latest time for mincha

We’ve discussed in the past (with respect to making early Shabbos) the machlokes between R’ Yehudah and the Chachamim regarding the proper time for mincha and ma’ariv. According to R’ Yehudah, the latest time for mincha is plag (1 1/4 hours before sundown), with ma’ariv permissable thereafter; according to the Chachamim the latest time for mincha is shekiya, sundown, and only then can you daven ma’ariv . The crux of the issue is what time the korban tamid bein ha’arbayin, which the tefilah of mincha corresponds to, was offered.

The gemara does not come to a conclusion as to who is right – d’aved k’mar avid, d’avid k’mar avid – one is free to follow either view so long as one is consistent. In other words, you can’t wait until after plag to daven mincha in accordance with the view of the Chachamim but daven ma’ariv on the same day before shekiya in accordance with R’ Yehudah’s leniency.

At first glance the reason why either view is acceptable is because sfeika derabbanan l’kula. When dealing with a mitzvah or issur derabbanan, where there is a doubt as to what the halacha is, one is permitted to be lenient. Since tefilah is derabbanan and there is no clear resolution who is right, one can be lenient and wait until shekiya to daven mincha or daven ma’ariv after plag if one davened an early mincha.

However, that’s not how the Rambam seems to see it. Hil Tefilah ch 3:

ויש לו להתפלל תפילת ערבית של לילי שבת, בערב שבת קודם שתשקע השמש; וכן מתפלל ערבית של מוצאי שבת, בשבת: לפי שתפילת ערבית רשות, אין מדקדקין בזמנה

The Rambam does not invoke the rule of sfeika derabbanan l’kula to justify davening ma’ariv early, but instead invokes the rule of “tefilas arvis reshus,” i.e. ma’ariv is less of an obligation than other tefilos because it does not correspond to a korban.

Another indication that this is not a real safeik is the Rambam’s ruling (Hil Temidim 1:3) that the tamid shel ben ha’arbayim was offered until sundown:

תמיד של בין הערביים, שוחטין אותו משיאריך הצל ויוכר לכול שהאריך, והוא משש שעות ומחצה ומעלה, עד סוף היום

Were there any real doubt as to who is right – R’ Yehudah or the Chachamim –the rule of sfeika d’oraysa l’chumra should apply and we should avoid offering the korban after plag. Yet, the Rambam allows until sundown for the korban to be brought.

Apparently the Rambam understood the gemara's conclusion not as a statement of doubt about who is right, but as an affirmation that both R' Yehudah and the Chachamim are right. Both positions are tenable halachic approaches. Since the Chachamim are the majority view we give preference to their opinion, but since tefilas arvis reshus one rely on R' Yehudah.

kilayim in bigdei kehunah

The Rambam writes in the last halacha in Hil. Kilayim (10:32) that kohanim may not wear bigdei kehunah (which contained kilayim) when not performing avodah. A kohein who does so is liable for malkos. Ra’avad disagrees and writes that kohanim may wear bigdei kehunah even if they are not engaged in avodah so long as they remain in the mikdash. I don’t have time for a full analysis of the machlokes, but do want to point out a Midrash Rabbah on Parshas Chukas which comments on Aharon’s death:

והלא אם יצא כהן גדול בבגדי כהונה חוץ מהר הבית, סופג את הארבעים, שהם צמר ופשתים, אלא להודיעך, שבלשון שקרבו לכהונה ואמר לו: קח את אהרן, בו בלשון אמר לו לעלות ההר

In finding fault with Aharon wearing the bigdei kehunah outside the mikdash, the Midrash seems to clearly side with the Ra’avad. What would the Rambam make of this? Without getting into the details, one method to defend the Rambam (see Ha’amek She’eilah to She’ilta 126 - p. 13 in the standard edition) would be to prove that the Midrash is an isolated view which the gemara disagrees with. I'm putting this one on the back burner for another time.

an amazing yalkut shimoni on the sin of mei meriva

Not to be missed among the many views of what Moshe did wrong at Mei Meriva is the opinion of Yalkut Shimoni (remez 564):

יען לא האמנתם בי ארבע חטאות כתובין כאן לא האמנתם, לא קדשתם, מעלתם, מריתם, לא האמנתם שלא אמרתי לכם להכות והכית אותו. ולא קדשתם לעיני כל ישראל להוציא להם מים מכל סלע שרוצים, מעלתם אמרת המן הסלע הזה, מריתם ודברתם אל הסלע שנה עליו פרק אחד ועברת על דברי.

The sin of “not speaking” according to the Yalkut does not mean not ordering the rock to produce water, but rather refers to the sin of not studying Torah near the rock. Moshe should have responded to the demand for water by sitting and learning! Hitting the rock to produce water undoubtedly demonstrated Hashem’s miraculous power, but it did not demonstrate the power of Torah, and it was for that specific crucial failing that Moshe was blamed.

There is much to learn from this Yalkut. Imagine the criticism a leader would face if after hearing of the people's needs and demands he would retreat to the beis medrash to sit and learn. The headlines would decry the callousness -- He doesn't care! He's not engaged in the world! But that's exactly the response the Yalkut sees as appropriate. Where else can we find guidence, what greater power can we bring to bear on a problem, if not the merit of Torah study?

Consider about whom the Yalkut is speaking – is there anyone who we can say embodied love for Torah more than Moshe Rabeinu? Is there anyone whose life was devoted to teaching Torah more than Moshe Rabeinu? Surely Moshe was the paradigm of what a Torah scholar should be. Nonetheless, Moshe is not spared criticism or punishment for failing in this one instance to impress upon the people the power of Torah.

We are not Moshe Rabeinu, but the responsibility rests with us as bnei Torah to reinforce to our families and others the awesome power of limud haTorah. "Ain mayim elah Torah" -- if we are diligent in our learning, even the dry rocks will be inspired.

some parsha points to ponder

I generally do shenayim mikra too fast. Here are a few random points worth slowing down and thinking in Rashi (answers can be found in various meforshim):

1) Rashi (20:1) explains that the parsha of parah is juxtaposed to the death of Miriam to teach that the death of tzadikim is mechapeir like the offering of korbanos. Why then not juxtapose one of the many parshiyos of korbanos that appear in VaYikra with Miriam's death -- why is specifically the parsha of parah adumah chosen?

2) Rashi writes (20:12) that Moshe failed to do a kiddush Hashem because he struck the rock instead of speaking to it. Yet Rashi in Parshas Be'ha'alosecha (12:22) implies that it was Moshe's exclamation of "Shimu na ha'morim" that was the sin. Which was it?

3) "VaYishma haKena'ani ki ba Yisrael derech ha'atarim." (21:1) Rashi explains that the Kena'ani heard that Aharon had passed away. Why does the text require any interpretation beyond its plain meaning, namely that the Kena'ani heard that Bnei Yisrael were travelling in their direction?

4) Why does Rashi (21:21) give a reason for Sichon objecting to Bnei Yisrael crossing his territory (namely, he was paid by the rules of Kena'an to keep them out) but Rashi doesn't give a reason for Edom's earlier objection?

5) Rashi (21:35) comments on the pasuk, "Vayaku oso v'es banav v'es amo", that Moshe personally killed Og. The word "vayaku" is written in the plural -- why does Rashi ascribe the killing of Og to Moshe alone?

compound zechuyos

Chazal tell us that the man fell in Moshe's merit, the well gave water in Miriam's merit, and the ananei hakavod protected the camp in Aharon's merit. After the death of Miraim, the be'er vanished, but was restored in Moshe's merit; after the death of Aharon the ananei hakavod departed but then returned in Moshe's merit. Apparently Moshe's merit alone must have been sufficient to bring about the be'er and the ananim, otherwise why would they have returned? Yet, if so, why do Chazal attribute their initial appearance to Aharon and Miriam and not exclusively to Moshe?

Chasam Sofer explains that each of these tzadikim, Moshe and Ahraon and Miriam, had a specific task: Moshe taught Torah; Aharon taught how to preserve shalom; Miriam taught yiras shamayim and inspired the women. Moshe's merit alone initially would have be insufficient to bring the ananei hakavod, the be'er, as well as the man. However, after 40 years of absorbing the yirah of Miriam, after 40 years of absorbing the teaching of shalom by Aharon, the people were on a far higher spiritual plane than they were at the start of their journey. Moshe could now even alone could restore the be'er and ananim.

There is a cumulative power to zechuyos. Because earlier generations struggled to achieve the seemingly impossible, we enjoy the benefit of their accomplishments and experience.

I want to mention one other Chasam Sofer because my wife has asked me this in the past. We know what Moshe and Aharon did wrong and why they died in the midbar, but what about Miriam? Why didn't she get to enter Eretz Yisrael?

The C.S. explains that the real reason behind the death of all three of these tzadikim is the sin (obviously slight) of lashon ha'ra. Chazal tell us that evil speech harms the speaker, the listener, and the one about whom it was spoken. It was Miriam's speaking against Moshe, Aharon's overhearing, Moshe being the topic of their gosip, which caused their death. Hashem hoped that the tragic death of these tazdikim would reinforce the lesson for us.

