Tuesday, April 27, 2010
the limits of Rambam's rationalism
The book's title is a misnomer for a number of reasons, the first of which is that it is less about Maimonides than a screed aimed at those who take issue with Rabbi Angel’s point of view. He describes his opponents as fundamentalists, obscurantists, authoritarian, and superstitious, while seldom offering quotes or examples that would support such claims. On the other hand, as I will explain next post, he lets pass without comment the most strained readings so long as they can be used in support of his own position. Not only is criticism aimed at those who clearly identify with the right-wing, but even the OU is chastised (p. 109) for the their setting up a service whereby people could request that Torah scholars recite psalms for them and insert a kvitel in the kosel on their behalf. Rabbi Angel questions, “Doesn’t Judaism believe that G-d is always present and listening everywhere?” I wonder what purpose Rabbi Angel’s synagogue serves when G-d could just as easily be approached in a public park on in the confines of one’s den. Not only are modern thinkers and organizations the subject of Rabbi Angel's ire, but even the words of the Gaon of Vilna are described as “shocking examples of a defective, superstition worldview.” (p. 101)
There are a number of flaws with Rabbi Angel’s approach.
The first question that we need to address is whether a philosophy of Judaism can be constructed based purely on rational metaphysics. To Rabbi Angel’s credit, he repeatedly concedes that the answer is a resounding No. For example, in describing how one gets from the philosophical G-d of first cause to the personal G-d of Judaism, Rabbi Angel explains that the “Rambam required us to make a ‘leap of faith.’” (p. 27) He further elaborates, “Although Rambam was a rationalistic philosopher, he understood that not all truth was attainable through the efforts of human reason.” (p. 31) Rabbi Angel coins the term “meta-reason” to describe these areas where we must fall back on sources other than our intellect. We know these areas of “meta-reason” to be true, “…because we have an authoritative tradition of revelation and because we personally experience it to be true.” (p. 34) Even with respect to proof of G-d’s existence, Rabbi Angel shies away from philosophical proofs and writes that, “We don’t need to prove G-d’s existence; we feel His presence and we know He is there.” (p. 37) On the role of tradition, Rabbi Angel notes that Rambam’s “…willingness to rely on faith in the biblical and rabbinic tradition need not be seen as a “compromise” with reason, but as an open-eyed admission of the limits of reason.” (p. 65)
Given this direction, one is left wondering why Rabbi Angel is so harshly dismissive of those with whom he disagrees. The Hareidi world does not reject the use of reason in toto, but instead simply takes a stronger position on its limits. Would Rabbi Angel describe the Vilna Gaon’s Judaism as lacking in “intellectual vibrancy,” the term he seems to reserve only for his own brand of Rambam-inspired rationalism? That such a description strikes us as absurd demonstrates the falsity of attempting to equate rejection of the Rambam with irrational extremism. Once one accepts that we are not dealing with a question of either/or, but rather of finding a proper balance between reason and "meta-reason", labeling those who take a different view than one's own as "fundamentalists" seems itself to be a critique grounded in personal opinion rather than intellectual substance.
The main thesis of the book is that Rambam's rationalism was tempered by tradition and therefore falls short of Spinoza's more extreme formulation. One cannot help but sense that his own thesis undercuts Rabbi Angel's own claims of following in the Rambam's footsteps. Might not his right wing opponents claim that it is they, in keeping to this spirit of moderation against the forces of pure reason, who are in fact the true heirs to the Rambam's legacy?
Rabbi Angel himself notes that “Rambam’s attempt to harmonize the Torah’s teaching with Aristotelian philosophy rings false – and unnecessary – to modern readers… We may be more skeptical about what is a ‘rationally proven truth’; various philosophical and scientific ‘truths’ of one generation have later been shown to be flawed and incorrect by subsequent generations.” (p. 50) One could not ask for a better explanation for the hesitancy to reinterpret Torah simply to fit what passes for intellectual fancy.
The elephant in the room that escapes notice entirely is the question of why Rabbi Angel is so enamored of the Rambam to the exclusion of so many other important views of Rishonim and Achronim. If the barometer of truth is not pure philosophy but rather, “authoritative tradition… and because we personally experience it to be true,” to quote Rabbi Angel himself, are not the views of the Gaon, the Ramban, the Ba’al Shem, or any others which have found a place in tradition and inspire far more significant numbers of Jews than the Guide equally important and meaningful?
Monday, April 26, 2010
ahavas yisrael - klal gadol batorah
Putting aside Rashi, the more basic question that begs asking is what Rabbi Akiva's point is. Hopefully we pay attention to the little details of halacha as well as the big principles, so what is gained by describing the mitzvah as a "klal gadol baTorah"? We've touched on this one as well (here). Chassidus (e.g. see Ch 32 of Tanya) connects the mitzvah of loving one's fellow Jew with the mitzvah of loving G-d -- where is G-d found in the world if not in the heart and soul of one's Jewish brother? We know that every Jewish soul has its roots in a letter of the Torah. Loving one's fellow Jew is thus not merely a matter of civility, but is a "klal...baTorah", a means of expressing one's connection and love for G-d and Torah as well.
Rav Shternbruch offers another answer that I thought was very powerful. There is a tendency to separate the mitzvah of ahavas yisrael from other religious obligations. This bifurcation leads to two errors. Firstly, there are those who think being a good Jew entails no more than being a good person-- it's all about tikun olam, being a nice person, etc. You can enjoy your tarfus so long as you lead a socially redeeming life. Rabbi Akiva taught that "V'ahavta l'rei'acha" has meaning only if it is a klal gadol baTorah, if it exists in the context of a commitment to other Torah obligations.
Secondly, and this is the flipside of Rav Shternbruch's point, it unfortunately doesn't take too much searching to find stories of those who think of themselves as bnei Torah who put on a poor demonstration of ahavas yisrael (and kav v'chomer non-Jews). Just as one cannot accept civility or ethics as stand-alone values divorced from other Torah precepts, one cannot be a medakdek in mitzvos without a committment to being medakdek in ahavas yisrael. Civility is not merely about social norma, but is a klal gadol baTorah, an integral component of one's religious persona.
Friday, April 23, 2010
R' Shimon Shkop on Kedoshim Te'hiyu
The Midrash asks a difficult to understand question on this command “kedoshim te’hiyu”: “yachol kamoni?” – is one obligated to be holy as much as G-d is holy? The Midrash answers that indeed, that is impossible, but we must be holy as much as people can be. How are we to make sense of this hava amina either according to Rashi or the Ramban? What does separation for arayot, or separation from indulgence, have to do with G-d?
R’ Shimon Shkop in his introduction to Sha’arei Yosher (text in Hebrew and in translation by R’ Micha Berger here) uses this Midrash as a basis to propose a different definition of kedusha. In a word, R’ Shimon equates kedusha with selflessness. Just as G-d acts as creator not for his own ends, but simply for the sake of the world, so too, we must dedicate ourselves to acting for the sake of others rather than our own needs.
