making a kabbalah for the future

Rashi comments on (3:1) וְאֵלֶּה תּוֹלְדֹת אַהֲרֹן וּמֹשֶׁה בְּיוֹם דִּבֶּר ה׳ אֶת מֹשֶׁה בְּהַר סִינָי that even though the pasuk is speaking about Aharon's children, they are called Moshe's תּוֹלְדֹת because לפי שלימדן תורה, מלמד שכל המלמד את בן חברו תורה, מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו ילדו.  Netziv explains at length that לימדן תורה in this context means specifically חכמת התלמוד.  Moshe taught Torah to all of Klal Yisrael, but they are not called his תּוֹלְדֹת because he did not (at least at this point in time) give over to them that added level of pilpul that he shared only with the Bnei Aharon. Netziv then asks on himself: the pasuk is talking about what took place בְּהַר סִינָי, at the moment of kabbalas haTorah.  At that moment, Moshe was not being mi'palpel with the Bnei Aharon.  At that moment Moshe was not sharing חכמת התלמוד with the Bnei Aharon.  Why then already at that moment are they called Moshe's תּוֹלְדֹת? 

Netziv answers that even though on that day the Bnei Aharon had not yet started learning from Moshe, nonetheless באותו יום קבלו עליהם ללמוד ממנו אח״כ, on that day they made a kabbalah and accepted upon themselves to become his students.  Therefore, it was from that moment that their status changed.

Netziv proves his point from the story (BM 84) of Reish Lakish, who started out as a bandit/robber.  One day he jumped into the river to chase after R' Yochanan, but R' Yochanan turned the tables on him and was able to convince Reish Lakish to take his great strength and dedicate his kochos to learning Torah.  The gemara then says that Reish Lakish found himself unable to jump out of the river he had just jumped in to. Rashi explains: ולא מצי. לקפוץ כבראשונה דמשקבל עליו עול תורה תשש כוחו  Reish Lakish hadn't learned a single daf yet or spent a single day in the beis medrash, but once he was mekabel upon himself to learn Torah, he became a changed person.

 

This is what Chag haShavuos is all about.  Even if you stay up both nights of Shavuos and manage to not sleep a wink in the day as well, you are not going to finish shas or Shulchan Aruch in 2 days.  But the point of the holiday is not to have a cram session.  The point is to make a kabbalah.  It's not how much you cover during those 48 hours that will make a difference, but rather what you are mekabeil upon yourself in those 48 hours to accomplish during the next days, months, years ahead that will make the difference. 

 

We celebrate 6 Sivan and not just 7 Sivan, which was the actual date of kabbalas haTorah.  Moshe added an extra day so Hashem gave us the Torah on the seventh, but we still celebrate on the 6th because that is the day when we were already ready to receive it, when our kabbalah to accept it was made.  That is as worthy of celebration as the actual giving on the Torah b'poel that took place on the next day.

The Midrash on the pasuk in Rus (2:12)  יְשַׁלֵּם ה׳ פׇּעֳלֵךְ וּתְהִי מַשְׂכֻּרְתֵּךְ שְׁלֵמָה מֵעִם ה׳ אֱלֹקי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲשֶׁר בָּאת לַחֲסוֹת תַּחַת כְּנָפָיו comments אָמַר רַבִּי חָסָא אֲשֶׁר בָּאת לַחֲסוֹת תַּחַת כְּנָפָיו.  All the sifrei dersush ask what R' Chasa adds to what the pasuk already tells us.  The Sanz Klausenberger (5733) explains that the Midrash is coming to justify Boaz's promise to Rus of  מַשְׂכֻּרְתֵּךְ שְׁלֵמָה, a complete reward.  Even though in point of fact Rus had not yet done anything yet as a Jew  to earn reward, she deserved it anyway because she took upon herself a kabbalah. The decision to make a commitment and throw one's lot in with Klal Yisrael, אֲשֶׁר בָּאת לַחֲסוֹת תַּחַת כְּנָפָיו, irrespective of what might happen going forward, is itself a life changing act.  Shem m'Shmuel similarly writes that we have a principle that mitzvah goreres mitzvah.  Good deeds create their own inertia, their own snowball of positive energy that keeps going. Reward is not given for following that path of inertia, but rather for the initial kabbalah that set things in motion. 

 

This also explains R' Yosef's cryptic remark that, "If not for this day [of Shavuos], there are many other Yosef's in the marketplace."  R' Yosef forgot his learning due to illness. He went from being Rosh Yeshiva to knowing no more than any other Joe on the street.  If all that mattered was what you know -- how many sugyos, how many blatt -- then Rav Yosef was washed up.  But it's not just what you know that counts, but what you aspire to know, the kabbalah to try and know.  Rav Yosef could not remember his learning, but he still had the desire to remember, the desire to learn, the kabbalah to do better if he could.          