Miriam began the downward slide by speaking against Moshe, undermining the sensitivity of the people to the harm of wrongful speech. Her death caused the removal of the be'er, and created a need for water. Had Moshe and Aharon spoken to the rock instead of striking it, it would have restored the nation's recognition of the power of words. Instead, by hitting the rock, Moshe and Aharon again gave the impression that words alone have no power.

We can now understand why there would never have been a churban had Moshe and Aharon led us into Eretz Yisrael. The churban habayis was caused by the cheit of lashon hara. Because Moshe and Aharon failed to impress upon the nation the power of words, they opened the door to the potential for tragedy. Therefore, they could not be the leaders to bring about a permanent yishuv ha'aretz.

bitul terumah (II)

To sum up yesterday’s long post: there is a din of “ma’achilin lo ha’kal ha’kal techila” that obligates one to opt for the lesser evil when faced with a choice of what to feed a choleh whose life is in danger. The gemara presents a machlokes as to whether terumah or tevel is the lesser issur. The case seems very strange -- why not just seperate terumah from the tevel and make it permissible (chulin)? We discussed two approaches as to why that is not an option:

1) Rashi: there is one pile of wheat that has exactly enough grain to bake what the choleh requires. If terumah is taken off, you haven't avoided an issur because the choleh will have to eat chulin + the terumah anyway. The debate is whether it’s still preferable to do the hafrasha and eat the terumah, or to just eat tevel?

2) Parashas Derachim interpreting the Ran: there are two piles of wheat, one of tevel one of terumah. The only reason the tevel cannot be turned into chulin is some external technical reason, e.g. the owner of the wheat did not give permission for hafrasha.

The Parashas Derachim writes that his approach helps resolve another difficulty. If the only obstacle to hafrasha is the fact that the choleh has to eat everything, why not be mafrish terumah and then mix it back in to the pile so it is bateil? “Ain mevatlin issur l’chatchila” is just an issur derabbanan, and here, faced otherwise with issurei d’oraysa, it seems the best way out. The case must be that the tevel cannot be fixed for some other technical reason.

Just to add fuel to the fire, I was bothered by another point. Since separating even one stalk of wheat is sufficient to fulfill the chiyuv d’oraysa of terumah, according to Rashi why not separate a tiny portion of terumah which would only be a chatzi shiur if eaten by the choleh?

The Avnei Milu’im (in the Shu”T, #18) argues against this Parashas Derachim. As we read in Parshas Korach, terumah requires “shemira” (“mishmeres terumosai”). It cannot be destroyed, used improperly, or made tamei. Ordinarily ain mevatlin issur l’chatchila is a din derabbanan, but when it comes to terumah, since bitul causes terumah to lose its identity and sanctity, it violates this d’oraysa halacha of shemira.

And to put my fire out as well: Rav Yosef Engel writes that even those who hold that eating chatzi shiur is derabbanan agree in the case of terumah that it is d’oraysa – ingestion by a zar would effectively destroy the terumah and therefore also be a violation of shemira.

Whether this chiddush of the Avenei Milu’im is correct is a major debate in Achronim. The Steipler in his Birchas Peretz on chumash is not convinced that bitul or loss of kedusha can be equated with destruction. Others offer alternative reasons why bitul would not work in this case, e.g. terumah is property of the kohen, and bitul does not work in the realm of dinei mamonos (arguing that the dollar you owe me is bateil to the rest of the money in your wallet and therefore doesn't have to be paid back just doesn’t work).

the lesser of two evils -- bitul terumah

When prohibited food must be eaten because of life threatening circumstances, the rule is "ma'achilin lo ha'kal ha'kal techila" (Yoma 83) – if there is a choice of issurim, we choose the lesser evil. This principle gives rise to a number of disputes in the gemara and rishonim as to which among various choices is the more minor issur. One of the interesting cases involves a person who requires meat on Shabbos, but there is no kosher meat available -- would it be better to violate Shabbos and shecht an animal to have kosher meat, or to consume non-kosher meat without violating Shabbos? At first glance one would think that Shabbos, an issur sekilah, is certainly the more stringent issur, but the Ran disagrees and argues that eating the treif food is more stringent as each and every k’zayis is a separate issur, while the Shabbos violation would involve just one act. This seems to be a classic question of kamus vs. eichus: how does one qualitatively more stringent issur stack up against a greater quantity of lesser issurim?

The Parashas Derachim challenges the Ran based the following case: The gemara asks which is worse -- eating tevel or eating terumah? Says the gemara: if it is possible to fix the tevel and make it chulin, there is nothing to talk about, as that is obviously the best option. The case in question is where that is impossible. Is tevel the lesser issur because at least in potential it can be transformed into chulin, or is terumah the lesser issur because at least it is permitted for some people (kohanim) to eat b’heter? The gemara quotes a machlokes and does not resolve the question.

What type of case does the gemara have in mind when it says that the tevel cannot be corrected through hafrasha? Rashi explains that we are speaking of a case where someone is ill and requires a specific amount of food which is equal to the total quantity of tevel available. For example, imagine a person who must eat an entire challah roll, and all you have is enough flour to bake exactly that one single challah roll. If you separate off terumah from the flour, the person will still have to eat that portion as well. Is it better to just bake the roll as-is, in a state of tevel, or is it better to do a hafrasha of terumah even though the person will have to eat both the chulin portion and the terumah portion?

Returning to the Ran, if multiple quantities of a lesser issur are viewed as more severe than even a one time desecration of Shabbos, it stands to reason that eating the one bite of terumah would be preferable to taking multiple bites of tevel, each of which is a separate issur. What's the whole machlokes about? Shouldn’t everyone agree the one bite aveira of terumah is the lesser evil than the bite after bite multiple aveiros done by eating tevel?

The Parahas Derachim answers that the Ran did not learn the gemara's case like Rashi. The machlokes must be where you have two separate portions, one which is terumah, one which is tevel, and are not sure which one to use. Why then not just separate terumah from the tevel? What makes it impossible? The P.D. says that there must be some technical reason that makes hafrasha impossible, e.g. the owner of the wheat did not give permission to do hafrasha from it, in which case the hafrasha is not chal. According to the Ran, given that there are two piles, no matter which one you eat, there will be multiple issurim involved.

Now we get to the fun part. The Parashas Derachim adds that by learning the gemara in this way (i.e. not like Rashi), you can resolve another difficulty. Given the way Rashi sets up the case, it seems that it is in fact possible to have your cake and eat it to without violating any issur!Instead of being mafrish terumah and eating it separately, why not just mix the terumah back with the other flour and be mevateil it?! True, there is a din of ain mevatlin issur l’chatchila – you cannot intentionally set up a situation of bitul – but that is only a din derabbanan according to most Rishonim. Everyone should agree that bitul is a better option than a certain d’oraysa violation. Why according to Rashi is this not a valid solution? It must be that since the gemara does not consider this option it means that we are not speaking of a single pile of food, but rather of two distinct piles, one of terumah, one of tevel, and the question is which one to choose.

This issue of ain mevatlin issur l'chatchila on terumah gets us involved in a major debate among Achronim -- to be continued bli neder.

a little chizuk

Yesterday was the annual siyum in my son's yeshiva and it was a tremendous source of chizuk. Over 60 bachurim finished Bava Kama (yes, my son was among them), and others were mesayeim other masechtos as well. These are boys who mostly hail from Far Rockaway and the 5 Towns, boys who certainly are aware of, if not exposed to, TV, the internet, to the allure of Central Ave in the Five Towns with its numerous hangouts and what-not. Yet, despite the potential distractions, these boys have achieved success in learning b'iyun and hasmadah. Y'yasher cheilam. I wrote this last year, but I'll repeat it: this is what chinuch is all about. My son's yeshiva doesn't have a gym period, an art class, a music program, etc. all of which I agree have value, but unless you can show me a yeshiva which has all those and can also boast of bachurim churning through masechtos, I'll stick with what we have.

Just two quick stories from the siyum:

First, a story about a bachur, one of my son's chaveirim. This boy is a Russian immigrant who came to the yeshiva last year mid-year from another school knowing next to nothing. The Menahel explained to the boy that the yeshiva has no real preparatory classes -- the expectation is that the boys will sit and learn gemara, Rashi, Tosfos, Rishonim. How will he fit in? The boy responded, "But I want to learn Torah." The Menahel said that he and the Rosh Yeshiva were in tears. What could they do? The Menahel is a tzadik and did the right thing -- they took the boy in and figured they would see what happens. This boy was mesayem Bava Kama this year.