But why then is mankind endowed with such strong feelings of self-love and ego? Rotzeh adam b’kav she’lo yoseir m’tisha kabin shel chaveiro! R’ Shimon answers that this trait of self love is also a necessary ingredient for achieving kedusha. A small person’s self-love will focus only on his/her selfish needs. However, a great person identifies with the community and the world. He/She attains self-fulfillment through the betterment of society as a whole. Society’s needs become their personal needs and agenda, motivating them to do great deeds on behalf of others.
It is this idea of kedusha as selflessness which the Midrash is addressing. As much as one strives for this G-dlike level of kedusha in selflessly serving the needs of others, by virtue of one’s humanity there will always still remain a tinge of selfishness, a lo lishma that is unavoidable.
Kedusha in R' Shimons' lexicon is not a synonym for withdrawal from the world. Quite the contrary. Kedusha demands that we engage in perfecting the world, and in doing so we achieve self-perfection as well.
Thursday, April 22, 2010
rechilus vs. lo ta'amod al dam rei'echa: protecting others from harm or protecting the accused
The Netziv captures in these few lines the tension between competing values that I don't think we as a community have fully figured out a way to resolve. Unfortunately the topic is far too often relevant to current events. A newspaper story or blog post appears about some person, often an individual of note, who is accused of crime: How do we ensure that the accused is not unjustly slandered and made the victim of baseless rumor while at the same time avoiding silence in the face of potential criminal action? How do we balance our obligation to respect the rights of the not-yet-proven-guilty with our obligation to protect the innocent from harm? When details of the sordid details are published, do we close our eyes and ears under the guise of avoiding rechilus, or do we spread the word based on lo ta'amod al dam rei'echa?
Wednesday, April 21, 2010
I now know what a mumar l'hach'is is
Maybe that can cater going-off-the-derech parties or something. I read the blog but am missing the "thinly veiled threats" that Joshie sees; my guess is that they are a product of an attention-starved imagination looking to create a certain rebellious image. I imagine that Joshie and others stuffing their faces with bacon represents a lashing out at religion, particularly if done within view of Hassidic Jews who represent the antithesis of their supposed freedom from the shackles of superstition. Pity is really a more appropriate response than threats. The owner's mother, who tries to keep kosher at home but lets the rules slide when outside according to the article, asked her son whether he really had to name the place Traif. He responded that he did because, "It represents who I am [and] I'm proud of who I am.""If this was 10 years ago, there's no way his windows would not be broken," said Joshie, who felt the need to support Traif in its opening week when he read negative comments on Traif's blog that he viewed as "thinly veiled" threats from the nearby Orthodox community. Joshie's two friends—one of whom is the son of a prominent rabbi and who ate non-kosher for the first time nearly a year ago in Las Vegas with Penn & Teller—said the food was truly special, far beyond their expectations. Joshie himself said he owes the owners for a touching evening, which he described as "getting off on a psychological level," and he added that he is interested in talking with the owners about hosting a meet-up of similarly disoriented former Orthodox Jews at the restaurant once a week.
I now understand better the gemara's distinction between types of mumrim: to enjoy the bacon is a mumar l'teyavon; to name the restaurant Traif is a mumar l'hach'is.
yishuv ha'aretz: chovas ha'gavra or mitzvah in the cheftza of the land?
My wife raised a good question regarding this chiddush and the mitzvah of yishuv ha'aretz. Assuming one is already living in Eretz Yisrael, is there a chovas hagavra to personally undertake activities for the sake of yishuv ha'aretz, or does yishuv ha'aretz simply mean that the cheftza of the land must be developed? For example, let's say a person living in Eretz Yisrael wants a new home -- does yishuv ha'aretz mean the individual is personally obligated to build that house (assuming he knows how), or does yishuv ha'aretz simply mean that there is a mitzvah for the home to get built, irrespective of who does it (Arab labor?) or how it gets done?
The chiddush of the Chasam Sofer hangs in the balance. If yishuv ha'aretz is just a chiyuv in the cheftza of the land to be developed, but there is no personal obligation to actually do the building, it cannot be compared to the mitzvah of tefillin. One cannot hire someone else or even appoint a shliach to don tefillin on one's behalf; it is the act of donning the tefillin on one's own body which the Torah demands. Is it similarly the act of building or farming which constitutes yishuv ha'aretz, or is it simply accomplishing the end result of having the land developed? If all that matters is the end result, it is hard to see why Rabbi Yishmael would allow for an interruption from Torah study when one can hire workers or accomplish that same result in some other way.
What makes this a tricky question is that yishuv ha'aretz is a multi-layered mitzvah. When we speak of yishuv ha'aretz in the sense of moving to Eretz Yisrael, the mitzvah obviously entails a chovas hagavra. You can't appoint a shliach to move to Eretz Yisrael and fulfill yishuv ha'aretz on your behalf. Yet, when we speak of yishuv ha'aretz in the sense of building and developing the land, it seems that the focus is on the end result, not the personal participation.
Tuesday, April 20, 2010
the mitzvah of orlah: talmud Torah and yishuv ha'Aretz
וכי תבואו אל הארץ ונטעתם כל עץ מאכל הדא הוא דכתיב: (משלי ג)עץ חיים היא למחזיקים בה. אמר רב הונא בשם ר' אחא: שלא יהיו דברי תורה בעיניך, כאדם שיש לו בת בוגרת והוא רוצה להשיאה לאחד, אלא (שם ב)בני אם תקח אמרי ומצותי תצפון
אתך, אם יש לך זכות קח אמרי
אילו נאמר עץ חיים היא לעמלים בה לא היתה תקומה לשונאי ישראל, אלא למחזיקים. אילו נאמר אשר לא ילמד לא היתה תקומה לשונאי ישראל, אלא (דברים כז)אשר לא יקים את כל דברי התורה הזאת, לכך נאמר: עץ חיים היא למחזיקים בה
What does the planting of fruit trees have to do with Torah study? One can take a mystical approach and read the Midrash as associating the idea of planting trees with the idea of the eitz hachaim and eitz hada'as. Torah study, the eitz hachaim, is the means of redeeming the world from the original sin caused by Adam first partaking of the eitz hada'as. The Midrash's meaning is entirely symbolic -- our task is to replant the eitz chaim, to return it to primacy.
However, the Midrash can also be understood in a way that does not rob planting of its concrete meaning (see Shem m'Shmuel). The lesson is that entering the land, planting trees and developing Eretz Yisrael, is an inseparable mission from that of learning and supporting Torah. A Torah based society can only be achieved in the physical boundaries of Eretz Yisrael, and Eretz Yisrael can only successfully be built with spiritual goals in mind.
The Chasam Sofer famously comments that the dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and R' Shimon bar Yochi (Brachos 35) over how to balance the obligation of Torah study with the need to plant and tend the field (i.e. to make a living) applies only in chutz la'aretz. In Eretz Yisrael, all would agree that one may and must tend to the fields as this is the mitzvah of yishuv ha'aretz. In light of our Midrash I would not take the Chasam Sofer's conclusion to mean that Eretz Yisrael demands an unavoidable concession to bitul Torah, but rather quite the reverse -- in Eretz Yisrael alone those occupations which would otherwise be considered bitul Torah take on the positive value of being the means of being machzik Torah.
