At what point in Sefer Shmos would you say that the geulah of Bnei Yisrael began? Did it start with the plagues? With Moshe's return? With Hashem's appearance to Moshe in the burning bush? Maybe even earlier with Moshe's awakening to the plight of his people? The Sefas Emes in the name of the Ch haRI"M places the start of geulah all the way back at of the second chapter of the Sefer where we read that the old Pharoah died and the Jewish people suddenly bewailed their fate, "VaYei'anchu Bnei Yisrael min ha'avodah". The S.E. explains that until there was a realization that life was intolerable, that things cannot go on under these circumstances, then there was no real sense of galus and therefore no real longing for geulah without which change would never happen. The BeSH"T interprets the double language of "haster astir" used to describe hester panim to mean that G-d will be hidden and, sadly, we will not even realize that he is hiding from us. The first step to getting out of galus is realizing that we are in one. As winter vacation approaches and the advertisements appear for kosher cruises with all the glatt kosher food and sushi you can eat and daf yomi to boot, it makes one wonder. If this is galus, that (chas v'shalom) who needs a geulah?
At his meeting with G-d at the burning bush Moshe challenges G-d and says that the Jewish people will not believe him, an argument that seems unbefitting to the character of a tzadik and defender of the Jewish people, and which therefore has been reinterpreted in various ways. The Ishbitza (among others) as always is worth looking at, but I am going to risk suggesting an approach that is almost the opposite of his reading but follows along the lines of the Ohr haChaim. The Noam Elimelech in a different context in this week's parsha (d"h vayomer Hashem) writes that when a tzadik speaks words of Hashem it is impossible for these words not to penetrate and break into the hearts of the listeners. This was undoubtedly true in Moshe's case, for Hashem had specifically promised, "V'sham'u l'kolecha" (3:18). Therefore, there was no doubt in Moshe's mind that his words uttered in G-d's name would be heard and would uplift the Jewish people. But is that called "emunah", belief? One may have no choice but to listen and obey when the tzadik is speaking, but what about the doubts that may linger when the speech is over? We can all ask the same question about ourselves. A person hears a great mussar speech or derasha and feels uplifted and elevated and motivated in avodas Hashem, and then days, hours, or sometimes even minutes later it wears off. Who is the "real" me? Is the "real" me the person on a high of avodah who then unfortunately slips and falls and needs a little spiritual help to keep reaching for those heights, or is the "real" me the person sinking into the avodas parech of the mundane and those moments of spiritual seeking were the aberration?
Hashem answers Moshe through the signs, first transforming Moshe's staff into a snake. The Tiferes Shlomo (Radomsker) writes that this was the special staff with the name of Hashem engraved upon it later user to perform the plagues; it was an article invested with kedusha. Yet, when tossed to the ground, it appeared as the most lowly of animals. Hashem was telling Moshe that Bnei Yisrael in reality are the most exalted people, but when tossed to the ground, when submerged in the decadence of Egypt, there is no wonder that they appear lacking. The same is true of water which was taken from one of the four rivers of Eden (I do not know the T.S.'s source of this) but when poured to the ground looked like blood.
Moshe is told to grab hold to the tail of that snake and lift it and it will turn back to the holy staff -- grab hold of the tail end of the lowliest member of Bnei Yisrael and lift that Jew up and you will discover his true character. The "real" Jew is not the snake slithering on the ground, but is the holy staff of Hashem -- he/she just needs someone to grab and lift.
The Rambam (Hil Geirushin ch 2) writes that a Jew who is coerced by Beis Din to perform a mitzvah is not acting against his will even if he screams in protest, because innate to every member of the Jewish people is a desire to obey G-d. Belief is the reality of a Jew by definition; everything else is pretense and pretend.
Similarly, the question of how the Torah can command love of G-d when love is an emotional response -- you can't force a person to love what he is repelled from -- is not a question. A Jew has an innate love of G-d by his/her very nature and it is only external forces which cover up that love and even go so far as to make us thingkwe don't have it.
And so we come back to the Sefas Emes. Our psyche has been warped by 2000 years of exile into thinking galus is a natural state for the Jew and geulah is some miraculous occurrence outside the bounds of nature. We have been trained to think of the snake as real and the staff as an aberration, a miracle that is imposed upon the true nature of things. The key yo geulah is reversing that thinking. The staff is real and the snake is the illusion. 2000 years of existence in exile is the unexpected miracle; living in Eretz Yisrael with toras Eretz Yisrael and a Beis haMikdash in all its glory is reality. We all believe it deep down inside because a Jew by definition believes; all the rest is just pretend. When we are sick of pretending, when we get to the point of "VaYe'anchu", becoming sick of galus, sensing the hester panim that exists even if you can learn daf yomi on a kosher cruise, then undoubtedly geulah will be hastened.
Friday, January 16, 2009
Wednesday, January 14, 2009
ain holchin b'pikuach nefesh achar harov (II)
Continuing from yesterday's post, we asked why one may not interrupt tefilah if a snake wraps itself around one's foot -- even though most snakes don't bite, ain holchin b'pikuach nefesh achar harov, halacha is suspended for even the slightest chance of mortal danger. How is this case different than a case of a person trapped under an avalanche on Shabbos where we are permitted to dig the body out even if there is only a slight chance the person is alive or Jewish.
R' Elchanan answers this question using the principle we mentioned on Monday of shomeir mitzvah lo yeidah davar ra, one who is engaged in the performance of a mitzvah is protected from harm. Really, be it snakes which don't often bite, or be it scorpions which do bite and kill, a person should not interrupt tefilah because the act of being engaged in a mitzvah is the best protection from harm. However, the gemara tells us that this protection is not absolute. Where shchi'ach hezeika, where danger is prevalent and common, the elevated level of danger overrides the protection afforded by the mitzvah. Therefore, we rely on the protection of tefilah with respect to snakes because they are not usually dangerous, but would be permitted to interrupt tefilah to brush off a scorpion.
A more "lomdish" answer to this question is perhaps possible. In the case of an avalanche, the situation that presents itself is one that is clearly life threatening -- the only question is whose life (Jew or non-Jew) is in jeapordy or whether the victim has already perished. However, in the situation of the snake, based on a consideration of most snake's behavior there is no clear and present danger. As an analogy, consider the ruling of the Rambam (Shvisas Asor 2:8) that where a there is a conflict of opinion between doctors over whether fasting on Yom Kippur would endanger a person's health we follow the opinion of the majority. Why in this case do we not utilize the principle of ain holchin b'pikuach nefesh achar harov? R' Scheinberg (Mishmeres Chaim III:Y"K 2) answers by also distinguishing between whether the issue is determining whether danger is present, in which case we follow rov, and whether the danger exists and we just need to determine details, in which case we ignore rov.
The logic behind this distinction can be explained using R' Shimon Shkop's reasoning in Sha'rei Yosher 4:13. The reason pikuach nefesh overrides rov is because the principle of following rov is itself just a din like any other -- pikuach nefesh overrides all halachos, including the halacha of rov. However, where it remains to be determined if danger exists, then we cannot yet call upon the rule of pikuach nefesh to push away the principle of rov because the existance of pikuach nefesh is itself what is at question.
A final solution to this question which may work is to distinguish between types of rov. The rov that presents itself in trying to determine who is buried under an avalanche is based on a statistical evaluation of the residents of the city -- a ruba d'isa kaman, a rov build around observation or counting. The rov that tells us that snakes don't bite is not determined based on observing all snakes in the world, but is rather based on inductive reasoning -- a ruba d'leisa kaman. Perhaps ain holchin b'pikuach nefesh achar harov would apply to a ruba d'isa kaman where a safeik still exists, but not to a ruba d'leisa kaman which essentially resolves a safeik entirely and renders all doubt non-existant (see Shev Shmaytza 2:15)
R' Elchanan answers this question using the principle we mentioned on Monday of shomeir mitzvah lo yeidah davar ra, one who is engaged in the performance of a mitzvah is protected from harm. Really, be it snakes which don't often bite, or be it scorpions which do bite and kill, a person should not interrupt tefilah because the act of being engaged in a mitzvah is the best protection from harm. However, the gemara tells us that this protection is not absolute. Where shchi'ach hezeika, where danger is prevalent and common, the elevated level of danger overrides the protection afforded by the mitzvah. Therefore, we rely on the protection of tefilah with respect to snakes because they are not usually dangerous, but would be permitted to interrupt tefilah to brush off a scorpion.
A more "lomdish" answer to this question is perhaps possible. In the case of an avalanche, the situation that presents itself is one that is clearly life threatening -- the only question is whose life (Jew or non-Jew) is in jeapordy or whether the victim has already perished. However, in the situation of the snake, based on a consideration of most snake's behavior there is no clear and present danger. As an analogy, consider the ruling of the Rambam (Shvisas Asor 2:8) that where a there is a conflict of opinion between doctors over whether fasting on Yom Kippur would endanger a person's health we follow the opinion of the majority. Why in this case do we not utilize the principle of ain holchin b'pikuach nefesh achar harov? R' Scheinberg (Mishmeres Chaim III:Y"K 2) answers by also distinguishing between whether the issue is determining whether danger is present, in which case we follow rov, and whether the danger exists and we just need to determine details, in which case we ignore rov.
The logic behind this distinction can be explained using R' Shimon Shkop's reasoning in Sha'rei Yosher 4:13. The reason pikuach nefesh overrides rov is because the principle of following rov is itself just a din like any other -- pikuach nefesh overrides all halachos, including the halacha of rov. However, where it remains to be determined if danger exists, then we cannot yet call upon the rule of pikuach nefesh to push away the principle of rov because the existance of pikuach nefesh is itself what is at question.
A final solution to this question which may work is to distinguish between types of rov. The rov that presents itself in trying to determine who is buried under an avalanche is based on a statistical evaluation of the residents of the city -- a ruba d'isa kaman, a rov build around observation or counting. The rov that tells us that snakes don't bite is not determined based on observing all snakes in the world, but is rather based on inductive reasoning -- a ruba d'leisa kaman. Perhaps ain holchin b'pikuach nefesh achar harov would apply to a ruba d'isa kaman where a safeik still exists, but not to a ruba d'leisa kaman which essentially resolves a safeik entirely and renders all doubt non-existant (see Shev Shmaytza 2:15)
Tuesday, January 13, 2009
ain holchin b'pikuach nefesh achar harov (I)
The Mishna in Brachos (30b) says that one may not interrupt tefilah (i.e. shmoneh esrei) even if a snake winds itself around one's foot. The Bartenua explains (based on the gemara 33a) that the law in the Mishna applies specifically to snakes because most of the time (rov) snakes do not bite. However, if a scorpion were to attack one can interrupt tefilah because scorpions usually do bite with fatal consequences.
Question: There is a principle in halacha of ain holchin b'pikuach nefesh achar harov, meaning that when it comes to questions of life and death we do not play odds but consider even the smallest chance of saving life worthy of effort. For example, if an avalanche buries someone on Shabbos, even if the odds are that the person in dead or not even Jewish, we must desecrate Shabbos to dig the person out based on the small chance that a Jewish person may be buried under the rubble and still alive. If so, why do we rely on the fact that most (rov) snakes do not bite and prohibit an interruption of tefilah -- if even only a small percentage of snakes do pose a danger, shouldn't we invoke this principle of ain holchin b'pikuach nefesh achar harov???
This question is tangentially related to the topic of yesterday's post -- it is discussed by R' Elchanan in his essay about secular studies in the context of the protection afforded by mitzvos, but multiple answers (I think) are possible. I'll give time to think it over and comment before posting answers.
Question: There is a principle in halacha of ain holchin b'pikuach nefesh achar harov, meaning that when it comes to questions of life and death we do not play odds but consider even the smallest chance of saving life worthy of effort. For example, if an avalanche buries someone on Shabbos, even if the odds are that the person in dead or not even Jewish, we must desecrate Shabbos to dig the person out based on the small chance that a Jewish person may be buried under the rubble and still alive. If so, why do we rely on the fact that most (rov) snakes do not bite and prohibit an interruption of tefilah -- if even only a small percentage of snakes do pose a danger, shouldn't we invoke this principle of ain holchin b'pikuach nefesh achar harov???
This question is tangentially related to the topic of yesterday's post -- it is discussed by R' Elchanan in his essay about secular studies in the context of the protection afforded by mitzvos, but multiple answers (I think) are possible. I'll give time to think it over and comment before posting answers.
Monday, January 12, 2009
Moving yeshivos out of danger zones: doesn't Torah protect?
Question raised on many other blogs: Isn't it hypocritical for yeshivos and talmidei chachamim to move out of towns within range of the Hamas rockets when these same students and talmidei chachamim use the fact that "Torah protects" (Sotah 21a) as a reason for army service exemption?
Firstly, the question makes the assumption that the primary reason for draft exemption is because Torah itself affords protection. Whether or not that is the only source for exempting talmidei chachamim from army service is debatable. The Rambam (end of Hil Shmitah) famously writes that anyone who devotes his life to avodas Hashem can take on the spiritual role filled by Sheivet Levi and be exempt from fighting wars just like the Leviim were. Conspicuously absent from the Rambam is any mention of Torah itself affording protection from danger as a reason for the exemption. At least on a theoretical level (and practical halacha is a separate discussion), the idea of exemption from army duty for the sake of Torah learning rests on more than the idea that "Torah protects".
But even without the charge of hypocrisy, the question still stands: why flee danger when Torah protects?
I don't understand why this question is raised now as if no historical precedent for the issue exists. The story of the Mir yeshiva's escape from Europe to Shaghai during WWII is well known. That escape included saving the likes of R' Chaim Shmuelevitz, R' Yerucham Lebovitz, etc. Question: if Torah protects, why not just leave the yeshiva intact in Europe? Surely the yeshiva itself, if not the surrounding area as well, would come to no harm because "Torah protects". Would those who question moving yeshivos out of the danger zone in Southern Israel similarly think that the Mir should have stayed put? If not, what's the difference between that situation and this one?
But more to the point, the idea that "Torah protects" being an immunity from all danger is simply a straw-man. Halacha itself tells us that we cannot ignore danger because of the promise of Divine protection. Why did the bris milah I was supposed to attend yesterday morning get postponed because the baby was in the hospital with an infection? The same gemara which tells us that Torah protects tells us that no harm can come from the performance of a mitzvah. In fact, the Chasam Sofer goes so far as to say (Shu"t Y.D. 245) that every milah is inherently a dangerous procedure and is permitted only because of this protection that stems from the mitzvah's performance. So why postponse any bris? Why not mal a hemophiliac baby and trust that no harm can come from the performance of a mitzvah?