 

I've written before that I am not a big fan of staying up all night on Shavuos and then the next day of Y"T or next Shabbos going right back to davening at 9:15.  (I think last time I wrote I said 9:00, but now shuls have pushed the starting times even later.)  Doing that is a one night stand.  Mattan Torah is "yom chasunaso."  When you get married, hopefully it is a lifelong commitment, not a one night celebration.  It's a kabbalah about how you intend to live your life going forward.  That's what we should be striving for.

sechora with peiros sheviis

Yesh lachkor whether the issur of sechora with peiros sheviis stems from the fact that if one uses the peiros for barter one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of achilas peiros, or whether sechora is an independent issur? 

Ramban counts the mitzvah of achilas peiros sheviis as a mitzvas aseh, and cites the derasha of l'achla v'lo l'sechora as his source, implying that the problem with sechora is that it negates the possibility of fulfilling the mitzvah of achila.  Rambam never counts eating peiros as its own mitzvah, so sechora must be an indepdent issur.

 

The Steipler suggests that this question may underpin a sasfeik in the gemara.  (Bechoros 12b) discusses whether one can use an animal purchased with peiros sheviis to be podeh a peter chamor. 

 

לפדות בבהמת שביעית ודאי לא תיבעי לך לאכילה אמר רחמנא ולא לסחורה כי תיבעי לך ספק

 

Rashi explains:

 

ודאי לא תיבעי לך. פטר חמור ודאי לא תיבעי לך דכיון דבעי למיתב פדיונו לכהן לא פריק ליה דלאכלה אמר רחמנא ולא לסחורה ונמצא זה קונה חמור בפירות שביעית שאינו ראוי לאכילה: ספק. כגון שילדה אמו זכר ונקבה דאמר במתני' מפריש טלה והוא לעצמו:

 

In a case of safeik peter chamor you have to be mafrish a lamb to remove the issur hanaah from the chamor, but you don't have to give it to the kohen because ha'motzi mei'chaveiro alav ha'raaya.  The pediya = sechora, but the lamb can still be still eaten by the owner.

If sechora is a problem because it negates the mitzvah of achila, in this case there should be no issue because the owner can eat it.  But if sechora is an issur in its own right, then this case should pose a problem.

a hatred that never goes away

וְנָתַתִּ֤י שָׁלוֹם֙ בָּאָ֔רֶץ וּשְׁכַבְתֶּ֖ם וְאֵ֣ין מַחֲרִ֑יד וְהִשְׁבַּתִּ֞י חַיָּ֤ה רָעָה֙ מִן־הָאָ֔רֶץ וְחֶ֖רֶב לֹא־תַעֲבֹ֥ר בְּאַרְצְכֶֽם׃

וּרְדַפְתֶּ֖ם אֶת־אֹיְבֵיכֶ֑ם וְנָפְל֥וּ לִפְנֵיכֶ֖ם לֶחָֽרֶב׃

 

 

Ohr haChaim asks: if וְנָתַתִּ֤י שָׁלוֹם֙ בָּאָ֔רֶץ , then what does the next pasuk mean וּרְדַפְתֶּ֖ם אֶת־אֹיְבֵיכֶ֑ם?  If there is peace, then who are the enemies that need pursuing?

 

Many of the meforshim answer that the pasuk is not speaking about what takes place within Eretz Yisrael, but rather it is speaking about enemies outside Eretz Yisrael.  Ohr haChaim explains ומה שקרא אותם הכתוב אויבים, לא לצד שהם באים לצור על עיר הקודש שאם כן אין בטח ואין שלום ליושביה, אלא קרא אותם אויבים לצד אויבי ה׳ רשעי הגוים נקראים אויבי ה׳ ואויבינו.  He assumes that "oyeiv" means a physical threat, and he is therefore left with a problem: If there is peace in Eretz Yisrael, then there is no threat, so how does the term make any sense?  The O.C. does not consider the possibility that although we may have peace in Eretz Yisrael, there might still be Jews remaining in the diaspora who would have to deal with oyvim and physical threats.  Maybe idea that Jews would remain in disapora lands where they have to face the physical threat of oyvim when there is peace and bracha in Eretz Yisrael  is too silly and remote an idea to even consider. In any case, his solution is that oyvim does not just mean a physical threat, but can also mean אויבי ה׳.