Last night I went to learn for a bit and daven ma'ariv at a local Beis Medrash which treats yesterday and today as any other day, as is the common practice in most yeshivos. A local synagogue had a celebration marking Yom ha'Atzmaut, but that local synagogue does not have a thriving beis medrash where people learn every night. There are gardeners tending to the planting of trees and celebrating their growth, and there are those who are sitting and being machzik Torah and learning Torah, but sadly, these worlds rarely intersect. Our Midrash sees them as ideally going hand in hand.
The fruit of a tree may not be eaten for three years until the tree develops and grows. The fruits of the spiritual and physical rebuilding of Eretz Yisrael are still immature, but it's never to early to express our hakaras hatov for their renewel and to remind ourselves of the ideals that motivate our efforts.
Friday, April 16, 2010
the peddler and Rav Yanai
We’ve discussed this Midrash before, but I want to add a little point (a little break from the heavy topic of miktzas ha'yom k'kulo). Everyone asks what impressed Rav Yanai so much -- all the peddler did was read a pasuk -- but I want to start with a simpler question before getting to that concluding line. You would think that in wandering from town to town and delivering this shpiel this peddler would have memorized his lines and have his act down cold. Why then does the Midrash specifically mention that the peddler, "hotzi sefer Tehillim...," he took out his Tehillim to read the pasuk? Even if you don't know the song, surely this one pasuk is not too much to remember by heart when you repeat it so many times?
But that gufa I think is the point. Even though this peddler went from town to town doing the same shtick over and over, even though he probably knew that pasuk backwards as well as forwards, every time he gave his performance he pulled out that sefer Tehillim and he read the pasuk again as if it was the very first time he was seeing it.
This explains Rav Yanai's astonishment as well. Rav Yanai of course knew the pasuk before the peddler taught it, but it was precisely because he knew it so well that he had the most to learn from the peddler. Who gives a second though to what they know cold? Who sees the words of Hodu, of Ashrei, of Shmoneh Esrei as fresh, as inspiring, as meaningful, when we see these same words every day, multiple times a day, and know them backwards and forwards? You want to see davening? Walk into a first grade classroom and watch the kids slowly read pesukim that we could recite in our sleep. Rav Yanai saw "hotzi sefer Tehillim" to read a simple pasuk and realized that even though he knows that pasuk cold, he can still read it with a sense of wonder and excitement as if he had never heard it before.
The lesson of the peddler is not just about how to read pesukim. As we know, the affliction of leprosy came as a punishment for slander, gossip, evil speech. Of course there is harm in speaking ill of a coworker, neighbor, friend, but even worse is speaking badly to a spouse, a child, someone one is close to. Often in these cases one does not even give the words a second thought; we take the attention and forbearance of those we are speaking to for granted. Hotzi sefer tehillim means not letting words go stale and unnoticed; it means greeting one's spouse on the 10,000th time walking through the front door with the same tone and expression that you used during sheva brachos week. This is a very high level to reach, one which I make no claims to being near to achieving myself. But at least this Shabbos we can pause a moment to think about the lesson of the peddler and Rav Yanai and try to point ourselves in the right direction.
Thursday, April 15, 2010
miktzas ha'yom k'kulo (II)
1) The gemara (Nazir 5-6) has a debate between Rav Masna and Bar Pada whether stam nezirus is 29 or 30 days long, meaning whether the nazir would shave on day 30 or day 31. However, the gemara concludes that Rav Masna who holds stam nezirus is 30 days (= day 31 is haircut day) also holds that miktzas ha’yom k’kulo; therefore the nazir is yotzei (b’dieved) even if he shaved on day 30. If both opinions hold that a nazir is yotzei if he shaves on day 30, what then is the difference between them? The meforesh (pseudo-Rashi) writes that the difference is in a case where the nazir became tamei on the afternoon of day 30. According to Bar Pada, nezirus ends on day 29; whatever happens on day 30 after the nazir’s shave is irrelevant. According to Rav Masna, day 30 is still part of the cycle of nezirus; if the nazir became tamei that afternoon, even though he already had shaved, he must re-do his nezirus.
If miktzas ha’yom k’kulo means that there is a chiyuv for only part of the day, then why do we care what happens in the afternoon after the nazir’s shave? However, if miktzas hayom k’kulo means that the chiyuv of nezirus encompasses the entire day, just we count observance of part of the day as a kiyum for the entire day, then I think we understand very clearly why becoming tamei in the afternoon undoes that chiyuv and forfeits the nezirus.
2) A woman becomes a zavah obligated to bring korbanos if she sees dam for three straight days. If she sees dam for one day, she must watch herself for one day b’taharah, as a shomeres yom. If she sees dam again on the second day, she is a zavah, but is not yet obligated to bring korbanos; she must watch on the third day, again shomeres yom k’neged yom again. If on the third day she again sees dam, she is a zavah who must bring korbanos. The gemara (Nazir 16a) asks how there could ever be a case of a zavah obligated to bring korbanos according to Rabbi Yosi, who holds of the principle of miktzas hayom k’kulo. Once the second day starts and the woman has not seen dam, miktzas hayom k’kulo – her count of a second day is complete. If she sees dam again, that is a new re’iya and has nothing to do with the past. The gemara answers that the din of zavah according to Rabbi Yosi would occur if she sees dam continuously for three straight days (see the gemara for a second answer as well).
If there is a chiyuv of shemira from dam for the entire day, just we count a shmira of miktzas hayom as sufficient, then I don't understand the conclusion. Just like if a nazir becomes tamei in the afternoon it forfeits the day despite miktzas hayom k'kulo, so too, the shomeres yom should forfeit her shmira of part of the day if the afternoon proves that the day is one of re'iyas dam. It seems from here that miktzas hayom means that all that is required is a shmira of part of the day.
Perhaps I should not expect consistancy. Even though it's the same words "miktzas ha'yom k'kulo", who says that the principle works the same way with respect to nezirus, shomeres yom, and I haven't even thrown in the machlokes Aba Shaul and Chachamim with respect to aveilus? The very fact that we have different Tanaim and Amoraim arguing in these different places about what seems to be the same principle may hint that we are in fact dealing with different animals.
I am not even convinced I have the lomdus here formulated correctly. I have been focussing on whether miktzas hayom means a chovas hagavra of some sort extends for only part of a day or whether the chiyuv extends for the entire day but is fulfilled with a kiyum on only part of the day. But why not look at time instead of the gavra? Perhaps miktzas hayom k'kulo means that we treat the day viz a viz the halacha in question as ending early. In other words, miktzas hayom k'kulo may mean that there is a chiyuv of aveilus (for example) for the entire seventh day of shiva, but the day ends at 9:00 in the morning instead of 7:30 at night.
Sad to disappoint, but I have not yet fully unravelled where we apply miktzas ha'yom. Maybe I can at least flesh out the question and problems next post, bl"n.