The answer is that halacha makes distinctions between degrees of danger. For example, even though shluchei mitzvah are promised protection from harm, where bari hezeika, where there is a clear and evident danger, one must take precautions. Poskim also further differentiate between danger that can be avoided e.g. by moving and danger that cannot be avoided - see Sdei Chemed vol 9 #82.
There is no contradiction between claiming Torah protects those who engage in its study and at the same time recognizing that there are limits to that protection. Whether the protection which would be sufficient during times of relative peace is sufficient given 1) the increased danger of war and 2) the possibility of avoiding the danger by moving is not a simple issue.
Firstly, the question makes the assumption that the primary reason for draft exemption is because Torah itself affords protection. Whether or not that is the only source for exempting talmidei chachamim from army service is debatable. The Rambam (end of Hil Shmitah) famously writes that anyone who devotes his life to avodas Hashem can take on the spiritual role filled by Sheivet Levi and be exempt from fighting wars just like the Leviim were. Conspicuously absent from the Rambam is any mention of Torah itself affording protection from danger as a reason for the exemption. At least on a theoretical level (and practical halacha is a separate discussion), the idea of exemption from army duty for the sake of Torah learning rests on more than the idea that "Torah protects".
But even without the charge of hypocrisy, the question still stands: why flee danger when Torah protects?
I don't understand why this question is raised now as if no historical precedent for the issue exists. The story of the Mir yeshiva's escape from Europe to Shaghai during WWII is well known. That escape included saving the likes of R' Chaim Shmuelevitz, R' Yerucham Lebovitz, etc. Question: if Torah protects, why not just leave the yeshiva intact in Europe? Surely the yeshiva itself, if not the surrounding area as well, would come to no harm because "Torah protects". Would those who question moving yeshivos out of the danger zone in Southern Israel similarly think that the Mir should have stayed put? If not, what's the difference between that situation and this one?
But more to the point, the idea that "Torah protects" being an immunity from all danger is simply a straw-man. Halacha itself tells us that we cannot ignore danger because of the promise of Divine protection. Why did the bris milah I was supposed to attend yesterday morning get postponed because the baby was in the hospital with an infection? The same gemara which tells us that Torah protects tells us that no harm can come from the performance of a mitzvah. In fact, the Chasam Sofer goes so far as to say (Shu"t Y.D. 245) that every milah is inherently a dangerous procedure and is permitted only because of this protection that stems from the mitzvah's performance. So why postponse any bris? Why not mal a hemophiliac baby and trust that no harm can come from the performance of a mitzvah?
The answer is that halacha makes distinctions between degrees of danger. For example, even though shluchei mitzvah are promised protection from harm, where bari hezeika, where there is a clear and evident danger, one must take precautions. Poskim also further differentiate between danger that can be avoided e.g. by moving and danger that cannot be avoided - see Sdei Chemed vol 9 #82.
There is no contradiction between claiming Torah protects those who engage in its study and at the same time recognizing that there are limits to that protection. Whether the protection which would be sufficient during times of relative peace is sufficient given 1) the increased danger of war and 2) the possibility of avoiding the danger by moving is not a simple issue.
Friday, January 09, 2009
Divrei Torah P' VaYechi: Yehudah - hero or villian? Din vs. "omek ha'emes"
The Yalkut Shimoni (159) records that after hearing the sharp criticism which Ya'akov Avinu delivered to Reuvain, Shimon, and Levi, Yehudah was terrified and thought Ya'akov would chastise him as well for his relationship with Tamar. Instead, Ya'akov comforted Yehudah by saying, "Yehudah, atah yoducha achecha", your brothers will praise you because through your admission of guilt Tamar and her children were saved. The Midrash continues and credits Yehudah for saving Yosef as well, for it was Yehudah who said to the brothers, "Mah betza ki na'harog es achinu", what gain will there be to us by killing our brother?
R' Yehudah Leib Chasman points out that we find in Chazal a diametrically opposite view of Yehudah based on this same pasuk of "mah betza..." The gemara (Sanhedrin 6b) connects the pasuk in Tehillim (10:3 based on Radak) "...U'botze'a beireiach ni'etz Hashem", "One who blesses the thief has blasphemized G-d", which uses the same root "betza", to the pasuk of "mah betza" and writes that one who blesses Yehudah has insulted G-d. Rashi explains: had Yehudah insisted on returning Yosef home instead of selling him the brothers would have followed his lead. Since instead Yehudah suggested that Yosef be sold he is culpable for the events which followed.
So which is it? Is Yehudah to be praised for saying "mah betza" and saving Yosef from death, or is Yehudah to be criticized and condemned for not doing more to bring Yosef home?
R' Leib Chasam answers that we need not view these two opinions as contradictory. Given that Yosef faced the danger of being killed, Yehudah certainly deserves credit for coming to Yosef's defense. However, measured against the ideal of what Yehudah could have accomplished, he is found wanting.
Chazal (Chagiga 9) famously interpret the difference between "oveid Elokim" and "asher lo avado" as the difference between one who learns a topic 100 times and one who learns the same topic 101 times. One who reviews a topic 100 times is obviously worthy of tremendous praise. Nonetheless, relative to what the same person might have accomplished, there is something lacking.
I would like to suggest another possible way to reconcile these Midrashim. We each ultimately will be called to upon to provide an accounting, a din v'cheshbon, for our actions. The Brisker Rav (which we discussed here) explains that there is a difference between "din" and "cheshbon". Din is an accounting of whether our actions were appropriate to the situation; cheshbon is an accounting of our role in creating the situation itself. For example, a person who misses shacharis may be obligated to make up that tefilah through a tefilas tashlumin at mincha time. Given the situation, davening that teflias tashlumin is the halachically appropriate course of action -- it satisfies an accounting of din. What is cheshbon? Cheshbon asks the question of why the person missed shacharis in the first place -- Could he have set an alarm clock? Did he stay up to late? What created the situation that din must deal with?
Given the circumstance of the brothers plotting to kill Yosef, Yehudah's best option was the suggestion to spare his life and instead sell him and for that he deserves praise. But that is not a complete accounting, for it looks only at din and not at cheshbon. How is it possible that the situation of Yosef's life being judged came to be? What led to these circumstances arising? Had Yehudah intervened and taken a stronger hand in quelling the animosity toward Yosef would the deliberations of killing vs. selling have been needed? Perhaps it is this larger picture of cheshbon which Chazal wish to convey in their criticism of Yehudah.
On a deeper level, I think perhaps we can reconcile these two views in light of a torah of the Ishbitza (I can't do justice to this in a few sentences-- see it in P' vaYeishev in the Mei haShiloach, and see my article "What's Bred in the Bone" in the kallahmagazine archives). In a nutshell the Ishbitza tells us that there is a truth based on din, which is based on what we see before us, but there is also an "omek ha'emes", a truth which transcends the facts. We are all familiar with this -- we have all heard of cases where it is obvious to all that Ploni is guilty of some crime but then he hires a "dream team" of lawyers who know what to say in court and the person is out free the next day, and sometime someone who is innocent is caught is a Kafka-esque horror of unjust prosecution. The din may say one thing, but the "omek ha'emes" is otherwise. How do we reconcile these two forces? The answer is that we can't -- there is a constant tug of war inside each of us, and that tug of war is the root of the difference between the leadership of Yosef and Yehudah.
At the end of Parshas VaYigash when the cup is found in Binyamin's bag Yehudah seems to accept guilt and resign himself to the fate of slavery without excuses. "Mah nomar l'adoni, mah n'daber, mah nitztadak..." (44:16) -- there is nothing that can be said, no justification, no excuses -- "hi'nenu avadim l'adoni", we will become slaves. Yet, the very next parsha begins "VaYigash eilav Yehudah", Yehudah came to Yosef and pleaded his case to allow for the brothers release! What changed?
The Sefas Emes quotes a teaching of the AR"I that sheds light on Yehudah's change of heart. Yehudah begins his soliloquay, "Bi adoni..." The word adoni is the same spelling as G-d's name. The ARI taught that Yehudah remembered that "bi", within himself and within each Jew, is the spark of Hashem (see below).
In other words, Yehudah at the end of P' MiKeitz was speaking on the level of din and acknowledging guilt. However, looking at the "omek ha'emes", looking at the world through the perspective of "bi Adoni", the truth of the ratzon Hashem could not allow the seperation of Ya'akov from the brothers and their enslavement.
The Ishbitza on our parsha writes that Ya'akov criticized each of the first three sons he addressed, but when he got to Yehudah he was guided by Hashem to show mercy. Yehudah's name itself is the same as the letters of the Yud-Key-Vav-Key with the addition of the letter daled. Yehudah's was an instrument of Hashem's plan expressing itself in this world while he personally was not even a metziyus -- he was a daled, a dal, a poor nothing, subsumed in the larger picture of ratzon Hashem. In other words, Yehudah only deserves to be criticized if we look externally at "his" choices and actions. But if we look at the "omek ha'emes", if we midah k'neged midah follow the trait which Yehudah himself embodied, "his" choices are really nothing other than a means of Hashem carrying out his plan in this world and Yehudah deserves the hoda'ah which his name also expresses.
There is no real contradiction between Midrashim. If we judge Yehudah based on the actions which we might perceive as onlookers, Yehudah is wanting. But justice and truth are not synonomous. The "omek ha'emes" is that Yehudah deserves the praise of his brothers.
R' Yehudah Leib Chasman points out that we find in Chazal a diametrically opposite view of Yehudah based on this same pasuk of "mah betza..." The gemara (Sanhedrin 6b) connects the pasuk in Tehillim (10:3 based on Radak) "...U'botze'a beireiach ni'etz Hashem", "One who blesses the thief has blasphemized G-d", which uses the same root "betza", to the pasuk of "mah betza" and writes that one who blesses Yehudah has insulted G-d. Rashi explains: had Yehudah insisted on returning Yosef home instead of selling him the brothers would have followed his lead. Since instead Yehudah suggested that Yosef be sold he is culpable for the events which followed.
So which is it? Is Yehudah to be praised for saying "mah betza" and saving Yosef from death, or is Yehudah to be criticized and condemned for not doing more to bring Yosef home?
R' Leib Chasam answers that we need not view these two opinions as contradictory. Given that Yosef faced the danger of being killed, Yehudah certainly deserves credit for coming to Yosef's defense. However, measured against the ideal of what Yehudah could have accomplished, he is found wanting.
Chazal (Chagiga 9) famously interpret the difference between "oveid Elokim" and "asher lo avado" as the difference between one who learns a topic 100 times and one who learns the same topic 101 times. One who reviews a topic 100 times is obviously worthy of tremendous praise. Nonetheless, relative to what the same person might have accomplished, there is something lacking.
I would like to suggest another possible way to reconcile these Midrashim. We each ultimately will be called to upon to provide an accounting, a din v'cheshbon, for our actions. The Brisker Rav (which we discussed here) explains that there is a difference between "din" and "cheshbon". Din is an accounting of whether our actions were appropriate to the situation; cheshbon is an accounting of our role in creating the situation itself. For example, a person who misses shacharis may be obligated to make up that tefilah through a tefilas tashlumin at mincha time. Given the situation, davening that teflias tashlumin is the halachically appropriate course of action -- it satisfies an accounting of din. What is cheshbon? Cheshbon asks the question of why the person missed shacharis in the first place -- Could he have set an alarm clock? Did he stay up to late? What created the situation that din must deal with?
Given the circumstance of the brothers plotting to kill Yosef, Yehudah's best option was the suggestion to spare his life and instead sell him and for that he deserves praise. But that is not a complete accounting, for it looks only at din and not at cheshbon. How is it possible that the situation of Yosef's life being judged came to be? What led to these circumstances arising? Had Yehudah intervened and taken a stronger hand in quelling the animosity toward Yosef would the deliberations of killing vs. selling have been needed? Perhaps it is this larger picture of cheshbon which Chazal wish to convey in their criticism of Yehudah.
On a deeper level, I think perhaps we can reconcile these two views in light of a torah of the Ishbitza (I can't do justice to this in a few sentences-- see it in P' vaYeishev in the Mei haShiloach, and see my article "What's Bred in the Bone" in the kallahmagazine archives). In a nutshell the Ishbitza tells us that there is a truth based on din, which is based on what we see before us, but there is also an "omek ha'emes", a truth which transcends the facts. We are all familiar with this -- we have all heard of cases where it is obvious to all that Ploni is guilty of some crime but then he hires a "dream team" of lawyers who know what to say in court and the person is out free the next day, and sometime someone who is innocent is caught is a Kafka-esque horror of unjust prosecution. The din may say one thing, but the "omek ha'emes" is otherwise. How do we reconcile these two forces? The answer is that we can't -- there is a constant tug of war inside each of us, and that tug of war is the root of the difference between the leadership of Yosef and Yehudah.
At the end of Parshas VaYigash when the cup is found in Binyamin's bag Yehudah seems to accept guilt and resign himself to the fate of slavery without excuses. "Mah nomar l'adoni, mah n'daber, mah nitztadak..." (44:16) -- there is nothing that can be said, no justification, no excuses -- "hi'nenu avadim l'adoni", we will become slaves. Yet, the very next parsha begins "VaYigash eilav Yehudah", Yehudah came to Yosef and pleaded his case to allow for the brothers release! What changed?
The Sefas Emes quotes a teaching of the AR"I that sheds light on Yehudah's change of heart. Yehudah begins his soliloquay, "Bi adoni..." The word adoni is the same spelling as G-d's name. The ARI taught that Yehudah remembered that "bi", within himself and within each Jew, is the spark of Hashem (see below).
In other words, Yehudah at the end of P' MiKeitz was speaking on the level of din and acknowledging guilt. However, looking at the "omek ha'emes", looking at the world through the perspective of "bi Adoni", the truth of the ratzon Hashem could not allow the seperation of Ya'akov from the brothers and their enslavement.