The guest speaker was Rav Noach Oelbaum from Queens, who told a story that I heard before from another reliable source as well. The minhag in Poland was that on the yahrzeit of the Rama, which is Lag baOmer, people would gather in Cracow by the Rama's kever and be mispallel and learn (see Yevamos 121a, Rashi on top). One year R' Yosef Shaul Natahanson, the Sho'el u'Meishiv, was passing through town on that date, so he came and paid his respects to the local mora d'asra, Rav Avraham David. The Rav asked R' Yosef Shaul to honor them with a derasha, but R' Yosef Shaul said they should talk in learning instead. The Rav asked what he would like to discuss; R' Yosef Shaul suggested maybe going through every Abayei and Rava in shas. (!) I imagine this little contest attracted a crowd, and so they began.... R' Avraham David put his head in his hands and began with Brachos, saying over ba'al peh every Abaye and Rava. After Brachos, he turned to the Shoel u'Meishiv and asked if they should continue, and he got a nod to go on. Next came Shabbos, and then seder Moed, and they kept going right through Nashim and Nezikin. Finally, and here there is a safeik whether it was in Mes. Sanhedrin or Shavuos, R' Yosef Shaul Nathanson said to stop -- enough for one day. Rav Avraham David turned to his guest and asked why, considering how much they had done so far, they should suddenly stop? To which the Sho'el u'Meishiv answered that he, R' Avraham David, had missed 33 instanced of Abaye and Rava since the beginning of shas, and l'chavod the yahrtzeit of the Rama on Lag (33) b'Omer, that's enough.

As Rav Oelbaum said, missing 33 Abayei and Rava's is mistama like a 95 on a test -- and all this on the spot, ba'al peh. We don't even have a hasaga of what this level of yedi'as haTorah is! Yet, people not too long ago were able to do it. But, you will say, how many of us have the kishronos, the ability, the memory, the concentration, of the Sho'el u'Meishiv? They had extraordinary ability -- what does it have to do with us? But I want to echo a point Rav Oelbaum made -- it's not all about memory and ability. How many of us have a cheishek for Torah like that of the Sho'el u'Meishiv? Rav Oelbaum related that the Chazon Ish's brother mentioned in his hesped for the C. I. that everyone knew of the ge'onus of the Chazon Ish, but did they also know about the tears he said when he davened "atah chonein l'adam da'as"? Hashem rewards those tefilos and that desire to achieve. You don't believe it? Just look at that 15 year old boy who didn't know aleph-beis last year and said a hadran yesterday.

The yeshiva deserves a special y'yasher koach for producing bachurim such as these, boys with a love for learning who will undoubtedly reap the rewards of that cheishek.

shabbos rosh chodesh (II)

Thanks to Anonymous for making me track down a R' Yosef Engel in Tziyunim laTorah (#38) that deals at length with the issue of overlapping kedushos hayom. One of the gemara's he cites relates to our issue of rosh chodesh on Shabbos which we discussed last post (part I here). In discussing which takes precedence, tadir or mekudash (Zevachim 90), the gemara tries to bring proof from the fact that the korban musaf of rosh chodesh (mekudash because it is called a moed) is offered before the korban musaf of shabbos (tadir, because it is brought every week). The gemara rejects this proof -- does rosh chodesh effect only its own musafim and not those of shabbos as well? In other words, on shabbos rosh chodesh we are not dealing with the usual korban musaf of shabbos that just happens to fall out on the same day as the musaf of rosh chodesh (a harkavah shichnit), but rather the kedushas hayom of rosh chodesh combines with that of shabbos to create a new, synthesis kedushas hayom (harkavah mizgit). The korban musaf of this shabbos has the benefits of both kedushos hayom together and is no proof to an ordinary tadir vs. mekudash issue.
This is clearly against what I wrote in the previous post, but R' Yosef Engel has much more to say on the issue.

hallel on shabbos rosh chodesh

The gemara (Archin 10) discusses why we say full hallel on some days and not others. Why no full hallel on Shabbos? Because, answers the gemara, Shabbos is not called a mo'ed, and we only say full hallel on a mo'ed. Why no full hallel on Rosh Chodesh, which is called a moed? Because, answers the gemara, there is no prohibition of doing work on Rosh Chodesh, which indicates that it is a different sort of mo'ed than the yamim tovim.

So why did we not recite full hallel yesterday? On Shabbos Rosh Chodesh all the necessary factors overlap -- it is Shabbos, so there is an issur melacha, and the day is called a mo'ed because it is Rosh Chodesh as well.

As we discussed once before (here), when two different kedushos hayom (or other logical halachic structures) overlap, one needs to investigate whether the two different factors co-exist side by side independently (what the Rogachover calles a harkava shichnit) or whether the two factors combine together to create a new synthesis (what he calls a harkava mizgit). In our case, if there was a new type of kedushas hayom created called Shabbos-Rosh Chodesh which was a synthesis of elements of both Shabbos and Rosh Chodesh, then perhaps one could argue the case for full hallel. But apparently that's not the case. The kedushas hayom of Shabbos and the kedushas hayom of Rosh Chodesh happen to coincide on the same day, but each retains its independence, each retains its shortcomings as a mechayeiv of hallel, and therefore, only partial hallel is recited.

korach's claim -- mamlechas kohanim v'goy kadosh?

Lest we dismiss as preposterous Korach's assertion that the nation is “kulam kedoshim” and all should have an opportunity to serve as kohen, we need only remind ourselves of Hashem’s words, “V’atem tehiyu li mamleches kohanim v’goy kadosh,” charging us with to become a nation of kohanim and a holy people. The question is not what gave rise to Korach’s claim, but why indeed was he wrong.

Moshe’s challenged Korach, “U’bikashtem gam kehunah?” -- Do you, Korach, also dare desire serving as kohen as well? Given Korach’s mindset, it is hard, writes the Shem m’Shmuel, to understand why Moshe’s challenge would give him pause. Given his claim of supposed holiness, Korach might feel that in fact there is no one more deserving of the position of kohen than himself.

The Shem m'Shmuel explains that the position of kohen demands being “kadosh,” but not in the way Korach imagined. “Kadosh” means separate. The kohen was kadosh not because he separated from the people, but rather because he separated himself from his own base instincts and desires, including the desire for position and privilige. Aharon did not desire the role of kohen, but had it thrust upon him. He did not hold himself above and seperate from the people, but mingled among them, trying to mend broken relationships and trying to make peace where quarrels broke out.

Moshe’s argument to Korach was that the very notion of “u’bikashtem,” desire for the position, is antithetical to the role of a kohen. A person who is convinced of his own self righteousness to the extent that he sees only himself as deserving is someone who has not succeeded in separating himself from desire enough to deserve the role that he aspires to.

Rashi comments on “V’asu li mikdash” that the word “li” means “lismi,” for my [Hashem’s] sake. The difference between Hashem’s charge and Korach’s claim is that while Korach was motivated by his desire to serve, Hashem demands, “V’atem tehiyu li mamleches kohanim v’goy kadosh,” that our becoming a nation of kohanim and kedoshim be purely “li,” for his sake alone.

hefsek in mitzvas tzitzis

1. If one intends to wear multiple pairs of tzitzis one should recite a bracha only on the first and then put on the other garments. The Rama (O.C. 8:12) writes that if a person took off the first garment before putting on the second garment a new bracha must be recited on the second garment. Many of the Achronim disagree. Since the person had in mind that the bracha would apply to all the garments, what difference does it make if the first is taken off before putting on the second? The Magen Avraham asks how this case is different than a person who recites one bracha intending to shecht multiple animals -- at the time of shechita on the second animal, the person is already finished with the first, yet no new bracha is required?

Seems to me that there is a clear difference between these cases. In the case of shechita, the mitzvah is finished m'meila once the first animal is done. Even if the person wanted the mitzvah to continue, it can't! In the case of tzitzis, it is only the person's deliberate removal of the garment that creates an interruption. If not for that, the chiyuv tzitzis accomplished by wearing the first garment would be ongoing. It's that choice to deliberately end the mitzvah which creates the hefsek.

2. The Beis Yosef (and GR"A) paskens (O.C. 8:14) that if you remove your talis, even if you have in mind to put it back on immediately, a new bracha is recited. The MG"A asks how this case is different from the case of a person who leaves a sukkah with the intent to return, in which case the Beis Yosef himself paskens no new bracha is required. Interestingly, here the Aruch haShulchan draws a distinction similar to the one I drew above -- there is nothing compelling the removal of the talis, so the choice to do so creates a hefsek. However, I think a more basic distinction can be drawn between the cases. The mitzvah of sukkah is one of dirah, living in the sukkah just as one would live in one's home. Just as living in a home does not mean imprisonment -- one can pop in and out as need be -- so too, by definition the mitzvah of sukkah allows one to pop in and out as need be without creating a hefsek. The mitzvah of tzitzis, however, does not allow for interruption -- take the garment off and the mitzvah ends.