 

The Ohr haChaim then adds something else.  I think the biggest mistake people have made in the past 2 years comes from not knowing this Ohr haChaim.  The history books are filled with the bloody and tragic stories of how Jews have been treated in Europe through the centuries: the endless cycle of pogroms, blood  libels, crusades, persecutions, inquisitions, and finally in our time, the Holocaust.  For some reason we thought this time would be different.  We thought this time the world had learned a lesson.  We thought barbaric attacks against Jews would not longer be condoned, and certainly not encouraged, by the "civilized" West.  Well, we were fools.  France is the same France of the Dreyfus trial; England is the same England that stopped Jews from escaping to Israel in the years preceding and during WWII, the same England that turned a blind eye to Arab violence against Jews under the Mandate.  Ohr haChaim writes  גם לצד שיודע ה׳ כי כל האומות שונא ישראל בטבע המתקנא והיא שנאה יסודית ואין לה תמורה.  And if you don't think that statement applies to the US of A, you are delusional.  

Are there individuals who are exceptions to the rule?  Of course there are.  But the exceptions are just that: exceptions.

I was reading Yardena Schwartz's book Ghosts of a Holy War: The 1929 Massacre in Palestine That Ignited the Arab-Israeli Conflict and every couple of pages she has to bring up the attack by Baruch Goldstein in Chevron, as if to provide something to stack up on the scale and provide balance against the litany of violance perpetrated by the Arabs.  What the author does not grap is that Goldstein is the exception that proves the rule.  For the most part, the Jews have not engaged in murder, in violent attacks, against the Arab population.  Goldstein was widely condemned by all segments of Israeli society.  The attacks against the Jews, however, are the rule.  The few Arabs who saved Jews during the Hebron massacre, the umos who saved Jews during the Holocaust, during other uprisings, had to stand against the masses who did engage in violance, and to this very day, celebrate that violence.  

 

The very next pasuk  וְרָדְפ֨וּ מִכֶּ֤ם חֲמִשָּׁה֙ מֵאָ֔ה וּמֵאָ֥ה מִכֶּ֖ם רְבָבָ֣ה יִרְדֹּ֑פוּ וְנָפְל֧וּ אֹיְבֵיכֶ֛ם לִפְנֵיכֶ֖ם לֶחָֽרֶב׃ ends with exactly the same words וְנָפְל֥וּ לִפְנֵיכֶ֖ם לֶחָֽרֶב׃ as our pasuk.  Why the word for word repitition?  Ibn Ezra answers: ונפלו אויביכם – פעם אחרת, שיפלו פעם אחרי פעם בלי תקומה.  Don't think that once you win the battle you are done.  We are dealing with, like the O.C. writes, a hatred that is built into the DNA of many people.  It will never go away.  Sadly, this is a battle that must be fought again, and again, and again.  

Rambam/Raavad on allegorical readings of pesukim

Rambam opens the last chapter of Mishne Torah telling us that in the days of mashiach the lion will not literally lie down with the lamb; it's just a mashal that means Israel will be at peace with its neighbors:

 אל יעלה על הלב שבימות המשיח יבטל דבר ממנהגו של עולם. או יהיה שם חידוש במעשה בראשית. אלא עולם כמנהגו נוהג. וזה שנאמר בישעיה וגר זאב עם כבש ונמר עם גדי ירבץ משל וחידה. ענין הדבר שיהיו ישראל יושבין לבטח עם רשעי עכו"ם המשולים כזאב ונמר. שנאמר זאב ערבות ישדדם ונמר שוקד על עריהם. ויחזרו כולם לדת האמת. ולא יגזלו ולא ישחיתו. אלא יאכלו דבר המותר בנחת עם ישראל. שנאמר ואריה כבקר יאכל תבן. וכן כל כיוצא באלו הדברים בענין המשיח הם משלים. ובימות המלך המשיח יודע לכל לאי זה דבר היה משל. ומה ענין רמזו בהן:

 

Raavad argues by cryptically simply quoting a pasuk from our parsha:

 

כתב הראב"ד ז"ל והלא כתוב בתורה והשבתי חיה רעה מן הארץ

 

What is his objection?  Just like the pasuk in Yeshayahu is a mashal, this pasuk is a mashal as well!  As Radbaz writes

 

ואין זו השגה, כמו ששאר הכתובים משל גם זה משל על אומה רעה כמו שדרשו על חיה רעה אכלתהו

 

The Margoliyos haYam (Sanhedrin 72) puts this Rambam together with another machlokes Rambam/Raavad l'shitasam.  The pasuk tells us with respect to ba ba'machteres אם־זרחה השמש עליו דמים לו שלם ישלם אם־אין לו ונמכר בגנבתו (Shmos 22).  The gemara in Sanhedrin darshens as follows:

 