The Ishbitza on our parsha writes that Ya'akov criticized each of the first three sons he addressed, but when he got to Yehudah he was guided by Hashem to show mercy. Yehudah's name itself is the same as the letters of the Yud-Key-Vav-Key with the addition of the letter daled. Yehudah's was an instrument of Hashem's plan expressing itself in this world while he personally was not even a metziyus -- he was a daled, a dal, a poor nothing, subsumed in the larger picture of ratzon Hashem. In other words, Yehudah only deserves to be criticized if we look externally at "his" choices and actions. But if we look at the "omek ha'emes", if we midah k'neged midah follow the trait which Yehudah himself embodied, "his" choices are really nothing other than a means of Hashem carrying out his plan in this world and Yehudah deserves the hoda'ah which his name also expresses.
There is no real contradiction between Midrashim. If we judge Yehudah based on the actions which we might perceive as onlookers, Yehudah is wanting. But justice and truth are not synonomous. The "omek ha'emes" is that Yehudah deserves the praise of his brothers.
Thursday, January 08, 2009
bein hashemashos and chezkas yom (II)
Yesterday we raised the question of why there is no concept of chezkas yom, a status quo of it being day, which would resolve the safeik status of bein hashemashos. I think at least three answers are possible:
1) As discussed yesterday, there cannot be a chazakah of it being day and not night because by definition that situation will change, and a chazakah cannot be established based on an unstable situation (chazakah he'asuya l'hishtanos - see Tos Gittin 2b).
2) The Brisker answer which was very popular in the comments is that bein hashemashos is not a safeik in the same sense that a piece of meat which may be cheilev or may be shuman is a safeik. In the latter case, the meat is either cheilev or shuman, but we cannot determine which. In the case of bein hashemashos, the period of twilight is by definition a mixture of both day and night, an indeterminate combination of both.
3) One can also answer with a Rogatchover-ish sevara. Bein hashemashos is not a single block of time, but is really an infinite number of constantly divisible smaller units of time. Chazakah works when we speak of maintaining the status quo of an object, but the status quo on one object is not transferable to another. Since each moment of bein hashemashos is an independent unit / object, chazakah cannot resolve a safeik in units of time (compare with this post).
So much for R' Scheinberg's question -- now for my question (I think this one is a little more challenging). If someone mistakingly followes an errant ruling of Beis Din, he/she is not liable for his/her own korban. The gemara in Horiyos discusses a case where Beis Din made an incorrect ruling but then retracted. What if someone followed the original ruling in error -- is that person liable for his/her own korban or not? Was the person aware of the retraction and acting of his/her own volition, or can they pass of their mistake as stemming from Beis Din's error?
Sumchus opines that the person is exempt from korban and he offers an analogy (see Horiyos 4a; I am going to simplify the case a bit for clarity): someone offered a korban bein hashemashos creating a safeik whether the korban was brought during the day and is kosher or whether it was offered at night and is pasul -- we assume the korban was brought by day and is kosher. So too, had a person acted before Beis Din retracted he/she would be exempt from korban; therefore, we assume the person's error was caused by Beis Din's ruling and he/she remains exempt until proven otherwise.
The Tosfos Rosh on the page explains the analogy a little better -- just like in the bein hashemashos case where we are unsure if the korban was offered at day or night we assume the korban was offered by day because "mukminan hayom b'chezkaso", there is a chazakah / status-quo of day which exists until proven otherwise, so too in the case of the potential exemption based on the ruling of Beis Din we assume there is a chazakah status-quo of the person being exempt until proven otherwise.
Question: we gave three beautiful sevaros to explain why there is no such thing as a chazakas yom that can resolve the status of bein hashemashos. Yet, here the Tosfos Rosh tells us that "mukminan hayom b'chezkaso", there is a concept of chezkas yom which we can use to certify as valid a korban offered bein hashemashos. (And note that the Tos Rosh specifically writes "chezkas hayom" as opposed to the next sentence discussing the Horiyos case where he refers to the "chezkas hagavra".) How can that be??? What is the difference between our original qustion and this case of Sumchus?
Hint: the only answer I can think of so far involves using R' Shimon Shkop-ish reasoning. Waiting to see if someone has a nice Brisker answer for this one!
1) As discussed yesterday, there cannot be a chazakah of it being day and not night because by definition that situation will change, and a chazakah cannot be established based on an unstable situation (chazakah he'asuya l'hishtanos - see Tos Gittin 2b).
2) The Brisker answer which was very popular in the comments is that bein hashemashos is not a safeik in the same sense that a piece of meat which may be cheilev or may be shuman is a safeik. In the latter case, the meat is either cheilev or shuman, but we cannot determine which. In the case of bein hashemashos, the period of twilight is by definition a mixture of both day and night, an indeterminate combination of both.
3) One can also answer with a Rogatchover-ish sevara. Bein hashemashos is not a single block of time, but is really an infinite number of constantly divisible smaller units of time. Chazakah works when we speak of maintaining the status quo of an object, but the status quo on one object is not transferable to another. Since each moment of bein hashemashos is an independent unit / object, chazakah cannot resolve a safeik in units of time (compare with this post).
So much for R' Scheinberg's question -- now for my question (I think this one is a little more challenging). If someone mistakingly followes an errant ruling of Beis Din, he/she is not liable for his/her own korban. The gemara in Horiyos discusses a case where Beis Din made an incorrect ruling but then retracted. What if someone followed the original ruling in error -- is that person liable for his/her own korban or not? Was the person aware of the retraction and acting of his/her own volition, or can they pass of their mistake as stemming from Beis Din's error?
Sumchus opines that the person is exempt from korban and he offers an analogy (see Horiyos 4a; I am going to simplify the case a bit for clarity): someone offered a korban bein hashemashos creating a safeik whether the korban was brought during the day and is kosher or whether it was offered at night and is pasul -- we assume the korban was brought by day and is kosher. So too, had a person acted before Beis Din retracted he/she would be exempt from korban; therefore, we assume the person's error was caused by Beis Din's ruling and he/she remains exempt until proven otherwise.
The Tosfos Rosh on the page explains the analogy a little better -- just like in the bein hashemashos case where we are unsure if the korban was offered at day or night we assume the korban was offered by day because "mukminan hayom b'chezkaso", there is a chazakah / status-quo of day which exists until proven otherwise, so too in the case of the potential exemption based on the ruling of Beis Din we assume there is a chazakah status-quo of the person being exempt until proven otherwise.
Question: we gave three beautiful sevaros to explain why there is no such thing as a chazakas yom that can resolve the status of bein hashemashos. Yet, here the Tosfos Rosh tells us that "mukminan hayom b'chezkaso", there is a concept of chezkas yom which we can use to certify as valid a korban offered bein hashemashos. (And note that the Tos Rosh specifically writes "chezkas hayom" as opposed to the next sentence discussing the Horiyos case where he refers to the "chezkas hagavra".) How can that be??? What is the difference between our original qustion and this case of Sumchus?
Hint: the only answer I can think of so far involves using R' Shimon Shkop-ish reasoning. Waiting to see if someone has a nice Brisker answer for this one!
Wednesday, January 07, 2009
bein hashemashos - why not use chazakah to resolve the safeik?
I'm going to break this idea up into the easy part and the hard part. The easy part I call easy because I have answers; the hard part is where I'm stumped.
Last Shabbos I discussed with my son the following question quoted by R' Scheinberg in his Mishmeres Chaim (a sefer which, along with the Mefa'aneyach Tzefunos, is a staple of oneg Shabbos): A basic principle in halacha is the idea of chazakah -- the assumption that a status quo is maintained until proven otherwise. For example, a kohen who sees a nega on the walls of a house may close the door and declare the house tamei without having to worry that the size or shape of the nega changed between the time of his observation and the time of his declaration. If so, why do we treat bein hashemashos as a period of safeik yom safeik layla -- why not say that since it had been day until the moment of twilight, the chazakah of it being day continues until proven otherwise at which point it become definitely night? Why is there a twilight period of halachic doubt if it is day/night when we can resolve that doubt using the rule of chazakah?
I have at least three good answers to this question -- one suggested by my wife, one by my son, and one by myself, roughly corresponding to a sevara, to a Rogatchover-ish idea, and a Brisker-type solution. I don't want to make it too easy, so I'm going to give away the sevara solution and you can work on the others. Tosfos (Gitin 2b) writes that chazakah cannot be applied to a situation which by definition is subject to change, e.g. a nidah is not considered to have a chezkas issur because we know at some point that she will stop seeing blood. Here too, we know that it will not remain day forever and the sun will eventually set; therefore, the status of day cannot be defined as something which is called a chazakah.
Feel free to comment away if you can think of a Rogatchover-ish or Brisker answer or even better, a pilpul answer, and then fasten your seat belts for part II.
Last Shabbos I discussed with my son the following question quoted by R' Scheinberg in his Mishmeres Chaim (a sefer which, along with the Mefa'aneyach Tzefunos, is a staple of oneg Shabbos): A basic principle in halacha is the idea of chazakah -- the assumption that a status quo is maintained until proven otherwise. For example, a kohen who sees a nega on the walls of a house may close the door and declare the house tamei without having to worry that the size or shape of the nega changed between the time of his observation and the time of his declaration. If so, why do we treat bein hashemashos as a period of safeik yom safeik layla -- why not say that since it had been day until the moment of twilight, the chazakah of it being day continues until proven otherwise at which point it become definitely night? Why is there a twilight period of halachic doubt if it is day/night when we can resolve that doubt using the rule of chazakah?
I have at least three good answers to this question -- one suggested by my wife, one by my son, and one by myself, roughly corresponding to a sevara, to a Rogatchover-ish idea, and a Brisker-type solution. I don't want to make it too easy, so I'm going to give away the sevara solution and you can work on the others. Tosfos (Gitin 2b) writes that chazakah cannot be applied to a situation which by definition is subject to change, e.g. a nidah is not considered to have a chezkas issur because we know at some point that she will stop seeing blood. Here too, we know that it will not remain day forever and the sun will eventually set; therefore, the status of day cannot be defined as something which is called a chazakah.
Feel free to comment away if you can think of a Rogatchover-ish or Brisker answer or even better, a pilpul answer, and then fasten your seat belts for part II.
Monday, January 05, 2009
yosef yashis yado al einecha -- comprehending hashgacha
Undoubtedly, when Ya'akov faced the challenge of descending to Egypt knowing that this was the start of an exile that he and his children would not live to see the end of (in fact, the full oppression of slavery only began once the Shevatim died), he must have wondered how unfolding events fit into the Divine plan and for what reason his children must suffer the oppression of exile. The Meshech Chochma finds Hashem's answer in the pasuk "Anochi eired imcha Mitzrayma... v'Yosef yashis yado al einecha" (46:4). Who could have predicted that the pain of thinking Yosef lost would turn into joy as Ya'akov and his sons discovered that Yosef was a leader in Egypt providing moral backbone to a society that had been steeped in sin (recall Avraham's fear for Sarah when he had to descend to Egypt) and that he would happily reunite with them? Who could have anticipated that the dreams of Yosef were reality and the reality of Yosef's loss was just a dream? This is the answer to the human desire to set eyes on the workings of the Divine plan. "Yosef will cover your eyes" -- the lesson derived from Yosef's story is that the Divine plan exceeds the limits of human comprehension; this knowledge alone at times must be our comfort and "cover our eyes" longing for deeper insight than we can attain.
toch k'dei dibur: a din in the poel or the nifal?
Last week we learned the machlokes between Ran and Rabeinu Tam whether toch k'dei dibur is a din d'oraysa or a din derabannan to allow a buyer to say hello to his rebbe and resume negotiations in a business deal. The Rishonim and Achronim note that a number of gemaras do not seem to fit Rabeinu Tam's theory:
1. The gemara (Nazir 20) notes that if someone accepts a vow of nezirus and a friend declares tok"d the words "v'ani", "I too", even though these words alone would not consititute a valid kabbalas nezirus, in the context of tok"d their meaning is clear and the nezirus is binding. The Chasam Sofer (Shu"T E"Z #97) asks: if tok"d is just a takanah derabbanan, wouldn't the korbanos brought by this second nazir be chulin b'azarah on a d'oraysa level?
2. The gemara (Nedarim 87) implies that if a man does hafarah on his wife's neder but then discovers tok"d that it was really his daughter who took the neder, the hafarah is valid and does not need to be repeated. Ran (Nedarim 87) asks: if tok"d is a takanah, how on a d'oraysa level has the neder of the daughter been absolved?
3. The same sugya records that a person who tears kriya upon hearing of the death of a parent and then discovers tok"d that it was his child, and not his parent, who passed away, need not tear kriya again. How does a takanah derabbanan designed to protect a buyer/seller in business dealings relate to this scenario? Rabeinu Tam's position seems to relate only to verbal transactions, not to an activity like kriya.
4. Testimony requires two witnesses to appear together. The Mishna tells us that two individuals who testify within a span of tok"d of each other are considered one witness-group. If tok"d is only a takanah derabbanan, how m'doraysa can two individuals ever joined to form a witness pair?
The Divrei Yechezkel (#27) suggests that there are two seperate dinim which are derived from the principle of tok"d: 1) a delay of tok"d does not consititute a hefsek between two statements; 2) a statement may be retracted tok"d of being said. Rabeinu Tam agrees with the Ran that the principle of tok"d not constituting a hefsek is a din d'oraysa, which explains all the cases cited above. The diagreement between Rabeinu Tam and the Ran is with regards to the second aspect of tok"d. The Ran saw both of these rules as stemming from the same don d'oraysa, while Rabeinu Tam opined that the possibility of complete retraction tok"d was a takanah.
What the Divrei Yechezek does not explain (l'fi aniyus da'ati) very clearly is the basis for the Ran and R"T's disagreement over this point. The Rogatchover writes that dinim can be broken down into the poel, the peulah, and the nifal -- roughly meaning there is an actor, an event or occurance, and an effect that is produced. I believe the issue of tok"d can best be explained using this chakira. Does tok"d teach that a speaker is still engaged in talking until a break of greater than tok"d has occurred, or is the speaker considered done after a pause, but the effect of his words is delayed by the span of tok"d? If the speaker is still considered engaged in speaking so long as tok"d has not passed, then the Ran would seem to be correct in allowing for retraction. So long as a person has not finished a deal, then changes may be made. However, if the speaker is considered to have finished but the nifal effect is incomplete until tok"d passes, then Rabeinu Tam has a basis for his sevara. Considering whether events are simultaneous, e.g. was kriya simultaneous with news of death, was the father aware of his daughter's neder when his hafarah took place, etc. is a measure of the timing of the nifal effect (kriya, hafarah) relative to its cause. Rescinding an agreement involves more than that. Even if the nifal effect of an agreement is not considered set until three seconds after the speaker has concluded, what right does a speaker have (once his original activity of speech has ended) to rescind that agreement or block that effect from occurring? That necessitates a new takanah.