Tuesday, April 13, 2010
miktzas ha'yom k'kulo (I)
I assumed what inspired his question is the soon to be holiday of Lag ba’Omer. The Rama (O.C. 493) writes that haircuts should be taken only once the day of Lag ba’Omer has started (i.e. in the morning) and not the night before. The GR”A explains that the mourning period of sefirah ends 15 days before Shavuos, which would be the 34th day of sefirah (which is when the Beis Yosef says mourning is suspended). However, since miktzas hayom k’kulo, once part of the 33rd day is observed in mourning, the aveilus of sefira is complete. (Miktzas hayom starts during the day, not from the night before based on the din of shomeres yom (Meg. 20) -- the gemara says "counting" means counting specifically days.) Others disagree. Aside from when you can take your haircut (most barbers are not open at night anyway), this issue has ramifications with respect to davening: if miktzas hayom is required, tachanun is recited at mincha the day before Lag ba’Omer; if the day is inherently one of simcha without miktzas hayom, tachanun is not be recited the day before at mincha (see Chok Ya’akov s.k. 6).
However, I guessed wrong. My son raised the question for a far less prosaic reason. We learn in Parshas Shmini that a kohen may not enter the mikdash with long hair like mourners were accustomed to have. The shiur of “long hair” is derived from the parsha of nezirus and is defined as going 30 days without a haircut. The Minchas Chinuch (mitzvah 149) raises the question of whether a kohein would be in violation only after going 30 full days without a haircut, meaning on day 31, or whether the kohein would be in violation on day 30, since miktzas hayom without a haircut k’kulo. If this halacha is exactly parallel to nezirus, then just as a nazir fulfills his neder of nezirus (b’di’eved) on day 30 because miktzas ha’yom k’kulo, perhaps here too the kohein is considered too long haired once day 30 has even partially passed. On the other hand, one might argue that nezirus is just a paradigm for what constitutes excessive hair growth, but the details of hilchos nezirus like miktzas hayom k’kulo do not transfer to the parsha that applies to the kohein.
Parenthetically, usually miktzas hayom k'kulo results in a leniency, e.g. ending shiva in the morning, stopping sefira mouring midway though day 33 instead of waiting for day 34. Minchas Chinuch is a twist because he uses it l'chumra -- the kohein would be chayav for his unkempt appearance a half a day earlier. Maybe some of you beki'im can offer other examples like this (l'chumra), because I can't.
Getting back to the point: so where do we apply miktzas yom k’kulo? Just because you observe Shabbos for part of the day does not mean miktzas hayom k’kulo so you are free to go to the ballgame in the afternoon! Why then does it work for nazir, for aveilus?
Second question (which may be easier to answer than the first) is yesh lachkor whether miktzas hayom k’kulo means that the halacha requires observing/counting only part of the day in question, or whether miktzas hayom k’kulo means that even though observing/counting all of the day is required, part of the day counts for the whole thing? More to come bl”n.
Friday, April 09, 2010
the economics of matzah and milu'im
The explanation is that immersion in intense and isolated holiness, such as which occurred during the days of milu’im, is not an end in itself, but is a means. Torah life is not meant to be lived cloistered in an Ohel. Intense spiritual growth in isolation is but a prelude and preparation for the even greater and more noble task of doing good in the regular, mundane world; engaging in the day to day without succumbing to spiritual lethargy and decay. It was that greater purpose which began on the eighth day.
Professor Steve Landsburg has an interesting blog post entitled, “The Tragedy of Chametz,” in which he comments about our giving up bread and the Xstian observance of Lent, “This always strikes me as mildly tragic. If you’re going to sacrifice your pleasures in order to feel virtuous, why not at least do it in a way that helps someone? Instead of giving up meat or leavened bread, donate a few hundred dollars to a worthy cause.” He compares these activities to a runner who pushes himself to run around a track: “You push yourself to do something hard, you feel good about it, and you leave the world pretty much the way you found it. What a shame that you didn’t push yourself to do something useful instead.”
Even if one accepts this sort of economic argument that measures “good” based on social utility alone (plenty of joggers run around a track for personal health and enjoyment; there need not be a social benefit for an activity to be positive), I think we can offer a reasonable response to Landsburg. The Zohar asks: if matzah is such a spiritual, elevating food, why do we not withdraw from chametz completely and eat it year round? The answer echoes the lesson of the days of milu’im: matzah is a means to an end, not an end in itself. The week of withdrawal from chametz is a week dedicated to building a different food-consciousness so that our eating year-round is done in a more spiritual, mindful manner. Having a different consciousness about food in turn can lead to a different consciousness about consumption in general.
It would be shortsighted to describe a week spent in job training or learning a new skill as a “tragic” waste of time even there is no immediate benefit (in fact, productivity may suffer during the training period). The net future gain accrued from having improved skills or knowledge more than compensates for the immediate loss (why else would companies offer paid training?). There may be no immediate gain from giving up chametz for a week, but without the spiritual “training” period of that week, the net gain of good works that result from having taken the time to work on developing a more moral and thoughtful personality would be impossible to attain.
Thursday, April 08, 2010
the paradigm for birchas kohanim in parshas shmini
There are a number of unique characteristics of the mitzvah of birchas kohanim. Even though most mitzvos are in force once a child reaches the age of gadlus, bar mitzvah, the Rishonim write that birchas kohanim is different and until nismalei zekano a kohein should not duchan by himself. Why should this mitzvah be different? The Shulchan Aruch further writes that an unmarried kohein should not duchan, ostensibly because a kohein must be in a state of simcha to duchan and one who is unmarried lacks complete simcha (parenthetical mussar haskel is obvious). The Magen Avraham asks: the only time we find a halachic requirement for a kohein to be married is the kohein gadol performing avodah on Yom Kippur; all other forms of avodah do not have such a requirement. Why should birchas kohanim be different? And why do we duchan only on Yom Tov, reserving the mitzvah only for this time of simcha?
The Aruch haShulchan O.C. 128:49 (link) finds an explanation of these anomalies in a halachic reading of a Zohar on our parsha. The Zohar explains that duchaning causes the Shechina to rest on the Jewish people, and cites the pesukim in our parsha, starting with “Dabeir el Aharon v’el banav…” The Aruch haShulchan suggests that the Zohar means that Aharon and his sons are the paradigm for kohanim who are obligated in the mitzvah of birchas kohanim. Just as Aharon and his sons were married (question that has me stumped: Nadav and Avihu?) when they performed birchas kohanim, and just as their performance of birchas kohanim was done at the height of simcha, during the inauguration of the Mishkan, so too must all future expressions of birchas kohanim be performed by married kohanim in a state of simcha.
Wednesday, April 07, 2010
keriyas yam suf and tzadik yesod olam
The Mechilta teaches a mashal: The king sold the inner field of his lot. When the customer came to take possession of the land, he discovered a guard standing by the outer lot who refused to let him pass. The customer begged admittance, saying that he has permission from the king, but the guard would not budge. The customer showed the guard the king’s ring, but still the guard would not budge. Finally, the king himself came. The guard fled, and the customer was able to pass.
If the guard is supposed to represent the Yam blocking passage to Eretz Yisrael, then what have we learned? Do we really need a mashal to tell us that rivers don’t split because we demand that they do? Or that they do split if G-d shows up and makes them?