3. I am not sure what to make of R' Chaim Volozhiner's statement in Keser Rosh that tzitzis have to be down to your knees.

the shiur of challah

Rashi (15:20) writes that challah is called terumah because like terumah it has no shiur -- any amount (m'doraysa) may be given to the kohen to fulfill the mitzvah. Yet, one pasuk later, Rashi comments that the word "titnu" teaches that one must give a not-insignificant amount to the kohen so that it counts as a proper nesina, an act of giving. Is there a minimum amount required to fulfill challah or isn't there?

The Noda b'Yehuda answers (as we've discussed before, and here as well) that there are two aspects to the mitzvah of challah: 1) removing the status of tevel from the dough; 2) making a gift to the kohen. Seperating any amount of dough removes the status of tevel from the dough. However, to fulfill the mitzvah of nesina, of presenting a gift to the kohen, requires a more significant gift.

stolen tzitzis and mitzvah haba'ah b'aveira

The gemara darshens from the words "V'asu lahem tzitzis" that the string of tzitzis must be owned and not stolen. Minchas Chinuch asks why a special pasuk is needed for this din -- stolen string should be excluded based on the din of mitzvah haba'ah b'aveira? (Obviously this is not a question according to the Rishonim (Tos. Sukkah 9) who hold mitzvah haba'ah b'aveira is only a psul derabbanan.) The M.C. explains that the din of mitzvah haba'ah b'aveira means that the mitzvah action is not acceptable to Hashem, it is not "l'ratzon." The limud from the pasuk goes a step further. Not only is wearing stolen tzitzis something Hashem funds unacceptable, but more than that -- it is like not wearing tzitzis at all. It's not just a lackof a kiyum mitzvah, i.e. like wearing a four cornered with tzitzis but getting no credit for it, but it's a biutl aseh as well, like not having tzitzis on the garment at all.

The Minchas Chinuch uses this same reasoning to explain why a limud is needed to exclude a stolen sukkah. Not only is eating in a stolen sukkah not a kiyum mitzvah because of mitzvah haba'ah b'aveira, but more than that -- it is like eating outside the sukkah, a bitul mitzvah. (See R' Yosef Engel in Asvan D'Oraysa #11 who rejects this chiddush.)

Ordinarily the shulchan aruch deals only in practical halacha, not philosophy. Tzitzis, tefillin, and sukkah are exceptions to the rule and the shulchan aruch tells us the reason for these mitzvos as well as how to perform them. Achronim explain that besides the regular din of kavanah required for all mitzvos, these mitzvos also require having in mind the reason behind them while doing the mitzvah.

R' Elchanan Wasserman, using similar logic to the Minchas Chinuch, raises the question of what happens if a person wears tzitzis without kavanah: does he simply lose the kiyum mitzvah, or would we go a step further and say it is as if the person was wearing a four cornered garment without any tzitzis, a bitul aseh?

collecting on the promise of Eretz Yisrael to Avraham Avinu

The Midrash (BaMidbar Rabbah 16) quotes R’ Acha haGadol’s derush on the pasuk “Yaveish chatzir naveil tzitz u’dvar Elokeinu yakum l’olam,” (Yeshayahu 40:8):

למה הדבר דומה? למלך, שהיה לו אוהב והתנה עמו ואמר לו: לך עמי ואני נותן לך מתנה. הלך עמו ומת. אמר המלך לבנו של אוהבו: אעפ"י שמת אביך, איני חוזר בי במתנה שאמרתי לו, בוא וטול אתה! כך הדבר, המלך, מלך מלכי המלכים הקב"ה. והאוהב זה אברהם, שנאמר (שם מא): זרע אברהם אוהבי. אמר לו הקדוש ברוך הוא: בא לך עמי (בראשית יב): לך לך מארצך וממולדתך ומבית אביך. התנה עמו, שיתן לו מתנה, שנאמר (שם יג): קום התהלך בארץ. וכן הוא אומר (שם): כי כל הארץ אשר אתה רואה לך אתננה. אמר לו הקב"ה למשה: אעפ"י שהתנתי עם האבות ליתן להם את הארץ ומתו, איני חוזר בי,

The Midrash reassures us that we still have a claim on Eretz Yisrael despite the fact that it was promised originally to Avraham and he is long dead. Why this affirmation now? Avraham Avinu had been dead already for hundreds of years by the time Bnei Yisrael left Egypt, ostensibly with the goal of settling Eretz Yisrael. Furthermore, wasn’t the land originally promised to Avraham in trust for his descendents, not as a personal gift – what is the hava amina that Hashem should not deliver?

The answer (as explained by the Shem m’Shmuel) is that there is little bit of Avraham Avinu that lives on inside each and every one of us. Avraham Avinu thus theoretically had the ability to personally collect on the promise of Eretz Yisrael through us.

The tragedy of the meraglim was that Bnei Yisrael disassociated themselves from this legacy of the Avos and their love of the land. That little piece of Avraham within was no longer alive, it no longer had meaning to the generation of the midbar. That ability of Avraham to personally collect was lost.

What right then did we have to the land? The Midrash answers that Hashem’s promise is irrevocable -- even if we fail to live up to the model of the Avos, Eretz Yisrael is ours.

I think this Midrash more generally addresses the inevitable rift that emerges between generations. Not only Avraham Avinu, but the spirit of all fathers and grandfathers eventually dies off, as children go their own way and pursue their own dreams and destiny. Does that mean that ideas and values are lost? Does that mean that the promises made to and by our forefathers have no meaning? Not necessarily. The dor hamidbar was not a dor of Avraham Avinu’s, but Hashem nonetheless was willing (and I don’t think the Midrash means begrudgingly) to reaffirm his promise of Eretz Yisrael. Despite there being differences between our generation and that of our parents or grandparents, and our generation and that of our children, there is a sense of continuity to yahadus which cannot be extinguished.

when a zemer fulfills a mitzvah d'oraysa

Warning: this post may cause you to skip a popular shabbos zemer -- don't say I didn't warn you.

This week I want to mention another chiddush of the GR"A that I don't fully understand. If you pay attention to the words, Tzur Mishelo is basically a song of thanks to Hashem for the food eaten at seudas shabbos. The stanzas "Hazan...," "Al kein Nodeh...," "Rachem...," "Yibaneh haMikdash..." parallel the brachos of birchas hamazon and echo the same themes. Therefore, as reported by R' Chaim Volozhiner, the GR"A avoided singing Tzur Mishelo lest it count as a fulfillment of his chiyuv d'oraysa of birchas hamazon.

I'm missing something here -- so what if it may count as a fulfillment of the chiyuv d'oraysa of bentching? Since one would not be yotzei on a derabbanan level by reciting Tzur Mishelo because it lacks the formula of shem and malchus, there should not be a problem of bracha l'vatalah in reciting the full bentching (and according to the Pri Megadim that we discussed here I would even venture to say there is not even a d'oraysa kiyum in singing Tzur Mishelo). Perhaps the concern is that if the zemer counts as bentching it means the meal has ended, which may not be convenient. But this too is a problem easily eliminated. One obvious solution is to sing the zemer at the close of the meal. Another solution: the Steipler (Orchos Rabeinu vol 1.) is reported to have made sure to eat a k'zayis of bread after singing Tzur Mishelo (so that his real bentching would be on a proper shiur achila) and also had in mind specifically that it is not a hefsek.

But there is a more basic problem I have with the whole chiddush. Mitzvos tzerichos kavanah, especially when speaking of a d'oraysa. I am willing to bet that a large number of people who sing Tzur Mishelo have no idea that it echoes birchas hamazon and have no intent for it to count as a kiyum mitzvah. The GR"A obviously did, but knowing what the words mean is not the same as having kavanah l'shem mitzvah. Just to be safe, you can even have negative kavanah while you sing, i.e. have in mind specifically to not be yotzei by singing. This seems to be even simpler than the Steipler's solution, which makes me wonder why the Steipler did what he did.

Any ideas?

choosing lots to find 70 zekeinim -- unfair probability?

One other Rashi from last week's parsha provided much food for thought in my home. Hashem told Moshe to select 70 zekeinim to help him. Problem: there is no way to divide 70 into 12 equal parts -- we need some way to determine which shevatim got only 5 representitives and which got 6. The solution was to draw lots. 72 lots were created, 70 of which said "zakein" and 2 which were blank. But, asks the Taz in Divrei David, is this method really fair? Let's say you are the first one to draw -- the odds of your getting one of the "losing" lots is 2/72. But let's say you are the last one to draw -- if no one else got a blank lot, you are certain to draw a losing ticket! The fewer lots in the mix, the greater the odds of drawing a losing ticket. The Yerushalmi provides some help and says there were 74 lots created, so that even the final two people to draw would have a chance to win. But even so, their odds would be 50/50, far higher than the initial person's odds of 1/36! (Perhaps it was my BIL's mention of the Monty Hall problem in a comment to the previous post that attracted my attention to this issue, as both problems deal with the effect of choice on probability.)

By rights I should have discussed this earlier in Parshas BaMidbar where the same issue comes up in regards to pidyon. Each Levi served as a substitute for a bechor. Problem: there were 22,000 Levi'im, but 22,273 bechorim. The 273 overflow had to pay pidyon, but how do you determine who the 273 "losers" who have to pay are? Again, the answer was to draw lots, and again the question is whether the method is really fair.