1. The gemara (Nazir 20) notes that if someone accepts a vow of nezirus and a friend declares tok"d the words "v'ani", "I too", even though these words alone would not consititute a valid kabbalas nezirus, in the context of tok"d their meaning is clear and the nezirus is binding. The Chasam Sofer (Shu"T E"Z #97) asks: if tok"d is just a takanah derabbanan, wouldn't the korbanos brought by this second nazir be chulin b'azarah on a d'oraysa level?
2. The gemara (Nedarim 87) implies that if a man does hafarah on his wife's neder but then discovers tok"d that it was really his daughter who took the neder, the hafarah is valid and does not need to be repeated. Ran (Nedarim 87) asks: if tok"d is a takanah, how on a d'oraysa level has the neder of the daughter been absolved?
3. The same sugya records that a person who tears kriya upon hearing of the death of a parent and then discovers tok"d that it was his child, and not his parent, who passed away, need not tear kriya again. How does a takanah derabbanan designed to protect a buyer/seller in business dealings relate to this scenario? Rabeinu Tam's position seems to relate only to verbal transactions, not to an activity like kriya.
4. Testimony requires two witnesses to appear together. The Mishna tells us that two individuals who testify within a span of tok"d of each other are considered one witness-group. If tok"d is only a takanah derabbanan, how m'doraysa can two individuals ever joined to form a witness pair?
The Divrei Yechezkel (#27) suggests that there are two seperate dinim which are derived from the principle of tok"d: 1) a delay of tok"d does not consititute a hefsek between two statements; 2) a statement may be retracted tok"d of being said. Rabeinu Tam agrees with the Ran that the principle of tok"d not constituting a hefsek is a din d'oraysa, which explains all the cases cited above. The diagreement between Rabeinu Tam and the Ran is with regards to the second aspect of tok"d. The Ran saw both of these rules as stemming from the same don d'oraysa, while Rabeinu Tam opined that the possibility of complete retraction tok"d was a takanah.
What the Divrei Yechezek does not explain (l'fi aniyus da'ati) very clearly is the basis for the Ran and R"T's disagreement over this point. The Rogatchover writes that dinim can be broken down into the poel, the peulah, and the nifal -- roughly meaning there is an actor, an event or occurance, and an effect that is produced. I believe the issue of tok"d can best be explained using this chakira. Does tok"d teach that a speaker is still engaged in talking until a break of greater than tok"d has occurred, or is the speaker considered done after a pause, but the effect of his words is delayed by the span of tok"d? If the speaker is still considered engaged in speaking so long as tok"d has not passed, then the Ran would seem to be correct in allowing for retraction. So long as a person has not finished a deal, then changes may be made. However, if the speaker is considered to have finished but the nifal effect is incomplete until tok"d passes, then Rabeinu Tam has a basis for his sevara. Considering whether events are simultaneous, e.g. was kriya simultaneous with news of death, was the father aware of his daughter's neder when his hafarah took place, etc. is a measure of the timing of the nifal effect (kriya, hafarah) relative to its cause. Rescinding an agreement involves more than that. Even if the nifal effect of an agreement is not considered set until three seconds after the speaker has concluded, what right does a speaker have (once his original activity of speech has ended) to rescind that agreement or block that effect from occurring? That necessitates a new takanah.
Thursday, January 01, 2009
Divrei Torah P' VaYigash: Yehudah's mission
I started working on something on the parsha but only got through a chatzi shiur. On the Midrash Tanchuma below there is a comment of the Ishbitza in Mei HaShiloach that I am trying to unravel and make intelligible, but so far no luck. See it inside and make of it what you will -- I need Shabbos to think about it.
The Midrash Tanchuma on the pasuk "V'es Yehudah shalacha lefanav l'horos lefanav Goshna" poses a halachic query as an introduction to the parsha: When is one permitted to say a bracha on the havdalah candle Motzei Shabbos? The Midrash answers that one can only say the bracha if one derives benefit from the flame, as we see from Hashem's example. We read in Parshas Braishis that Hashem first saw that light was good and afterwards, "VaYavdel...", Hashem made a seperation.
The Midrash begs for explanation. What does the halacha of reciting havdalah on a candle have to do with Yehudah’s mission?
The Imrei Emes explains that when Adam haRishon sinned just before the start of the first Shabbos of creation the world fell into a state of both spiritual and physical darkness. As a result of man’s sin. G-d’s presence, which had been felt during the process of creation, became obscured and hidden. Motzei Shabbos of creation was the first time that man had to face this darkness of existence alone outside the Garden of Eden. Rather than succumb to despair and fear, Chazal describe how Adam took two stones and rubbed them together to produce a spark. Explains the Imrei Emes: When G-d’s presence is hidden, when the world looks dark and desolate, we should not give up hope, but rather we need to exert ourselves and make an effort to recapture that light and produce a new spark.
Ya’akov needed to prepare his children for the darkness of exile that would befall the Jewish people in Egypt. By sending Yehudah ahead to establish a yeshiva he impressed upon that that although G-d’s presence may he hidden, through toil in Torah and their efforts the light of goodness can be recaptured and once again illuminate the world.
The Midrash Tanchuma on the pasuk "V'es Yehudah shalacha lefanav l'horos lefanav Goshna" poses a halachic query as an introduction to the parsha: When is one permitted to say a bracha on the havdalah candle Motzei Shabbos? The Midrash answers that one can only say the bracha if one derives benefit from the flame, as we see from Hashem's example. We read in Parshas Braishis that Hashem first saw that light was good and afterwards, "VaYavdel...", Hashem made a seperation.
The Midrash begs for explanation. What does the halacha of reciting havdalah on a candle have to do with Yehudah’s mission?
The Imrei Emes explains that when Adam haRishon sinned just before the start of the first Shabbos of creation the world fell into a state of both spiritual and physical darkness. As a result of man’s sin. G-d’s presence, which had been felt during the process of creation, became obscured and hidden. Motzei Shabbos of creation was the first time that man had to face this darkness of existence alone outside the Garden of Eden. Rather than succumb to despair and fear, Chazal describe how Adam took two stones and rubbed them together to produce a spark. Explains the Imrei Emes: When G-d’s presence is hidden, when the world looks dark and desolate, we should not give up hope, but rather we need to exert ourselves and make an effort to recapture that light and produce a new spark.
Ya’akov needed to prepare his children for the darkness of exile that would befall the Jewish people in Egypt. By sending Yehudah ahead to establish a yeshiva he impressed upon that that although G-d’s presence may he hidden, through toil in Torah and their efforts the light of goodness can be recaptured and once again illuminate the world.
Wednesday, December 31, 2008
toch k'dei dibur - d'oraysa or derabbanan
Before Chanukah I touched on the topic of toch k'dei dibur and want to get back to it because of a few good questions in the comments (thanks Micha). There is a basic dispute between Rabeinu Tam and the Ran as to the source of toch k'dei dibur. Ran (Nedarim 87) holds that tk"d is a din d'oraysa based on the all too common phenomenon of a person's brain taking a few seconds to catch up to his mouth. I person who screams "buy" to his broker may turn around a second later and scream "I meant sell!" Since it is mental agreement and coming to terms and not just speech alone which seals a transaction, the few seconds until a person's mind (and not just his mouth) is settled allow for retraction or clarification.
Rabeinu Tam disagrees and holds that tk"d is a takanah derabbanan. Really, we should all be bound by our words and have no opportunity to retract or clarify. However, Chazal recognized that in normal business transactions there are times when we deliberately pause mid-speech, e.g. a person sees his Rebbe and wants to say "Shalom Alecha Rebbe." Therefore, Chazal allowed the time it takes to say those few words as a natural break after which the person can resume his previous speech and retract or clarify as necessary.
The gemara notes that there are certain exceptions to the rule of tk"d, e.g. kidushin, gitin, avodah zarah, megadef. According to the Ran, the reason for these exceptions is simple. The rule of tk"d is based on the assumption that a person sometimes speaks before thinking. These exceptional cases have such serious consequences that a person undoubtedly is fully aware of what he is saying and doing while speaking. It is unimaginable, for example, that a person should utter "harei at mekudeshet li" to betroth a woman without fully being aware of the impact and consequences of those words.
According to Rabeinu Tam, there seems to be no clear reason why Chazal should have excluded any cases from the takanah of tk"d. The Rashbam (Baba Basra 130) writes that these exceptions are simply a "chumra derabbanan", i.e. because of the severity of the prohibitions involved and the issues at stake, Chazal decided to stick to the letter of the law and not make any allowances for tk"d retraction or clarification.
So much for the basics. The next step is to collect and review the cases of tk"d discussed in various sugyos and see which model -- the Ran's or R"T's -- fits better. More to come, bl"n.
Rabeinu Tam disagrees and holds that tk"d is a takanah derabbanan. Really, we should all be bound by our words and have no opportunity to retract or clarify. However, Chazal recognized that in normal business transactions there are times when we deliberately pause mid-speech, e.g. a person sees his Rebbe and wants to say "Shalom Alecha Rebbe." Therefore, Chazal allowed the time it takes to say those few words as a natural break after which the person can resume his previous speech and retract or clarify as necessary.
The gemara notes that there are certain exceptions to the rule of tk"d, e.g. kidushin, gitin, avodah zarah, megadef. According to the Ran, the reason for these exceptions is simple. The rule of tk"d is based on the assumption that a person sometimes speaks before thinking. These exceptional cases have such serious consequences that a person undoubtedly is fully aware of what he is saying and doing while speaking. It is unimaginable, for example, that a person should utter "harei at mekudeshet li" to betroth a woman without fully being aware of the impact and consequences of those words.
According to Rabeinu Tam, there seems to be no clear reason why Chazal should have excluded any cases from the takanah of tk"d. The Rashbam (Baba Basra 130) writes that these exceptions are simply a "chumra derabbanan", i.e. because of the severity of the prohibitions involved and the issues at stake, Chazal decided to stick to the letter of the law and not make any allowances for tk"d retraction or clarification.
So much for the basics. The next step is to collect and review the cases of tk"d discussed in various sugyos and see which model -- the Ran's or R"T's -- fits better. More to come, bl"n.
Tuesday, December 30, 2008
Chanukah retrospective: a few simple lessons of the chag
A few simple lessons from Chanukah that we should not lose sight of even after the chag:
1) Focus on one day at a time: the Chashmonaim had no way of knowing that the little oil they found would miraculously last for eight days. They could easily have looked at that one jug and been filled with disappointment -- what good is one day's worth of oil when more than a week's worth is needed? Instead, they rejoiced at finding that jug and in being able to at least light something. Don't let worry about the future blind you to happiness that can be found in small accomplishments and the success of the moment.
2) Hadlakah oseh mitzvah: Even though the highlight of the chag seems to be the supernatural burning of the oil for eight days, the halacha focusses on the human effort of lighting and not the Divine miracle that kept the candles burning. Don't expect G-d to do it all -- it takes human effort, even effort that we recognize as insufficient by itself, to bring about miracles.
3) Kavsa ain zakuk lah: Provided sufficient oil is used and the menorah is lit in a location that is not windy, one is not responsible if the menorah becomes extinguished. Projects fail; plans backfire. As long as you initially made the proper effort, don't take failure personally.
4) Ad she'tichleh haregel: The gemara writes that the candles must burn until there are no longer regel=feet of shoppers in the marketplace. Chassidic sources homiletically read this phrase as hergel=routine. If doing things the same old way is not accomplishing what it had in the past or not leaving you feeling fulfilled, maybe it's time for a change. Don't let routine and past patterns govern behavior forever.
1) Focus on one day at a time: the Chashmonaim had no way of knowing that the little oil they found would miraculously last for eight days. They could easily have looked at that one jug and been filled with disappointment -- what good is one day's worth of oil when more than a week's worth is needed? Instead, they rejoiced at finding that jug and in being able to at least light something. Don't let worry about the future blind you to happiness that can be found in small accomplishments and the success of the moment.
2) Hadlakah oseh mitzvah: Even though the highlight of the chag seems to be the supernatural burning of the oil for eight days, the halacha focusses on the human effort of lighting and not the Divine miracle that kept the candles burning. Don't expect G-d to do it all -- it takes human effort, even effort that we recognize as insufficient by itself, to bring about miracles.
3) Kavsa ain zakuk lah: Provided sufficient oil is used and the menorah is lit in a location that is not windy, one is not responsible if the menorah becomes extinguished. Projects fail; plans backfire. As long as you initially made the proper effort, don't take failure personally.
4) Ad she'tichleh haregel: The gemara writes that the candles must burn until there are no longer regel=feet of shoppers in the marketplace. Chassidic sources homiletically read this phrase as hergel=routine. If doing things the same old way is not accomplishing what it had in the past or not leaving you feeling fulfilled, maybe it's time for a change. Don't let routine and past patterns govern behavior forever.
Monday, December 29, 2008
a zar lighting menorah
The Minchas Chinuch (mitzvah 98) writes that for many years he was troubled by the Rambam's opinion (Hil Bi'as Mikdash ch 9) that a zar is permitted to light the menorah. The only way this would seem practically possible is if a kohen removed the menorah from the heichal (which a zar is not permitted to enter), a zar lit the menorah, and a kohein then returned the menorah to its proper place. However, this scenario cannot work. The gemara tells us with respect to lighting our Chanukah menorah that the hadlakah and not the hanacha, the lighting and not the placement of the menorah is the mitzvah, and therefore lighting must be done in a spot which is kosher for the mitzvah to be fulfilled. For example, assuming the menorah needs to be placed in public view by a doorway, one cannot fulfill the mitzvah by lighting in one's basement and then carrying the menorah and placing it in its proper location. If so, writes the Minchas Chinuch, the same should hold true with respect to the menorah of the mikdash --lighting done outside the heichal by a zar and then moving the menorah into the heichal should constitute an invalid act of lighting and not fulfill any mitzvah. How then can the Rambam declare that a zar is permitted to light?
