akeidas Yitzchak - all a big misunderstanding?

A hypothetical question: If I think that there is a mitzvah to walk barefoot to shul every day, and I fulfill that mitzvah with great mesirus nefesh, with blisters on my feet in the summer, and even at the cost of getting frostbite in the winter, do I get schar for a kiyum mitzvah?

This should not require much thought to answer.  How can I get schar for a mitzvah that's not a mitzvah?  Yes, there is schar for good intentions: אפילו חשב אדם לעשות מצוה, ונאנס ולא עשאה, מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו עשאה (Kid 40a), but that's where the good intentions were to do a mitzvah.  In this case, there is no mitzvah!  

Seems like an obvious point, but it also seems to fly in the face of our tefilos and our understanding of this week's parsha.  We call upon Hashem to remember the zechus of akeidas Yitzchak.  We view akeidas Yitzchak as the greatest act of mesirus nefesh and ahavas Hashem; it was the greatest test Avraham was called upon to pass, and which he did with flying colors.  Yet Rashi comments on G-d's command וְהַעֲלֵהוּ שָׁם לְעֹלָה עַל אַחַד הֶהָרִים אֲשֶׁר אֹמַר אֵלֶיך that:

 לא אמר לו: שחטהו, לפי שלא היה חפץ הקב״ה לשחטו, אלא יעלהו להר לעשותו עולה, ומשהעלהו, אמר לו: הורידהו

G-d told Avraham to bring Yitzchak up to the mountain, but not to actually sacrifice him. There was never such a mitzvah!  

Does this mean that Avraham chopping wood, taking a knife, preparing to sacrifice his son, was all a big mistake and misunderstanding?  Did Avraham misinterpret the dvar Hashem?  

If there was never such a mitzvah, why do invoke the schar Avraham's deed forever after?  It's not schar for just carrying Yitzchak up and down the mountain, but schar for the willingness to sacrifice Yitzchak that we are asking Hashem to remember.  If that was never a mitzvah, why should it be worth any more reward any more than my walking to shul barefoot?  

R' Shmuel Birnbaum (in Tiferes Shmuel on the parsha) answers this question with a yesod developed by the Ketzos in his introduction.  The gemara (BM 86a) writes that there was a machlokes in heaven about a din in hil negaim:

 קָא מִיפַּלְגִי בִּמְתִיבְתָּא דִרְקִיעָא: אִם בַּהֶרֶת קוֹדֶמֶת לְשֵׂעָר לָבָן – טָמֵא, וְאִם שֵׂעָר לָבָן קוֹדֵם לַבַּהֶרֶת – טָהוֹר.

סָפֵק – הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא אוֹמֵר: טָהוֹר, וְכוּלְּהוּ מְתִיבְתָּא דִרְקִיעָא אָמְרִי: טָמֵא. וְאָמְרִי: מַאן נוֹכַח? נוֹכַח רַבָּה בַּר נַחְמָנִי. דְּאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר נַחְמָנִי: אֲנִי יָחִיד בִּנְגָעִים, אֲנִי יָחִיד בְּאֹהָלוֹת

כִּי הֲוָה קָא נָיְחָא נַפְשֵׁיהּ, אֲמַר: טָהוֹר, טָהוֹר. יָצָאת בַּת קוֹל וְאָמְרָה: אַשְׁרֶיךָ רַבָּה בַּר נַחְמָנִי שֶׁגּוּפְךָ טָהוֹר, וְיָצָאתָה נִשְׁמָתְךָ בְּטָהוֹר

How could Rabbah bar Nachmaini resolve a machlokes between G-d himself and the mesivra d'rekiya!?  Isn't it obvious that G-d knows the right answer?

The Ketzos quotes the Derashos haRan as explaining that built into the Torah is the allowance for different possible interpretations.  "Eilu v'eilu divrei Elokim chaim."  In an absolute sense there is no one "right" answer.  So how do we figure our what to do?  The Torah resolves the problem with the principle of "lo ba'shamayim hi" - the final arbiter of what is "correct" is whatever the chachmei ha'dor think is correct.  It's in our hands to determine the "right" answer.  Therefore, the heavens had to turn to Rabbah bar Nachmeini, the posek ha'dor in hil negaim, to determine exactly what the psak should be.  It's not what's "right" in heaven that matters, but rather what we think is "right" on earth.

