eats underdone, only partially cooked meat, like you would grab off the grill if you were in a hurry and had no time to wait:  

אמר רבינא יין חי מזיג ולא מזיג בשר חי בשיל ולא בשיל כבשר כיבא דאכלי גנבי

By the korban pesach there is an issur d'oraysa of אל תאכלו ממנו נא.  One is not allowed the eat the korban unless it is fully roasted.  Forget the ptur of chaburas mitzvah -- eating the meat of korban pesach cannot make one a ben sorer u'moreh because it is too well done!

Probably the simplest answer to the Rogatchover's question is that if meat is cooked kmaachal Ben Derusa'i, either 1/3 or 1/2 cooked, it is cooked enough to avoid the issur of  נא but rare enough to still make one eligible to become a ben sorer u'moreh (Divrei Yechezkel end of #15).  

R' Shmuel Rozovsky suggested a different yesod: the ptur of chaburas mitzvah does not depend on what is being eaten, but rather depends on the context in which the eating occurs.  If you read the Mishna in Sanhedrin carefully

אכל בחבורת מצוה אכל בעיבור החדש אכל מעשר שני בירושלים אכל נבילות וטריפות שקצים ורמשים... אכל דבר שהוא מצוה ודבר שהוא עבירה

There are two separate exclusions mentioned: אכל בחבורת מצוה and אכל דבר שהוא מצוה.  The latter case is speaking about where consuming the food is the mitzvah.  The former case, חבורת מצוה, is where the ben sorer u'moreh is eating whatever he is eating, nearly raw meat and underaged wine, not a cheftza shel mitzvah, but the chevra he is eating with are engaged in a meal that is a mitzvah, like eating korban pesach. In this case the food he is eating makes him eligible to become a ben sorer u'moreh, but the context he is eating in in precludes that possibility.

This yesod helps resolve another difficulty with Rashi. Aside from the case of eating korban pesach, Rashi gave another example of chaburah shel mitzvah: היינו כהנים שאוכלין קדשים.  Why does Rashi say *kohanim* eating kodshim?  Kodshim like a korban shelamim can be eaten by the person who brings the korban, even a yisrael; it doesn't have to be eaten only by a kohen?!  

Pshat in Rashi is that we are not speaking here about a ben sorer eating kodshim, which is an achila shel mitzvah.  The case Rashi is speaking about is where the ben sorer u'moreh goes out and steals his underdone steak of chulin but joins in with a chevra of kohanim who are eating their own kodshim steaks.  Even though the cheftza of food the ben sorer u'moreh is eating makes him eligible to be chayav, Rashi tells us that if you are eating that meal alongside those who serve in the Mikdash, kohanim who are eating kodshim l'shem mitzvah, you can't be a ben sorer u'moreh.  The context, the environment, keeps you on the straight and narrow.

The flipside of this yesod is the Ramban we discussed 10 years ago which explains that the reason why the ben sorer u'moreh is chayav is כי לא הומת בגודל חטאו, אלא לייסר בו את הרבים ושלא יהיה תקלה לאחרים.  As R' Leib Chasman explains, the din of the prat, the individual, is influenced by the tzibur, by the klal.  Even though the ben sorer's actions taken on their own are not necessarily so bad, since they can have a negative influence on the community and lead others astray, they therefore must be nipped in the bud.  Where the ben sorer finds himself in a chaburah shel mitzvah, the tables are turned and it is he who falls under the influence of the community, his environment, and therefore the danger is averted.

how quickly people forget 9/11

On 9/11 I was working for a company in lower Manhattan, on Broad Street, and had the unfortunate privileges of having front row seats for the day's events.  I remember in the years that followed, both at that company and a different company I worked for, the day of 9/11 was marked by a moment of silence at the time which corresponded to when the first airplane struck the Twin Towers.  That momentary pause grew shorter and shorter as the years passed, as people were in a rush to resume their work.  I can't recall when, but at some point in the intervening years (and I am at a different company now, so maybe this was always the way they did it here) that moment of silence got replaced with an email.  After all, people are so busy, who can spare even a moment to reflect?  Maybe those who had time t some point might read that email, but who are we kidding?  This year 9/11 came an went and there was not even that email. 