I think there is a different lesson here. We all have personality layer upon personality layer built around the core of our neshomos, outer “fields” of all kinds that form rings around the innermost chamber of who we really are. That inner core is the “tzadik yesod”, the foundation upon which all rests. The Mechilta is speaking to us about our own attempts (assuming we even try to make any) to penetrate the protective layers, the pollution, the hardened shell of our own selves to rediscover the beautiful inner field which the king has given us. Too often we delude ourselves into thinking true pnimiyus is about verbal commitments to being a “religious Jew” or doing that which is right, or true pnimiyus is about wearing the king’s ring, whether it be a talis, tefillin, or black hat. None of that gets you past the guard into the real inner field of the soul. Getting to the inner field is about mustering from within the connection with the king himself, a connection that goes beyond words and dress and lies at the core of our being. Passing across the Yam is easy if one can pass across the turbulent waters of one’s own soul and reconnect with the core of tzadik yesod olam.
Thursday, April 01, 2010
Pesach - din on wheat
The Ran answers by distinguishing between the judgment of the individual, which occurs on Rosh haShana, and the judgment of the community, which occurs on Pesach.
The Shem m’Shmuel is troubled by this distinction. The amount of wheat which the community deserves should be no more than the sum total of that which is deserved by the individuals which comprise that community. If the amount each individual deserves is already determined on Rosh haShana, then QED the amount of wheat that the community will get is already a foregone conclusion.
I think the point of the Ran may be that the community is indeed more than the sum of its parts. As we discussed earlier (here), there is a distinction between a tzibur and a shutfus. A partnership is no more than a division of a whole into parts. A tzibur, however, is like a corporation; it is a new collective entity and not merely the glue which holds the parts together. There is no one particular individual or group of individuals who is the owner of a shul, of a yeshiva, of a chessed institution. Whether these mosdos are successful or deeply in the red perhaps is decided in the din of Pesach. Let's hope and daven that we come out OK.
Monday, March 29, 2010
the power to influence others
The Maggid of Koznitz (Avodas Yisrael) explains derech derush that the halacha is teaching that when it comes to ridding ourselves of spiritual chameitz, the harmful aveiros and character traits the prevent our spiritual growth, a person has the power to not only influence his own behavior, but has the power to inspire his entire family to do a bedika and rid themselves of chameitz. The Koznitzer Maggid continues that there are great tzadikim who can even influence an entire city to remove their chameitz; there are still greater tzadikim who can influence the whole world to eliminate their chameitz.
“VaYikra Moshe l’kol ziknei Yisrael,” Moshe called together the leaders of Klal Yisrael and instructed them in the laws of korban pesach.” Rav Amiel in his Dersahos El Ami (vol 3 p. 250) asks why Moshe gathered only the leaders to teach the halachos of korban pesach when the chiyuv to bring the korban was incumbent upon the entire nation? Perhaps the answer is that Moshe wanted to convey to the zekeinim that is within their power and it is their obligation, not his alone, to lead, to transmit Torah, to influence the people. (Rav Amiel gives a different answer).
A slave takes orders, he doesn't give orders. A slave is beholden to the influence and whims of his master; he has no ability to impact the course of his own life, much less the life of others. It is this power to be a mashpi'a and not just a mekabeil that marks the difference between a ben chorin and an eved. This idea lies at the heart of the difference between the mitzvah of zechiras yetziyas mitzrayim and sippur. While the former can be fulfilled by internal thought, the latter involves articulating an idea to others. "V'she'aino yodeya loshol -- at pesach lo!"
Have a Chag Kasher v'Sameiach!
Friday, March 26, 2010
lishma: chatas vs. korban pesach
Both a chatas and the korban pesach must be offered “lishma”. Why is it that a chatas can be disqualified only by the lo lishma of having a different korban in mind, but the pesach is disqualified even by a lo lishma of having chulin in mind?
Rav Amiel explains (link) that after we already have achieved geulah, the thought of chulin while offering a korban does not diminish from the inherent sanctity of the offering. But while we are still erev pesach awaiting our geulah and preparing our korban pesach, while our redemption is still in its formative stages, the lack of lishma can corrupt, diminish, and pasul the entire enterprise.
I would add that perhaps this is why we celebrate the taking of the korban pesach on Shabbos and not on 10 Nissan. Shabbos is what defines the purpose of the rest of our workweek; it is the lishma of our existence.
Wednesday, March 24, 2010
the gift that Moshe could not give
יש זהב, הכל הביאו נדבתן למשכן זהב, הה"ד: (שמות כה) וזאת התרומה וגו
. ורב פנינים, זו נדבתן של נשיאים, דכתיב: (שם לה) והנשיאים הביאו וגו'.
וכלי יקר שפתי דעת, לפי שהיתה נפשו של משה עגומה עליו ואמר: הכל הביאו נדבתן למשכן ואני לא הבאתי!
א"ל הקב"ה: חייך, שדיבורך חביב עלי יותר מן הכל, שמכולן לא קרא הדיבור, אלא למשה, ויקרא אל משה
The Midrash opens VaYikra by highlighting the generosity of the people and the princes in their giving of gold and precious gifts to the Mishkan. Yet, Moshe was sad, as he had not given any gift. Hashem responded by telling Moshe that convsering with him is more valuable than all the gifts in the world, as no one else was called to speak with Hashem – “VaYikra el Moshe…”
The obvious question: why should Moshe have been sad? No one stopped him from giving a gift – if he wanted to, he could have given something just like everyone else!
Excuse me for explaining the Shem m’Shmuel here the way I did to my kids. My daughter really wants a certain watch and a specific pair of sneakers; to her these are very significant items (unfortunately). If my daughter wanted to show how much she loved the Mishkan, there is no question in my mind what she would donate to it -- she would give up that watch or sneakers (if she had them). That would be a real sacrifice, a real show of commitment.
Sounds like a silly example, but the grown-up world is much the same. Wow! – Ploni gave his preferred stock to the shul; Ploni did even better and plunked down a quarter of a million dollars of his hard earned money to dedicate a classroom; Plonis gave that expensive diamond necklace to auction and dedicated the proceeds to the yeshiva. What dedication! What we hold dear and significant may change as we get older, but the feeling of sacrifice that makes a gift of those items into a show of commitment remains the same.
But along comes the poor kollel guy and he wonders how he fits into this. He has no preferred stock, he has no windfall, his wife doesn’t have a diamond necklace, and here’s the most important point – he doesn’t want any of those things! All he wants is to sit and learn. B’shlama if you devote yourself to accumulating cute little watches, or preferred stock, or whatever your heart desires in the world, then you can give yourself a big well deserved pat on the back for giving up that object of desire for the sake of a higher purpose. There is a real kvishas ha’yetzer here, and I don’t mean to belittle it! But if all you do is sit in the Beis Medrash and you don’t know from preferred stock of diamonds or watches, and all that is valuable to you is how R’ Chaim’s chiddush answers a kasha of the Ketzos, what’s your gift? What are you going to give up to show your dedication and commitment?