The Midrash (B"R 8:5) writes that there was a debate among the angels as to whether or not it was worth it to create man:

אָמַר רַבִּי סִימוֹן, בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁבָּא הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא לִבְרֹאת אֶת אָדָם הָרִאשׁוֹן, נַעֲשׂוּ מַלְאֲכֵי הַשָּׁרֵת כִּתִּים כִּתִּים, וַחֲבוּרוֹת חֲבוּרוֹת, מֵהֶם אוֹמְרִים אַל יִבָּרֵא, וּמֵהֶם אוֹמְרִים יִבָּרֵא, הֲדָא הוּא דִכְתִיב (תהלים פה, יא): חֶסֶד וֶאֱמֶת נִפְגָּשׁוּ צֶדֶק וְשָׁלוֹם נָשָׁקוּ. חֶסֶד אוֹמֵר יִבָּרֵא, שֶׁהוּא גּוֹמֵל חֲסָדִים. וֶאֱמֶת אוֹמֵר אַל יִבָּרֵא, שֶׁכֻּלּוֹ שְׁקָרִים. צֶדֶק אוֹמֵר יִבָּרֵא, שֶׁהוּא עוֹשֶׂה צְדָקוֹת. שָׁלוֹם אוֹמֵר אַל יִבָּרֵא, דְּכוּלֵיהּ קְטָטָה. מֶה עָשָׂה הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא נָטַל אֱמֶת וְהִשְׁלִיכוֹ לָאָרֶץ, הֲדָא הוּא דִכְתִיב (דניאל ח, יב): וְתַשְׁלֵךְ אֱמֶת אַרְצָה,

What does it mean that G-d threw emes down to earth?  How does silencing truth's voice, removing his platform, address the issue raised?  

R' Yaakov Kaminetzki (in Emes l'Yaakov) explains that there are two different levels or standards of truth: there is absolute truth, and then there is the relative truth that we humans are used to dealing with.  When you sing "kallah na'ah v'chasudah" at a wedding (Kesubos 17), it doesn't matter whether or not the kallah is really beautiful as measured on some absolute scale of beauty.  All that matters is that in her chosson's eyes she is beautiful.  As far as he is concerned, relative to his frame of reference, it's the truth.  When the Midrash says that Hashem kicked the midah of emes down to earth, it doesn't mean that Hashem chose to disregard truth.  What it means is that the standard of truth for mankind is not absolute truth as it exists in heaven, but is relative truth as it exists for us on earth.  

"Lo ba'shamayim hi" means the same is true of halacha.  The "right" answer is the one that appears correct to us, not what is "right" in some absolute sense.

R' Shmuel Birnbaum is mechadesh that the same principle applies to nevuah.  What the prophet sees or hears is subject to his interpretation, and that is what determines the meaning of the nevuah.  When Avraham was commanded הַעֲלֵהוּ שָׁם לְעֹלָה, since Avraham interpreted that to mean that Hashem was asking him to sacrifice Yitzchak, the act of literal sacrifice became a mitzvah.  It doesn't matter in an absolute sense what Hashem meant or didn't mean, because that is not the standard by which we determine what halacha or nevuah means.  The standard of truth is our perception (by "our" I mean the chachmei ha'mesorah or the navi) of what is meant. 

We say in the bracha before the haftarah אֲשֶׁר בָּחַר בִּנְבִיאִים טוֹבִים, וְרָצָה בְדִבְרֵיהֶם הַנֶאֱמָרִים בֶּאֱמֶת.  R'SB explains that when we say the words הַנֶאֱמָרִים בֶּאֱמֶת, we are not thanking Hashem for giving us prophets that don't c"v lie -- that should go without saying.  What we are affirming in our bracha is this principle that the navi's interpretation of the dvar Hashem -- his perception of what Hashem meant -- is true, נֶאֱמָרִים בֶּאֱמֶת, because that is the only truth that is relevant and that counts. 

no substitute for a parent

Avaraham made his way to Eretz Yisrael and wandered around until he reached Shchem (12:6):

 וַיַּעֲבֹ֤ר אַבְרָם֙ בָּאָ֔רֶץ עַ֚ד מְק֣וֹם שְׁכֶ֔ם עַ֖ד אֵל֣וֹן מוֹרֶ֑ה וְהַֽכְּנַעֲנִ֖י אָ֥ז בָּאָֽרֶץ

Why did he stop there?  Rashi explains עד מקום שכם – להתפלל על בני יעקב כשיבאו בשכם  He stopped to daven for the children of Yaakov.