ת"ר אין לו דמים אם זרחה השמש עליו וכי השמש עליו בלבד זרחה אלא אם ברור לך הדבר כשמש שאין לו שלום עמך הרגהו ואם לאו אל תהרגהו תניא אידך אם זרחה השמש עליו דמים לו וכי השמש עליו בלבד זרחה אלא אם ברור לך כשמש שיש לו שלום עמך אל תהרגהו ואם לאו הרגהו

 

The gemara interprets the term  אם זרחה השמש עליו to mean that it has to be clear as day that the ganav will allow nothing to stand in his way. The Rambam paskens (Geneiva 9:10)

 

היה הדבר ברור לבעל הבית שזה הגנב הבא עליו אינו הורגו ואינו בא אלא על עסקי ממון אסור להרגו ואם הרגו הרי זה הורג נפש שנאמר אם זרחה השמש עליו אם ברור לך הדבר כשמש שיש לו שלום עמך אל תהרגהו. לפיכך אב הבא במחתרת על בנו אינו נהרג שודאי שאינו הורגו. אבל הבן הבא על אביו נהרג:

 

Raavad disagrees and writes that a ba ba'machteres can never be killed if he comes during the day. אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו.  Irrespective of the derasha of Chazal, if the words of the pasuk tell us that אם זרחה השמש עליו, that when the sun is shining you can't kill the ganav, then we have to respect the literal meaning of the text.

 

Now we understand, says the Margoliyos haYam, what the Raavad's objection is in that last chapter about mashiach.  The Raavad l'shitaso holds that you can allegorize and take pesukim of navi as a mashal, but when it comes to words written in the chumash, you cannot ignore the literal meaning of the text. The punchline of Raavad's hasaga is **והלא כתוב **בתורה, and since we are dealing with a pasuk in chumash, it's a whole different ball game.  If the Torah tells us that the lion will change its ways, then it means animals won't behave the same.  Torah is on a different level than neviim and kesuvim, and אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו.

 

There is a danger of getting involved in issues that relate to ikkarei emunah, so with that caveat and the hope that I am not making an error, I was thinking that this machlokes l'shitasam is reflected as well in the famous machlokes Rambam and Raavad in ch 3 of hil teshuvah.  Rambam writes that someone who thinks והאומר שיש שם רבון אחד אבל שהוא גוף ובעל תמונה is an apikores.  Raavad comments:

 

א"א ולמה קרא לזה מין וכמה גדולים וטובים ממנו הלכו בזו המחשבה לפי מה שראו במקראות ויותר ממה שראו בדברי האגדות המשבשות את הדעות:

 

The usual hesber people give to the machlokes is that the Raavad of course accepted the incorporeality of G-d as a given.  What Raavad is objecting to is the labelling of everyone who thinks otherwise as an apikores.  In Raavad's view someone led astray by their literal reading of the text is an inadvertent apikores, a shogeg, and his heresy should not be held against him.  Rambam disagrees, as "nebach an apikores" is still an apikores (the aphorism quoted in the name of R' Chaim Brisker).  There are no excuses, there is no shogeg, when it comes to errors of belief.

 

Perhaps the Raavad is more tolerant of those led astray לפי מה שראו במקראות because the Raavad l'shitaso holds אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו and the literal reading of the text carries weight despite the derashos of Chazal.  I'm not suggesting Raavad would go so far as to accept the notion of G-d having form, but what I am suggesting is that he at least sees the possibility of a rational, understandable error given the need to preserve the literal reading of the text.  Rambam, on the other hand, holds that even when it comes to the text of the Torah, the derashos of Chazal and/or the principles of ikkarei emunah completely override the literal meaning of the text, so much so that if someone is a literalist and assigns G-d a form, the error is inexcusable. 

some notes from the Ayeles haShachar

Some he'oros from the Ayeles haShachar this week because I am preoccupied.  In some cases I left out his answers and some of the shakla v'terya:

 1) Rashi comments (21:1) לא יטמא בעמיו – בעוד שהמת בתוך עמיו, יצא מת מצוה that a kohen can be mitamei to bury a meis mitzvah.  The Chofetz Chaim writes that so long as there is another jew who can do the burial, it's not a meis mitzvah.  The implication is that if there are only aku"m available, a kohen can be metamei himself.  R' Shteinman asks: the din is that it is preferable to bury a meis by an aku"m on Y"T rishon rather than delay the burial until Y"T sheni.  If the fact that the burial is being done by an aku"m is not enough reason to allow for halanas ha'meis, why is it enough reason to allow for tumas kohanim?

 

2)  וְלַאֲחֹתוֹ הַבְּתוּלָה הַקְּרוֹבָה אֵלָיו - presumably the only way to know that she is a besula is because she has a chazakah as such.  Why does the gemara (Ch 10) never suggest this as the makor for the principle of chazakah?  (True, the gemara talks about examinations that can be performed to ascertain whether someone is a besulah, but it would be a dochak to say that the pasuk is speaking about the specific case that such an exam was done just before aveilus set in.)