Just to be clear: I’m not speaking about the guy who has nothing to give up but wishes he was a millionaire who did – the point here is more subtle than that. I am speaking about the guy who even if he had a million dollars would feel just the same as if he had an overdrawn checkbook because it just doesn't matter to him (or her). Tosfos (Avodah Zarah 11a) asks how the gemara on the one hand can tell us that Rebbi had vegetables on his table all year, a sign of luxury when produce could not be flown in from all over the world, yet on the other hand Chazal tell us that on his deathbed Rebbi held up his fingers and said that he had taken no benefit from this world. What about the spread on his table?! R’ Tzadok answers that there is no contradiction. Rebbi had the required trappings of the Nasi, including wealth, but it had no impact on his personality or value system. Sneakers or preferred stock, diamonds or watches, to the likes of Rabbi Yehudah haNasi, to Moshe Rabeinu, having these valuable commodities gave them no added pleasure, and parting with them would be no challenge.
This is what bothered Moshe. It's not that Moshe lacked gold and silver to donate as a gift -- it's that his gift, davka because all that is material meant so little to him, could not be given with the same feeling of sacrifice l'shem shamayim that others achieved through their gifts. And ultimately, it's that spirit of sacrifice, not the glitter of the gold, which Hashem cherished.
The ohr which came from the transformation of the choshech of material desire into a spirit of giving was, to Moshe’s eyes, brighter even than the light of untainted goodness which shone in his heart.
I should explain the conclusion of the Midrash, but I think this is enough for now. We are not Moshe Rabeinu or Rabbi Yehudah haNasi. I assume most of us work for a living, and especially in tight economic times, we value our dollars and worry about finances. So when a simple ba'al habayis gives kimcha d’pischa, helps pack boxes for a Tomchei Shabbos or some other organization, helps others with their needs, and sacrifices a little bit of what he/she values for the sake of a fellow Jew, he or she should know that they have performed an act that even Moshe Rabeinu would envy.
she'hechiyanu on bedikah (III)
A talmid chacham I told this to was willing to accept that bedika is a chiyuv on the home rather than the person, but remained ambivalent about whether this would impact the bracha of she’hechiyanu. My son is a contrarian and automatically rejects my Brisker chilukim, but he changed his mind a bit when he saw that R’ Baruch Ber also said that the chiyuv bedika is a din in the cheftza of the house. I haven’t seen the shiur (it is in one of the new compilations of R’ B.B.’s shiurim), but my son reports that the argument goes something like this: in order for person A to fulfill a mitzvah on behalf of person B, person A must be a bar chiyuva. For this reason a cheiresh, shoteh, or katan cannot recite birkas hamazon or blow shofar for an adult. R’ Baruch Ber quotes in the name of R’ Chaim that Reuvain also cannot put up a mezuzah on Shimon’s door for him. Since mezuzah is a chovas hadar, an obligation which rests on the resident of a home, and Reuvain is not a resident in Shimon’s house, Reuvain is just like the cheiresh, shoteh, or katan viz. a viz. the Shimon’s obligation to affix a mezuzah. However, Reuvain can do a bedikas chameitz for Shimon. Why the difference? After all, Shimon doesn’t have to search out an destroy all chamietz, only chameitz which he owns – the obligation is limited to Shimon’s property. If Reuvain is precluded from affixing a mezuzah for Shimon because residency in Shimon's home is a precondition to being mechuyav, Reuvain should be precluded from doing bedikah for Shimon because owning the chameitz in question is a necessary precondition to being required to do bedikah!
The distinction between the two cases is that mezuzah is a chovas hagavra, an obligation that rests personally on the resident of the home, while bedikas chameitz is not an obligation on the individual – rather, it is an obligation that rests on the home to be baduk. The requirement that a mitzvah being done by a bar chiyuva applies only when the focus of the mitzvah is the performance of the act; where the focus is the end result, the effect produced on the object, it matters not by whom or how that effect is achieved.
I thought my idea would answer a different question as well. Why is there no she'hechiyanu on the mitzvah of seforas ha'omer? Anon1 has been arguing in the comments that she'hechiyanu is only recited on mitzvos that bring about simcha (Tos Sukkah 46, echoed by the Ba'al haMaor with respect to sefirah done zecher l'mikdash), but the Rambam never mentions such a rule. Perhaps the answer with respect to sefirah is that again, there is no chovas hagavra to count; the chiyuv is on the days to be counted. This sevara would help us deal with the case of a katan who matures and becomes bar mitzvah in the middle of sefirah. Even though part of the count was done while he was a minor, since the focus of the mitzvah is days being counted, not who does the counting, the point is irrelevant. The (perhaps fatal) flaw in my reasoning is that based on my approach there seems to be no reason that a minor could not be motzi a gadol in sefirah. At least give me points for trying : )
Tuesday, March 23, 2010
she'hechiyanu on bedikas chameitz (II)
In terms of the disagreement between the Tur and Ba'al haIttur, I think Chaim Markowitz hit the nail on the head in distinguishing between the ma’aseh mitzvah and the mechayeiv. The Tur argued that bedikas chameitz can be performed just about any day of the year given the right conditions, e.g. a person leaving home who plans to return mid-chag and needs to make sure the house is chameitz free. Therefore, the mitzvah is not characterized as asi m’zman l’zman, something that comes at some infrequent time interval. The Ittur would argue that no matter when you do the actual ma’aseh mitzvah of bedikah, the kiyum mitzvah accomplished by its performance only takes effect on the night of erev Pesach. Or, to put it in Telzer terminology, the sibas hachiyuv is ohr l’arba asar, regardless of when the actual act of searching is done. The debate between Tur and Ittur boils down to the question of what gives rise to the need for she’hechiyanu – is it the fact that the ma’aseh mitzvah comes along rarely, or the fact that the kiyum mitzvah comes along rarely, even if the ma’aseh can be done at any time?
Anon1 raised another good point with respect to the definition of asi m’zman l’zman. Even if, as the Tur writes, the mitzvah of bedikah can theoretically be done on any day, there is still only one day in the year when it need be done. Here too, I think we get involved in chiyuv vs. kiyum. Practically the ma’aseh mitzvah is done only once annually, but the fact that there is no fixed date shows that the chiyuv is one which applies year-round. To add some fuel to the question, as I mentioned above, Tosfos holds that a kohein would recite she’hechiyanu when doing avodah twice a year with his mishmar. Yet, in theory a kohein has the option of doing avodah on any day – he could bring his own korban. That theoretical possibility of a kiyum on any given day does not preclude reciting she’hechiyanu on the twice a year days the kohein would minimally do avodah. It’s worth noting that Rashi and the Rambam offer completely different interpretations of that sugya, but even without that, I'm not sure that I'm not comparing apples and oranges -- bedikas chameitz is a chiyuv on each person; I don’t know if there is a chiyuv on every individual kohein to do avodah.
Maybe some more to come on this…
Monday, March 22, 2010
she'hechiyanu on bedikas chameitz
Some food for thought to start the week: The Tur quotes the opinion of the Ba’al haIttur that a bracha of she’hechiyanu should be recited on bedikas chameitz just like it is recited over any mitzvah that comes at some infrequent time interval, e.g. ner Chanukah, megilas esther, lulav, shofar, etc. The Tur disagrees, though he writes that if one wants to recite the bracha one may do so b’toras reshus.