Later in the parsha, Avraham tells Hashem that gifts don't mean anything so long as he does not have any children (15:2-3):

וַיֹּ֣אמֶר אַבְרָ֗ם ה׳ אלקים מַה⁠־תִּתֶּן⁠־לִ֔י וְאָנֹכִ֖י הוֹלֵ֣ךְ עֲרִירִ֑י וּבֶן⁠־מֶ֣שֶׁק בֵּיתִ֔י ה֖וּא דַּמֶּ֥שֶׂק אֱלִיעֶֽזֶר

וַיֹּ֣אמֶר אַבְרָ֔ם הֵ֣ן לִ֔י לֹ֥א נָתַ֖תָּה זָ֑רַע וְהִנֵּ֥ה בֶן⁠־בֵּיתִ֖י יוֹרֵ֥שׁ אֹתִֽי

Sifsei Chachamim asks: If Avraham stopped to daven for the Bnei Yaakov at Shechem, then he must have known that he would have children and grandchildren and great grandchildren!  How are we to understand Avraham's complaint?

Netziv says a beautiful pshat in those pesukim later in the parsha which answers the Sifsei Chachamim's question.  The words of Avraham's complaint are out of order, as the Ohr haChaim points out: אומרו הן לי - היה לו לומר הן לא נתת לי.  Netziv explains that Avraham deliberately put the word  לִ֔י first.  What Avraham was saying is that even if I have children, what good is it at this point in my life?  How can I in my old age, when my best years are long past, raise them and transmit to them my values, my ideology, my torah?  In what sense will those children be MY children, given to ME - לִ֔י - if I cannot fully experience raising them?  

Netziv's pshat begs the question of why was this was of such concern to Avraham Avinu.  In those very pesukim Avraham refers to Elizer as דַּמֶּ֥שֶׂק אֱלִיעֶֽזֶר.  Chazal tell us that Eliezer earned this title because he was דולה ומשקה מתורתו לאחרים, Eliezer was capable of teaching to others all the torah of Avraham.  Eliezer was such a tzadik that he went alive straight into Gan Eden at the end of his life.  Couldn't Avraham have charged Eliezer with the task of teaching his child torah, just like Eliezer taught it to others? Couldn't he have sent the child to cheider, to yeshiva, to learn there?

We see from here, writes R' Chaim Elazari in his Nesivei Chaim, is that no matter how good the yeshiva or cheider or Beis Yaakov, it's no substitute for a parent.  You don't become Avraham AVINU through shlichus.  Chinuch is a mitzvah she'bigufo, it requires direct interaction between parent and child.  When Avraham davened for a child, it is this experience that he pined for.  

2) Another great point from R' Chaim Elazari: Avraham did not want to accept any gifts from the King of Sdom lest people say that Sdom, not Hashem, made him rich  אִם⁠־מִחוּט֙ וְעַ֣ד שְׂרֽוֹךְ⁠־נַ֔עַל וְאִם⁠־אֶקַּ֖ח מִכׇּל⁠־אֲשֶׁר⁠־לָ֑ךְ וְלֹ֣א תֹאמַ֔ר אֲנִ֖י הֶעֱשַׁ֥רְתִּי אֶת⁠־אַבְרָֽם (14:23). Why did Avraham not have the same compunctions about taking gifts from Pharoah earlier in the parsha?

R' Elazari answers that Hashem's promise that He would make Avraham rich applied only in Eretz Yisrael.  Therefore, he did not want Sdom to get any credit.  In chu"l, however, Avraham had no guarantee, and could therefore could accept the gifts of others.

In galus, accepting hand outs is acceptable. In chu"l we live in a state of dependency on others for protection and sustenance.  Not so in Eretz Yisrael, where we are meant to stand on our own two feet, reliant only on Hashem for our needs.  We may not be there yet, but it's important to keep the goal and ideal in mind.

l'chaim - to life!

The gemara (Sanhedrim 108) tells us that Noach found a certian bird sitting quietly in a room in the ark not bothering anyone or anything.  He asked the bird, "Don't you want food?" to which the bird replied, "I saw you were busy and didn't want to bother you."  In response to this act of kindness Noach blessed the bird that it should live forever.

Maharasha asks: this gemara seems to contradict a different Chazal.  The Midrash teaches that this bird lived forever because it was the only animal that did not listen to Chavah and eat from the Eitz ha'Daas:

מהכא משמע דמברכתו של נח זכה לכך אבל בב״ר אמרו ותקח מפריו ותאכל הכל שמעו לה ואכלו חוץ מעוף א׳ ושמו חול הה״ד וכחול ארבה ימים אלף שנה הוא חי ובסוף אלף שנים גופו כלה וכו׳ וחוזר ומגדל אבריו וחי ע״כ וק״ל

One possible simple answer is that not eating from the Eitz ha'Daas prevented natural death, but there was always the chance that the bird might be hunted and killed.  Noach's blessing prevented even that from occurring.

