Thursday, December 10, 2009

ain issur chal al issur and R' Shimon's derech halimud

Some bookstores (e.g. The Strand in NYC) were meant for browsers more than buyers. The internet allows for virtual browsing, and hebrewbooks.org is the sort of site where treasures are often found. I recently chanced on a Sefer haYovel published in honor of R' Shimon Shkop’s fiftieth year as Rosh Yeshiva that is filled both with divrei halacha as well as student’s reminisces worth taking a look at.

The first essay, written by Rav Unterman, describes the beauty of R’ Shimon’s analytical style, which he illustrates (p. 14) by recalling a shiur that R’ Shimon gave one Shavuos morning. The topic of the shiur was the following question of the Sha'ar haMelech: An issur cannot prohibit something which is already prohibited -- ain issur chal al issur -- except in the special circumstance that the new issur adds something not included in the existing one. If an animal died and became neveilah on Yom Kippur, the issur neveilah is not chal on the meat because all food, meat included, is already prohibited because it's Yom Kippur. The Sha’ar haMelech writes that he does not understand why this should be the case. He reasons as follows: Eating even a chatzi shiur of food is prohibited on Yom Kippur, but there is no punishment for eating less than a k’koseves hagasah. However, the issur neveilah is punishable with malkos if one eats even a k’zayis, which is less than a k’koseves. Since the issur neveilah adds the potential for punishment for eating a lesser amount, it should apply on top of and in addition to the issur achila of Yom Kippur.

How do we know adding the potential for punishment alone allows for an assur to be chal on top of another issur? From the following seemingly parallel case: if a person takes a shevua not to eat a chatzi zayis of neveilah, the shevua is chal. Even though eating a chatzi shiur of neveilah is already prohibited, there is no punishment unless a full k’zayis is eaten. Since the shevua adds the potential for punishment for eating even a chatzi shiur (for violating the shevua), it is chal on top of the existing issur neveilah.

Concludes the Sha'as haMelech: If the issur of shevua is chal on top of the issur neveilah because it adds the potential for punishment for eating even a smaller shiur, why is the issur neveilah not chal on top of the issur achila of Yom Kippur because it adds the potential for punishment for a eating even smaller shiur?

Rav Unterman writes that R’ Shimon’s solution to this question so impressed the listeners that they felt there was no question that his derech halimud was founded on indisputable truths.

So, here’s a chance to test your power of reasoning – what's the teirutz? No bekiyus required – you have all the facts you need at your disposal, and you have the additional advantage of a living a few decades after R' Shimon's derech has been perculating through the yeshiva system and has had a chance to reach our ears in one form or another of a shiur or chaburah. (I’m willing to bet that some of you who do come up with an answer will either find a Brisker way out or frame an answer similar to R’ Shimon’s in Brisker-garb because most of us have been brainwashed as Briskers, but we shall see : )

My son is has gotten enough of a feel for R’ Shimon’s derech from fielding these type questions (I usually hint to him in advance that “It’s a R’ Shimon question” or “It’s a R’ Chaim” so he develops a sense for what different types of questions/answers to expect) that the first thing he said to me was, “Let me guess – it has something to do with the “sibas ha’issur.” Those are indeed the magic words that let you into R’ Shimon’s mind. Now you just need to figure our the rest : )

I’ll bli neder post the solution at some point soon. Why knows? If this made such an impression on R' Unterman, who was a gavra rabbah himself, maybe it will inspire me and you to crack open the Sha'rei Yosher a little more often.

Wednesday, December 09, 2009

starving at the doors of the banquet

Not Brisker Yeshivish has three back to back must-read posts (I, II, III) cataloging some of the common themes found in the thinking and writing of the the so-called rationalist/academic camp. I'm hesitant to use it as an example, but what the heck -- L'havdil, here is a passage from The Seven Storey Mountain by Thomas Merton, a book which seems to have waned in popularity but still makes some of the "100 best books of the century" lists. On p. 175 Merton writes:

How many there are in the same situation! They stand in the stacks of libraries and turn over the pages of St. Thomas's Summa with a kind of curious reverence. They talk in their seminars about "Thomas" and "Scotus" and "Augustine" and "Bonaventure" and they are familiar with Maritain and Gibson, and they have read all the poems of Hopkins -- and indeed they know more about what is best in the Catholic literary and philosophical tradition than most Catholics ever do on this earth. They sometimes go to Mass, and wonder at the dignity and restraint of the old liturgy. They are impressed by the organization of a Church in which everywhere the priests, even the most un-gifted, are able to preach at least something of a tremendous, profound, unified doctrine, and to dispense mysteriously efficacious help to all those who come to them with troubles and needs.

In a certain sense, these people have a better appreciation of the Church and of Catholicism than many Catholics have: an appreciation which is detached and intellectual and objective. But they never come into the Church. They stand and starve in the doors of the banquet -- the banquet to which they surely realize that they are invited -- while those more poor, more stupid, less gifted, less educated, sometimes even less virtuous than they, enter in and are filled at those tremendous tables.

Different religion, same contrast between the world of "objective" scholarly study and passionate belief.

And here the academic will undoubtedly object and say it is not the displacement of the passion and love of religion which is his aim, but rather his goal is simply for a different kind of passion, one that comes from understanding based on fact and reason rather than myth and folklore. Objection noted, but I don't find it to be a credible argument. In my limited experience I have not found learning or avodah outside the walls of the traditional yeshiva, where the assumptions of that world are questioned or rejected, on par with the learning and avodah within those walls -- you can be your own judge. Yes, there are interesting questions the scholar asks, articles and books that we can gain from, just like there is something to be gained by reading about the religious conversion of Merton. But I would rather stay at my own "tisch" and grab a fruit off the other table than sit at the table of the academics and sacrifice the banquet of passion and commitment on my own.

Tuesday, December 08, 2009

missing the subtle message

Hashem appeared to Ya'akov after the conclusion of the battle with Shechem and ordered him to return to Beit El. Why did G-d need to order Ya'akov to return to Beit El, his home? The opening of Parshas VaYeitzei tells us that Ya'akov intended and promised (with G-d's help) to return home -- his stay in Lavan's home was just a temporary escape from Eisav. Ya'akov had also already been told while in Lavan's home that it was time to leave, and he was already on the road, ostensibly headed back home. Rashi cites a snippit of Midrash Tanchuma to answer this question, but it's worth seeing the text of the Midrash in its entirety:

בא וראה כשהלך יעקב לארם נהרים מה כתיב שם וידר יעקב נדר לאמר וגו' (בראשית כח), השיבו על כל דבר ודבר, הלך ונתעשר ובא וישב לו ולא שלם את נדרו הביא עליו עשו ובקש להרגו נטל ממנו כל אותו דורון עזים מאתים לא הרגיש, הביא עליו המלאך ורפש עמו ולא הרגו שנאמר ויותר יעקב לבדו ויאבק איש עמו זה סמאל שרו של עשו שבקש להרגו שנאמר וירא כי לא יכול לו ונעשה צולע, כיון שלא הרגיש באת עליו צרת דינה שנאמר ותצא דינה, כיון שלא הרגיש באת עליו צרת רחל שנאמר ותמת רחל ותקבר, מסייע ליה לרב שמואל בר נחמן דאמר כל הנודר ואינו משלם גורם לאשתו שתמות שנאמר אם אין לך לשלם וגו' אמר הקב"ה עד מתי יהא הצדיק הזה לוקה ואינו מרגיש באיזה חטא לוקה הריני מודיעו

The Tanchuma answers that G-d reiterates his command to Ya'akov to return home because Ya'akov had delayed in fulfilling his promise to do so. Through its answer, the Midrash also manages to tie together the many disparate episodes of the parsha -- Eisav, the angel, Shechem, Rachel's death -- quite nicely. All are a punishment for Ya'akov's delay.

A few points:

1. Textual -- the Midrash sees the death of Rachel as part of the punishment for Ya'akov's delay, yet, the death of Rachel is written in the parsha only after G-d appears again to order Ya'akov home. It seems a stretch to suggest based on this Midrash alone that events are written out of order. I have no good answer.