One might answer simply that the lots were not truly random but were guided by hashgacha, but if that's the case, why not dispense with the pretense of lots entirely? Another interesting answer offered by the Taz in BaMidbar is that since the lots were drawn from a fixed jumble, we apply the principle of kol kavua treat everyone has having 50/50 odds. This seems hard to swallow. Kol kavua is not a metziyus; it's a legal fiction. You can't use a halachic reality to answer a mathematical question about real metziyus. Kol kavua doesn't mean the odds are really 50/50, but rather despite the tilt in odds, for purposes of law we treat kol kavua as 50/50.

My son and I both thought this question doesn't get off the ground. No matter who chooses first and who chooses last, the odds remain the same. Imagine dealing a deck of cards to 52 people. Whether you stop after 10 cards or 20 or 50, the odds of any one person holding the ace of spades is still 1/52. The Taz cites a Rashba"sh who writes that the more lots chosen, the greater the odds the losing lot is among those taken already (simple principle of rov). I'm not sure I follow the logic here completely, and for either of these answers to work I think (though I may be wrong) you have to assume that no one revealed their choice in advance. To tell you the truth, the more I think about this, the more confused I get, probably (no pun intended) because I am a lost cause when it comes to math. If anyone has another solution or cares to shed some light, please comment away.

Moshe Rabeinu as shliach tzibur

Commenting on the strangely short prayer by Moshe on behalf of Miriam, Rashi (second pshat) writes that Moshe was concerned lest the people say that he immersed himself in prayer for his sister but not for them. While the people were fast developing a track record of crying wolf and complaining without basis, this one surely is way beyond the pale. What are we to make of it?

I want to suggest a limud zechus and a different way to read Rashi. The meforshim are troubled by the extra word "leimor" in the pasuk, "VaYitzak Moshe el Hashem lei'mor..." "Leimor" suggests that the words are meant to be spoken to others, as in, "VaYidaber Hashem el Moshe leimor," yet here Moshe is speaking to Hashem, not instructing others. Why the extra word?

Perhaps there was a dual nature to Moshe's tefilah: on the one hand, Moshe was acting as Miriam's brother and offering a personal tefilah on her behalf. On the other hand, Moshe was also the shliach tzibur for klal yisrael, who, as evidenced by their willingness to delay and wait for her, were obviously concerned and moved by Miriam's plight. Klal yisrael wanted to join in tefillah as well. "Leimor" teaches that Moshe recited his tefilah out loud, encouraging others who wished to join him in a communal tefilah.

Most of us have probably experienced at one time or another a ba'al tefilah that went on a little bit too much and lost the tzibur's interest in the process. Moshe Rabeinu avoided a lengthy tefilah for precisely this reason. He did not want to be charged with having only his personal needs in mind and forgetting his role as the people's leader in prayer as well; he did not want people to say that the tefilos he offered were his alone and were not on their behalf as well.

who were Eldad and Meidad?

Who were Eldad and Meidad, singled out for prophecy beyond what their 70 peers experienced? The Targum Yonasan has an interesting spin. Recall that when Pharoah decreed that all male children should be drowned Amram divorced Yocheved, which started a movement that others followed (Sotah 12). It took the cajoling of Miriam to re-unite her parents, leading ultimately to Moshe's birth. Targum Yonasan writes that Yocheved actually married Elitzaphan bar Parnach after being divorced, Eldad and Meided are offspring from that marriage! That makes them Moshe, Aharon, and Miraim's half brothers.

I told this to my wife on Shabbos, and she raised a few objections. How could Amram re-marry Yocheved after she married another husband? (My answer: no problem, the Torah had not been given yet so there was no issur.) How was there time for her to conceive and give birth to two children? (Who knows how long she was divorced?) And doesn't the gemara say that Amram's actions led to a mass divorce movement -- all husbands followed his lead and divorced their wives as well. It doesn't make sense that someone would buck the trend and marry Yocheved. (I have no answer for this point other than to think the Midrashing argue.) Perhaps, suggested my wife, the idea here is to create a thematic relationship and remind us of the separation between Amram and Yocheved as a prelude to the parsha of Miriam's objecting to Moshe's separation from his wife.

My wife later showed me that the Ksav v'Kabbalah quotes that a certain scholar (unnamed) sent a letter to Rav Amram Gaon saying he saw the graves of Eldad and Meided and on their their tombstones is written "Brothers of Aharon from the father but not the mother." According to this story, Amram divorced Yocheved after mattan Torah, as she was his aunt and became forbidden to him. Amram remarried and had two other children named in a way to emphasize that they came from a kosher marriage: Eldad = "aino dodah," not from my aunt; Meided = "mi hu dodasi" who is my aunt. The relationship between Eldad and Meided and Moshe, Aharon, and Miriam in this version is the opposite of the Targum -- they are half brother through the same father. However, the Ksav v'Kabbalah questions the authenticity of this legend. If Amram divorced Yocheved only after mattan Torah, that only leaves two intervening years until the episode of Kivros haTa'avah, where Eldad and Meided became prophets. They must have been precocious toddlers indeed! I also wonder at the purported tombstone engraving. Why mention being brother of Aharon and not Moshe Rabeinu?

The mysterious lineage of Eldad and Meided, their prophecy, what happened to them, have all the ingredients to make a good thriller. Someone get Dan Brown on the phone...

For another insight on the parsha from the Ksav v'Kabbalah, see here.

"shelo shina" -- Sefas Emes vs. Ishbitza on why Aharon was praiseworthy

Rashi tells us that the words, "Vaya'as kein Aharon," that Aharon did as told in lighting the menorah, are written in praise of Aharon, "she'lo shina," as he made no changes. The obvious question: Why is doing a mitzvah without change from the way it was commanded deserving of praise and not simply to be expected? The Sefas Emes and the Ishbitza read Rashi as addressing the same point, but head in nearly opposite directions!

Sefas Emes (5735): Of course Aharon did not change anything the first time he lit the menorah; the chiddush is that he didn’t change anything even the ten-thousandth time. Not only was there no deviation in what Aharon did, there was also no deviation in Aharon’s thought and attitude. Most of us need change to prevent boredom and staleness -- not Aharon! He carried with him the exact same thoughts which he had the first time he lit the menorah even years later and those same thoughts continued to inspire him.

Ishbitza: The word “shinah” can also mean repetition. The ten thousandth lighting of the menorah may superficially have looked exactly the same as the first lighting, but that was not the case. Every time Aharon lit the menorah he discovered a different nuance to the mitzvah, he had a different thought in mind. Aharon never once repeated the mitzvah the same way as the day before.

The Sefas Emes sees the hischadshus, the enthusiasm and intensity, of the initial lighting as singular and irreplaceable, while the Ishbitza sees hischadshus as an ongoing process. The chanukas hamishkan through lighting the menorah (see Meshech Chochma) can teach us something about the proper approach to chinuch. The word about Slabodka was that after attending, even if you might sin, you would never really enjoy it -- that's the "shelo shina" of the Sefas Emes that lasts a lifetime. But on the other hand, a person needs to be able to develop the ability to pull new tricks out of his own hat and re-charge even when long out of yeshiva. It's somewhat paradoxical, notes the Shem m'Shmuel (in the Chanukah ma'amarim) that the word chinuch, which really means training till a task can be repeated again and again, is related to the word chanukah, inauguration, the first time something is done. This tells us that true chinuch is not merely repetition of past lessons, but the repetition of inaugurations, as each accomplishment brings an opportunity to add something new, "shelo shina" Ishbitza style.

GR"A on kiddush before ma'ariv

Having a 7:00 kabbalas shabbos minyan is like having a circle with four angles equal angles and sides -- a halachic contradiction in terms. The gemara has two views as to the proper time for mincha/ma’ariv: according to one view mincha must be completed before plag and ma’ariv may be done immediately afterward; according to other view mincha may be davened until shkiya and ma’ariv only afterward. Either view may be followed provided one is consistent. The problem with the 7:00 minyan is that it takes the short end of both sticks -- mincha is later than plag but ma'ariv is earlier than shkiya.

Someone commented that there was an easy solution: daven mincha early, go home, get ready for Shabbos, make kiddush, eat your meal, and then come back to shul and daven ma’ariv at the proper time. Everyone is happy -- the kids get supper at a decent hour and you avoid the contradiction in zmanei tefilah.

Only problem is that the GR”A in Ma’aseh Rav shoots this down. GR"A holds that kiddush may not be recited before ma’ariv. The proof: the gemara (Brachos 27b) writes that Rav davened ma’ariv early on erev shabbos. Asks the gemara, did Rav also say kiddush? The gemara answers by quoting Rav Nachman in the name of Shmuel that one can daven early on erev shabbos and say kiddush as well.