 

3) The gedarim of "v'kidashto" are a bit unclear.  The PM"G (OC 53:14) writes that ideally a kohen gets first dibs to be the sha"tz for davening.  There is a a Keren Orah (Horiyos 12) that says if a kohen and a Yisrael have a bris milah on the same day, the mohel should do the bris of the kohen first.  Ah"S raises the question of two burials on the same day.  Does the mitzvah of v'kidashto apply even to a meis (like the din of kibud av v'eim, which continues after death) or not? 

 

4) A kohen asked the Steipler whether he should train his left handed son to be a righty because m'heira yibaneh ha'mikdash and a lefty can't do avodah (Bech 45).  The Steipler quoted a midrash that says all mumim will be healed when mashiach comes, so he has nothing to worry about.  The Ah"S asks: the Rambam brings down the halachos of what constitutes a mum, implying that these halachos are and will be noge'a l'maaseh.

 

5) The gemara equates the fact that a lulav with a split ti'yomes is pasul on Y"T with the fact that it is a shinuy which is koneh in dinei mamonos.  However, R' Elchanan in Koveitz Shiurim (B"K 112) points out that not every mum constitutes a shinuy, e.g. a nick in the ear of a korban is a mum that disqualifies but is not a shinuy that would be koneh.  How do you distinguish between these cases?

 

Yesh lachkor whether the presence of a mum is the sibah which pasels a korban, or whether the mum is a siman that the object is changed from its original state and therefore no longer acceptable?

 

The nicked ear falls into the former category.  The animal is essentially the same animal, but the presence of the nick disqualifies it.  The split ti'yomes falls into the latter category.  It's not the fact that it is pasul which proves that it is a shinuy, but aderaba, it's the fact that it is a shinuy which creates a psul because the object is a different object. 

 

Which category does the mumim of kohanim fall into?  Rashi writes (21:21) that a mum is posel only while it is present מום בו – בעוד מומו בו פסול, הא אם עבר מומו, כשר.  R' Shteinman argues that this proves that it is the presence of the mum which is the psul, not the fact that it indicates a shinuy, otherwise even if the mum is removed, the psul should still remain.  (Why this is true is a but unclear to me, but I think he means is that when something is acquired through a shinuy, if the shinuy is removed, the object does not revert back to the original owner.  So too, if mum is a psul because it indicates that there is a shinuy, it is the fact that the shinuy happened which is the psul, it is the change which occurred, irrespective of whether it can be undone or not.)

 

6)  וּמִיַּד בֶּן נֵכָר לֹא תַקְרִיבוּ אֶת לֶחֶם אֱלֹקיכֶם מִכׇּל אֵלֶּה כִּי מׇשְׁחָתָם בָּהֶם מוּם בָּם לֹא יֵרָצוּ לָכֶם. (22:25) Is there a din of "ritzuy" by the korban of an aku'm?  The gemara (Zev 45b) writes that עובדי כוכבים לאו בני הרצאה נינהו:  Similarly the Hagahos Ashr"I in Baba Basra explains the reason that we cannot accept tzedakah from an aku"m but can accept korbanos nedava from them is because there is no kaparah associated with korbanos nedava [tzedakah is a mechapeir!]  Some therefore explain that the end of our pasuk is not talking about the particular case of korbanos aku"m, but in a more general sense.

 

7) The gemara writes that the issur of oso v'es bno only applies when shechita is done, but not if you just stab the animal.  The gemara doesn't mean davka shechita, but rather means whatever the halachically proper way to kill the animal is, as we see from the fact that oso v'es bno applies to the sa'ir la'Azazel pushed off the cliff on Y"K.  Yesh lachkor according to R' Akiva who holds (Chulin 17a) that during the 40 years in the midbar shechita was not required on non-korban meat, was there an issur of oso v'es bno?  Does the gemara mean there was no din of shechita then, or for those 40 years was stabbing the animal the equivalent of shechita? 

 

8) בַּחֹדֶשׁ הָרִאשׁוֹן בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר לַחֹדֶשׁ בֵּין הָעַרְבָּיִם פֶּסַח לַה׳.  (23:5)  14 Nisan is not a moed.  Why is it listed here? 