Why does the Tur take issue with the Ba’al haIttur? Some poskim write that we are yotzei our requirement to recite she’hechiyanu on matzah, marror, and the other mitzvos of leil haseder with the one she’hechiyanu we recite over the Yom Tov. Similarly, on Purim we recite one she’hechiyanu at the time of krias ha’megillah and have in mind that it applies to mishloach manos, seudah, and matanos la’evyonim. Perhaps that one she’hechiyanu of leil haseder applies as well to the mitzvah of eliminating the chameitz for the sake of the chag.
The Tur, however, offers another explanation for why the Ittur is wrong. The Ba’al haIttur assumes that bedikas chameitz is not the sort of mitzvah that comes along every day – it has one designated time, once a year, when it can be fulfilled. But this is not the case. If someone was planning to leave today to their hotel in the Cancun, they would have had to have done bedikas chameitz last night. If someone is leaving tomorrow, their bedikas chameitz has to be done tonight. In theory, according to some Rishonim, you could have to do bedikas chameitz Chanukah time, or even at Rosh haShana, depending on your travel itinerary (those of us staying home have no such headaches : ) So in reality bedikas chameitz is not at all like lulav or shofar or ner chanukah, mitzvos d’asi m’zman l’zman, mitzvos that come along once a year – it is a mitzvah that can be done just about any day you like.
What is the point of disagreement between the Tur and the Ba’al haIttur? Aside from the Tur, is there any other reason you can think of for not saying a she’hechiyanu on bedikas chameitz?
Friday, March 19, 2010
a calling that transcends words
The parsha and the sefer opens with a calling, “VaYikra el Moshe m’Ohel Moed,” the word “vayikra” noticeable being spelled with a small letter aleph, opening the door to derush galore. Rashi explains the call consisted of a voice which emanated from the Ohel Moed and was heard by Moshe alone, signaling to him that it was time to approach and immerse in learning a new sugya.
What was this little voice heard only by Moshe? I don’t think that Rashi means to say that Moshe had extra sensitive hearing. If there was a voice, why could it not be heard by all, and if there wasn’t a voice, than what is Rashi referring to?
The Ma’or vaShemesh explains that language suffers limitations. Words are great for describing the concrete, physical world, but as we get into the abstract, words fail us. Sometimes a single glance by a husband to a wife or vice versa can communicate what a thousand words cannot. Communication from Hashem required a mind like only Moshe had in order to absorb ideas directly, without the medium of language as a barrier. Moshe “heard” what no words could make clear to other listeners. The small “aleph” of VaYikra hints to the insignificance of language when communicating on this level.
What does this mean for us? I believe the Piecezna says that the mystical concept of Moshe’s neshoma being found in each dor applies not only to the tzadikim, but to each of us – there is a little bit of Moshe Rabeinu within you and me. Whatever we understand our calling to be, there is no denying that it first expresses itself as a feeling, an intuition, and only then (and only sometimes) can it be converted into words and language that can be made sense of by others. Even those Rishonim who see positive value in the philosophical justification of belief do not mean that reason is the basis for belief; they simply mean that there is a kiyum mitzvah in being able to translate what we know to be true into language that can be appreciated by others. Certainly there are truths that we each hold dear that cannot be encapsulated in words without great difficulty.
The calling that each of us hears is unique; it is heard by no one else. What springs to mind is the gemara’s story (Ta’anis 21) of Ilfa and R’ Yochanan, who were both desperately poor and finally decided together that they needed to leave yeshiva. They packed their bag and set out on their way. Eventually they paused to rest under a bridge. While resting R’ Yochanan heard the voices of angels plotting to kill himself and Ilfa for having abandoned yeshiva. Turning to Ilfa, his comrade, R’ Yochanan asked if too heard the voices. Ilfa replied that he did not. Realizing that the message was meant for him alone, R’ Yochanan returned to the yeshiva and eventually became the great R’ Yochanan, Rosh haYeshiva, while Ilfa went on his way to engage in business while still maintaining his devotion to learning. Ilfa was not deaf, and was no less capable a talmid chacham than R’ Yochanan, but he did not hear the same voices that R’ Yochanan did; his calling was of a different nature. In his introduction, the Margoliyas haYam proves that Ilfa was indeed a giant in Torah learning, albeit not a Rosh Yeshiva. The decisions and choices that lead a person to be either a R’ Yochanan or an Ilfa are worth discussing with others, but at the end of the day every decision is personal, as our ears are often privy to a message and calling that we alone hear and which is meant for no other.
Thursday, March 18, 2010
the shiur for bal yera'eh and the definition of ba'alus (III)
Wednesday, March 17, 2010
the shiur of bal yera'eh (II)
Anonymous was mechavein to R’ Scheinberg’s first answer, namely that at least some Rishonim see bal yera’eh as a safeguard against eating chameitz. Therefore, the shiur for bal yera’eh is k’zayis, the same as the shiur of the issur of achilas chameitz, not the shiur of perutah used to define ownership.
A second answer given by Rav Scheinberg makes use of a chiddush the gemara says with regard to chameitz and bor b’reshus harabim. The gemara writes that in reality one does not own a bor b’reshus harabim or chameitz on Pesach (what can you do with issurei hana’ah?); nonetheless, the Torah makes one liable for digging the bor in the public domain and for chameitz in one’s home. The fact that chameitz has no value because it is worth less than a pertuah has no more effect than the more general statement that chameitz lacks value on Pesach because one cannot eat it or possess it – nonetheless, one violates bal yera’eh for having it around.
I am not sure I fully grasp this answer. Even granted that chameitz potentially worth $100 and chameitz worth less than a penny is all the same once Pesach arrives, why does that mean we should evaluate bal yera’eh using a shiur of k’zayis? Why not just treat the chameitz as if ownership did theoretically exist and use the standard of perutah?
My son and I both thought that there is another way to resolve this question. Who says bal yera’eh has anything to do with ownership? I can violate bal yera’eh even for keeping the chameitz of a non-Jew in my home, so long as I am responsible if it is lost or stolen (there are technical details here that I am not getting involved in now.) Once we are dealing with an issue that does not depend directly on ownership, but on responsibility, the chiddush of Rashi in Sukkah does not apply.
Further thoughts on this question to come bl"n… stay tuned.
Tuesday, March 16, 2010
Kallah Magazine Pesach edition.
a month of no tachanun -- why?
The Aruch haShulchan, however, offers a different rationale. He writes that the zodiac sign for the month is Aries, the ram, which was worshipped by the Egyptians as a diety. The act of offering a korban Pesach from the very animal worshipped by the Egyptians demonstrated the falseness of their entire belief system. The entire month was thereby transformed from a celebration of idolatry to a celebration of Hashem’s dominion and geulah.
The nafka minah between these two approaches would be whether to skip tachanun during the last days of Tishrei, post- Sukkos. If the reason for skipping tachanun for the entire month is because we already omit tachanun for most of the month anyway, the same logic should apply in Tishrei, with its many Yamim Tovim. But if the reason for skipping tachanun depends on the unique character of Nissan, the same would not apply to any other time period.