What exactly is the proof from this gemara? Just because Rav davened and then said kiddush does not mean that it cannot be done some other way!? The meforshim on the Ma'aseh Rav are so troubled by this issue that they suggest that perhaps the GR"A never said this chiddush in the first place (an easy solution!). You can nitpick and say that since Shmuel first repeats that once can daven early, which was never under debate, and only then tells us the chiddush that kiddush can be recited, he implies that these two facts are related and tefilah must precede kiddush. Still, far from compelling. Even if you kvetch out some diyuk in the gemara, how do you explain the lomdus? Why is it that tefilah must precede kiddush? I don’t know the answer. For the record, the Aruch haShulchan has no problem with kiddush before ma'ariv. But for those who are concerned for the GR"A's view, the very fact that the GR"A thought this chiddush was correct gives it a stamp of legitimacy, even if the proof is unclear (as noted by the meforshim on the Ma'aseh Rav).

nazir -- sinner or saint?

While some Tanaim hold that the nazir’s self-denial is itself sinful, the majority view seems to be that nezirus can bring a person to great spiritual heights. Various pesukim refer to the nazir and the prophet in the same breath, implying a similar status. Why then must the nazir bring a korban chatas? Ramban answers that the chatas is a penalty for the nazir ending his nezirus and not remaining on this plateau of spiritual perfection. Tosfos (Ta’anis 11), however, denies the basis of the question. The nazir surely reaches great spiritual heights, but at the same time is guilty of a minor infraction of foregoing the pleasures of the world. The greater good is worth the peril of the lesser evil. Tosfos notes that even where required by halacha to take on a vow of nezirus – “ha’ro’eh sotah b’kilkula yazir min ha’yayin” – the nazir is nonetheless is guilty of a minor sin.

Rav Bloch in Shiurei Da’as wonders what Tosfos means by this last point. How can a person be called a sinner if he/she is following the path required by halacha?!

“Ain tzadik ba’aretz asher ya’aseh tov v’lo yechetah.” The simple understanding of the pasuk is that even the greatest people experience failures – 99 out of 100 actions of a tzadik may be raiseworthy, but there is always that 1 out of 100 misstep. R’ Chaim Volozhiner, however adds an additional insight: the pasuk is not just speaking of quantitative tzidkus, but qualitative tzidkus as well. Even acts which are perceived as righteous are only 99% pure, but there is an inevitable element of “lo lishma,” selfishness, wrongful motivation, which creeps into all deeds. Even a tzadik cannot act with pure intention of “tov” without cheit tainting his deeds.

As psychologists put it, our actions are overdetermined, i.e. there are multiple individually sufficient causes that drive behavior. The Torah is realistic in its assessment of personality – even good people who do the right thing do so with mixed motives.

Rav Bloch interprets Tosfos as referring to the motivations that bring one to accept a vow of nezirus. Becoming a nazir may, under certain circumstances, be the 100% right thing to do, but that doesn’t mean the potential nazir's motives are 100% pure is making that leap. When we submerge the totality of our personality into an endeavor, even a positive endeavor, the bad traits that are inherent within us come along for the ride. That initial small lacking of proper intention stands out all the more in light of the tremendous spiritual heights reached by the nazir, but ultimately does not diminish in the larger sense from the value of the commitment.

kiddush for a nazir

The gemara (Nazir 3b) quotes a derasha to prohibit a nazir from mitzvah wine as well as non-mitzvah wine. What mitzvah wine are we talking about, asks the gemara? The gemara answers: kiddush and havdalah. But, asks the gemara, why is a derasha needed to permit that – the nazir is “mushba v’omeid” already? Rashi explains: since the Torah commands that kiddush be made over wine, no vow of nezirus can interfere with that pre-existing obligation.

Tosfos disagrees with Rashi's reading. Reciting kiddush over wine may be a din d'oraysa, but drinking the wine of kiddush is certainly is not! The gemara, explains Tos, is asking a rhetorical question – is the person mushba v’omeid to drink the wine, requiring a pasuk to teach that it is allowed?! Obviously not, therefore the pasuk must teach us something else.

Did Rashi really think that even drinking wine is part of the mitzvah d’oraysa of kiddush? Possibly, but it is difficult to understand why this should be so. Rav Soloveitchik suggested a different approach to Rashi (quoted by R’ H. Schachter in “M’Pninei haRav”, Zeved Tov p. 249). Rashi read the gemara to mean that the cheftza of mitzvah wine is mufka, inherently excluded, from the parsha of nezirus. In other words, wine used for kiddush is a food-item which is excluded from the nezirus vow, just like most other food and drink. It's not that the mitzvah of kiddush overrides the vow of nezirus, which would force us to define kiddush as including drinking, but rather that kiddush wine is never included in that vow in the first place.

the message of Megillas Rus

The message of Megillas Rus, take 1:

Ploni Almoni knew that Boaz, the Gadol haDor, paskened that Rus the Moavi’ah was permitted, but Ploni nonetheless stubbornly stuck to his own way of thinking. No matter what his reasoning, whether it was concern for the established custom of rejecting converts from Moav, or worry lest a future Beis Din disqualify his lineage, of some other concern, Ploni was still wrong. His decision cost him the opportunity to bring David's family into the world. The message of the megillah is that personal cheshbonos, even when they appear to be well grounded, must give way to the rulings of our Gedolim.

The message of Megillas Rus, take 2:

The established norms of tradition could not be clearer: converts from Moav could not be accepted. Social and religious convention closed minds and hearts to Rus' plight. But there was someone willing to listen – Boaz. Roused by empathy for her plight, Boaz re-examined accepted doctrine and discovered that the law was not as clear as some would like it to be. There was room for leniency – Moavi v’lo Moavis – and Rus could be accepted into Klal Yisrael. Accepting Rus would be perceived as the act of a maverick, but Boaz did not hesitate. The message of Rus is that when faced with the call of those who cry out for empathy, for equality, for help against injustice, we must re-examine tradition and find innovative solutions, even if they challenge convention and received wisdom. The Ploni Almoni’s of the world may lead a life of safe complicity, but it is the courage of Boaz (Bo-Oz) that will lead us to redemption.

The message of Megillas Rus, take 3:

Be wary of simplistic derush that imposes ideological readings onto the text to the preclusion of other possible meanings.

tosefes shabbos and tosefes yom tov on shavuos

The Shulchan Aruch O.C. 261:4 says that an eiruv may not be made once one was mekabeil Shabbos. Yet, in O.C. 393:2 the Shulchan Aruch quotes two views on the question. Why does the Beis Yosef not cite both views in siman 261?

The Dagul m’Revava answers that these simanim are speaking of two different cases. In siman 393 the Beis Yosef refers to making an eiruv during “tosefes shabbos.” In siman 261 he refers to making the eiruv after one has accepted Shabbos by saying barchu. The difference is as follows: tosefes shabbos means simply stopping work in advance of Shabbos, a pure issur gavra of doing melacha. Kabbolos Shabbos means accepting the kedushas hayom of the upcoming day. When speaking of the time period of tosefes Shabbos, when one has not yet accepted the kedushas hayom but has simply accepted the issur of melacha, the beis Yosef is willing to entertain two views as to whether an eiruv can be placed. Not so where one has accepted kedushas hayom of Shabbos, in which case placing an eiruv is certainly prohibited.

This Dagul m’Revava may shed light on a number of sources that relate to tosefes Shabbos that we discussed in the past. For example, Tosfos (Kesubos 47) holds that the din of ain m’arvin simcha b’simcha does not apply during tosefes Shabbos and a wedding may be held so long as it is not yet actual Yom Tov or Shabbos. Perhaps the logic here is that ain m’arvin simcha b’simcha applies to the kedushas hayom of shabbos or yom tov, but has nothing to do with the pure issr gavra created by tosefes.

The Netziv writes that the words “b’etzem hayom ha’zeh” used to describe Shavuos tell us that there is no din of tosefes yom tov. Others go so far as to suggest that woman not light their Yom Tov candles early, as this would constitute an acceptance of the chag and cut short sefirah. Rav Shternbruch (Shu”T Tshuvos v’Hanhagos vol 4 #111) rejects this sevara. Even if we cannot extend kedushas yom tov earlier than nightfall, as we learned from the Dagul m’Revava, it is possible to have tosefes without making a statement about the kedushas hayom. Rav Shternbruch writes based on this that when one accepts tosefes on shavuos (the mitzvah of being mosif on shabbos or yom tov should ideally be done through a verbal declaration, not simply by stopping work) one should be careful to accept “tosefes yom tov” and not say that one is accepting the “kedushas yom tov.”

My son was very unhappy with this chiluk of the Dagul m’Revava (he’s in good company: the Aruch haShulchan writes that it is a distinction without a difference) and added a good point regarding the practical upshot. Neicha those who read my blog and are informed about such matters, but what of the rest of the world? As my son put it, what do I think his sisters have in mind when they light candles – do they think their kabbalah is merely tosefes, or do they think it is an acceptance of the kedushas hayom, like any other Shabbos or yom tov? (The way around that is to educate them about the sugya, which is sometimes easier said than done.)