 

9) Yesh lachkor whether וּשְׂמַחְתֶּם לִפְנֵי ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶם שִׁבְעַת יָמִים is a tnai in the mitzvah of lekichas lulav, and therefore if someone is noteil lulav but is not b'simcha while doing so his mitzvah of netilas lulav is lacking, or whether  וּשְׂמַחְתֶּם לִפְנֵי ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶם שִׁבְעַת יָמִים is its own mitzvah which netilas lulav is one element of fulfilling.  (According to the Bikurei Yaakov's understanding of the Rambam the mitzvah of netilas lulav for 7 days applies in Yerushalayim even today.)

 

10) Does someone who is sitting in the sukkah have to leave to go inside and shower for Shabbos?  Would we not apply the rule of oseik b'mitzvah patur min ha'mitzvah here?

 

11) The gemara writes that there was (at one point in time) a special bracha associated with lechem ha'panim so that even if a person ate only a small portion (less than a k'zayis) he would feel satiated.  Yesh lachkor in that case whether a person would have to say birkas ha'mazon.  On the one hand it is "v'savata" from the eating, but on the other hand less than a k'zayis is not considered a maaseh achila.

 

12)  וַיַּנִּיחֻהוּ בַּמִּשְׁמָר (24:123)  Was that just so he would not run away, or is there a din that required putting such a person in prison?

 

13) Rashi comments on  וְרָגְמוּ אֹתוֹ כׇּל הָעֵדָה that from here we learn כל העדה – במעמד כל העדה, מכאן ששלוחו של אדם כמותו.  R' Akiva Eiger (Kid 41) points out that the gemara never suggests this as a source for the din of שלוחו של אדם כמותו.  Interestingly the Sifra which is the source for the first half of Rashi's statement --  בְּמַעֲמַד כָּל הָעֵדָה --  omits the second half.  As Ah"S points out, if everyone (כל העדה) was in fact present, then you don't need a din of shlichus here.  The first half of Rashi/Sifra seems to contradict the second half. 

tochacha is not just for others; Torah on one foot

1) R' Gershon Edelstein z"l points out that the mitzvah of tochacha doesn't just mean going around and telling other people what they are doing wrong.  Rabbeinu Yonah writes in the Shaarei Teshuvah 2:26

וְיִתְבּוֹדֵד בְּחַדְרֵי רוּחוֹ וְיָשׁוּב יַהֲפֹךְ יַד תּוֹכַחְתּוֹ עַל נַפְשׁוֹ. וְלֹא יִסְמֹךְ עַל תּוֹכַחַת הַמּוֹכִיחַ לְבַדּוֹ.

The mitzvah is also to give oneself tochacha!  Chazal darshen הוכח תוכיח אפילו מאה פעמים.  Certainly this applies to correcting one's own shortcomings.

2) The gemara tells the famous story of the convert who came to Hillel and asked to be taught the entire Torah on one foot.  Hillel responded with a reformulation of v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha -- don't treat others in a way that you would not want to be treated yourself.  Treat other people with kindness and respect.

What a crazy request -- the whole Torah on one foot?!  Was he just trying to test Hillel's patience?  (discussed this before here)

R' Shlomo Fischer explained that we learn in Avos that על שׁלשׁה דברים העלם עומד.  The world stands on three things: Torah, avodah, and gemillus chassadim.  

The ger was asking Hillel: if you had to choose one of the three -- one foot to stand on instead of three -- which is the most important?

To which Hilel replied: chessed comes before everything else.  Master midos and chessed, and the rest will follow.  

lifnei iveir -- bein adam l'chaveiro or bein adam laMakon? issur klali or issur prati?

R' Yaakov Kaminetzky in Emes l'Yaakov on the parsha sets down a fundamental yesod in understanding lifnei iveir.  We think of lifnei iveir as a bein adam l'chaveiro din, like many of the other dinin in the parsha.  Don't cause someone to trip and come to physical harm, don't give bad advice, don't cause someone spiritual harm by causing them to violate an issur.  R' Yaakov is mechadesh (and others say this as well, e.g. see Koveitz Shiurim from R' Elchanan in Pesachim #95 very muck b'kitzur) that lifnei iveir contains a bein adam laMakom component as well.  When the Torah prohibits eiver min ha'chai, for example, the issur is not just for you to not eat eiver min ha'chai. The issur is for you to cause eiver min ha'chai to be eaten by yourself *or* by others.  To put in another way, not only is there a din klali of lifnei iveir that says not to cause harm, but lifnei iveir is also a prat in every individual lav which extends it to actions done by others.   

(Seems to me that lifnei iveir is like the opposite side of the coin as arvus.  Arvus means (according to some Rishonim) that if someone else needs help to do a mitzvah, even if you've done the mitzvah already yourself, it’s like your chiyuv is incomplete.  Here too, even if you haven’t eaten the eiver min ha'chai, if you enable someone else to do so, your observance of the lav of maachalos assuros is faulty.)