2. Moral -- The subtle hint of repeated punishment is apparently lost on Ya'akov, who trudges along through difficulty after difficulty not realizing that his behavior is his own worst enemy. If Ya'akov, the bechir ha'avos, could not grasp that G-d was trying to tell him something even after receiving patch after patch, we who have no nevuah and are groping in the dark for direction surely stand a good chance of remaining confounded and confused even as G-d sends signal after signal our way (see R' Shternbruch's Ta'am v'Da'as).

3. Halachic -- The Midrash assumes (as does the Zohar) that a person's wife may even die as a result of his delaying fulfillment of a neder. (My wife jokingly commented that this may suggest a strategy to those who wish to get rid of their spouse-- hopefully not!) Yet, the gemara (Rosh haShana 6a) states clearly that this is not the case, darshening, "V'haya becha cheit" -- v'lo b'ishtecha cheit. A simple answer is that Rachel was not punished directly for Ya'akov's delay, but she simply suffered the natural effects of danger during childbirth, which more often led to death in ancient times. Had Ya'akov been more careful, Rachel might have been afforded the supernatual protection that comes of extra zechus. See the Kli Chemdah for a more complex pilpul on the topic.

Monday, December 07, 2009

a Freudian Rashi

The Torah describes the death and burial of Devora, the nursemaid of Rivka, as a means of hinting that Rivka herself had died. Rashi (35:8) asks why the Torah does not openly tell us of Rivka’s death; he answers that Rivka’s death was kept quiet so that people would not curse the womb which produced Eisav.

Why would people tarnish Rivka’s memory by only recalling that she brought Eisav into the world and ignoring the rest of the story? Rivka was also the mother of Ya’akov, not only Eisav. In fact, it was Rivka who even more than Yitzchak showed her affection for Ya’akov. R’ Shteinman in his Ayeles haShachar points out that this is human nature -- we harp on the faults of others and neglect and ignore the good. Sad, but so very true.

Rav Shteinman further asks why people would blame Rivka for Eisav’s faults and actions? And why only her and not Yitzchak? Rashi preceded Freud by a good many years, but I cannot resist answering R’ Shteinman’s kashe by pointing to the old psychoanalytic standby used to explain abnormal behavior -- “It’s all your mother’s fault.” Whether there is truth to it or not I don’t know, but it certainly is a sentiment that has entered our cultural psyche (no pun intended). Is that a result of the popularization of psychoanalysis, or has the trend to blame mothers for the ills of society been around much longer?

Friday, December 04, 2009

the concept of "tziruf" and the shiur of gadlus

Rashi (Nazir 29b) writes that the earliest age at which the Torah refers to someone as an “ish”, being a mature adult, is 13. The Torah in Parshas VaYishlach writes about Shimon and Levi, who we know b’mesorah were 13 at the time of their fight with Shechem(and Rashi adds that if you want to calculate it, go ahead), “VYikchu ish charbo”. This is the source for the age of bar mitzvah. The Rosh in a tshuvah disagrees and says that the source is a halacha l’Moshe m’Sinai.

In a letter to my wife’s grandfather, R’ Dov Yehudah Shochet, on the occasion of one of her uncles becoming bar mitzvah, the Lubavitcher Rebbe cites this machlokes and writes that a nafka mina between Rashi and the Rosh would be the age of gadlus for a ben Noach, a question raised by the Mishne l’Melech and other Achronim. If the age of gadlus is simply a measure of maturity, as Rashi seems to indicate, there is no reason to distinguish between a yisrael and a ben noach. But if it is simply an arbitrary number set by halacha l’Moshe m’Sinai, as the Rosh writes, then it would apply only to a yisrael because shiurim are part of Torah and were never given to bnei noach (Chasam Sofer Y.D. 317). (I actually suggested this same nafka mina in a post last year, so baruch shekivanti.)

The Rebbe then adds a bit of derush. Since the age of kabbalos ol mitzvos, at least according to Rashi, is a matter of reason and not an arbitrary number, one might mistakenly think that the kabbalos ol itself is dependent upon reason. Therefore, precisely where the textual hook of the word “ish” appears, the Torah continues with the word “charbo”, an allusion to mesirus nefesh, a quality which transcends the bounds of reason and logic. (I wonder how my wife’s grandfather, who was steeped in the mesorah of Telz known for emphasis on da’as (e.g. Shiurei Da’as), would have taken this.)

We actually find a hint to the idea of gadlus starting from age 13 earlier in the Torah. In Parshas Toldos, Rashi comments on "VaYigdilu hane'arim" (25:27) that Eisav and Ya'akov were 13 when they each went their own way in life.

On a related note, interestingly the gemara (Nazir 62a) says that m’doraysa from the age of “mufla ha’samuch l’ish” nedarim made by a ben noach are binding. However, the same may be true only m’derabbanan with respect to a yisrael. Why is there a distinction in this shiur with respect to age between a ben noach and yisrael? Rashi explains that this is simply a chumra that applies to ben noach, as we find in other areas. The Rogatchover (see R’ Kasher’ into to Rogatchover al haTorah, Braishis, p. 60) offers a deeper insight. The concept of tziruf, which binds together individual units into a larger whole, is a legal fiction which exists only because we have a legal framework of Torah that gives it reality. For a ben noach, no laws that depend on tziruf exist. The Rogatchover poses the following chakira: Is becoming a gadol a matter of reaching a specific point in time, or is it a matter of having lived through 13 years worth of hours, minutes, and seconds? The Rogatchover suggests that for a ben noach, it is a matter of reaching a point in time, such as mufla ha’samuch l’ish. For a yisrael, gadlus is measured by shtei sa’aros, not reaching a specific point like mufla ha’samuch l’ish. It is the passage of time, not a specific point in time, which leads to the growth of shtei sa’aros – the tziruf of previous years together make a person into a gadol.

Can you use the Rogatchover’s chakira to explain the machlokes Rashi and Rosh? I think maybe you can: According to the Rashi, “ish” is a point of time at which maturity is reached, no difference if you are a yisrael or a ben noach. According to the Rosh, gadlus is a product of the tziruf of the passage of previous years and therefore a halacha l’Moshe m’Sinai is needed to be mechadesh it as a conceptual construct.

Thursday, December 03, 2009

migu as zechus hata'anah

As we discussed, when two pairs of eidim offer contradictory testimony, Tosfos holds that migu cannot bolster the credibility of one pair over the other. Because trei k’meh, i.e. the credibility of 100 witnesses is no better than 2, it stands to reason that the credibility of 2 witnesses who have a migu is also no better than the credibility of 2 witnesses without -- there is simply nothing, no other proof or combination of proofs, which trumps two witnesses. Yet, after citing this explanation of Tosfos, the Sha’ar haMisphat holds that if one of the litigants, a ba’al din, has a migu in a case where witnesses contradict each other, his claim wins. Why should this be so? If there are two witnesses that back up the plaintiff’s story and two witnesses that back up the defendant’s story, and no evidence in the world that trumps witnesses, why does throwing the litigant's migu into the mix tilt the scales?

R’ Elchanan’s answer to this question (Koveitz Shiurim #4) is one of the classics. The simple way to understand migu is that it is a siman, an indication that your claim is truthful. Since if you wanted to lie you could tell a better lie, the weakness of your claim is a mark in its favor. But this, says R’ Elchanan, is only half the story. It’s not just the possibility of a better story that bolsters your claim, but rather we view your defense as if you had actually told the better story – you get the benefit of a better claim without actually having to articulate it. This is known in yeshvish-ese as having a “zechus hata’anah”.

Coming back to our question, where two litigants and witnesses are at a standoff about fact X, migu does not help either pair of witnesses because it adds no more credibility to testimony about X than the witnesses already have. But where the litigant has a migu, that’s another story. A migu in the hands of the plaintiff or defendant says that in addition to claim X which is under dispute, their zechus hata’anah means claim Y is also implicitly on the table to their benefit. Since the standoff between the witnesses is only with respect to the facts about X, the addition of claim of Y can tip the scales in one party’s favor.