On a final note, the practice of not saying kiddush until dark on Shavuos night (the Taz is the one who mentions not davening ma’ariv until dark, but most poskim refer to kiddush only) is very difficult to understand. Assuming the Dagul m’Revava is right, why should Shavuos be different than any other week when those who make early Shabbos recite kiddush during the period of tosefes even though the kedushas hayom of Shabbos is yet to arrive? M’ikkar hadin it seems there is no real issue here (Shu”T l’Horos Noson 7:31) and one would certainly be yotzei kiddush if it is recited early.

na'aseh v'nishma

Chazal tell us that the expression "na'aseh v'nishma" was used only by angels in their service of Hashem until the Jewish people came used it to declare their commitment before matan Torah. What is so special about these two words? If the phrase is simply an expression of unquestioning loyalty, would we expect less from the Jewish people after they merited yetziyas mitzrayim and a blatant display of hashgacha along the journey to Sinai? It would be surprising if Bnei Yisrael were not willing to accept the Torah willingly, even sight unseen! It must be that there is something more here…

The Rishonim (see Tosfos, Brachos 11, Rosh) ask why a person does not have to make a new birchas haTorah if he takes a break from learning during the day. Why is learning Torah different than, for example, the mitzvah of sukkah, where a person would be required to recite a new bracha if he leaves the sukkah and then returns later? The Beis Yosef (O.C. 47) cites an answer offered by the Agur. Even if a person stops learning to do other mitzvos, those mitzvos have halachos and dinim that govern how they are performed. There is never really a hefsek, a break from learning Torah, as every mitzvah act must involve Torah thoughts about what to do and how to do it and when and where to act. [The Emek Bracha quotes the Agur as I explained it here, in connection with mitzvos, but as cited by the Beis Yosef the Agur actually says even more: every act, even going to the restroom, is governed by halachos, and therefore there is never a hefsek from Torah.)

The Bikkurei Ya'akov paskens that birchas haTorah should be recited before performing the mitzvah of netilas lulav if one takes the lulav before davening. Rav Shternbruch (Moadim u'Zmanim vol 8) wonders why this should be so -- what does the bracha on talmud Torah have to do with the mitzvah of lulav? In light of the Agur, there is no question. Netilas lulav, like other mitzvos, has a myriad of halachos that define how it should be performed. One cannot engage in the proper performance of the mitzvah without also engaging in Torah thought. (Perhaps the Agur holds that even hirhur of Torah requires a bracha.)

I think that "na'aseh v'nishma" points to this link between deed, “na’aseh,” and Torah study, “nishma.” Judaism does not consist of two separate realms, the practical and the intellectual, but rather the practical itself must be an intellectual experience. "Na'aseh v''nishma" does not mean we will do and then study, a sequential relationship between ideas. Rather it means that through doing we will arrive at study, a logical relationship. "Na'aseh v'nishma" is not a "hakkava shichnit," to use the Rogatchover's jargon, i.e. a commitment to two mutually exclusive ideals that exist side by side, but rather "na'aseh v'nishma" is a a commitment to a synthesis, a "harkava mizgit," a hybrid fusion.

Chazal tell us that myriads of angels descended to place two crowns on the head of every Jew, one for the commitment to "na'aseh", one for the commitment to "nishma". After the cheit ha'eigel, the angels returned to reclaim those crowns. Why, asks the Avnei Nezer (cited by the Shem m'Shmuel), should the angels have reclaimed the crown of nishma? The commitment of "na'aseh" may have been undermined by the act of worshiping the eigel, but how was the commitment to "nishma," to learning, affected?

The removal of both crowns underscores that learning and mitzvah performance are intertwined. Torah study without a commitment to practical implementation is worthless; practical implementation without Torah knowledge is impossible.

It is uniquely human to take action and afterward exclaim, “What was I thinking!?” but angels have no such second thoughts – deed and thought are united as one. This is the ideal of “na’aseh v’nishma” which we experienced at Sinai.

summer issue of Kallah Magazine

My wife has put together another issue of Kallah Magazine and posted it online for easy viewing. Please click on the link here (http://issuu.com/AriellaBrown/docs/summer10) to have a look or just click on the issue below. If you contact any of the advertisers please mention where you saw the ad. Thank you!

Open publication - Free publishing - More tsnius

Rav Soloveitchik on making early Shabbos

In an article in the sefer Zeved Tov (a compilation of torah essays in honor of Rav Zevulun Charlop, former dean of RIETS, available here in .pdf format), Rav Hershel Shachter cites (p. 245) a number of insights from Rav Soloveitchik in connection with the Ramban’s comments to the pasuk “Zachor es yom hashabbos.” Ramban mentions that Shabbos must be distinct from other days in the week, similar to the Rambam’s psak (Shabbos 30:3) that one must have different, better food for Shabbos, nicer clothes for Shabbos, and even if one eats lavish meals all week one should change the time of the meal so as to mark Shabbos as special. Based on this idea Rav Soloveitchik frowned on the practice of making early Shabbos. The Rav felt that the motive behind early Shabbos is to have dinner at the same time as usual, to make Shabbos more like the rest of the week, contrary to the theme developed by the Ramban and Rambam. Making early Shabbos does not necessarily pose a problem in terms of hilchos tefilah, assuming one davens mincha before plag and ma’ariv only afterwards, but it does pose a problem in this are of hilchos shabbos.

As someone whose kids still grow cranky waiting too long for dinner, I sympathize with those who make early Shabbos. Looking at the Rambam, it is in the context of discussing what to do if you eat lavish meals during the week that the Rambam says to eat at a different time. If nothing else distinguishes the seudas Shabbos, than the time the meal is served will have to do. But for most of us the Shabbos meal is distinguished from regular weekday dinner in various ways, e.g. by what is served, how it is served, the fact that the family is eating together, etc. Where the meal is defined as special in other ways, I am not so sure eating earlier, even at the same time as usual, to avoid cranky kids is an issue, b'frat if it will be a more peaceful seudah in keeping with the Shabbos spirit. Hard to know what RYBS would hold without more information. (Haleva'i anyway that I should get home from work in time to make early Shabbos.)

(Update: By coincidence I saw in a local paper that RHS is a guest rabbi-in-residence somewhere and he is scheduled to speak between mincha and ma'ariv at their Friday night early kabbolas shabbos minyan. I think it's a fair guess that he is davening at the minyan he is speaking at, despite the sevara in the article. Make of it what you will.)

parshas bamidbar: the rebbe-talmid relationship

Unfortunately I have not had much time to write, so just a few thoughts on parsha to close out the week.

Rashi writes that Moshe reacted to Hashem telling him to count every levi from 30 days old by asking how he could possibly intrude and enter every tent to get a proper count. (Apparently Moshe felt that he must personally due the counting and not rely on eid echad testimony – I’m not sure why.) At first glance the question is seems audacious. What do you mean how can you intrude – Hashem told you to count, so do whatever it takes to count! But apparently that’s not how to understand the dvar Hashem. It is as preposterous to think Hashem would demand a breach of privacy as it would be to think if Hashem said to go from NY to NJ he meant us to walk on water. Therefore Moshe asked for clarification. The respect for the dignity and rights of others is so integral and essential to the meaning of Torah that Moshe correctly intuited that no tzivuy can cross these norms.

And just to be clear, when I write “breach of privacy”, I mean exactly that. I don’t think the concern here was tzniyus, in case someone in the house was not dressed properly when Moshe stopped by, as that situation could easily be averted with a knock on the door and a warning before entering. I think the very assumption of the right to demand entrance to someone's home without prior invitation, no matter how important the reason, is the issue at hand here. The obvious lesson that zealousness for kvod shamayim which tramples of kavod habriyos is an oxymoron.

The Netziv makes a number of significant points in his comments on the parsha that relate to the rebbe-talmid relationship.

The Torah speaks of the children of Moshe and Aharon, "V’Eileh toldos Aharon u’Moshe b’yom diber Hashem es Moshe b’Har Sinai "(3:1), though it lists only Aharon’s children. Chazal, cites by Rashi, explain that Moshe the teacher is given equal credit as if he too were the father of Aharon’s children. (see Havolim’s post for details). One would imagine that this special bond between rebbe and student developed over the course of years of study together. However, the pasuk speaks of the bond as existing “byom diber… b’har Sinai,” from the moment of kabbalas haTorah. Apparently it is not the course of study over years, but rather it is the commitment which the student makes on day one which forges the bond Chazal speak of. (Of course the upcoming holiday of Shavuos is a good time to reflect on the significance of making an initial commitment at the moment of kabbalas haTorah.)