 The difference between these two components comes into play when we speak of lifnei iveir by an aku"m.  The gemara tells us that lifnei iveir applies even to an aku"m, e.g. you cannot offer a piece of eiver min ha'chai to an aku"m to eat.  That din reflects the second element, the bein adam laMakom, of lifnei iveir.  It cannot possibly apply to the bein adam l'chaveiro aspect.  We learn in San 85b  כּוּתִי אַתָּה מְצֻוֶּוה עַל הַכָּאָתוֹ וְאִי אַתָּה מְצֻוֶּוה עַל קִלְלָתוֹ.   How then can you be chayav for indirectly causing the aku"m to stumble and fall? 

 

Achronim use this yesod to answer a kasha on the Emunas Shmuel.  The Tur writes that the issur of eiver min ha'chai applies only to kosher animals.  Taz (Y"D 62) asks: בטור כתוב ואינו נוהג אלא בטהורים וקשה למאי נ״מ כ״כ דהא טמאה בלאו הכי אסור .  You can't eat a tamei animal anyway, so l'mai nafka mina whether there is additionally an issur eiver min ha'chai or not?  Emunas Shmuel answers that there is a nafka mina for lifnei iveir.  He writes that lifnei iveir applies only to something which is assur to you.  You can't offer a nazir a glass of wine because were you a nazir, you would not be allowed to drink wine.  You can't give an aku"m eiver min ha'chai because eiver min ha'chai is assur for you to eat.  However, since there is no issur of eiver min ha'chai on a tamei animal, it is not assur for you to eat, and therefore there is no lifnei iveir.  In this case, you can give it to an aku"m.  Asks the Beis haLevi and R' Chaim Ozer (Achiezer III:81): the gemara (BM 10b) speaks about a case of   ֹּ כֹּהֵן דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ לְיִשְׂרָאֵל צֵא וְקַדֵּשׁ לִי אִשָּׁה גְּרוּשָׁה. and Tos says there is lifnei iveir for the yisrael.  A yisrael is allowed to marry a gerusha.  According to the Emunas Shmuel why then is there a problem of lifnei iveir?  How is this case different than offering eiver min ha'chai of a tamei animal to an aku"m?

 

With R Yaakov's yesod we can say the following chiluk.  When it comes to giving eiver min ha'chai to an aku"m, all I have to worry about is the bein adam laMakom din of eiver min ha'chai.  I have no bein adam l'chaveiro obligation viz a viz an aku"m.  Therefore, since on a tamei animal there is no issur eiver min ha'chai, there can't be any lifnei issur of enabling others to eat it.  However, when it comes to a yisrael being mekadesh a gerusha on behalf of a kohen, here the bein adam l'chaveiro also comes into play.  The yisrael may not have an issue to marry a gerusha, so there is no bein adam laMklom issue, but there is a din klali that says he cannot harm his fellow member of Klal Yisrael.  If I can't cause the kohen harm by giving him bad advice, I certainly can't cause him harm by doing kiddushin on he behalf to a woman he is not allowed to marry!

 

There are a few other nafka minos from this yesod:

 

1) R' Akiva Eiger on the first Mishna in Shabbos writes that if you enable someone else to be mechalel shabbos, you violate the lav of lifnei iveir, but that does not make you a mumar.  Only chilul shabbos makes you a mumar.  According to R' Yaakov, the bein adam laMakom of lifnei iveir is a prat in hil Shabbos.  When the Torah commands you not to violate Shabbos, included in that issur is not enabling others to do so.  Therefore, perhaps you would be a mumar.

 

2) The Shach writes (YD 151:6) that the issur derabbanan of afrushei m'isura (similar to lifnei iveir) does not apply to a mumar.  Dagul meiRevava asks why not?  A mumar is still a Jew!  R' Yaakov answers that there is no bein adam l'chaveiro responsibility to a mumar (moridin v'lo maalin), and so the lifnei iveir/afrushei m'isura does not apply.

 

3) R' Akiva Eiger has a safeik whether one can give eiver min ha'chai to an aku"m in need of it for pikuach nefesh.  Does the din of "v'chai ba'hem," the heter of pikuach nefesh, apply to an aku"m, or is that pasuk speaking only to us? R' Yaakov points out that based on the logic of the Emunas Shmuel, lifnei iveir is an extension of that which is assur to me.  If under the circumstance of pikuach nefesh eating eiver min ha'chai is mutar for me, the issur cannot extend to an aku"m.  The whole safeik does not get off the ground.