Rav Pincus in Tiferes Torah suggests a different answer.  We've in the past discussed the gemara (R"H 32) that teaches that on Rosh haShana that angels are perplexed as to why Bn"Y are not saying hallel -- R"H is still a yom tov after all?  Hashem answers that it is impossible to sing hallel and be joyous when the Book of Life and Book of Death stand open before us:

אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ אָמְרוּ מַלְאֲכֵי הַשָּׁרֵת לִפְנֵי הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא רִבּוֹנוֹ שֶׁל עוֹלָם מִפְּנֵי מָה אֵין יִשְׂרָאֵל אוֹמְרִים שִׁירָה לְפָנֶיךָ בְּרֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה וּבְיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים אָמַר לָהֶם אֶפְשָׁר מֶלֶךְ יוֹשֵׁב עַל כִּסֵּא דִין וְסִפְרֵי חַיִּים וְסִפְרֵי מֵתִים פְּתוּחִין לְפָנָיו וְיִשְׂרָאֵל אוֹמְרִים שִׁירָה.

B'shalama the Book of Death being open, asks Rav Pincus, neicha that we should be trembling in our boots.  But why does the gemara also mention the fact that the Book of Life is open?  Why is our trepidation on Yom haDin related to that book as well?  

We see from this Chazal a tremendous yesod: Life means more than the absence of death.  It's not enough to hope you are not inscribed in the Book of Death on Rosh HaShana and m'meila, if nothing bad happens, life will continue as-is ad infinitum with no need to do anything more.  A person needs to have a reason to live; a person needs to strive for fulfillment, for growth.  This is especially true on the Yom haDin, especially on Rosh haShana when the entire world has a chance to renew itself and be reborn.  If a person is not part of that, what is life for?  We are beyond the days of Rosh haShana, but this shabbos is also Rosh Chodesh, a time of hischadshus.  It's not enough to slide into the new month maintaining status quo.  We have to renew ourselves, renew our reason for being here, or what are we living for?  

That's why we are shaking in our boots when the Book of Life is open.  If you just skate by by avoiding the Book of Death without a Book of Life, you don't really have a life after all.  

Unless we also make it into that Book of Life, our existence will be a futile exercise and will inevitably draw to a close. 

Think for a moment about the two special trees in Gan Eden, the Eitz haDaas and the Eitz haChaim.  If being alive means no more than avoiding death, then why was there an Eitz haChaim?  Avoiding the Eitz haDaas alone would do the trick of guaranteeing eternal life?  Al korchacha life must be about more than cheating death.  We need an Eitz haChaim, we need a Sefer haChaim, meaning and reason for being here, or all the years in eternity don't really matter.

This the lesson Chazal are teaching us in this story about Noach's magical bird.  True, the bird did not eat from the Eitz ha'Daas and therefore had the potential to live forever, but what a sad, meaningless existence that would be. Such a life would come to nothing and ultimately fizzle out on its own. It was by doing an act of chessed that this bird demonstrated that its existence had positive meaning, and that is the secret to the bracha which Noach gave it of true eternal life. 

Rogatchover on building the teivah: is the mitzvah the maaseh or the totza'ah?

The Rogatchover asks what the geder of Hashem's mitzvah to make a teivah was.  Was it the עצם המעשׂה, the act of building the teivah, or was it the end result, the תוצאה, of having a teivah, which was crucial?

I would say mi'sevara that it depends on what the real reason for building the teivah was.  If the point was to have a place of refuge for Noach and family during the flood, then all that matters is the end result of having a safe haven.  If the point was to raise awareness of the impending flood and thereby arouse the people to do teshuvah, then process of building, which people would take note of, was crucial.  (Baruch she'kivanti, my son pointed out that the L. Rebbe makes this point in a sicha (vol 15).)

The Rogatchover in his unmatched genius brought a proof from the following gemara (Sukkah 52b):

״וַיַּרְאֵנִי ה׳ אַרְבָּעָה חָרָשִׁים״, מַאן נִינְהוּ אַרְבָּעָה חָרָשִׁים? אָמַר רַב חָנָא בַּר בִּיזְנָא אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן חֲסִידָא: מָשִׁיחַ בֶּן דָּוִד, וּמָשִׁיחַ בֶּן יוֹסֵף, וְאֵלִיָּהוּ, וְכֹהֵן צֶדֶק.