One can perhaps answer this question of the Minchas Chinuch with R' Chaim Brisker's explanation of that same Rambam. R' Chaim suggests that the Rambam does not view the act of lighting the menorah in the mikdash as a mitzvah at all. There is a requirement for the menorah to be lit, a chiyuv in the cheftza of the menorah, but how that result is achieved, the process of lighting, is not in-and-of-itself a mitzvah act. It is for this reason that a zar can light.
The Minchas Chinuch's comparison between the halacha of lighting our Chanukah menorah and the mitzvah of lighting the menorah in the mikdash is a false analogy. With respect to the Chanukah menorah, the act of lighting is itself a mitzvah, and must therefore be done in a proper location. With respect to the menorah in the mikdash, the act of lighting is just a preparatory condition but is not itself a mitzvah.
Returning to the issue we raised in yesterday's post, we can now argue that the fact that according to the Beis Yosef the menorah oil was divided into eight equal parts of insufficient oil does not prove that one gets credit for performing a mitzvah with less than the proper shiur, e.g. eating less than a k'zayis of matzah. Lighting the menorah is not inherently a mitzvah act (compare with the Beis HaLevi mentioned yesterday) and hence a lack of shiur is not an impediment to lighting. The same cannot be said of eating matzah where the act itself is a mitzvah.
One can perhaps answer this question of the Minchas Chinuch with R' Chaim Brisker's explanation of that same Rambam. R' Chaim suggests that the Rambam does not view the act of lighting the menorah in the mikdash as a mitzvah at all. There is a requirement for the menorah to be lit, a chiyuv in the cheftza of the menorah, but how that result is achieved, the process of lighting, is not in-and-of-itself a mitzvah act. It is for this reason that a zar can light.
The Minchas Chinuch's comparison between the halacha of lighting our Chanukah menorah and the mitzvah of lighting the menorah in the mikdash is a false analogy. With respect to the Chanukah menorah, the act of lighting is itself a mitzvah, and must therefore be done in a proper location. With respect to the menorah in the mikdash, the act of lighting is just a preparatory condition but is not itself a mitzvah.
Returning to the issue we raised in yesterday's post, we can now argue that the fact that according to the Beis Yosef the menorah oil was divided into eight equal parts of insufficient oil does not prove that one gets credit for performing a mitzvah with less than the proper shiur, e.g. eating less than a k'zayis of matzah. Lighting the menorah is not inherently a mitzvah act (compare with the Beis HaLevi mentioned yesterday) and hence a lack of shiur is not an impediment to lighting. The same cannot be said of eating matzah where the act itself is a mitzvah.
Sunday, December 28, 2008
difference between chanukah and purim in al hanisim
There is an interesting discrepency between the way the miracle of Purim is described and the way the miracle of Chanukah is described in our tefilah of "Al haNisim" . The recounting of the story of Purim in "Al haNisim" ends with the Haman's hanging, ending the danger to the Jewish people. The recounting of the Chanukah story goes a step further. We not only relate the miracle of the victory over the Greeks and the end of our persecution, but we add, "V'kav'u shmonas y'mei Chanukah eilu l'hodos u'l'hallel" -- we describe the establishment of the holiday of Chanukah as a reaction to the miracle. Why is the establishment of the holiday incorporated into the text of Al haNisim which thanks Hashem for the miracle of our salvation?
The Kedushas Levi asks why the miracle of Chanukah was established as a holiday and so many other victories over our enemies were not. The answer perhaps lies in a careful reading of the description of the holiday given in the gemara (Shabbos 21b). The gemara writes that in the year following the miracle "kav'um v'asaum yamim tovim b'hallel v'hoda'ah". If we were writing the text we would have probably said that the Yom Tov was established "l'hallel v'hoda'ah", similar to the text of tefilah where we say "l'hodos ul'hallel". Why does the gemara use the strange phrase "b'hallel" instead of describing the praise sung to Hashem, "l'hallel..."? The Sefas Emes answers that the day of Yom Tov does not in fact obligate us to sing praises to Hashem. Quite the reverse. It is our praises to Hashem which the miracle of the day elicited which led to the establishment of the day as a Yom Tov. It was through our hallel, "b'hallel", that the day attained its character. It was not the miraclulous victory over the Greeks which created Chanukah, as many other victories have come and gone without a Yom Tov being established. The Yom Tov of Chanukah was given to us because our hearts opened in response to this victory unlike any other.
I think this explains the different in the Al haNisim text as well. The establishment of Chanukah as a Yom Tov is not just a coda to the events of Chanukah, but is an essential aspect of the miracle itself. Unlike other victories which came and went, Chanukah's song of hallel made an everlasting impression on the character of the Jewish people and has left us with a Yom Tov l'doros.
The Kedushas Levi asks why the miracle of Chanukah was established as a holiday and so many other victories over our enemies were not. The answer perhaps lies in a careful reading of the description of the holiday given in the gemara (Shabbos 21b). The gemara writes that in the year following the miracle "kav'um v'asaum yamim tovim b'hallel v'hoda'ah". If we were writing the text we would have probably said that the Yom Tov was established "l'hallel v'hoda'ah", similar to the text of tefilah where we say "l'hodos ul'hallel". Why does the gemara use the strange phrase "b'hallel" instead of describing the praise sung to Hashem, "l'hallel..."? The Sefas Emes answers that the day of Yom Tov does not in fact obligate us to sing praises to Hashem. Quite the reverse. It is our praises to Hashem which the miracle of the day elicited which led to the establishment of the day as a Yom Tov. It was through our hallel, "b'hallel", that the day attained its character. It was not the miraclulous victory over the Greeks which created Chanukah, as many other victories have come and gone without a Yom Tov being established. The Yom Tov of Chanukah was given to us because our hearts opened in response to this victory unlike any other.
I think this explains the different in the Al haNisim text as well. The establishment of Chanukah as a Yom Tov is not just a coda to the events of Chanukah, but is an essential aspect of the miracle itself. Unlike other victories which came and went, Chanukah's song of hallel made an everlasting impression on the character of the Jewish people and has left us with a Yom Tov l'doros.
hadlakas menorah and chatzi shiur
The Minchas Chinuch frequently raises the question of whether any credit is earned by performing a mitzvas aseh if one has less than the proper shiur. For example, would one get any credit for eating half a k'zayis of matzah, or is it not considered an act of eating unless a proper shiur is consumed? The basis for the safeik seems to be whether the concept of shiur is a quantitative measure (kamus), in which case less than the full amount might still count as some degree of kiyum, or whether shiur is a qualitative measure (eichus), in which case less than the full amount does not count as anything.
One proof cited by the Minchas Chinuch is the gemara (Yoma 39) which says that when times were bad each kohen would get only a small portion the size of a pol of the lechem hapanim or the shtei halechem. Apparently eating this small portion, albeit less than a k'zayis, is still considered a kiyum mitzvah of eating kodshim (see Tosfos Yeshanim).
One can argue on this proof. The Beis haLevi (I:2:7) writes that the mitzvah of eating kodshim is not a chovas hagavra incumbent on the individual to eat kodshim, but is rather a chovas hacheftza for kodshim to be consumed. It is the result, not the act or process, which is important. Therefore, since eating less than a k'zayis contibutes toward achieving the desired outcome, it is considered a mitzvah. The same might not be true of achilas matzah where the chiyuv rests on the individual to engage in an act of eating.
The Beis Yosef famously asks why the holiday of Chanukah is 8 days when there was sufficient oil for at least one day. His first answer is that the kohanim did not anticipate a miracle and divided the oil into 8 equal parts so that they could light something on each night. Even though only a small portion was lit on each night, that small portion miraculously burned the entire night on each of the eight nights.
Perhaps one can bring a proof from this Beis Yosef to resolve the Minchas Chinuch's question. Each lamp of the menorah was usually lit with a shiur of 1/2 a lug of oil. If performing a mitzvah with less than the proper shiur is meaningless, what were the kohanim hoping to accomplish by lighting a small insufficient shiur on each night? It must be that even though less than the shiur was utilized, there was still a kiyum mitzvah in lighting.
This proof is also debatable, but we will save that for another time bl"n.
One proof cited by the Minchas Chinuch is the gemara (Yoma 39) which says that when times were bad each kohen would get only a small portion the size of a pol of the lechem hapanim or the shtei halechem. Apparently eating this small portion, albeit less than a k'zayis, is still considered a kiyum mitzvah of eating kodshim (see Tosfos Yeshanim).
One can argue on this proof. The Beis haLevi (I:2:7) writes that the mitzvah of eating kodshim is not a chovas hagavra incumbent on the individual to eat kodshim, but is rather a chovas hacheftza for kodshim to be consumed. It is the result, not the act or process, which is important. Therefore, since eating less than a k'zayis contibutes toward achieving the desired outcome, it is considered a mitzvah. The same might not be true of achilas matzah where the chiyuv rests on the individual to engage in an act of eating.
The Beis Yosef famously asks why the holiday of Chanukah is 8 days when there was sufficient oil for at least one day. His first answer is that the kohanim did not anticipate a miracle and divided the oil into 8 equal parts so that they could light something on each night. Even though only a small portion was lit on each night, that small portion miraculously burned the entire night on each of the eight nights.
Perhaps one can bring a proof from this Beis Yosef to resolve the Minchas Chinuch's question. Each lamp of the menorah was usually lit with a shiur of 1/2 a lug of oil. If performing a mitzvah with less than the proper shiur is meaningless, what were the kohanim hoping to accomplish by lighting a small insufficient shiur on each night? It must be that even though less than the shiur was utilized, there was still a kiyum mitzvah in lighting.
This proof is also debatable, but we will save that for another time bl"n.
Friday, December 26, 2008
Divrei Torah: Chanukah, Mikeitz
The Midrash offers two strikingly different interpretations of pasuk “VaYivaser Ya’akov levado” (32:25), Ya’akov was alone in the camp awaiting his encounter with Eisav. According to one interpretation Ya’akov was alone because he returned for little jugs that had been left behind, small baggage that had been forgotten; according to another interpretation Ya’akov stood alone in symbolic anticipation of the day when G-d’s presence alone will be felt in the world, the day of Redemption. Two opposite extremes of isolation: the idea of being alone in caring for trivial detail and minutia when others have moved on vs. the idea of being alone in seeing the ultimate “big picture” that all else leads to – which one is the truer reflection of Ya’akov’s personality? Rav Kook (Shmu’os haRa’aya) explained that these are not two contradictory images, but are two sides of the same coin. The idea of Redemption is not one of escape from this world into a nirvana of supernatural experience, but rather it is the revelation of G-dliness as present with us in even the smallest and most trivial mundane details of life. It is the same Ya’akov who saw even the smallest jugs left behind as containers of potential spiritual value who stands alone in anticipation and readiness for the ultimate day of Redemption.
The highlight of Chanukah is the final day known as “Zos Chanukah” when we read the parsha of “Zos Chanukas hamizbeiach” (BaMidbar 7:84), “This is the dedication of the altar…” The Midrash (VaYikra Rabbah 21:1) elsewhere draws a connection between the word “zos” and the pasuk “b’zos ani boteiach”, “In this I will place my trust…” Why is trust in G-d highlighted through the word “zos”? The Ba’al Shem Tov explained that almost anything in the world can be referred to as “this.” I can refer to the chair I am sitting on and say I am sitting on “this”, I can refer to my computer and say I am writing on “this”, I can refer to the idea of this vort and say I am thinking about “this.” All these things can be referred to by the same magic word “zos” or “this” because though they may all superficially appear to be very different, they share a common denominator – they all manifest G-d’s presence in the world. Trust in G-d, “B’zos ani boteiach,” is rooted in the fact that there is nothing in the world, whether it is a chair, a computer, or even a little jug, that escapes G-d’s dominion. This G-dly spark found in everything is the little jug of oil, that potential to bring light and good and good into the world, which was found by the Chashmonaim, which was earlier looked for by Ya’akov, and which is the “zos” of “Zos Chanukah” (Sefas Emes Chanukah 5641) which brought redemption in the past and heralds future Redemption.
The Sefas Emes continues that equal to the word “zos” in its potential to refer to everything is the word “kein”. After lighting the menorah the Torah tells us “Va’Ya’as kein Aharon”, “Aharon did it.” No matter what was done, one can say that “it” was done! The reason why is because no matter what was done, every action potentially has some connection to fulfilling Hashem’s plan in this world. The opposite of “kein” is the idea that the world runs mechanistically with no plan and no oversight – “hergel”. The idea of lighting the menorah “ad shetichleh regel min hashuk” is homiletically interpreted to mean that on Chanukah we strengthen our belief in Divine oversight and banish this notion of “hergel” from our philosophical vocabulary.
When the brothers appear before Yosef, as described in Parshas Mikeitz, they protest that they are not spies, “Keinim anachnu lo hayu avadecha meraglim (42:11).” The Sefas Emes explains that we are indeed, "keinim”, we espouse the philosophy of “kein” and “zos”, and reject a world that sees everything as hergel, a world of “meraglim”.
The highlight of Chanukah is the final day known as “Zos Chanukah” when we read the parsha of “Zos Chanukas hamizbeiach” (BaMidbar 7:84), “This is the dedication of the altar…” The Midrash (VaYikra Rabbah 21:1) elsewhere draws a connection between the word “zos” and the pasuk “b’zos ani boteiach”, “In this I will place my trust…” Why is trust in G-d highlighted through the word “zos”? The Ba’al Shem Tov explained that almost anything in the world can be referred to as “this.” I can refer to the chair I am sitting on and say I am sitting on “this”, I can refer to my computer and say I am writing on “this”, I can refer to the idea of this vort and say I am thinking about “this.” All these things can be referred to by the same magic word “zos” or “this” because though they may all superficially appear to be very different, they share a common denominator – they all manifest G-d’s presence in the world. Trust in G-d, “B’zos ani boteiach,” is rooted in the fact that there is nothing in the world, whether it is a chair, a computer, or even a little jug, that escapes G-d’s dominion. This G-dly spark found in everything is the little jug of oil, that potential to bring light and good and good into the world, which was found by the Chashmonaim, which was earlier looked for by Ya’akov, and which is the “zos” of “Zos Chanukah” (Sefas Emes Chanukah 5641) which brought redemption in the past and heralds future Redemption.