I am posting this because it tangentially came up in the comments to the post about migu and eidim, but it is a piece that sticks in my mind for another reason. Last year my son was in 9th grade and learning Baba Basra and I remember early in the year talking to him about a migu sugya and discovering that he had never heard of this idea of “zechus hata’anah”, so we learned it together. This year (bli ayin hara) I don’t think I can come up with a single R’ Elchanan on the masechta he is learning (and I would not want to go head to head with him on other masechtos either) that he does not know already. As I’ve written before, if you want to take see the type growth in learning you should aspire for, just look at your kids. Every year is an exponential leap beyond the level of the previous year, whether it be knowing R' Elchanan or simply moving from Reishis Keri'ah to knowing how to read a pasuk.

Tuesday, December 01, 2009

einei ha'eidah

In The Age of Wonder: How the Romantic Generation Discovered the Beauty and Terror of Science by Richard Holmes, the author discusses the discovery of Uranus by William Herschel, a musician turned astronomer whose theories and observations rekindled an interest in the field of astronomy and helped change the way we look at the universe. Herschel's discovery was made possible because he was able to construct telescopes that were far greater in power than anything his peers were using, but having the right tools does not tell the whole story. Holmes writes (p. 116):
The more he was challenged by professional astronomers, the more Herschel became conscious of his 'art of seeing', and how it needed explaining afresh. 'The eye is one of the most extraordinary Organs,' he repeatedly told his correspondants. Classical physiology was wrong. Visual images did not simply fall upon the optic nerve, in the same sense that they fell upon a speculum mirror. The eye constantly interpreted what it saw... The astronomer had to learn to see...
Holmes suggests that Herschel's training as a musician aided his ability to observe the night sky. Like sight reading a score, Herschel could grasp patterns in the sky without needing to observe each star individually. "Or more subtly, the brain that was trained to recognise the highly complex counterpoints and harmonies of Bach and Handel could instinctively [italics mine] recognise analogous star patternings." (p. 115)

It occurred to me that perhaps we refer to Chazal as the "einei ha'eidah," the eyes of the people, because their power of vision is characterized by these same two aspects of "seeing" that Holmes describes. Firstly, seeing is not instinctive, but is a learned behavior, a skill, and a highly trained observer who has worked on developing his vision can perceive far more than the average person. Dismissing the words of a talmid chacham by saying, "I don't see his point," just highlights the paucity of our own vision in comparison to what the talmid chachaim does see. Secondly, our talmidei chachamim and einei ha'eidah have an instinctive grasp of reality that we may not share. To attempt to reduce what can be grasped instinctively and instantly into a series of steps that someone else can follow and duplicate is not always possible.

P.S. The book is pretty interesting (so far), whether you are looking for a history of science during the Romantic age or just a good read.

trei k'me'ah: quantity of proof vs. quality of proof

Two witnesses can charge that one or both of a pair of other witnesses are thieves (or some other psul) and disqualify them from testifying. However, two witnesses would not be believed if they charge that the testimony of other witnesses is a lie. We would be left with a case of trei u’trei, a standoff. Tosfos (B"K 72b d"h ain) asks: why in this second case would we not believe the accusing witnesses that their counterpart’s testimony is a lie migu that they could just accuse their counterparts of being thieves and disqualify them?

The first answer of Tosfos focuses on metziyus. Migu assumes that were someone to lie, he would tell the best lie possible; a defect in a claim is evidence of its truthfulness. This sevara does not apply when speaking of two witnesses because two people practically would be unable to coordinate a story to fabricate a better lie.

The second answer of Tosfos is based on a din. We know that the testimony of 100 witnesses is no better proof than the testimony of 2 witnesses: trei k’me’ah. We also know that the testimony of witnesses is stronger proof than migu. So if 100 witnesses are no better proof than 2 witnesses, QED that 2 witnesses + a migu are no better proof than 2 witnesses alone.

According to the second answer of Tosfos, migu adds no credibility. However, according to the first answer of Tosfos, were it theoretically possible to apply the sevara of migu, it would make a difference. What is the point of debate?

R’ Elchanan (Koveitz Shiurim) writes that there are two ways to understand trei k’me’ah.
1) Relative: One type of proof can be weighed against a qualitatively different type, e.g. ruba v’chazakah ruba adif, rov is better proof than chazakah, but there is no difference between a greater or lesser quantity of the same type of proof. All proof through testimony, be it from 2 or 100 witnesses, amounts qualitatively to the same thing.
2) Objective: testimony of two witnesses is by definition the highest degree of proof possible and therefore cannot be trumped by anything, even a greater quantity of witnesses.

If trei k’me’ah just tells us that different quantities of the same proof equal out, then adding a qualitatively different type of proof to the mix, e.g. adding migu to one side of the scale, tips the balance. However, if trei k’me’ah means that by definition there is no proof of any type superior to that of two witnesses, adding migu to the scale has no effect.

Question/observation: according to R' Elchanan's first approach, the scales only move when we compare and weigh qualitatively different forms of proof against each other, not different quantities. Sounds to me like this means that sugyos that invoke two chazakos beating one (e.g. the discussion in Nidah 2-3) work only if the chazakos being weighed are qualitatively different. It would be interesting to test if we could really come up with qualitative differences between all the various forms of chazakah, but that type of project is beyond me at this point.

Friday, November 27, 2009

the ladder of Ya'akov's dream

Ya’akov in his dream sees the image of a ladder, “V’hinei malachei Elokim olim v’yordim bo,” with angels were going up and down “it”. The pronoun “bo” sounds like it refers to the ladder; however, there is another view in the Midrash (68:18) that explains that “it” refers to Ya’akov himself (unlike in English, there is no difference in the Hebrew between “it” and “him”). The Midrash continues that angels flew to the Heavens and saw the image of Ya’akov engraved (so to speak) on G-d’s throne, but then they descended to Earth and found him slumbering and laughed and mocked him.

The parsha continues, “V’hinei Hashem nitzav alav,” telling us that Hashem stood above “it/him”. Once again, we have a similar debate in the Midrash (69:2) as to whether the ambiguous pronoun refers to the ladder or to Ya’akov himself.

What is the nekudas hamachlokes here?

The two views of the Midrash offer us two perspectives on Ya'akov's dream. The first view of sees Ya’akov’s dream as a look outward at the angels coming and going in the world, governing how things are run. Above this entire mechanistic framework, above the ladder, stands G-d himself, controlling everything. Ya’akov is reminded, as he stood on the threshold of entering Lavan’s home court, that events are not happenstance, but are controlled by an army of messengers sent from above.

The second view sees Ya’akov’s dream as a look inward, at the coming and goings of his own thoughts. R’ Chaim Volozhiner (Nefesh haChaim 1:19) writes (based on a Zohar) that the ladder of Ya’akov dream refers to his own soul. Rav Bloch in the Shiurei Da’as explains that the angels of Ya’akov’s dream represent his kochos henefesh, the characteristics and traits of his personality, his self, his soul. Ya’akov’s saw the heights to which his potential could carry him, but also saw the slumber and weakness into which he could fall, a vision of lost potential worthy of being mocked. It’s not the transcendent image of G-d who controls the outside world and nature which appeared to Ya’akov, but rather the image of G-d as standing above him, relating to him personally, aware of and measuring his thoughts and deeds (see Sefas Emes 5651).

(As an aside: a great post on how to approach Midrash.)

Wednesday, November 25, 2009

Ya'akov's tears: Questions that result from the reader's paradigm

I am a big believer in appreciating seforim on their own terms. There are multiple ways to skin a cat and answer a kashe, and a pilpul of the Chasam Sofer is no less interesting or valid than a distinction of R’ Chaim Brisker. The key to unlocking and enjoying a sefer is to accept the terms of the system being used, the boundaries of the thinker’s paradigm, and then exploring how the author maneuvers within it. Stepping outside the box and comparing and contrasting paradigms is interesting, but some people get so bogged down in defending one system over the other that they never come to any appreciation for the genius of the maneuvering and navigation and chiddushim that can come out of a system different than the one they are locked into.