As an aside, I’m just wondering about the association of Aries with Egyptian worship. The zodiac signs are based on ancient Greek tradition. Maybe someone with more knowledge of ancient Egypt than I have can shed light on whether these same signs carried significance in ancient Egyptian culture as well.
Monday, March 15, 2010
the shiur of bal yera'eh (I)
Rav Scheinberg gives two answers and my son and I (joint effort) think there is a third. More to come bl”n.
Friday, March 12, 2010
what does kiddush hachodesh have to do with pesach?
But we might ask more generally: why is it that rosh chodesh gets any mention here at all? We understand that the celebration of yetziyas Mitzrayim had to be preceded by korban pesach and the laws of the chag, but why did Hashem introduce the laws of kiddush hachodesh here and not at some later opportunity?
The answer must be that just as the laws of korban pesach, the laws of chameitz and matzah, are integral to the celebration and experience of Pesach, the idea of kiddush hachodesh is integral to that celebration as well. Our preparation for the chag requires not only a review not only of the parsha and halachos of pesach, but also a review of the parsha of kiddush hachodesh, or our experience of pesach is lacking.
Why is that so? Rav Tzadok suggests that kiddush hachodesh introduces us to the power and ability of klal yisrael to create kiddusha, to sanctify the material world. More specifically, parshas hachodesh introduces us to the idea that the rosh beis din declares mekudash mekudash and the people follow – kedusha can be developed and channeled only through the leadership of chachmei hador.
I am not sure why this idea of introducing kedusah to the world could not be conveyed through the parsha of korban pesach itself, with its demand to be mekadesh an animal for the sake of a korban. Therefore, I would like to suggest a slightly different avenue of thought. The halacha is that a girl over three who is niveles is no longer considered a besulah; under three we assume the besulim grow back. The Yerushalmi (Kesubos 1:2) has the following case: a girl’s birthday is 10 Adar; she becomes niveles on the 15th. QED that she is no longer a besulah. However, before the end of the month goes by beis din declares a leap year; there is now another Adar in the calendar. Poof! – the girl’s birthday is now really 10 Adar II (see previous post here regarding bar mitzvah in leap years) , not Adar I, and the be’ila does not affect her status – she is still considered a besulah. How can this be? Being a besulah depends on empirical fact – changing the calendar can’t change what happens to the girl’s body? But we see from this Yerushalmi that indeed it can. As the Pnei Moshe explains, even nature agrees with the psak of beis din.
The parsha of kiddush hachodesh teaches that not only can the chachamei hador introduce kedushah into a seemingly independent state of nature/teva, but more than that – the chachmei hador, the Torah, is what defines and controls teva itself. [Update: see the Bnei Yisaschar who makes a similar point in his derasha on P' haChodesh and alludes to this Yerushalmi as well.]
All the many questions of Pesach night really boil down to one mystery: How does a people enslaved for hundreds of years suddenly become a nation of free souls? And when we speak of the freedom of Pesach we are not just speaking about legal definitions; were that the case it would make no sense for someone imprisoned in some dungeon because he is Jewish to celebrate Pesach – where is his freedom? What happened at Pesach was not an emancipation proclamation, but a fundamental change in the character of the Jewish people that could never be erased, a quality that remains with us even in the darkest dungeons and at the bleakest moments. Pesach was a change in the metziyus of klal yisrael.
It is this power of the Torah to change metziyus, to alter very fabric of reality, which is the necessary prelude to chag haPesach, which marks our change in metziyus from an enslaved and downtrodden people into the am hanivchar.
Thursday, March 11, 2010
minuy for korban pesach and the the concept of joint ownership (II)
The question opens the door to making a nice chiluk (as Yosef and PC commented) between the concept of shutfus and the concept of tzibur. Whether a sukkah is owned by 2 people or 2 million people, the legal structure we are speaking of is a partnership. Here, Rashi introduces the requirement of shares having a certain minimal value for the concept of partnership to be make sense. The ownership of the korban pesach, however, like other communal korbanos, is defined by a different legal structure. Communal ownership is more than the sum of its individual parts. It is more like a corporation; ownership is retained by a global entity distinct from the individual members who make up its parts. When we speak of ownership by the tzibur, there is no requirement for each individual member to have a share of any specific value.
There is another, less intuitive answer to this question offered by Rav Noson Gestetner in Shu”T L’Horos Noson (vol 1 #24). He argues that Rashi does not mean that the concept of ownership does not apply to less than a perutah in value; as the Minchas Chinuch asks, this is obviously wrong, as the issur of theft applies to less than a perutah. Rather, what Rashi means is that one cannot acquire an item that is worth less than a perutah. But while I may not be able to buy one little square of chocolate worth less than a penny, if I buy a chocolate bar worth $100, I am the owner of every little square’s worth, even a little nibble worth next to nothing. Furthermore, if I buy a hundred chocolate bars at one time, even if each chocolate bar itself is worth next to nothing, even Rashi would agree that the sale works because the aggregate value of the goods acquired is worth more than a perutah. Hashta d’asis l’hachi, the difference between sukkah and korban pesach is that one sukkah is purchased at a time, and the value being acquired by each individual contributor is minimal; animals are purchased in groups, as a flock or herd, and the total cost to each individual for a large scale purchase may indeed exceed a perutah.
This distinction helps resolve another difficulty raised by the Minchas Chinuch (325). If one assumes that ownership of the matzah used to fulfill the mitzvah of achilas matzah is required, there is a potential problem if the value of an individual matzah is less than a perutah (obviously the Minchas Chinuch got better prices on his hand shemurah than I do in my local supermarket, or he was speaking on a purely theoretical level.) The L’Horos Noson answers that instead of looking at the value of individual matzos we should be looking at the value of the sale as a whole. Since matzah is purchased by the pound, in multiple units, the value of the sale as a whole does exceed a perutah and works even according to Rashi. Once the sale take effect, ownership by definition extends to every individual unit of matzah, meeting the requirement of “lachem.”
Wednesday, March 10, 2010
minuy for korban pesach and the the concept of joint ownership
Yet, the gemara (Kiddushin 41) accepts the possibility of a korban Pesach jointly owned by all of klal yisrael. The gemara rejects “v’shachatu oso kol kahal adas yisrael” as a source for shlichus, even though one person does shechita on behalf of the entire community, because that may be a unique case where everyone whom the shliach is acting for has a share in the korban. Why in this case do we not apply Rashi’s rule? If all of klal yisrael were to share in one korban, the stake of each person would certainly amount to less than a perutah; it should be so negligible as to be meaningless?
Let me take one possible answer to this problem off the table right away. You could reject the premise of the question and argue that the korban pesach necessitates minuy – being counted as a participant – but minuy does not require ownership. My son’s birthday was last week and his present was an Imrei Binah, which raises this issue (Hil Pesach end of siman 2). The I.B. opines that a kinyan is required for minuy. Granted you could debate his proof and argue otherwise, but for now let's avoid that debate. How else might you answer this question?