The Sefas Emes continues that equal to the word “zos” in its potential to refer to everything is the word “kein”. After lighting the menorah the Torah tells us “Va’Ya’as kein Aharon”, “Aharon did it.” No matter what was done, one can say that “it” was done! The reason why is because no matter what was done, every action potentially has some connection to fulfilling Hashem’s plan in this world. The opposite of “kein” is the idea that the world runs mechanistically with no plan and no oversight – “hergel”. The idea of lighting the menorah “ad shetichleh regel min hashuk” is homiletically interpreted to mean that on Chanukah we strengthen our belief in Divine oversight and banish this notion of “hergel” from our philosophical vocabulary.
When the brothers appear before Yosef, as described in Parshas Mikeitz, they protest that they are not spies, “Keinim anachnu lo hayu avadecha meraglim (42:11).” The Sefas Emes explains that we are indeed, "keinim”, we espouse the philosophy of “kein” and “zos”, and reject a world that sees everything as hergel, a world of “meraglim”.
Tuesday, December 23, 2008
zerizus vs. hidur in lighting chanukah candles
A few months ago we discussed the proof of the Shvus Ya'akov as to how to resolve a conflict between zerizus and hidur in a case where you can either do netilas lulav with a kosher esrog immediatly or wait until later and do netilah with a m'hudar esrog. A similar question can be raised with regards to hadlakas neiros Chanukah. If at the zman of hadlakah one has only enough oil to fulfill the basic mitzvah of lighting one candle, but later that same night one can obtain more oil and perform the hadlakah in a way that is min hamehadrin, is it preferable to light b'zman, or preferable to forgo lighting b'zman and light later to fulfill being min hamehadrin?
Something to think about while watching your candles burn.
Something to think about while watching your candles burn.
Monday, December 22, 2008
Waiter, there's a fly in my soup! -- hilchos borer (2)
I do want to get to more Chanukah stuff, but we were in the middle of borer and I want to finish that topic. Lots of interesting comments to the last post, but I want to do this slowly before jumping to the answer. The Aruch haShulchan (319:9) asks a fundamental question. If borer involves any sort of selecting, then it seems we run into trouble at every turn on Shabbos. For example, you have three suits in the closet and want to take out one to wear; you have three spoons in front of you at your place setting and want to use one of them -- why in each of these cases is taking the desired item not a violation of borer?
The Aruch haShulchan gives two answers. The first answer hinges on the rules we learned last time. Quick review: Borer means selecting between items and is permitted if three conditions are met:
1) ochel is being removed from psoles
2) it is for immediate need/consumption
3) a special utensil (e.g. a strainer) is not being used
As we learned, ochel does not mean exclusively food, nor does psoles mean bad stuff. Ochel simply means the item you want; psoles is the item being discarded. If you take the spoon that you want or the suit that you want, that is ochel m'toch psoles for immediate use and is therefore permissible.
The second answer of the Aruch haShulchan (actually, it's the first one he suggests) is that we don't even need to refer to the three criteria here because, as I mentioned, there is another condition that needs to be met before we even begin speaking about borer and it almost goes without saying: we need a mixture. Where each individual item is clearly recognizable, e.g. I can clearly tell one suit from another; I can clearly tell the difference between each spoon at the place setting in front of me, taking one item is not called borer. The Aruch haShulchan writes that this is called netilah, taking a desired item, and it has nothing to do with the melacha of borer which entails sorting between different items, .
So now for a little test with a case that appears in many handbooks and which was given by my daughter's teacher. You sit down to your Shabbos chicken soup and suddenly notice something is wrong. "Waiter, there's a fly in my soup!" Can you remove that fly on Shabbos?
Most handbooks will tell you (based on a Ta"z) that that the correct procedure in this case is to take a little soup out along with the fly. Removing the fly alone would be taking psoles from ochel, which violates rule #2 in our list of three criteria. However, shlepping the fly along with a little soup, which is ochel, avoids separating between fly and soup and is therefore OK.
If this was your answer, I'm afraid you failed the test. Based on the basic rules of borer this approach makes no sense. First of all, as we learned, ochel does not mean food; ochel means the item that you want, as opposed to psoles, which you are just taking to discard. If the whole purpose of taking some soup with the fly is to discard that soup in the trash with the fly rather than eat it, that spoon of soup itself becomes psoles! Instead of violating borer by separating a fly from soup, you now have violated borer by separating a fly+soup that you don't want to eat from the soup you do want to eat. That does not seem to accomplish anything.
The second point I guess depends on your soup. I like my chicken soup pretty clear, with maybe some noodles or a matzah ball floating along in it. I am pretty confident that I can tell the difference between clear chicken soup and a fly even if I took off my glasses. Why should removing the fly not be considered what the Aruch haShulchan calls netilah? We shouldn't even need to speak about borer in this case because we haven't met the most basic criteria required to talk about it: we don't have a mixture. We have two distinct items and are just removing one from being nearby the other.
(Just for the record, one can defend the Taz, but doing so involves some elaboration. My point for now is that taking the Taz at face value [as many people do] 'flies' in the face of the basic rules of borer and is therefore not a good illustration if you want to understand or teach principles.)
The Aruch haShulchan gives two answers. The first answer hinges on the rules we learned last time. Quick review: Borer means selecting between items and is permitted if three conditions are met:
1) ochel is being removed from psoles
2) it is for immediate need/consumption
3) a special utensil (e.g. a strainer) is not being used
As we learned, ochel does not mean exclusively food, nor does psoles mean bad stuff. Ochel simply means the item you want; psoles is the item being discarded. If you take the spoon that you want or the suit that you want, that is ochel m'toch psoles for immediate use and is therefore permissible.
The second answer of the Aruch haShulchan (actually, it's the first one he suggests) is that we don't even need to refer to the three criteria here because, as I mentioned, there is another condition that needs to be met before we even begin speaking about borer and it almost goes without saying: we need a mixture. Where each individual item is clearly recognizable, e.g. I can clearly tell one suit from another; I can clearly tell the difference between each spoon at the place setting in front of me, taking one item is not called borer. The Aruch haShulchan writes that this is called netilah, taking a desired item, and it has nothing to do with the melacha of borer which entails sorting between different items, .
So now for a little test with a case that appears in many handbooks and which was given by my daughter's teacher. You sit down to your Shabbos chicken soup and suddenly notice something is wrong. "Waiter, there's a fly in my soup!" Can you remove that fly on Shabbos?
Most handbooks will tell you (based on a Ta"z) that that the correct procedure in this case is to take a little soup out along with the fly. Removing the fly alone would be taking psoles from ochel, which violates rule #2 in our list of three criteria. However, shlepping the fly along with a little soup, which is ochel, avoids separating between fly and soup and is therefore OK.
If this was your answer, I'm afraid you failed the test. Based on the basic rules of borer this approach makes no sense. First of all, as we learned, ochel does not mean food; ochel means the item that you want, as opposed to psoles, which you are just taking to discard. If the whole purpose of taking some soup with the fly is to discard that soup in the trash with the fly rather than eat it, that spoon of soup itself becomes psoles! Instead of violating borer by separating a fly from soup, you now have violated borer by separating a fly+soup that you don't want to eat from the soup you do want to eat. That does not seem to accomplish anything.
The second point I guess depends on your soup. I like my chicken soup pretty clear, with maybe some noodles or a matzah ball floating along in it. I am pretty confident that I can tell the difference between clear chicken soup and a fly even if I took off my glasses. Why should removing the fly not be considered what the Aruch haShulchan calls netilah? We shouldn't even need to speak about borer in this case because we haven't met the most basic criteria required to talk about it: we don't have a mixture. We have two distinct items and are just removing one from being nearby the other.
(Just for the record, one can defend the Taz, but doing so involves some elaboration. My point for now is that taking the Taz at face value [as many people do] 'flies' in the face of the basic rules of borer and is therefore not a good illustration if you want to understand or teach principles.)
lighting menorah through a gerama
A few weeks ago when we went to the NY Hall of Science in Queens, NY we saw a video playing near one of the exhibits that showed one of these machines where each thing that occurs or moves triggers a reaction that causes the next movement, and so on (there is a name for these things, but I can't remember it -- someone please remind me. [Update: Thank you Wolf! It is called a Rube Goldberg machine, and some examples can be seen here]). The setup shown on the video has a lot of fuses and things that catch fire, which reminded my wife of Chanukah. This prompted the question of whether one would be yotzei hadlakas ner Chanukah if one constructed an elaborate device like this. In other words, would you be yotzei hadlakah through a gerama, or do you need an actual ma'aseh hadlakah?
I didn't have a good answer at the time (and still don't), but at least I now have a mareh makom: the question is raised in the Halichos Shlomo (which collects R' Shlomo Zalman Auerbach's piskei halacha) and footnotes a discussion by R' Tzvi Pesach Frank in a journal. Something to think about while watching the candles.
I didn't have a good answer at the time (and still don't), but at least I now have a mareh makom: the question is raised in the Halichos Shlomo (which collects R' Shlomo Zalman Auerbach's piskei halacha) and footnotes a discussion by R' Tzvi Pesach Frank in a journal. Something to think about while watching the candles.
Sunday, December 21, 2008
bitachon - chanukah
Thinking about bitachon in the face of adversity should remind us of giborim b'yad chalashim, resha'im b'yad tzadikim -- it's part of the holiday spirit. Tehilim 112 speaks about the trait of bitachon, but look at the last letters of the words below:
משועה רעה לא יירא
נכון לבו בטוח בה׳
סמוך לבו לא יירא
עד אשר יראה בצריו
משועה רעה לא יירא
נכון לבו בטוח בה׳
סמוך לבו לא יירא
עד אשר יראה בצריו
Friday, December 19, 2008
Divrei Torah: Parshas vaYeishev
Available as .pdf for download here. I am still not sure how convenient it is to list a .pdf as a seperate link, but a 2 page doc makes for a long post and does not print out as well. I reduced the font and pasted it below for those who do not want the .pdf.
Ya’akov dwelled in the land of his forefathers…. (37:1) Rashi cites the Midrash’s comment on the use of the verb y-sh-v here, “vayeishev Ya’akov” (compare with 47:28, “vayechi Ya’akov”) as indicating that Ya’akov sought to dwell in peace and tranquility having overcome the challenges of Lavan’s house and his re-encounter with Eisav. Yet, Hashem denied him this request: “Is it not enough for the righteous to have tranquility in the world to come – must they also demand it in this world as well?” This seems like a harsh response, but by coincidence just this morning I read a story told in the name of R’ Gedalya Schorr which I think sheds light on the Midrash.
The story is told of the Rizhiner who one year after Yom Kippur revealed that he could tell what anyone davened for on Yom Kippur and exactly how the beis din shel ma’alah received those prayers. No one dared test the Rizhiner, but finally one person who was not chassid came forward and asked. The Rizhiner looked at the person and told him, “You used to be a great masmid in yeshiva and aspired to become a great talmid chacham, but financial constraints forced you into business where you have had a degree of success, yet you still long for the beis medrash. Your davened with great sincerity that Hashem should take care of your parnasa so that you should have the opportunity once again to immerse fully in learning.”
The man was amazed – that was his exact tefilah. “And what was the response on shamayim?” he asked.
The Rizhiner answered that the man’s request had been rejected. “The beis din shel ma’aleh decided”, explained the Rizhiner, “that although there is great nachas in shamayim from your learning, there is even greater nachas from your striving to learn despite the challenges of time and other concerns that stand in your way.”
We request that Hashem remove from us many obstacles and challenges that make our life difficult, but perhaps Hashem himself sends us those challenges so that in struggling to overcome them we grow and create even greater nachas ruach in shamayim than we could otherwise.
Despite the story of the Rizhiner, one cannot but help feel that if things were smoother one could accomplish so much more. “If only… I could do more.” There is no denying the truth to this assertion, but it misses the whole picture. The seemingly small efforts we might be able to make in any area given the constraints of life’s challenges, if done with sincerity and dedication, can produce tremendous results that we may not even be aware of. The Sefas Emes explains that we see this from our parsha. “Reuvain heard and saved him [Yosef] from their hands” (37:21). Reuvain had the most noble intentions when he suggested that Yosef be lowered into a pit. Imagine his shock and surprise when he returned later (37:29) only to find Yosef missing and discover that he had been sold into slavery by the other brothers -- all those plans and great intentions for naught! Yet, that is not how the Torah looks at things. “Vayatzileihu” – Reuvain did save his brother. Had it not been for Reuvain, Yosef might have been killed immediately. Reuvain may not have brought Yosef home as he had planned, but it was because of his intercession that Yosef lived and would rise to become Yosef the great ruler of Egypt and Yosef the tzadik. The Sefas Emes writes that when a person is motivated by sincere intention to do a good deed, even though it may appear that his efforts prove unsuccessful, he should rest assured that something is indeed accomplished, even if that something is not always apparent.
The challenges and burdens which we must overcome not only may seem to make life more difficult, but may seem unfair and unjust. The Sefas Emes writes that the stories of these parshiyos teach us how to accept Hashem’s actions in this world with happiness and love even through suffering and confusion. Yosef felt that he was destined for greatness. Can we imagine what he must have felt as the brothers stripped him of his ksones and tossed him into a pit and later sold him? Can we imagine the sense of embarrassment that Yosef would have been reduced to left without even the shirt on his back? Yet, Yosef accepts this as part of Hashem’s plan – Yosef trusts that this method of bringing about the fulfillment of his dreams will bring greater nachas ruach in shamayim even if in his mind it would be easier and better if things had gone differently. It is precisely this immunity to embarrassment and sense of bitachon that later gave Yosef the strength flee from the wife of Potifar leaving his shirt in her grasp, no matter how embarrassing that situation might have been. Without the former challenge, the latter spiritual success could not have been achieved. The strength of character built from his dealings with his brothers that gave Yosef the strength to survive in Egypt. And if we look at the story as a whole, it is this long circuitous path of the dreams coming to fulfillment that give us the tribes of Menashe and Ephraim and lead Yehudah to his own story that gives rise to the lineage of Moshiach. Had things gone “smoothly”, none of that could have been accomplished.