Why are these 4 people called craftsmen?  Rashi explains that Mashiach ben David and ben Yosef will build Beis haMikdash; Eliyahu built a bamah on Mt Carmel; Kohen Tzedek is Shem ben Noach who helped his father build the teivah.

Had Noach been commanded in the עצם המעשׂה of building the teivah, then how could he have allowed his son to help?  He was given the mitzvah, not his son, and there is no din of shlichus for a ben Noach!  It must be, says the Rogatchover, that all that matters was the תוצאה, but who did the building or how it was done was not important.

an experience that makes an impression

Rashi writes that the gathering of  וַיַּקְהֵל מֹשֶׁה אֶת⁠ כׇּל⁠ עֲדַת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל took place למחרת יום הכפורים, כשירד מן ההר.  When that gathering finished, the Torah reports וַיֵּ֥צְא֛וּ כׇּל־עֲדַ֥ת בְּנֵֽי־יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל מִלִּפְנֵ֥י מֹשֶֽׁה.  It should go without saying that when Moshe was done speaking everyone went home.  Why mention it?  (See this post where we discussed this.)

R' Avraham Shapira quotes Chasam Sofer that the point the Torah is trying to make is that in this case it wasn't just stam you went home, business as usual, like you come home from the grocery store or a day of work. In this case it was clear on the faces and in the behavior of the people that they had come מִלִּפְנֵ֥י מֹשֶֽׁה, they had just experienced something important, something that made an impression. 

So too when we come to למחרת יום הכפורים, the experience of Y"K should leave it mark, and there should be an impression left even as we depart from the kedushas ha'yom. 

tefilas neilah - kaparah of the tzibur

Rambam writes in hil teshuvah 1:4 that teshuvah alone is not enough to be mechapeir on chilul Hashem:

 במה דברים אמורים בשלא חילל את השם בשעה שעבר אבל המחלל את השם אע"פ שעשה תשובה והגיע יום הכפורים והוא עומד בתשובתו ובאו עליו יסורין אינו מתכפר לו כפרה גמורה עד שימות. 

Yet earlier in halacha 1:2 Rambam indicates that the שעיר המשתלח brings kaparah for everything, even the cheit of chilul Hashem.

שעיר המשתלח לפי שהוא כפרה על כל ישראל כהן גדול מתודה עליו על לשון כל ישראל שנאמר והתודה עליו את כל עונות בני ישראל. שעיר המשתלח מכפר על כל עבירות שבתורה הקלות והחמורות. בין שעבר בזדון בין שעבר בשגגה. בין שהודע לו בין שלא הודע לו הכל מתכפר בשעיר המשתלח. והוא שעשה תשובה

R' Avraham Shapira explained that the difference is that שעיר המשתלח is a kaparah for the community as a whole, as the Rambam writes, מתודה עליו על לשון כל ישראל.  Although an individual's personal teshuvah is not enough to forgive chilul Hashem, it can be forgiven as part of the kaparah extended to the community.

Similarly, Meshech Chochma at the end of parshas VaYelech writes that tefilas neilah also has that exceptional power to afford kaparah even for chilul Hashem:

והנה כל ימי תשובה שמלך יושב על כסא וצבא השמים עומדים עליו יכול להועיל רק על עבירות שאין בהם חלול השם שוקלין זכויות כנגד עבירות, אבל על חה״ש ע״ז אמרו אם יכופר לכם העון עד תמותון ב״י, כי אין יוהכ״פ מכפר (סוף יומא), ורק בעת החתימה שהשי״ת דן יחידי אז הוא שעת הכושר שהשי״ת יסלח מרוב טובו אחרי גודל הבכי והחרטה, כי אם הוא ימחול על חלול כבודו מי יאמר אליו, לכן בנעילה סדרו הפסוקים למה תמותו, השיבו וחיו כי לא תחפץ במות כו׳ וכיו״ב, כי הכל על עון חלול השי״ת   

This is because, explained R' Avraham, tefilas neilah, like the שעיר המשתלח, is the time of kaparah for the tzibur, not just for each of us as individuals.

This is the climax of the avodah of Y"K -- joining as a tzibur, receiving kaparah as a tzibur.  