 

4) The Rama writes that lifnei iveir of avodah zarah is not a yei'hareg v'al yaavor.  What would be the hava amina otherwise?  R' Yaakov explains that if lifnei iveir is not an issur klali but is an extension of the issur avodah zarah, one could argue that it should take on all the parameters of the parent issur including being yei'hareg v'al yaavor.  (I am a bit confused by this point.  If you accept the argument of the Emunas Shmuel l'kula like in the above case, why indeed does it not apply l'chumra here?  The hava amina would seem to be correct!)

 

There are a few other nafka minos as well, ayen sham for more.

korban oleh v'yoreid vs korbanos of metzora

In the case of korban oleh v'yoreid the Torah allows a poor person to bring 2 birds, a chatas and olah, in place of animals.  Sefer haChinuch (mitzvah 123) has a chiddush that if the poor peson voluntarily brings the higher priced animal korban instead of the birds, he is not yotzei.  He explains that the Torah does not want a person to extend himself beyond his means, even if for a good cause.  (Kal v'chomer a person should not live beyond his means and waste $ on nahrishkeit). 

 

Achronim ask the following kashe: a metzora is chayav to bring a chatas, asham, and olah.  If a person cannot afford to bring three animals, the Torah says he can subatitute bird offerings for the chatas and olah.  There is a mishna mefureshes at the end of negaim (14:12) that says that a poor person who brings the regular korban of three animals instead of the birds is yotzei.  If so, that should serve as the binyan av paradigm.  The same din should apply to korban oleh v'yoried.  Why, according to the Chinuch, is there a difference betweem these cases and the poor person is not yotzei with the higher priced korban in the case of oleh v'yoreid?   (See Chasam Sofer Shabbos 132a and see my son's post from 5 years ago on this topic.)

 

The Imrei Emes was asked this kashe and gave a cryptic one sentence answer: oleh v'yoreid is different because the person is missing a korban.  No one understood what he meant -- the poor peson brings a korban, a more expensive one than required in fact, so what is he missing?  When R' Menachem Zemba heard the answer, he deciphered it.  In the case of metzora, the rich person brings a chatas, olah, and asham, as does the poor person.  The only difference is that the poor person substitutes birds in place of animals.  In the case of oleh v'yoreid, the rich person brings one animal as a chatas; the poor person brings 2 birds, one as a chatas, one as an olah.  When the poor person who is chayav chatas and an olah brings a rich person's korban of a single chatas, he is missing something -- he is missing the korban olah that goes with his chatas.  True, he may have spent more money on that single animal, but that doesn't make up for the fact that he is getting off with one korban in place of two. 

 

This is such a great answer you have to wonder why all the other achronim who were spinning their wheels trying to work out a solution didn't come up with it.  There's a great explanation for that as well.

 

The Ohr Sameich once had a dream that he was in the yeshiva shel maalah and the giants of the past were sitting and learning and the Rashba stood up and announced in front of everyone that there is a Jew in Dvinsk who was mechavein l'amita shel Torah more than he was.  The gem (Chulin 22) has a hava amina that an olas ha'of can be offered at night.  Asks the Rashba: avodah is always done during the day.  How can there be even a hava amina of bringing a korban at night?  There must be an error in the girsa.

 

A bunch of years ago I posted the Meshech Chochma's brilliant answer to this Rashba.   He quotes Ibn Erza who explains why it is that the poor person who brings a korban oleh v'yoreid has to being 2 birds in place of the single korban chatas.  When a korban chatas animal is offered there are fats brought on the mizbeiach and meat eaten by the owner.  A bird chatas ha'oef has no fat or meat that is offered.  Just the blood is offered.  Therefore, says Ibn Erza, the chatas bird has to be paired with an olah.  The olah is offered in its entirety, with all the meat, and it therefore makes up for the missing fats that are normally part of the chatas. 

 

Avodah cannot be done at night, but hekter chalavim, the burning of the korban fats, can be.  Since the bird olah is a substitute for the fats of the animal chatas, one might therefore have a hava amina that it can be brought at night, akin of hekter chalavim, kah mashma lan. 

 

Queue applause from the Rashba.

 

In light of this yesod the Imrei Emes's argument takes a hit.  The reason a poor person has to bring the olah bird is because he needs to make up for the missing fats.  Were he to bring an animal chatas, he is not missing anything.  He doesn't need the make up korban because the animal korban is all inclusive.

R' Shayaleh's yahrzeit? Yom haAtzmaut?

Such is the state of the world in which we live that in some shuls if I were to give a klop on the bimah this morning and announce no tachanun because it is Reb Shayale's yahrzeit, no one would bat an eyelash, but were I to give a klop and say no tachanun because Yom ha'Atzmaut, that's a whole different ball game.  

Probably the most important thing is not to descend into the sefirah trap of "lo nahagu kavod zeh la'zeh" whatever you personally do.