The first step in dealing with any difficulty is accepting it as Hashem’s will. Yosef is cast into prison, “vaYitneyhu el beis hasohar”, but the pasuk continues and ends, “vaYehi sham b’beis hasohar,” Yosef was there in the prison (39:20). If he was thrown into prison, obviously he was in prison – why the seeming redundancy? If we reflect on our own lives and circumstances the answer becomes clear. A person may at times feel that his job is like a “prison” that he cannot escape from because he needs to support his family and cannot risk leaving. A person can G-d forbid suffer an illness that leaves him/her confined to a bed, a “prison” that prevents escape to carry on a normal life. What child does not at times feel that school is a “prison” that must be suffered through (and what teacher does not at times feel the same way?) And so we sit day-in and day-out and dream of our escape, or engage in all sorts of empty activities designed with the goal of escapism in mind. The Kedushas Levi explains that this is why the pasuk ends “Yosef was in the prison” -- Yosef was not engaged in regret, Yosef did not engage in a repetitious cycle of reconsidering whether he had played his cards right and whether he was to blame for his fate, Yosef was not fantasizing about could-be’s or escapist dreaming. Yosef understood that at this point in life, for whatever reason, it was his fate as decreed by Hashem to be in prison and he must accept it, deal with its challenges, and trust that Hashem will guide him for the future.
Ya’akov dwelled in the land of his forefathers…. (37:1) Rashi cites the Midrash’s comment on the use of the verb y-sh-v here, “vayeishev Ya’akov” (compare with 47:28, “vayechi Ya’akov”) as indicating that Ya’akov sought to dwell in peace and tranquility having overcome the challenges of Lavan’s house and his re-encounter with Eisav. Yet, Hashem denied him this request: “Is it not enough for the righteous to have tranquility in the world to come – must they also demand it in this world as well?” This seems like a harsh response, but by coincidence just this morning I read a story told in the name of R’ Gedalya Schorr which I think sheds light on the Midrash.
The story is told of the Rizhiner who one year after Yom Kippur revealed that he could tell what anyone davened for on Yom Kippur and exactly how the beis din shel ma’alah received those prayers. No one dared test the Rizhiner, but finally one person who was not chassid came forward and asked. The Rizhiner looked at the person and told him, “You used to be a great masmid in yeshiva and aspired to become a great talmid chacham, but financial constraints forced you into business where you have had a degree of success, yet you still long for the beis medrash. Your davened with great sincerity that Hashem should take care of your parnasa so that you should have the opportunity once again to immerse fully in learning.”
The man was amazed – that was his exact tefilah. “And what was the response on shamayim?” he asked.
The Rizhiner answered that the man’s request had been rejected. “The beis din shel ma’aleh decided”, explained the Rizhiner, “that although there is great nachas in shamayim from your learning, there is even greater nachas from your striving to learn despite the challenges of time and other concerns that stand in your way.”
We request that Hashem remove from us many obstacles and challenges that make our life difficult, but perhaps Hashem himself sends us those challenges so that in struggling to overcome them we grow and create even greater nachas ruach in shamayim than we could otherwise.
Despite the story of the Rizhiner, one cannot but help feel that if things were smoother one could accomplish so much more. “If only… I could do more.” There is no denying the truth to this assertion, but it misses the whole picture. The seemingly small efforts we might be able to make in any area given the constraints of life’s challenges, if done with sincerity and dedication, can produce tremendous results that we may not even be aware of. The Sefas Emes explains that we see this from our parsha. “Reuvain heard and saved him [Yosef] from their hands” (37:21). Reuvain had the most noble intentions when he suggested that Yosef be lowered into a pit. Imagine his shock and surprise when he returned later (37:29) only to find Yosef missing and discover that he had been sold into slavery by the other brothers -- all those plans and great intentions for naught! Yet, that is not how the Torah looks at things. “Vayatzileihu” – Reuvain did save his brother. Had it not been for Reuvain, Yosef might have been killed immediately. Reuvain may not have brought Yosef home as he had planned, but it was because of his intercession that Yosef lived and would rise to become Yosef the great ruler of Egypt and Yosef the tzadik. The Sefas Emes writes that when a person is motivated by sincere intention to do a good deed, even though it may appear that his efforts prove unsuccessful, he should rest assured that something is indeed accomplished, even if that something is not always apparent.
The challenges and burdens which we must overcome not only may seem to make life more difficult, but may seem unfair and unjust. The Sefas Emes writes that the stories of these parshiyos teach us how to accept Hashem’s actions in this world with happiness and love even through suffering and confusion. Yosef felt that he was destined for greatness. Can we imagine what he must have felt as the brothers stripped him of his ksones and tossed him into a pit and later sold him? Can we imagine the sense of embarrassment that Yosef would have been reduced to left without even the shirt on his back? Yet, Yosef accepts this as part of Hashem’s plan – Yosef trusts that this method of bringing about the fulfillment of his dreams will bring greater nachas ruach in shamayim even if in his mind it would be easier and better if things had gone differently. It is precisely this immunity to embarrassment and sense of bitachon that later gave Yosef the strength flee from the wife of Potifar leaving his shirt in her grasp, no matter how embarrassing that situation might have been. Without the former challenge, the latter spiritual success could not have been achieved. The strength of character built from his dealings with his brothers that gave Yosef the strength to survive in Egypt. And if we look at the story as a whole, it is this long circuitous path of the dreams coming to fulfillment that give us the tribes of Menashe and Ephraim and lead Yehudah to his own story that gives rise to the lineage of Moshiach. Had things gone “smoothly”, none of that could have been accomplished.
The first step in dealing with any difficulty is accepting it as Hashem’s will. Yosef is cast into prison, “vaYitneyhu el beis hasohar”, but the pasuk continues and ends, “vaYehi sham b’beis hasohar,” Yosef was there in the prison (39:20). If he was thrown into prison, obviously he was in prison – why the seeming redundancy? If we reflect on our own lives and circumstances the answer becomes clear. A person may at times feel that his job is like a “prison” that he cannot escape from because he needs to support his family and cannot risk leaving. A person can G-d forbid suffer an illness that leaves him/her confined to a bed, a “prison” that prevents escape to carry on a normal life. What child does not at times feel that school is a “prison” that must be suffered through (and what teacher does not at times feel the same way?) And so we sit day-in and day-out and dream of our escape, or engage in all sorts of empty activities designed with the goal of escapism in mind. The Kedushas Levi explains that this is why the pasuk ends “Yosef was in the prison” -- Yosef was not engaged in regret, Yosef did not engage in a repetitious cycle of reconsidering whether he had played his cards right and whether he was to blame for his fate, Yosef was not fantasizing about could-be’s or escapist dreaming. Yosef understood that at this point in life, for whatever reason, it was his fate as decreed by Hashem to be in prison and he must accept it, deal with its challenges, and trust that Hashem will guide him for the future.
Thursday, December 18, 2008
hilchos borer
My eldest daughter is learning hilchos shabbos in school and this always seems to lead to amusing discussions as we attempt to try to figure out the logic behind various chumros taught as "THE" halacha. The way girls learn halacha (and it's not much better for boys, but since boys have a gemara background they have the tools to discover more on their own) is by memorizing a list of do's and dont's with scant attention to distinctions between a d'oraysa or a chumra of an acharon and with little more than a smattering of understanding of the principles behind halacha (after all, to derive principles you need to go back to the source and open a gemara, and we would not want to encourage that even in areas where they must know and understand the law.) The do's and don'ts are "THE" halacha -- seldom is there a mention of multiple views or an attempt to understand them. In general, this is what many parents expect -- schools are there to teach dogma, not to teach people to think (but that's another discussion).
So we come to a psak on borer that my daugter came home with that got us involved in a nice review of these halachos, which is what I wanted to write about before starting my rant. My daughter's teacher declared that it is prohibited to remove a sticker from an apple on Shabbos in order to eat the apple.
To begin to understand this we need a quck review of borer. Borer means selecting between items and is permitted if three conditions are met:
1) ochel is being removed from psoles
2) it is for immediate need/consumption
3) a special utensil (e.g. a strainer) is not being used
Rule #1 needs special clarification. Ochel here does not mean exclusively food, nor does psoles mean bad stuff. Ochel in this context means the item you want; psoles is the item being discarded.
The reason why these rules apply (note: this was not explained to my daughter) is because the melacha of borer involved sifting the harvest for storage. The conditions above distinguish the act of simply eating from the prohibited act of sorting the harvest.
So the sticker on the apple is being removed by hand, meeting criteria #3, the apple will be eaten immediatly, meeting criteria #2, but the sticker being removed is psoles because it will be discarded in the trash. We fail on condition #1. QED removing the sticker is prohibited.
Sounds simple, but I think it is totally wrong. I'll save the details for the next post, but let me throw out a hint as to where we are headed: although the three conditions I listed can be found in any hilchos shabbos handbook, there is another condition that is seldomly listed. This condition is not obscure or unknown, but is so basic that it escapes notice, even though without understanding it nothing in borer makes sense. But that's the story for the next post...
So we come to a psak on borer that my daugter came home with that got us involved in a nice review of these halachos, which is what I wanted to write about before starting my rant. My daughter's teacher declared that it is prohibited to remove a sticker from an apple on Shabbos in order to eat the apple.
To begin to understand this we need a quck review of borer. Borer means selecting between items and is permitted if three conditions are met:
1) ochel is being removed from psoles
2) it is for immediate need/consumption
3) a special utensil (e.g. a strainer) is not being used
Rule #1 needs special clarification. Ochel here does not mean exclusively food, nor does psoles mean bad stuff. Ochel in this context means the item you want; psoles is the item being discarded.
The reason why these rules apply (note: this was not explained to my daughter) is because the melacha of borer involved sifting the harvest for storage. The conditions above distinguish the act of simply eating from the prohibited act of sorting the harvest.
So the sticker on the apple is being removed by hand, meeting criteria #3, the apple will be eaten immediatly, meeting criteria #2, but the sticker being removed is psoles because it will be discarded in the trash. We fail on condition #1. QED removing the sticker is prohibited.
Sounds simple, but I think it is totally wrong. I'll save the details for the next post, but let me throw out a hint as to where we are headed: although the three conditions I listed can be found in any hilchos shabbos handbook, there is another condition that is seldomly listed. This condition is not obscure or unknown, but is so basic that it escapes notice, even though without understanding it nothing in borer makes sense. But that's the story for the next post...
Tuesday, December 16, 2008
from what age is kol isha assur?
My youngest daughter (age 7) has a chumash play in school this year and parents, including fathers, are invited. Since this play includes singing (as each of my older daughters passed through the same grade I saw the same performance) my wife asked me at what age the issur of kol isha kicks in. As much as I appreciated her trying to think of an excuse to spare me from attending, it seems that according to most poskim the singing voice of a penuya tehorah is permitted. R' Moshe in Igros Moshe (O.C. #26) advises that m'ikar hadin until age 11 there is no problem of kol isha. However, R' Moshe cautions that though this is the letter of the law, where possible, one should strive to be machmir. Given R' Moshe's caution I was wondering how widespread it is to have performances like this where fathers may attend. Looking at another case by comparison, R' Moshe is lenient and holds that m'ikar hadin there is no problem with drinking non-chalav yisrael milk, but advises schools to be machmir; to the best of my knowledge, they are. My guess is that in America it is more prevalant even in schools that try to position themselves to the right, while in Israel a chareidi Beis Ya'akov would probably ban such performances completely (the Sheveit haLevi in vol 5 takes a very hard line on kol isha and prohibits singing zmiros together, hearing a radio broadcast, and advises that even all girl schools should perform singing softly lest male neighbors hear). I would be interested in hearing your feedback. More often than not, especially in education of girls, it seems that sociology is the baseline that dictates what is done.
The Ishbitza on bitachon and yirah
In a past discussion of the conflict between Ya'akov's fear and the needs for bitachon I described the Abrabanel's insight which my wife pointed out to me as a "realisitic model of bitachon". Ya'akov was preparing for battle with his brother. Abarbanel writes that someone who has no fear of battle is a fool, not a ba'al bitachon, because such a person does not have a sense of the value of human life. Precisely because a hero is fully aware of what stands to be lost, yet nonethless conquers fear and enters battle, is he considered a real ba'al bitachon. Trust in G-d does not mean overlooking the dangers posed by reality or being fearful of the consequences of failure. Bitachon means pushing ahead despite those fears and consequences.
The thoughts are always well meant, but going over to someone who just found out they have an illness, lost a job, or some other tragedy and telling them "Don't worry" is not going to make them feel any better even if you insist that G-d will make things out. Worry full well! But despite that worry, be confident that G-d is still with you.
This is my favorite approach to the topic, and it is an approach that I found echoed in a teaching of the Ishbitza. Going back to the gemara, the idea of shema yigrom hacheit which we find by Ya'akov is presented in the context of the gemara telling us that David haMelech would arise every night at chatzos to ponder his fate. Although he was a "chassid", righteous beyond reproach, he nonetheless feared as well shema yigrom hacheit, a fear which the gemara cites Ya'akov as the model for. Why did he arise precisely at chatzos to ponder this message? Explains the Ishbitza, it is humanly impossible to reconcile fear and bitachon. If one is truly confident, one has no fears; if one is afraid, one lacks bitachon. Yet, these emotions coexist in each of us. The key is to maintain a balance between them. We must arise at chatzos, the precise midpoint, or we risk faltering.
The gemara continues on the nexy amud to tell us that one who is someich geulah l'tefilah by ma'ariv is a ben olam haba. The Ishbitza reads this gemara as hinting at the same theme. For the ba'al bitachon, G-d's geulah, redemption, is always at hand. Yet, in the darkness, when no light of hope can be seen, our fears lead us to call out in prayer to G-d. Logically it is impossible to explain how these emotions can coexist. If redemption is at hand, then need we pray with all our might?; if we pray so fearfully, are we lacking in confidence that G-d will act only for the good? We flip-flop between theses different poles, because only a ben olam haba, outside the constraints of this-worldly reason can possibly manage them simultaneously. Yet, that process of flip-flopping from one to the other, of using one as the springboard to the other, is precisely what we are charged to do.
In the Ishbitza's model there is no denying or resolving the contradiction between yirah and bitachon. Akin to the Kierkegaardian knight of faith, the human condition is one of paradox.
The thoughts are always well meant, but going over to someone who just found out they have an illness, lost a job, or some other tragedy and telling them "Don't worry" is not going to make them feel any better even if you insist that G-d will make things out. Worry full well! But despite that worry, be confident that G-d is still with you.