What we cannot achieve as individuals, we can achieve as a klal.  

bracha on besamim on Y"K which falls on motzei shabbos; bracha on ner when a woman recites havdalah

There is a machlokes ha'poskim whether the bracha on besamim is said in havdalah when Y"K falls on Shabbos. The SA writes (624:3) writes that the bracha is omitted, as the purpose of besamim is to help us recover from the loss of our neshoma yesira, but on Y"K there is no neshama yseira since we can't eat or drink.  The Mordechai disagrees.  Taz quotes Maharashal who argues that there is no downside to being choshesh for the Mordechai and adding the bracha, as the bracha is a birchas ha'nehenin.  If you smell the spices and enjoy the fragrance, it's not a bracha levatala.  This is how the Mishna Berura paskens l'maaseh:

אבל רבים מהאחרונים חולקין ע"ז וסוברין דכשחל בשבת יש לברך על הבשמים ואין כאן חשש ברכה לבטלה כיון שנהנה. ומ"מ אין להורות לצבור כן ולמחות בידם במקום שנהגו בבהכ"נ שלא לברך על הבשמים רק לעצמו בביתו יכול לברך [פמ"ג].

Aside from the issue of bracha levatala, Taz raises a different concern.  If one is not obligated to say it, wouldn't adding the bracha on besamim constitute a hefsek between the bracha on the kos and the bracha of havdalah?  He draws an interesting analogy to tekiyas shofas to get out of this problem:

וויש לכאורה לדחות זה שכ' מאחר שנהנה כו' דמ"מ יש כאן הפסק בין ברכת בורא פרי הגפן לברכת המבדיל בבשמים אם אין הכרח להם מ"מ נראה דעדיף טפי לצאת ידי כל הדיעות מלחוש להפסק וראיה מדברי ת"ה סימן קמ"ב לענין קשר"ק שתוקעין בסדרים דבזה נפיק ידי כל הקולות דהיינו או קר"ק או קש"ק ולא חיישינן להפסיק אם קש"ק עיקר הוה התרועה הפסק ואם קר"ק עיקר הוה השברים הפסק דכיון דעכ"פ כבר יצא י"ח לא חיישינן להפסק  אע"ג דעיקר התקיעות הם על סדר הברכות הכי נמי  כיון דיוצא ממ"נ לא חיישינן להפסק:

I think the simplest solution to be yotzei both deyos here is that of the Chayei Adam (klal 145.  My son pointed out to me that R' Ovadya says the same in Chazon Ovadya.):

והרוצה לעשות מן המובחר לצאת דעת האומרים לברך גם על הבשמים כשחל בשבת נ"ל דלאחר שסיים ברכת המבדיל בין קדש לחול אז יברך על הבשמים ולא באמצע הבדלה

This Taz has ramifications not just when Y"K falls on Shabbos, but for other havdalah issues as well.  The Biur Halacha at the end of OC 296 is medayek from the MG"A that women are exempt from the birchas ha'ner when reciting havdalah on motzei Shabbos.  Had you asked me, I would have said based on this Taz that if they have no chiyuv recite the birchas ha'ner, they should not be allowed to recite the bracha, as it would constitute a hefsek.  This is in fact how R' Tukashinski paskens in his luach.  

The sefer Halichos Beisa (end of ch 15) disagrees.  He suggests that even according to the Biur Halacha, women may recite the bracha if they desire to do so.  The difference between this case and that of the Taz is that when it comes to a regular motzei Shabbos, the fact that women lack a chovas ha'gavra (odd to use that term here : ) to say the bracha does not change the fact that it is part of the takanah of what constitutes the normal seder of havdalah.  On Y"K which falls on Shabbos, however, since according to the SA since there is no neshoma yseira, the bracha of besamim is not part of the "cheftza" of the takanah of havdalah for that day.  

As proof to this argument he cites the PM"G that an aveil is exempt from reciting the bracha on besamim since he is too upset to have the enjoyment of a neshama yseira; however, the PM"G implies that if the aveil may recite the bracha if he chooses to do so.  Here too, the aveil may lack a chovas hagavra because of his circumstance, but the takana of havdalah on motzei Shabbos includes the bracha, and therefore there is no issur to say it.

Important to note that this issue is only with respect to a regular motzei Shabbos. The Halichos Beisa suggests that when Y"K falls on Shabbos even according to the M"B women are obligated in the birchas ha'ner, as the purpose of the ner on motzei Y"K is part of havdalah -- to distinguish between the ner that we were not allowed to use for 24 hours and ner that we now can use -- as opposed to on a regular motzei Shabbos where it is a shevach for the creation of candlelight.