Am I surprised?  Not at all.  We are so busy moving from one task to the next, from gobbling up one bit of information and moving on to the next, that there is no time to reflect on or remember the past, nor do we want to.  America would prefer to think of the world as benign and to deny that there is unredeemable evil which must be eradicated.  I also realize that I am getting older, and some of the people around me at work were in diapers when these events occurred.  They have no personal recollection of what happened, and doubt any lesson they may have had in school truly impressed upon them the significance of what happened that day.

Monday, September 09, 2024

matzeivah vs mizbeiach -- the value of individualism

 וְלֹֽא⁠־תָקִ֥ים לְךָ֖ מַצֵּבָ֑ה אֲשֶׁ֥ר שָׂנֵ֖א ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ׃

Why do we find this expression אֲשֶׁ֥ר שָׂנֵ֖א ה׳ אֱלֹקיךָ davka here by the issur of matzeivah?  The Torah doesn't say not to be mechalel Shabbos because it is something that Hashem hates, or not to engage in arayos because it is hated.  Why here?

Rashi writes that worship at a matzeivah was acceptable during the time of the Avos but no longer since it is used for avodah zarah.  Why then is worship at a mizbeiach acceptable?  That too is used by ovdei avodah zarah?

The difference between a matzeivah and a mizbeiach is that a matzeivah is made of one stone, while a mizbeiach is made from many.  

A matzeivah represents avodas Hashem through one, singular path.  It's one size fits all.  That worked well when dealing with the Avos, who were individuals.  It does not work well when dealing with a plurality, with a nation.  For the nation, only worship on a mizbeiach, composed of multiple stones, each representing a different path, a different steam of avodah, can succeed.

The first commandment of the aseres ha'dibros is not "Anochi Hashem Elokeichem," but rather "Anochi Hashem Elokecha" -- Hashem addressed himself to each individual, acknowledging that each person has their own way of relating to Him.

Building a matzeivah, turning Judaism into a one size fits all religion, is a direct contradiction to that message of "...Hashem Elokecha," which affirms the value of individualism.

Sunday, September 08, 2024

a cause worthy of your support

I rarely advertise causes to support here, and in this case I am a noge'a ba'davar since my son learns in this kollel, but at the same time, as a noge'a ba'davar I can tell you that from what I see the kollel does amazing work.  They provide shiurim for adults, the bnei kollel learn b'chavrusa with adults as well as kids, they check and keep up the eiruv, and the kollel is an important Torah presence in a small out of town community.

If you can lend a hand and donate something to the Somerton Community Kollel, please pitch in here:

https://thechesedfund.com/sck/somerton-community-kollel-2024/teams/philadelphiabrowns

I know they will appreciate the support.

l'vaker b'heichalo

לַחֲז֥וֹת בְּנֹעַם⁠ ה׳ וּלְבַקֵּ֥ר בְּהֵֽיכָלֽוֹ׃

Rav Tamir Granot, R"Y of Orot Shaul, explains that the term לְבַקֵּ֥ר here has a similar meaning to the way it is used in the context of bikur cholim. The mitzvah of bikur cholim is not just to stop in and say hello to the choleh. Bikur cholim means to investigate what the choleh needs or wants and to try to help.

We want to experience נֹעַם⁠ ה׳, the pleasure and enjoyment of closeness to Hashem. But we also have to remember that we have a responsibility וּלְבַקֵּ֥ר בְּהֵֽיכָלֽוֹ׃. We have to ask ourselves what kavyachol the Shechina needs from us; what can we do to help Hashem make His presence felt in the world to a greater degree?







  

Thursday, September 05, 2024

malchus - Divine right or by consent of the people?

Why is it that מלך שמחל על כבודו אין כבודו מחול (Kes 17a)?  Rashi explains:

שום תשים עליך מלך. ישראל הוזהרו שישימו עליהם שימות הרבה כלומר שתהא אימתו עליהם הלכך אין כבודו מחול שלפיכך ריבה הכתוב שימות הרבה:

In other words, the Torah demands that we give respect to the king; it has nothing to do with his wishes, and so he cannot choose to demur.

Rabeinu Yonah (San 21), however, offers a different explanation. He writes that the honor due to a king is not because of his person, but rather is because he is representative of the nation.   As Tos in Zevachim (16a d"h meyushav) puts it, אין זה שלו אלא של אחרים. Therefore, the honor is not his to dispense with.