This is my favorite approach to the topic, and it is an approach that I found echoed in a teaching of the Ishbitza. Going back to the gemara, the idea of shema yigrom hacheit which we find by Ya'akov is presented in the context of the gemara telling us that David haMelech would arise every night at chatzos to ponder his fate. Although he was a "chassid", righteous beyond reproach, he nonetheless feared as well shema yigrom hacheit, a fear which the gemara cites Ya'akov as the model for. Why did he arise precisely at chatzos to ponder this message? Explains the Ishbitza, it is humanly impossible to reconcile fear and bitachon. If one is truly confident, one has no fears; if one is afraid, one lacks bitachon. Yet, these emotions coexist in each of us. The key is to maintain a balance between them. We must arise at chatzos, the precise midpoint, or we risk faltering.
The gemara continues on the nexy amud to tell us that one who is someich geulah l'tefilah by ma'ariv is a ben olam haba. The Ishbitza reads this gemara as hinting at the same theme. For the ba'al bitachon, G-d's geulah, redemption, is always at hand. Yet, in the darkness, when no light of hope can be seen, our fears lead us to call out in prayer to G-d. Logically it is impossible to explain how these emotions can coexist. If redemption is at hand, then need we pray with all our might?; if we pray so fearfully, are we lacking in confidence that G-d will act only for the good? We flip-flop between theses different poles, because only a ben olam haba, outside the constraints of this-worldly reason can possibly manage them simultaneously. Yet, that process of flip-flopping from one to the other, of using one as the springboard to the other, is precisely what we are charged to do.
In the Ishbitza's model there is no denying or resolving the contradiction between yirah and bitachon. Akin to the Kierkegaardian knight of faith, the human condition is one of paradox.
bitachon vs. bechira chofshis - - can we trust that others will not harm us?
Continuing the discussion of bitachon, one of the questions I left off with is how to square the idea of bitachon with shema yigrom hacheit. If a response to true bitachon is promised even to the unworthy, then of what consequence is the fact that one might have sinned?
With respect to Ya'akov's fear of encountering Eisav because of shema yigrom hacheit one can possibly kvetch and say that Hashem might have responded to Ya'akov's bitachon my sparing only Ya'akov, or Ya'akov and children but none of his property. This answer addresses the "letter of the law" but I don't think it addresses the spirit of bitachon. From Hashem's perspective there is no difference between saving all or saving part; once bitachon is in place, why not trust that Hashem will save all? The Ramban suggests this kvetch, but also pulls no punches and writes that perhaps Ya'akov's fear of shema yigrom hacheit was in fact a lack of bitachon. "Lo kol hama'amin boteach." This same idea is echoed by the Rambam in Shmoneh Prakim who proves from this episode that a Navi can have failings (see R' Elchanan Wasserman's explanation of this Rambam at the end of Koveitz He'oros. I don't see his question.)
A lomdishe answer to this issue is given by the Alter of Navardhok in his Madreigas haAdam. The Alter writes that the reason for Ya'akov's fear goes back to the brachos given by Yitzchak. Ya'akov was not blessed with unconditional dominion over Eisav --Eisav received his own blessing guaranteeing that when Ya'akov let down his guard and was not observant of Torah and mitzvos, he, Eisav, would be able to rise against Ya'akov. The fear of Ya'akov was not because G-d does not respond to the bitachon of a rasha, but rather because Hashem would fulfill this bracha to Eisav if Ya'akov did not measure up in tzidkus.
I would simplify this answer, and by coincidence, this brings us to this week's parsha : ) The Ohr HaChaim asks what Reuvain was thinking when he suggested lowering Yosef into a pit filled with scorpions rather than allow the brothers themselves to harm Yosef. Either way, Yosef was in danger, so what was Reuvain hoping to accomplish? The Ohr haChaim answers that scorpions and snakes have no bechira and could harm Yosef only if Hashem decreed such. However, the brothers had bechira. Hashem allows bechira to play out even if it goes agains the ideal Divine plan.
It is one thing to have bitachon that one will survive and illness, a dangerous storm, etc. In these cases one faces the threat of nature, which is completely controlled by Hashem. It is quite another thing to have bitachon from another person's threat, as Ya'akov faced in his encounter with Eisav. In this case Hashem's promise to intercede on behalf of the ba'al bitachon is overridden by Hashem's desire to allow the free will of people to play out in this world.
With respect to Ya'akov's fear of encountering Eisav because of shema yigrom hacheit one can possibly kvetch and say that Hashem might have responded to Ya'akov's bitachon my sparing only Ya'akov, or Ya'akov and children but none of his property. This answer addresses the "letter of the law" but I don't think it addresses the spirit of bitachon. From Hashem's perspective there is no difference between saving all or saving part; once bitachon is in place, why not trust that Hashem will save all? The Ramban suggests this kvetch, but also pulls no punches and writes that perhaps Ya'akov's fear of shema yigrom hacheit was in fact a lack of bitachon. "Lo kol hama'amin boteach." This same idea is echoed by the Rambam in Shmoneh Prakim who proves from this episode that a Navi can have failings (see R' Elchanan Wasserman's explanation of this Rambam at the end of Koveitz He'oros. I don't see his question.)
A lomdishe answer to this issue is given by the Alter of Navardhok in his Madreigas haAdam. The Alter writes that the reason for Ya'akov's fear goes back to the brachos given by Yitzchak. Ya'akov was not blessed with unconditional dominion over Eisav --Eisav received his own blessing guaranteeing that when Ya'akov let down his guard and was not observant of Torah and mitzvos, he, Eisav, would be able to rise against Ya'akov. The fear of Ya'akov was not because G-d does not respond to the bitachon of a rasha, but rather because Hashem would fulfill this bracha to Eisav if Ya'akov did not measure up in tzidkus.
I would simplify this answer, and by coincidence, this brings us to this week's parsha : ) The Ohr HaChaim asks what Reuvain was thinking when he suggested lowering Yosef into a pit filled with scorpions rather than allow the brothers themselves to harm Yosef. Either way, Yosef was in danger, so what was Reuvain hoping to accomplish? The Ohr haChaim answers that scorpions and snakes have no bechira and could harm Yosef only if Hashem decreed such. However, the brothers had bechira. Hashem allows bechira to play out even if it goes agains the ideal Divine plan.
It is one thing to have bitachon that one will survive and illness, a dangerous storm, etc. In these cases one faces the threat of nature, which is completely controlled by Hashem. It is quite another thing to have bitachon from another person's threat, as Ya'akov faced in his encounter with Eisav. In this case Hashem's promise to intercede on behalf of the ba'al bitachon is overridden by Hashem's desire to allow the free will of people to play out in this world.
Monday, December 15, 2008
toch k'dei dibbur
Once one says a bracha on food or a mitzvah, the food must immediatly be consumed or the mitzvah performed without interruption. Speaking between the bracha and action is not permitted. The Chayei Adam (klal #5) has an interesting safeik: what if one speaks only 1 or 2 words between the mitzvah and the action?
What difference does it make how many words are spoken? The rule is "toch k'dei dibur k'dibur damei" -- a break of less time than it takes to say "shalom alecha rebbi" is not considered a break or interruption. In this case would we say that since the action occurs within toch k'dei dibur of the bracha it is considered simultaneous to the bracha, or would we say that an interruption has occurred, regardless of how short its duration?
What difference does it make how many words are spoken? The rule is "toch k'dei dibur k'dibur damei" -- a break of less time than it takes to say "shalom alecha rebbi" is not considered a break or interruption. In this case would we say that since the action occurs within toch k'dei dibur of the bracha it is considered simultaneous to the bracha, or would we say that an interruption has occurred, regardless of how short its duration?
eid echad against a rov
Before I totally lose all continuity between posts I want to finish up the eid echad topic. The Pnei Yehoshua proved that an eid echad is believed against a rov by virtue of the fact that we believe our butcher that meat is kosher despite the fact that most meat in the world is treif. Another proof he offered was from the fact that we believe an eid echad who testifies as to the identity of the owner of a lost object even though most people in the world are not the object's owner.
R' Naftali Trop argued that this latter example is not a proof. Let's review what a classic case of rov is: 9 butcher stores sell kosher meat and 1 store sells trief meat. If I find a piece of meat, I can assume it is kosher based on the principle of rov. The case of a lost object is not comparable for two reasons:
1) As noted in a comment to the original post, the evidence of a large number of kosher stores directly contradicts the evidence of the single treif store in determining the status of the meat -- rov resolves that contradiction by telling us to follow majority. However, in the case of the lost object, the rov does not tell me anything about who the owner of the object is. There is no contradiction between the evidence that a single individual among many must be the owner and the evidence that a majority of individuals are not the object's owner. Therefore, rov has no bearing on this case.
2) The Tosfos RI"D explains that in the case of the kosher stores we don't need to identify which store the meat came from -- we simply need to identify if it came from any kosher store. In that case there is a cumulative effect created by the evidence of multiple stores that increases the statistical liklihood of the meat being kosher. However, in the case of a lost object, we need to identify exactly who the owner of the object is. There are equal odds for/against any individual being the owner, so there is no majority vs. minority with which to resolve identity.
R' Naftali Trop argued that this latter example is not a proof. Let's review what a classic case of rov is: 9 butcher stores sell kosher meat and 1 store sells trief meat. If I find a piece of meat, I can assume it is kosher based on the principle of rov. The case of a lost object is not comparable for two reasons:
1) As noted in a comment to the original post, the evidence of a large number of kosher stores directly contradicts the evidence of the single treif store in determining the status of the meat -- rov resolves that contradiction by telling us to follow majority. However, in the case of the lost object, the rov does not tell me anything about who the owner of the object is. There is no contradiction between the evidence that a single individual among many must be the owner and the evidence that a majority of individuals are not the object's owner. Therefore, rov has no bearing on this case.
2) The Tosfos RI"D explains that in the case of the kosher stores we don't need to identify which store the meat came from -- we simply need to identify if it came from any kosher store. In that case there is a cumulative effect created by the evidence of multiple stores that increases the statistical liklihood of the meat being kosher. However, in the case of a lost object, we need to identify exactly who the owner of the object is. There are equal odds for/against any individual being the owner, so there is no majority vs. minority with which to resolve identity.
bitachon (III)
I realized that I can keep writing about bitachon post after post and not exhaust the topic while possibly boring everyone, so maybe I will have to intersperse other stuff. I left two questions hanging at the end of part 2 (part 1 here, part 2 here), but before getting to those, some other quick points.
1) I was beaten by a comment to posting the Yalkut Shimoni on the pasuk "Rabim machovim l'rasha v'ha'boteach b'Hashem chessed y'sovevenu (Teh 32)" The Yalkut darshens that the "boteach b'Hashem" might very well be the rasha of the opening of the pasuk! Of course, this fits perfectly with the opinion of the Ramban that even a rasha can have bitachon. By coincidence (I usually don't use the sefer) I saw the Mishnas R' Aharon vol 4 (R' Aharon Kotler zt"l) quotes this derasha and is perplexed at how a rasha can receive a positive response to bitachon. I am not sure if R' Aharon saw the Ramban (he refers only to the Chovos haLevavos), as it seems to me that the Ramban answers this question. Ramban notes that the pasuk, "B'tach b'Hashem" continues "v'aseh tov", to warn that although the rasha can call on the resource of bitachon and ellicit mometary mercy from Hashem, it does not mean that Hashem will wipe clean his slate of wrongdoing. There must be a follow-up of good deeds. See the Mishnas R' Aharon for his answer.
2) As mentioned in part 2, the Maharal refers to Hillel's bitachon that his home was not in danger when he heard a sudden outcry in the city. Maharal notes that the gemara is meduyak / particular in referring to a sudden outcry. Such an outcry could not be the result of the normal course of events, but must be an abberation, a departure from the norm, an almost supernatural occurance. That is why Hillel felt confident in calling on his bitachon. Where there is a clear intercession by G-d into mundane affairs, as evident by events being so out of the ordinary as to be unexpected and unanticipated, then a person has a right to assume that the events conform to Heavenly direction and the ba'al bitachon will be spared. I think the Maharal makes a significant point, but the question is where to draw the line. If someone walks off a four story building and thinks that because he is a ba'al bitachon he can fly, I think it is obvious that he is trying to go against what the normal course of nature is and will not succeed. But what about someone struck down by a sudden illness? Such an event may be sudden, but illness is part of the natural world. Some of the cases the Maharal himself uses to illustrate his point seem to fall into this area.
1) I was beaten by a comment to posting the Yalkut Shimoni on the pasuk "Rabim machovim l'rasha v'ha'boteach b'Hashem chessed y'sovevenu (Teh 32)" The Yalkut darshens that the "boteach b'Hashem" might very well be the rasha of the opening of the pasuk! Of course, this fits perfectly with the opinion of the Ramban that even a rasha can have bitachon. By coincidence (I usually don't use the sefer) I saw the Mishnas R' Aharon vol 4 (R' Aharon Kotler zt"l) quotes this derasha and is perplexed at how a rasha can receive a positive response to bitachon. I am not sure if R' Aharon saw the Ramban (he refers only to the Chovos haLevavos), as it seems to me that the Ramban answers this question. Ramban notes that the pasuk, "B'tach b'Hashem" continues "v'aseh tov", to warn that although the rasha can call on the resource of bitachon and ellicit mometary mercy from Hashem, it does not mean that Hashem will wipe clean his slate of wrongdoing. There must be a follow-up of good deeds. See the Mishnas R' Aharon for his answer.
2) As mentioned in part 2, the Maharal refers to Hillel's bitachon that his home was not in danger when he heard a sudden outcry in the city. Maharal notes that the gemara is meduyak / particular in referring to a sudden outcry. Such an outcry could not be the result of the normal course of events, but must be an abberation, a departure from the norm, an almost supernatural occurance. That is why Hillel felt confident in calling on his bitachon. Where there is a clear intercession by G-d into mundane affairs, as evident by events being so out of the ordinary as to be unexpected and unanticipated, then a person has a right to assume that the events conform to Heavenly direction and the ba'al bitachon will be spared. I think the Maharal makes a significant point, but the question is where to draw the line. If someone walks off a four story building and thinks that because he is a ba'al bitachon he can fly, I think it is obvious that he is trying to go against what the normal course of nature is and will not succeed. But what about someone struck down by a sudden illness? Such an event may be sudden, but illness is part of the natural world. Some of the cases the Maharal himself uses to illustrate his point seem to fall into this area.
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