I remember once posting about the twists and turns the Parashas Derachim takes us through in exploring how the Avos kept the entire Torah, with every detail, and at the same time retained their status as bnei Noach. A ben Noach cannot keep Shabbos – what did the Avos do? How did Ya’akov marry two sisters if he kept the Torah? Some people were not even willing to entertain the question because they never got past insisting that the Avos had some general sense of commitment but not did not observe the details of every mitzvah d’oraysa and derabbanan. The torah and genius of the Parashas Derachim are a closed book if you reject the frame of reference needed to set up the question. Or to take another example, if you cannot accept using a mystical framework to read chumash, you have basically shut the door on hundreds of seforim whose insight might enrich your avodas Hashem.

I have noticed that the Ayeles haShachar of Rav Shteinman on chumash adopts the same paradigm or framework as the Meshech Chochma, the Netziv, Maharal Diskin, and especially the Brisker Rav and the Rogatchover, and others. These gedolim read every detail in chumash (and Rashi) as having halachic import or explainable on purely halachic terms (and I know that is a gross oversimplification and exaggeration, but in one sentence I can’t do better). For example, in the post I did earlier on why Ya’akov felt bad about sleeping where he did, the Brisker Rav comes up an explanation based on the halachos of morah mikdash rather than practical, moral, or theological reasons.

Every now and then I find a question where it seems that the boundaries of the paradigm create the real stumbling block rather than a path for a solution (similar to the way the Parashas Derachim's understanding of the Avos' shemiras hamitzvos creates a set of problems that he then resolves, but which might not exist if not for the framework he adopts) and I wonder if there is a deliberate attempt to find an answer that works within the thinker's framework or whether the whole thing operates on some unconscious level and once you are submerged in an approach it eclipses other solutions. You could ask this question in any number of contexts; I raise it here for no other reason than it hit me again when I saw this question of Rav Shteinman on VaYeitzei:

Ya’akov meets Rachel and the Torah tells us, “VaYisa es kolo vayeivk,” Ya’akov cried (29:11). Why was he crying at this moment? Why does the Torah mention his emotional reaction to meeting Rachel? Rashi explains that Ya’akov cried because he saw prophetically that Rachel would not be buried with him.

Rav Shteinman asks: So what? Why should that have upset Ya’akov? He answers that there must be a “sibah meyuchedes” for the Avos and Imahos to be buried together (see Baba Basra 58), but he offers no further explanation of what that "sibah" might be. He also cites (but does not think it is compelling) a ShLa”H who explains that Ya’akov saw that Rachel would be buried on the road as a comfort to the Jewish people headed to exile. Ya’akov cried over the destruction of the Mikdash and that future exile.

Now, call me romantic, but I don’t see the question. Ya’akov has just met the woman whom he will marry. The Torah tells us that “Vaye’ehav Ya’akov es Rachel” – Ya’akov loved Rachel. We know that Ya’akov’s relationship with Rachel was special; she was the akeres habayis. Given all that, is it really hard to understand why Ya’akov would be upset over the fact that the woman who he loves will be buried along the road and not share a grave with him?

Rashi offers another explanation and attributes Ya'akov's crying to the fact that he has come empty handed. Here it is Sifsei Chachamim who asks: So what? Why cry over a lack of money? A tzadik places no value on material wealth. Rav Shteinman answers that Ya'akov did not cry for the loss of money so much as what money represented: the loss of opportunity to do chessed. But why not cry over that loss earlier, when it occurred? Again, the romantic answer is obvious: it's not just the loss of the opportunity for any chessed which troubled Ya'akov, but specifically the loss of ability to greet his future wife with the proper gifts that would be expected of him, the specific chessed (if you want to call it that) which must be shown to one's spouse.

Does reading Rashi with Rav Shteinman's lens in this case solve a problem that the average reader would get stuck on or create a problem that the average reader would not be troubled by? I guess the answer is "It depends" -- is the average reader a romantic or a dispassionate observer? Do we understand emotionally the grief of not being buried with one's beloved, even if it has no halachic justification? Does it sit easy with us ascribing that sense of emotional grief to Ya'akov, or at least reading Rashi as doing so?

One need not pick and choose between these approaches or the many others that are possible. Every approach unlocks questions that we otherwise might not have asked and offers answers that we otherwise might not have thought of, which is what makes learning so interesting and rewarding.

Why did Ya'akov regret his slumber?

V’Anochi lo yada’ti (28:16). Why was Ya’akov so upset that he had slept? The Brisker Rav held that because of the din of morah mikdash there was an issur for Ya’akov to sleep at the spot of the Mikdash even before it was built.

R’ Shteinman in his Ayeles haShachar suggests that Ya’akov was perturbed because during this entire experience of hisgalus haShechina he was asleep – completely passive. Avodas Hashem requires that a person take action, to grow and develop through his/her own efforts, not to passively experience and enjoy whatever Hashem grants. Especially in a place or time of hashra’as haShechina, one's avodah takes on added significance and meaning and Ya'akov felt he missed an opportunity.

The Seforno and Ohr haChaim stress a slightly different theme. Upon waking up Ya’akov realized that the place where he slept was so imbued with holiness that he was even able to experience prophecy with no prior preparation. Ya'akov bemoaned the fact that if such a great revelation could take place with no preparation, how much greater the result could have been if he had actively prepared. The effect of kedusha is far more pronounced when anticipated and prepared for them when haphazardly experienced. V'hi hanosenes that when we enter a place of kedusha, such as a shul, what we glean from the experience will be far more meaningful if we prepare for and anticipate the experience rather than haphazardly attempt to grab whatever inspiration may fall into our mind by chance.

I think there is another reason Ya'akov felt he missed an opportunity. I hate to be cliché, but what comes to mind is the phrase “Strike while the iron is hot”. As people in sales know, you have to close the deal while the customer is hooked, because if he/she gets off with an “I’ll think about it,” odds are that enthusiasm will wane and nothing will come of it. Inspiration that is not followed up immediately by an act of commitment will not make a lasting impression. Perhaps this is why we start learning again right after making a siyum: the tremendous inspiration of the siyum needs to be invested immediately into beginning again on more learning. Ya’akov wanted to respond to this moment of bracha and revelation with some act that would capture his inspiration and transform it into a concrete commitment, but in this case he was unable to do so.

Tuesday, November 24, 2009

shok b'isha ervah: tzniyus skirt length

If you have daughters you have undoubtedly faced the question of how long a skirt must be to pass halachic muster. The answer to this important question can make or break a good shopping opportunity. The easy part to figure out is that since "shok b'isha erva" (Brachos 24a) a skirt has to cover the part of the leg called the "shok". The harder part is figuring our where on the leg the shok is.

The Torah tells us regarding a korban shelamim (VaYikra 7:32):
וְאֵת שׁוֹק הַיָּמִין תִּתְּנוּ תְרוּמָה לַכֹּהֵן מִזִּבְחֵי שַׁלְמֵיכֶם
Rashi comments: Shok refers to [the part of the animal’s hind leg extending] from the אַרְכּוּבָה [knee-joint, the bone and the flesh of which are usually] sold together with the head, up till the middle joint [of the upper leg] which is called רֶגֶל סֹבֶ שֶׁל. [The animal’s leg has three sections to it; thus, the שׁוֹק is the middle of those three sections.] In other words, shok is not the lower bone of the leg, but is the upper bone -- the thigh. The Pri Megadim, Mishna Berura, and Chazon Ish all conclude that a skirt must therefore cover at least from the knee and above, but below the knee is just a matter of minhag.

Things get tricky because Tosfos (Menachos 37) writes that human anatomy is different than animal anatomy and the shok on an animal does not correspond to what the shok is on a person. Tosfos writes that the shok is actually the lower part of the leg in people. The description of the term shok by the Bach (O.C. 75) as a place that if not for the chiddush din or ervah we would not consider prohibited to be exposed because it is normally covered in dirt seems to point to the lower foot as the area being discussed, not an area above the knee. Based on these sources some poskim (R' Vozner; the Chazon Ish also debates the proofs for this position) argue that a skirt should be much longer and cover far below the knee as well.