These two views may reflect a larger issue, namely, from where does a king derive his authority -- is it a Divine right, or a reflection of the will of the people?  

Radbaz comments on the halacha of moreid b'malchus (Melachim 3:8) that this din applies to 

 והאי מלך היינו שהומלך על פי נביא או שהסכימו עליו כל ישראל

We see two distinct tracks: authority based on appointment by a navi and authority that is vested in the office by the people.

This dichotomy is reflected in different halachos in the Rambam.  In Hil Melachim 1:3 Rambam writes:

אין מעמידין מלך בתחילה אלא על פי בית דין של שבעים זקנים ועל פי נביא. כיהושע שמינהו משה רבינו ובית דינו. וכשאול ודוד שמינם שמואל הרמתי ובית דינו:

You need a prophet and a beis din to appoint a king, which seems to reflect authority being bestowed by G-d.  Yet the Rambam writes with respect to dina d'malchusa (Gezeila 5:18):

במה דברים אמורים במלך שמטבעו יוצא באותן הארצות שהרי הסכימו עליו בני אותה הארץ וסמכה דעתן שהוא אדוניהם והם לו עבדים. אבל אם אין מטבעו יוצא הרי הוא כגזלן בעל זרוע וכמו חבורת ליסטים המזויינין שאין דיניהם דין וכן מלך זה וכל עבדיו גזלנין לכל דבר:

Here the Rambam indicates that it is the consent of the governed which is the ultimate source of authority.

In fact, the Brisker Rav points out that the Mishna in Sanhedrin which lists off the functions of Sanhedrin:

אֵין דָּנִין לֹא אֶת הַשֵּׁבֶט וְלֹא אֶת נְבִיא הַשֶּׁקֶר וְלֹא אֶת כֹּהֵן גָּדוֹל, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. וְאֵין מוֹצִיאִין לְמִלְחֶמֶת הָרְשׁוּת, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. אֵין מוֹסִיפִין עַל הָעִיר וְעַל הָעֲזָרוֹת, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. אֵין עוֹשִׂין סַנְהֶדְרִיּוֹת לַשְּׁבָטִים, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. אֵין עוֹשִׂין עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת, אֶלָּא עַל פִּי בֵית דִּין שֶׁל שִׁבְעִים וְאֶחָד. וְאֵין עוֹשִׂין עִיר הַנִּדַּחַת בַּסְּפָר, וְלֹא שְׁלֹשָׁה, אֲבָל עוֹשִׂין אַחַת אוֹ שְׁתָּיִם

omits any mention of their role in appointing a king. GRI"Z explains (the Rav developed this idea as well) that Sanhedrin served a dual role: as the executive branch, and as representatives of the people.  The Mishna in Sanhedrin is an enumeration of the executive branch roles of Sanhedrin.  Appointing a king is a function of their role as representatives of the people, and therefore does not belong on this list.  This is perhaps not just a procedural issue, but is reflective of the source of the king's authority.

This question may underpin a machlokes Rav and Shmuel regarding the scope of a king's power.  When Bn"Y demanded that Shmuel haNavi appoint a king, he warned them of the consequences (Sh I:8):

יאוַיֹּ֕אמֶר זֶ֗ה יִֽהְיֶה֙ מִשְׁפַּ֣ט הַמֶּ֔לֶךְ אֲשֶׁ֥ר יִמְלֹ֖ךְ עֲלֵיכֶ֑ם אֶת־בְּנֵיכֶ֣ם יִקָּ֗ח וְשָֹ֥ם לוֹ֙ בְּמֶרְכַּבְתּ֣וֹ וּבְפָרָשָׁ֔יו וְרָצ֖וּ לִפְנֵ֥י מֶרְכַּבְתּֽוֹ:

יבוְלָשֹ֣וּם ל֔וֹ שָׂרֵ֥י אֲלָפִ֖ים וְשָׂרֵ֣י חֲמִשִּׁ֑ים וְלַחֲר֚שׁ חֲרִישׁוֹ֙ וְלִקְצֹ֣ר קְצִיר֔וֹ וְלַעֲשֹ֥וֹת כְּלֵֽי־מִלְחַמְתּ֖וֹ וּכְלֵ֥י רִכְבּֽוֹ:

יגוְאֶת־בְּנוֹתֵיכֶ֖ם יִקָּ֑ח לְרַקָּח֥וֹת וּלְטַבָּח֖וֹת וּלְאֹפֽוֹת:

ידוְאֶת־שְֹ֠דֽוֹתֵיכֶם וְאֶת־כַּרְמֵיכֶ֧ם וְזֵיתֵיכֶ֛ם הַטּוֹבִ֖ים יִקָּ֑ח וְנָתַ֖ן לַעֲבָדָֽיו:

טווְזַרְעֵיכֶ֥ם וְכַרְמֵיכֶ֖ם יַעְשֹ֑ר וְנָתַ֥ן לְסָרִיסָ֖יו וְלַעֲבָדָֽיו:

טזוְאֶת־עַבְדֵיכֶם֩ וְֽאֶת־שִׁפְח֨וֹתֵיכֶ֜ם וְאֶת־בַּחוּרֵיכֶ֧ם הַטּוֹבִ֛ים וְאֶת־חֲמוֹרֵיכֶ֖ם יִקָּ֑ח וְעָשָֹ֖ה לִמְלַאכְתּֽוֹ:

יזצֹאנְכֶ֖ם יַעְשֹ֑ר וְאַתֶּ֖ם תִּֽהְיוּ־ל֥וֹ לַעֲבָדִֽים:

יחוּזְעַקְתֶּם֙ בַּיּ֣וֹם הַה֔וּא מִלִּפְנֵ֣י מַלְכְּכֶ֔ם אֲשֶׁ֥ר בְּחַרְתֶּ֖ם לָכֶ֑ם וְלֹֽא־יַעֲנֶ֧ה יְהֹוָ֛ה אֶתְכֶ֖ם בַּיּ֥וֹם הַהֽוּא:

Was Shmuel haNavi just making a threat as to what might happen should the king abuse his power, or does this list accurately reflect what a king is empowered to do?  The gemara (San 20b) writes:

אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל כל האמור בפרשת מלך מלך מותר בו רב אמר לא נאמרה פרשה זו אלא לאיים עליהם שנאמר שום תשים עליך מלך שתהא אימתו עליך

Rav Yaakov Ariel suggests that Rav does not necessarily hold that a king is just a figurehead with no real power.  That would not seem to fit with many examples in Tanach.  Rather, the machlokes Rav and Shmuel revolves around this question of whether power is Divinely granted to the king and therefore there is little limit on its scope, or whether it depends on the consent of the goverened, and therefore has a more narrow scope and can be reined in.  

This whole discussion brought to my mind a famous vort of the Gaon m'Vilna on the pasuk in Teh (22:29)  כִּי לַה׳ הַמְּלוּכָה וּמֹשֵׁל בַּגּוֹיִם.  The Gaon explains (see Ibn Erza to Braishis 37:8) that there is a difference between a malchus and memshala.  Memshala means ruling by coercion; malchus is with the consent of those ruled.  When it comes to Bn"Y, כִּי לַה׳ הַמְּלוּכָה because we willingly accept Hashem as our king.  When it comes to the other nations, וּמֹשֵׁל בַּגּוֹיִם, they willy-nilly accept Hashem as king, only against their will.

I think there is a parallel between the malchusa d'arah and the malchusa d'rekiya, and these two terms reflect the issue we have been discussing.  Memshala is not just malchus with an arm twist.  It's a different animal entirely, both in the scope and source of the authority it defines.  It is authority that is imposed form without, as opposed to authority that is a reflection of the will of the people.  The idea of tekiyas shofar, of malchiyos on Rosh haShana, of our acceptance of Hashem as our ruler, is what differentiates us from the aku"m in that it reflects a relationship of malchus and not memshala, authority that comes from isarusa d'litata, bottom up, from the people, as opposed to one of isarusa d'leila, top down, imposed from without, based in fear instead of love.

The truth is that these two tracks, malchus as a function of tzav Hashem and malchus as a  function of consent of the people, are intertwined, as the Shem m'Shmuel points out.  How can you ever arrive at consent of the masses when every person has their own agenda, their own ideas about what should be done and who should do it?  The path to common consensus is only through the common denominator of acceptance of ratzon Hashem.