If the shiur of the Chazon Ish and Mishna Berura are good enough for you, your daughters may once in awhile find a skirt that passes muster in a regular store. If not, your daughters are pretty much limited to "frum" stores which cater to long skirt lengths.

In the school which my girls attend they are required to wear a uniform with a skirt that goes well below the knee, but they are also required to wear knee socks (socks which cover to the knee, not just the ankles) so that no part of the lower leg is exposed. My suspicion is that this is just a matter of conforming to what other similar schools set as their uniform rather than a formal psak. My impression is that the knee-sock rule is flaunted by most girls on weekends or outside school, but what really reinforces my belief that this is just a matter of uniform and not halacha is the fact that the school has Moros who wear sheer stockings or to cover their lower leg (below the knee). Obviously if you think a first grader needs to wear knee socks because the lower leg is ervah, then teachers who are religious role models should follow the same standard. (For the record, the Chazon Ish 16:8 writes that the age at which you start enforcing these rules depends on the maturity of the girl, so a first grader may have no halachic obligation to follow any of these rules to begin with.)

Monday, November 23, 2009

Eisav and Ya'akov kicking in the womb

At the beginning of Toldos the Torah relates that Yitzchak has married Rivka "bas Besuel haArami achos Lavan" and they have no children. Rashi explains that the Torah recounts Rivka's lineage to emphasize that in spite of growing up around a wicked father, a wicked brother, and in a neighborhood of evildoers, she rose above it all and became righteous. Why does this praise belong here at the opening of Toldos?

Later, Rivka is troubled by the pounding she feels in her womb. The Midrash explains what troubled her: When she passed a house of idolatry she felt the kicking of Eisav to get out; when she passed a beis medrash, she felt the kicking of Ya'akov to get out. Meforshim are bothered by this description. Chazal (Nidah 30) tell us that while a baby is in the womb it is taught the entire Torah by an angel. We can easily understand why Eisav would want out of such an environment, but why would Ya'akov be trying to get out? One of the answers given is that even with an angel doing the teaching, Torah cannot be learned properly or appreciated sitting next to an Eisav.

With this in mind perhaps we can answer our original question. The praise of Rivka for rising above the influence of her father, brother, and neighbors is (perhaps) a precursor to the parsha that follows. Why was Rivka so confused at the struggle in her womb? Because she understood why Eisav wanted to get out, but she could not understand why Ya'akov was kicking. If she could spiritually flourish surrounded by negative role models, why was Ya'akov, who was learning Torah from an angel, so anxious to get out just because his neighbor was Eisav?

For another insightful comment on the parsha, see my wife's blog here.

Friday, November 20, 2009

Alter of Novardok on Eisav's personality

We all know that Eisav is the bad guy in the parsha right from the outset, but if you just read the pesukim it's hard to figure out why. The facts: he looked red and hairy at birth, he was a man of the field, and next thing we know Ya’akov is trying to get him to surrender the bechorah for a pot of lentils. Rav Shteinman writes that the Torah succinctly says it all with the simple description “man of the field”. It’s not what Eisav did which is significant, but what he didn’t do. The dedication to worldly pursuits at the expense of being “yoshei ohalim” demonstrated a lack of caring for spiritual values. The Chasam Sofer cites the Hafla’ah who noted that Eisav is not just called “ish tzayid” but is “yodeya tzayid” -- “yode’a” in the Biblical sense means connecting with, not just having knowledge of. Eisav felt a connection with the world outside the Beis Midrash, not with what took place within its walls.

This emphasis on rejection of the hallowed study hall as the root of all evil will undoubtedly strike some as dismissive of those who do not have the fortitude to be "yosheiv ohalim". Is there no middle ground between the life of being "yosheiv ohalim" and becoming an Eisav? As Rav Hirsch seems to indicate, is it perhaps that lack of a middle ground that contributes to making Eisav in the first place? Leaving those questions for food for thought, I want to present an approach taken by the Alter of Novardok in Madreigas haAdam (Darkei haChaim ch 1-4) where he devotes a few chapters to the personality of Eisav and explaining why Yitchak wanted to bless him.

What made Ya'akov so sure that Eisav would sell him the birthright? Why did he even think the topic was open for discussion? When Eisav comes back from the field, it is a house of mourning that he enters. Rashi tells us that Ya'akov was cooking lentils because Avraham had died; lentils were a traditional food of mourning because they symbolically represent the circle of life and death that follows us all. Eisav takes no note of the context, the type of food and why it is being served, and instead just demands some of the "red stuff" in the pot. He does not see the situation beyond what the momentary demand of his appetite allowed for. The Alter explains that it is the failure to pause and take stock is the hallmark of Eisav. It's too late to attempt to learn mussar in the midst of a trying situation or after desire has taken over. Mussar is about cultivating the power to pause and appreciate a situation fully or to consider all the ramifications that follow from a choice before acting. Seeing that Eisav was governed by impulse and not given to reflection was the clue that the bechorah, the service in Mikdash which demanded discipline and sacrifice of immediate needs for long term reward, was not for Eisav.

We should not yet so easily dismiss Eisav as either lacking in emunah or not recognizing the value of the precious gift of bechorah which he held. As Rashi tells us, Eisav asked Ya'akov what the bechorah meant before surrendering it and it was only the demand to abstain from wine or suffer death for profaning the avodah which dissuaded Eisav from keeping his treasure. But why do we fault Eisav? Imagine the yeshiva bachur who decides he is just not cut out for learning and instead should pursue a lucrative career. He knows that learning has its rewards, but he also recognizes that a true Torah lifestyle of "pas b'melach tochal" has challenges which are not to be treated lightly. Should we fault the choice to give up the rewards given the assessment that the challenges and demands are too great?

Here the Alter has what I think is a profound insight. Were Eisav really honest with himself, he would acknowledge that it's not the threat of death for failure which dissuaded him from accepting the role of bechor -- it's the desire for that cup of wine. Any step upward in ruchniyus carries with it greater demands and responsibilities. It is easier to excuse ourselves as unworthy of lofty goals or not capable of rising to meet great challenges than to admit that it's the enjoyment of the position we are in now that weighs us down. Faced with the option of pursuing a lucrative career or spending a few more years learning, can a bachur say b'lev shaleim that the draw of money, the freedom to live a more relaxed religious lifestyle, the desire to see or be part of the world, etc. all play no role and have no influence on his decision of which path to pursue -- it's a purely disinterested and intellectually objective calculation? Or is he perhaps selling his bechorah for a cup of wine and using supposed lack of ability as an excuse? I am merely using this scenario as an example and do not mean to suggest that every decision to not stay in learning forever is wrong or a surrender to worldly temptation. The point is that objectivity is hard to maintain when an easy way out is present, and all kinds of good excuses and rationalizations that are not easy to penetrate can disguise lazy surrender as the greater good.

How can we tell if we are being honest with ourselves or just making excuses to remain in a comfort zone? After the sale Eisav despised the bechorah. Why? If I see a painting by Rembrandt or hear a symphony by Mozart I don't feel angry or jealous; I know these people have gifts which I lack. If the bechorah was not meant for Eisav, if he truly did not think he was fit for the position, then why the harsh reaction if someone else steps up to the plate? The difference is that while I know I am not Mozart or Rembrandt, Eisav in his heart knew that he did have the kochos hanefesh to be the true bechor and was just making excuses to allow himself to follow temptation. Seeing someone else with the same ability who offers no excuses but instead rises to meet the challenge is what grates on the nerves. If Ya'akov is the paradigm of truth, his opposite, Eisav, is a paradigm of falsehood. The false image of himself which Eisav shows his father is but a small lie compared to immense lie which he tells himself, the web of excuses disguised as objective calculation that he uses to justify pursuing a direction that he forever will regret.

What the Alter is trying to teach us is that we often fail (as he writes) not because emes is so hard, but because sheker is so easy. The inner struggle between ratzon and seichel can be won only only if we are willing to strip away the facade and look at ourselves and life in a brutally honest fashion.

Wednesday, November 18, 2009

the penalty of kofer

The value of a person can be pledged to the Mikdash (e.g. dmei ploni alay) and calculated based on the price a person would fetch on the slave market. The Mishna (Archin 20a) tells us that if the person who is the object of the pledge dies, the pledge cannot be redeemed because a person's worth as a servant cannot be calculated after death.

This halacha seem to contradict another din. If a shor mu'ad kills a person the owner must pay a penalty, kofer. There is a machlokes whether kofer is calculated based on the value of the mazik, the owner of the ox, or based on the value of the nizak, the person killed. If we can assess the value of the nizak after death for purposes of kofer, why can we not assess the value of a person for purposes of redeeming a pledge to the Mikdash?

Tosfos answers that in the case of kofer there is a special gezeiras hakasuv that allows and demands that an assessment of value be made. Rashi suggests a logical distinction between the cases. In the case of an ox which gores the owner becomes liable the instant the damage is done; the assessment is just a means of determining how much to pay. In the case of a pledge, the assessment itself creates the obligation to pay; it is not just a means of determining how much cost is involved.

Why does Tosfos resort to saying this is a gezeiras hakasuv instead of accepting Rashi’s logical distinction? Perhaps Tosfos holds that the obligation of kofer is not a natural result of the crime, but must exists only after the court assess the damage (the value of the nizak) and imposes its penalty.

Tuesday, November 17, 2009

the donkey of Rav Pinchas ben Yair

Yesterday we compared and contrasted the donkey of R’ Pinchas ben Yair, which would not eat prohibited food, with the camels of Avraham Avinu. Today I want to directly address this strange phenomenon of a donkey which does not eat ma’achalos asuros – how does this work and what can we learn from it?

The gemara (B.M. 85) tells of a fight between R’ Chanina and R’ Chiya. R’ Chanina warned R’ Chiya that he is not one to be trifled with – “If all the Torah were forgotten, I could restore it with my pilpul.” R’ Chiya was not fazed and replied that he is not one to be trifled with either – “I would ensure that Torah is never forgotten. I would first raise flax, then use the flax to weave nets; I would use the nets to catch fish, then use the fish to attract and capture deer; I would then use the hide of the deer to write books and the flesh of the deer to feed poor orphans. I would take the books I have written and go to a town and teach five children each one of the five books of chumash and then have them teach each other, and I would teach six children each an order of Mishna and then have them review with each other, and in this way the Torah would never be forgotten from the Jewish people."

Why did Rav Chiya have to plant the flax to make the nets to catch the fish to get the deer to write the books? Why not just go buy hides or paper? The Maharasha explains that we see from this gemara the importance ofnot just doing good deeds, but ensuring that the means which are used to accomplish them are pure and proper. Who knows where the paper in the store came from or why it was produced? But if you make it yourself, you know it was made l’shem shamayim. Rav Ya’akov Moshe Lesin, the former mashgiach of YU and talmid of Slabodka, adds in his Maor sheBaTorah that this goal even warrants the sacrifice of Rav Chiya’s own learning to bring it about.

The Shomer Emunim (Derush haEmunah ch. 7) quotes from early sources that there is a concept of “koach hapoel b’nifal”. A craftsman, for example, who makes an object is not divorced from the object once it is complete – something of the craftsman’s character, effort, motivation, soul remains with the object and defines its character as well. Were I to simply quote the Shomer Emunim’s advice in the name of the Ba’al Shem Tov not to read even Torah literature unless you know that the author is an upstanding individual because the identity of the author, the poel, can corrupt the book, the nifal, even if it contains only Torah thoughts, you might dismiss it as an overzealous stringency of chassidus. But the same sentiment is echoed by R’ Lesin, who writes in the name of R’ Chaim Volozhiner that a student who uses a sefer which happens to have been published by a non-G-d fearing individual will have less success in his learning. Why did davening and learning in the days of the gemara take place in a field? The GR”A suggests it is because the presence of impure motivation in building a study hall might corrupt the learning that is done later in that building.

While this idea may have you trembling a bit, there is a positive side as well. I am sure Rav Pinchas ben Yair rode his donkey for good reasons, l’shem mitzvah. And when you use something, even a donkey, chamor=chomriyus in general, for good reasons, it becomes invested with all the love and l’shem shamayim of its owner: koach hapoel b’nifal. Such a donkey is not one that can eat ma’achalos asuros. I don't think it is by accident either that Chazal highlight the donkey's behavior specifically with respect to its not eating food which did not have terumos and ma'sros taken off. What made the food in question prohibited is the mixture of that which we can eat with that which must be given to the kohen or levi. A donkey whose master does not tolerate a mixture of motives is a donkey which will not eat a mixed up jumble of issur and heter either.

And if you need a little more of a boost, remember that Hashem is “machadesh b’tuvo” all of creation every single day. Think of the koach ha’poel all of the world is invested with – if only we pay attention and tap into it.

The madreigos the Shomer Emunim is speaking of, or R’ Chaim Volozhiner is speaking of, are far above where most of us are holding. I don’t think anyone would suggest that you start making your own paper instead of buying a notebook, but we can still glean something from these ideals in terms of our behavior. I recently heard a Rosh Yeshiva thank the accountant who watched the yeshiva’s books for making sure that although they were trying to raise money for a building, everything was done on the up-and-up. This is R’ Chaiya’s principle in action. The Rosh Yeshiva could easily divorce himself from how the bricks and mortar get there and focus on the benefit of saying a shiur to a larger audience in a more spacious environment, but whether we sense it or not, somehow that shiur would be a different shiur.

Monday, November 16, 2009

did Avraham's camels need a muzzle?

When Eliezer arrives at Rivka's home he removed the muzzles from his camels so they could eat. Rashi explains that the Torah deliberately calls our attention to this detail to emphasize that Avraham’s camels traveled with their muzzles on to prevent their eating neighbors’ crops.

Another opinion in the Midrash challenges this view. Certainly Avraham’s camels were no less holy than the donkey of Rav Pinchas ben Yair, which refused food which did not have ma’aser properly taken. There was no need to muzzle Avraham’s camels because they could be relied on not to eat stolen food.

In defense of the first view, the meforshim on the Midrash and meforshei Rashi explain that while the camels could be depended on to miraculously not eat stolen food, that does not absolve Avraham and Eliezer from taking proper precautions. Ain somchin al hanes – we do not rely on miracles, even ones that we know will occur. But why then does the second view argue? What is the point of disagreement between the two sides?

The gemara tells us just as Hashem protects R’ Pinchas ben Yair’s donkey from sin, kal v’chomer Hashem protects tzadikim from coming to sin. Tosfos (Gittin 7a) quotes Rabeinu Tam’s view that this special protection applies only to ma’achalos asuros, but not to other sins. Other Rishonim disagree (see the Otzar Meforshei haTalmud). Perhaps the debate between the two views in the Midrash hinges on this issue. Stolen food is not the same as ma’achalos asuros, as the food is intrinsically permitted; it is the prohibition of theft which places it off limits.

If you want to go a step further, perhaps you might argue that the debate arises specifically in this case where there is an act of achila but an issur gezel (or mazik) – is extra protection afforded because a ma’aseh achila is being done, or does it depend on the chalos of the issur, which is gezel? Along these same lines, Tosfos explains that there is no protection afforded where the issur involved is only derabbanan. Perhaps this indicates that an issur derabbanan done b'shogeg is not an issur at all (because lo tasur is violated only by an act of deliberate rebellion), or perhaps one might explain that even though the act done is one of achila, since the issur violated is the more general lo tasur, no protection is afforded.

The question of how to understand the exemption of ones arises in a number of sugyos. Is an issur done b’ones considered a ma’aseh aveira for which there is no punishment, or is it not even considered a ma’aseh aveira? Rav Yosef Engel (Beis haOtzar #25) writes that a nafka mina between these views would be whether Hashem protects a tzadik from an issur b’ones. I wonder if I am missing something, because it seems that there is a major limitation on this nafka mina. According to Tosfos, Hashem’s protection is limited to cases of ma’achalos asuros, yet misa’aek b’chalavim v’arayos is chayav because of the hana’ah received – i.e. even if one accidentally b’ones ate ma’achalos assuros, one would still be chayav. Of course Hashem’s protection would extend to a case where the act results in a chiyuv. I’ll leave it to the comments for someone to work out a chiluk between ones and misasek (Shu”t RAK”E #7?) or come up with a case that is ones but not misasek.

Friday, November 13, 2009

cause and effect

Getting to Chayei Sarah, a few quick ideas on this short Friday:

1) The pasuk first describes Lavan as running to greet Eliezer (24:29 - vayaratz...) but then continues the description of the scene (24:30) by telling us "vayavo el haish", he approached Eliezer. The Meshech Chochma suggests that the reason Lavan ran to greet Eliezer was because he mistakenly thought that Eliezer was there to invite him to be Avraham’s son-in-law. The gemara darshens (Baba Basra 16b) the pasuk, “Hashem beirach es Avraham bakol,” to mean that Avraham also had a daughter. Lavan assumed what better match for this girl than himself! However, as the parsha continues, “When he saw the ring and the bracelet…” which Eliezer had given Rivka, it dawned on Lavan that it was not he who Eliezer had come for, but rather his sister. Lavan immediately slowed down, no longer running with the same show of enthusiasm.

There is an element of self-centeredness to Lavan's reaction. Perhaps this is why later the parsha speaks of the dialogue between Eliezer and "Lavan and Besuel," mentioning Lavan even before his own father. Lavan's ego craved being the center of attention. If he could not gain fulfillment for that need through being the object of Eliezer's interest, he would fulfill it by managing the negotiations.

We often hear about the danger of negiyos, but like all kochos hanefesh, there is a positive side to negiyos as well. Look at the zerizus Lavan showed when he thought Eliezer was there for him! The Shomeir Emunim writes that even the greatest tzadikim at times lose their motivation, kal v'chomer the rest of us. There is nothing wrong with contemplating the gadlus and reward that comes from Torah -- what's in it for us -- as a means to regain that motivation.

2) Meforshim (Seforno, Kli Yakar, Ishbitza) explain that when Yitzchak went out to the field to daven (as Chazal explain the pasuk), his intent was to pray for the shidduch that was in the works. He looked up and saw the approaching camels and there was Rivka, his bride. Hashem responds to our tefilos before they even escape our lips -- terem nikra'u v'ani e'eneh.

But was it really Yitzchak's davening, or intent to daven, which caused his shidduch to be brought to fruition? Wasn't it the efforts of Avraham in sending Eliezer (which Yitzchak seems to have played no role in) and Eliezer's efforts in carrying out his mission which were the crucial ingredients? Yitzchak's tefilah after the job was over seems too little too late to have made any difference. Imagine the askanim and ba'alei batim who get together and raise funds and build a shul and along comes the Rov and says a kapitel of tehillim before cutting the ribbon on the front door -- thanks, but we could have done it without you.

Apparently the whole chaim of events, starting with Avraham's charge to Eliezer, was in fact all caused by Hashem preparing a response to Yitzchak's tefilah. It is that one kapitil of tehillim at the end which brings together all the people and money and ingredients to build the shul (which in no way diminishes their efforts).

Along the same lines, Rashi comments earlier in the parsha that the words "yosheiv" in the pasuk "Efron yosheiv b'toch bnei Cheis" is written missing a vav because Efron was appointed leader on that very day so that negotiations with Avraham would be done through a distinguished person. Rav Shteinman writes based on the Matnos Kehunah that the Midrash does not mean to celebrate the deference which the Bnei Cheis showed to Avraham, but rather the pasuk is celebrating the effect which Avraham's presence had on the Bnei Cheis. Even though Efron would otherwise not have deserved to be made leader, the kavod which Avraham deserved caused his appointment to occur. Tzadikim have a spiritual impact that shapes events in the physical world (as the Nefesh haChaim discusses at great length.)

more on what made the akeidah unique

As a follow up to last week's post on the test of the akeidah I was privileged to have received the following summary of a sicha of the Lubavitcher Rebbe (Likkutei Sichos Vol. 20 p. 73-78)from R.A. (thank you!) and am posting it here. I would just add (specifically to answer the question in parenthesis) to also see R' Tzadok in Pri Tzadik at the end of Lech Lecha who also contrasts the early tests of Avraham with the akeidah, but we have to save that for another time as we're up to Chayei Sarah already.

The Rebbe asks the question asked by many commentaries as to why it says that if Avraham failed the test of the Akeidah 'people would say the first tests were meaningless' - how could this be so, especially considering that the test of the Akeidah was such a difficult one.

The Rebbe prefaces by quoting the question of the Sefer Haikkarim (3:36) as to why we constantly quote the story of the Akeidah more than all the other kedoshim who gave their lives Al kiddush Hashem like R. Akiva and his colleagues and all the kedoshim in every generation (and one can't say that it is due that to give ones' child up demands more self-sacrifice than to
give up ones' own life, because also in later generation there was Chana and her seven sons (see Gemara Gittin 77b) as well as the instances throughout history where many others have done the same).

The Sefer Haikkarim answers by quoting Breishis Rabbah (66:10) that there was nothing 'forcing' Avraham to do what Hashem had asked him, as he could have said to Hashem that earlier he had been promised that through Yitzchak he would become a nation etc., yet nevertheless he said 'I didn't challenge your intentions' (kivashti es rachami vloh hirhari acharei midosecha). [The Ran in his drashos (no. 6) mentions this point in the context as to why
Hashem used the expression 'please' when speaking to Avraham, because it was a request as opposed to a command]. On the other hand the kedoshim who gave their lives throughout history did it on the basis of a command (Venikdashti btoch bnei yisroel - Emor 22:32)

This answer however is problematic for two reason: a) When Hashem Himself requests something its definitely a 'hechrech' and b) amongst those who gave their lives their were many who did so under circumstances in which they were not required to according to Torah.

The Rebbe answers by saying that the difference by Avraham was that he was the first one to have self-sacrifice, and by his act he opened up the gates, so to speak, for all others to be have self-sacrifice after him. In a spiritual sense this 'opening of the gates' required a much greater level of self-sacrifice than anyone else that came after him.

(There is another question on this in regards to the fact that Avraham seemingly had such self-sacrifice previously by the test of Ur Casdim but we will leave that for now.)

One could argue however, that seemingly we see that the concept of self-sacrifice also exists by the other nations of the world; they also seem to be capable of giving up their lives for the sake of their beliefs? The answer is that the true concept of self-sacrifice is - the sacrifice of the 'self'. In other words it very possible that a person would give up their life on the basis of a calculation that they stand to gain (even in death) a certain sense of fame or proving their point. This is a 'calculated' self-sacrifice. The true concept of self-sacrifice is that one gives himself entirely over to Hashem without any calculations etc. - one is totally nullified to Hashem's will, whatever it may be. The self sacrifice that Avraham had at Ur casdim was a public one in a sense, it was in connection to Avraham's desire to spread the belief in Hashem in the world as he had been doing until then, to the point that he was willing to give up his life. However in the Akeidah, the self-sacrifice was not about anything that he believed in or stood for, rather it was simply following the command of Hashem. As the Ibn Ezra points out 'at the time that he tied up his son no one was there'. (see note 40, 41 in the sicha). In fact the whole episode was contrary to Avraham's desire to spread Hashem's name in the world, because this was only to have continued through his son who he was about to sacrifice!

This was the unique quality of the Akeidah - It had absolutely no place in intellect or logic, rather it was purely about fulfilling the will of Hashem, which is the true definition of self-sacrifice.

This answers why the Gemara says that 'people would say that the first tests were meaningless', because had Avraham failed it would have shown that he had only passed the first tests because of his own nature, his own (holy) interests. However once he passed the test of the Akeidah, which required him to do something that had no intellectual basis and made absolutely no
sense, to the point that it contradicted everything he stood for, only then it became evident (and proven retro-actively in regards to his previous tests) that it had not been his own 'calculations' that had driven him to self-sacrifice but rather it was simply him fulfilling Hashem's will.

Wednesday, November 11, 2009

the akeidah: the only test?

Rashi (22:2) writes that Hashem used the term “na”, please, in commanding the akeidah because Hashem begged Avraham not to fail so as to not provide the people of the world with an excuse to say this failure proves the first tests meaningless and Avraham and his religion are a failure. It is remarkable that people might even consider dismissing the rest of Avraham's accomplishments and legacy if he should fail to meet the demanding test of the akeidah, but we know that's how people are. As I commented recently on someone else's blog, a talmid chacham could spend years learning and teaching Torah and all that good can be undermined and dismissed if the individual makes even one strange comment that gets noticed and broadcast --the yotzei min haklal becomes the definition of the klal. Anyway, getting back on topic, I don't think Rashi here means to say that the only reason G-d wanted Avraham to succeed was l'afukei his detractors (as some interpret), but rather in addition to all the good reasons we would expect G-d should want Avraham to succeed the word "na" clues us into an additional factor at play here.

Rav Shteinman in Ayeles HaShachar raises the rather pragmatic question of how people might draw any conclusion from Avraham's response to the akeidah -- who knew about the test and who would know whether Avraham passed or failed? He therefore concludes that Rashi does not mean to say others will literally question Avraham if he fails, but rather the one blot on an almost-perfect record would cry out for correction. You don't get as much credit for the 99 successes as the blame you get for that one failure.

Rav Shteinman goes yet a step further and writes that all the previous successes were not true tests as they did not pose a challenge for someone on Avraham's level. The akeidah was the one and only true test of Avraham's character (I would note that the word "nisah", test, is used only here and not earlier in the Torah [see Netz"iv]), and therefore, success here was critical.

I want to contrast R' Shteinman's approach with that of the Arugas haBosem. The Midrash notes that the test of the akeidah and the first test which Avraham faced, the test of leaving his home, are both introduced with the words, "lech lecha". Given the similarity of expression, the Midrash seems to equate the two tests and asks which was greater. The answer -- the akeidah was greater -- is obvious and not nearly as surprising as the fact that a question and hava amina to think otherwise was raised in the first place. The Arugas haBosem explains that objectively speaking the akeidah is certainly the greater test, as the Midrash concludes. However, G-d's tests are calibrated to the level and ability of each individual. The test of leaving home may very well have been as challenging to an Avraham early in his relationship with G-d as the test of the akeidah was to an Avraham who was already mature in his religious development. It's not the objective accomplishment alone which counts in G-d's eyes; l'fum tza'ara agra -- its the effort and progress of the individual relative to their ability and gifts which count as well.

These two approaches are not mutually exclusive. We each have a task and goal for which we were placed in this world; whether we passed that test and did or did not achieve that goal is a significant question. But at the same time, achieving that goal may require overcoming numerous hurdles and obstacles, each of which drives development to the next stage and each of which is an accomplishment in its own right.

Tuesday, November 10, 2009

can angels eat meat that's not really meat?

Rashi explains based on the gemara (Baba Metziya 86) that although angels cannot eat, the angels who came to Avraham pretended to eat so as to not deviate from the normal practice of the community. The lesson for us is to blend in when blending in is appropriate. However, Tosfos on that sugya quotes the Midrash that contrary to the gemara's assumption, the angels did in fact eat. It is hard to say that there is a machlokes in "metziyus" whether angels can or cannot eat, so there must be some other explanation of what the underlying issue here is. I once tried to explain the gemara's position based on the view that the angels came on Pesach and matzah was served. The process of making matzah, turning raw wheat into a finished baked product, represents the sanctification of the physical world, a process angels are removed from and incapable of engaging in. Rav Shteinman in his Ayeles haShachar explains the two views as disagreeing over whether an angel can adopt a physical body for the purpose of fulfilling a mission or not. I'm not sure how much this adds to our understanding of the issue, as it begs the follow up question of why an angel can or cannot an angel appear in physical form -- in other words, the basis for that dispute -- which seems to bring us full circle back to where we started.

My wife's grandfather, R' Dov Yehudah Shochet, apparently (the return letter is published, but not the letter he sent) suggested in a different context that the machlokes Rishonim whether angels have a body or not (which I am not familiar with) can be explained as being no machlokes at all because it all depends on what the meaning of the word "body" is. Yes, angels have a body if you mean some type of spiritual envelope for their presence, but no, angels do not have a body if you mean a physical form. The Lubavitcher Rebbe replied to this letter with proof from the Rambam that no body means no body, i.e. no form whatsoever. Perhaps this machlokes is reflected in the differing views of the gemara and Midrash.

The Rishonim and Achronim discuss how Avraham could have served milk and meat to his guests when Chazal tell us that he obeyed the entire Torah even before it was given. The Da'as Zekeinim answers simply that the milk was served first followed by the meat. There are numerous other creative answers. Malbi"M writes that the cow served was no ordinary cow, but was an animal created through kabbalistic means using sefer yetzirah. Proof comes from the pasuk itself -- "es habakar asher asah," the cow which was made, not just prepared. The assumption is that this type of cow is not really meat and can be eaten together with milk. When discussing this at home the suggestion came up that these different views may help explain the difference between the gemara and Midrash (this is obviously speculative). If the meat served was physical beef, as the Da'as Zekeinim understood, then it is no wonder angels could not eat it, but if the beef was mystical beef created with the sefer yetzira, perhaps this type of food might be on the menu even of an angel.

On a final tangential note, the Malbi"m's assumption that meat created miraculously does not have the properties of what we call meat reminded me of a famous kashe of R' Chaim Brisker. The Beis Yosef asks why we celebrate Chanukah for eight days when there was enough oil for one day. One answer is that the jug of oil miraculously refilled itself each day, including the first, upon being emptied. R' Chaim questions why this miraculously created oil was acceptable for use in the menorah when the Torah demands that specifically olive oil be used. Miracle oil may look, taste, and feel like olive oil, but it did not come from olives! I saw another blogger discuss this recently and will leave you with the link and something to mull over as we get closer to Chanukah.

Monday, November 09, 2009

chinuch for chessed

Rashi writes that Avraham fulfilled the mitzvah of chinuch by giving Yishmael the job of preparing the meat for this guests who arrived (18:7). The Minchas Chinuch (264) questions whether chinuch applies only to a mitzvah chiyuvis, e.g. tefillin, lulav, which the child will inevitably be bound to perform when he becomes an adult, or does it also apply to mitzvos like aveilus, which may a person may never have to observe in his lifetime. Rav Shteinman in his Ayeles haShachar uses this aRashi as a source to prove that chinuch applies even to a non-chiyuvis mitzvah. I’m a bit surprised. Why is chessed defined as non-chiyuvis because guests and people in need don't show up every day and may not show up at all? Instead of looking at chessed as being reactive, shouldn't we be proactive and seek out opportunities to do kindness?

Another point to consider is that Rabeinu Manoch (Hil. Shvisas Asor 2:10) suggests based on the wording of the Rambam that in addition to how to perform specific mitzvos, chincuh also encompases a more general obligation to see that a child grows into a Torah observant Jew. Perhaps when Rashi refers to chinuch he means it in this global sense of inculcating Yismael with the value system which Avraham lived by.

Aside from the chinuch of Yishmael, there is an interesting Seforno that suggests that the environment of Avraham's home already impacted Yitzchak. Why did these angels need to visit when Avraham had already been told by Hashem that he would have children? The Seforno answers that they came to tell Sarah the good news so that she would also be happy and give thanks to Hashem, "k'dei she'yehiyeh ha'obar shaleim", so that the child would be "complete." It's not just the mother's mood, the feeling of simcha, which would contribute to Yitzchak's sheleimus, but it is Sarah's giving thanks to Hashem which would spiritually set the tone for his future.