The end of the parsha speaks of the covering of the utensils of the Mishkan in preparation for the camp traveling. The Netziv notes that the description of the covering of the menorah is unique in two aspects: 1) the Torah first mentions the covering of techeiles and then tells us that it is to be used for the menorah, while with respect to other kelim first the kli is mentioned and then its covering; 2) the Torah instructs that not only the menorah, but each and every one of the utensils used in its lighting is to be covered in this one covering of techeiles. There are two lessons here. Firstly, the techeiles is a reminder of Hashem’s heavenly guidance (like the techeiles thread of tziztis); the menorah represents the light of wisdom found in the Torah. Divine assistance in the study of Torah does not come only after one has achieved success in learning. Were that the case the difficulty and demands of Torah study would cause many to turn away. The techeiles is mentioned first because Divine assistance comes even before one has achieved success in learning. Hashem doesn’t wait for us; he reaches out and helps us get to the goals we aspire to. Secondly, rebbe and talmidim must forge a strong bond and exist as one community. The menorah and the instruments which serve it are all wrapped in the same garment, inseparable. Again, important lessons to take to heart as we draw closer to the holiday of kabbalas haTorah.

yom yerushalayim

asiri vaday v'lo asiri safeik: rov as probablity

The Ksav V’Kabbalah at the end of parshas Bechukosai brings up a sugya which deserves mention due to the enormous amount of ink spilled by Achronim discussing it, but I’m afraid all I’m going to give for now is roshei perakim due to lack of time and my lack of research into it (but feel free to comment away!) The scenario: after a customer purchased a side of beef at the local butcher, it was discovered that one of the cows put up for sale was a treifa. Using the rule of thumb of kol d’parish m’ruba parish, the customer assumes that his side of beef is part of the rov and is kosher. Yet we also have a rule of kol kavua k’machtza al machtza. If anyone were to now walk into the store to purchase a side of beef, the rule of kavua tells us that every hide of beef has an only 50/50 chance of being kosher, and hence may not be eaten (safeik d’oraysa l’chumra). But how can this be? If the side of beef the customer took home is kosher, how every side of beef remaining in the butcher store, including potentially the side of beef from the same cow bought by the customer, be treif?!

The Kv"K cites the K'reysi, who suggests an answer based on a din in hilchos ma’aser beheima (end of Behukosai). If an animal counted for ma’aser beheima jumps back into the herd, the halacha (Bava Metziya 6) is that the entire herd is patur from ma’aser. The reason why is because every tenth animal counted is potentially the one which jumped back in and an animal already counted is patur. The Rishonim (quoted in Shita Mekubetzes) ask: but isn't this one animal bateil in the entire herd? They answer that the Torah demands asiri vaday – the definitive 10th animal – for ma’aser beheima. Rov tilts the odds in favor of any animal being counted not being the one that jumped back in, but a high degree of certainty – good odds – is not the same as definitive truth. In lomdishe terms, rov is mevarer the safeik, not machriya the safeik. (Side note: note that the question here dealt with bitul b'rov, but the answer speaks to the rule of kol d'parish... how are these concepts related is a long discussion in its own right!)

Returning to our butcher store case, if we declared with certainty that the meat in the customer’s possession is from a kosher cow, we would indeed be hard pressed to justify declaring a side of beef from the same cow treif! But that’s not how rov works. In reality we don’t know whether the side of beef in the customer’s possession is kosher – all we have is a probability of rov. There still remains a doubt whether the meat is really kosher or treif, and there remains a doubt as well whether the corresponding side of beef in the butcher store is kosher or treif. Kok d’parish and kol kavua do not determine physical reality – they just provide two different ways of relating to uncertainty. Sometimes meat can be eaten despite the doubt that it may be trief, sometimes not.

The Ksav v’Kabbalah is not happy with this approach based on a question from Kesubos 15 that we once discussed (here). He follows up with an answer he received from from R’ Akiva Eiger, but this post is long enough for now, so if you want more you'll have to read it inside (link).

the connection between tochacha and archin

Someone asked me on Shabbos why the parsha of archin follows the tochacha – what does one thing have to do with the other? The Rishonim ask this question and explain (see Rashbam in particular, also Ramban, Abarbanel) that the tochacha is primarily a punishment for failure to observe shemita. Rashi writes that the length of the galus predicted by the tochacha corresponds exactly to the years of shemita and yovel that were not observed properly by the Jewish people. The tochacha is therefore connected with the laws of shemita that open Parshas BeHar. The close of Bechukosai, with its discussion of the assessment of the value of property, returns the discussion to the laws of yovel. Since a field will return to its original owner at the yovel, its value must be assessed relative to when the next yovel will be.

It is a bit difficult to understand, however, why the Torah inserted the tochacha between the sections that deal with yovel. Abarbanel addresses this point, but I like the idea suggested by the Ishbitza. The theme of the parsha of archin is pidyon – redemption of pledges. The Ishbitza suggests that the idea of redemption should be understood more generally. Faced with a disheartening list of punishments, the Torah ends the parsha by telling us that all is lost; there is always an opportunity to redeem onself. Excluding the first pasuk of "Vayidaber Hashem el Moshe…" and the last pasuk which closes the parsha, there is an exact pasuk by pasuk match between the thirty-three pesukim of parshas archin and the thirty-three pesukim of tochacha. Every punishment has an escape clause should a person sincerely return to Hashem.

My wife thought of a slightly different formulation along these same lines. By connecting archin to tochacha perhaps the Torah is teaching that punishment itself is a means of redemption. G-d does not punish merely to cause pain; he punishes for the sake of kaparah and to teach us to change our ways.

Tosfos vs. the Ran on counting sefirah early

Yesterday I mentioned the view of Tosfos (Menachos 66a) that since sefrah is derabbanan it can be counted during bein hashemashos based on the principle of safeik derabbanan l’kula. The Ran disagrees and argues that sfeika derabbanan l’kula means that if one is forced into a situation of doubt, one can be lenient; it does not give a person the right l’chatchila create a situation of safeik.

Rav Hershel Shachter (article here) notes that the Ran’s point seems to be borne out by the principle of ain m’vatlin issur l’chatchila, which tells us that one should ideally avoid having to decide a safeik if such a situation could be avoided. Why then does Tosfos advocate counting during beis hashemashos?

Rav Shachter suggests that Tosfos agrees in principle to the Ran, but argues that the case of sefirah is different because there is compelling reason in this case to enter into the safeik: the din of temimos. Tosfos held that the count of sefirah must be done at the earliest possible moment to include as much of the 24 hour day as possible. (If one davens ma'ariv at a late minyan it would be preferable based on this to count sefirah earlier.)

Why does the Ran disagree? The Ran may simply hold that since were sefirah d’oraysa counting early would be impossible (as sfeika d’oraysa l’chumra), the din derabbanan of sefirah done zecher l’mikdash cannot have more stringent parameters the d'oraysa mitzvah and cannot require counting earlier. Altrenatively, Rav Shachter suggests an interesting chiddush: the Ran may hold that the count of sefirah done at any point during the night covers the entire time period in question. In other words, just like kiddush hachodesh by beis din, even if done mid-day, retroactively creates a status of kedusha on the entire day, so too, the count of sefirah done at any point during the night effectively includes every moment of the night in the mitzvah, retroactive to the night's beginning. According to this approach, the reason to count early is not because of the din of temimos, but rather because of the usual din of zerizim makdimim.

A similar machlokes perhaps exists with respect to the mitzvah of kiddush. The Tur writes that one should hurry to recite kiddush immediately upon getting home Friday night to fulfill the mitzvah of zachrey’hu b’knisaso. The Rambam (shabbos 29:14), however, makes no mention of a need to rush, and even adds that although “ikkar kiddush” is at night, the kiddush may be recited at any point during Shabbos.

According to the Tur, the mitzvah of kiddush serves to sanctify the time of Shabbos going forward from the moment it was recited. Therefore, to encompass as much of Shabbos as possible, kiddush must be recited at the earliest possible moment. The Rambam, however, understood that kiddush works even retroactively, like the kiddush hachodesh of beis din. There is no specific din in hilchos kiddush that demands that it be recited early, only the usual din of zerizim.

a rising tide lifts all boats

Among the brachos promised to Bnei Yisrael in Parshas Bechukosai is, “V’lo tigal nafshi eschem,” Hashem will not be repulsed by us. Given the tremendous gifts of the other brachos, e.g. more than bountiful crops, enemies falling on their own swords, peace in the land, etc., the bracha that Hashem will not be repulsed by us hardly seems much of a blessing at all!

The Netziv explains that this bracha is not directed to those who fulfill “Im b’chukosai tei'leichu,” but to the stragglers who do not. When the majority of the community lives a Torah life not only will they receive the tremendous brachos promised by the parsha, but even those who might fall through the cracks are promised that “lo tigal nafshi eschem,” Hashem will not abandon them.

krias shema - d'oraysa or derabbanan?

There is an opinion of Tosfos (Menachos 43b) which holds that krias shema is not a mitzvah d’oraysa, contrary to what most of us probably assume without a second thought. Because of the many proofs that reading krias shema is in fact a kiyum d’oraysa (see Tosfos Sotah 32b which lists numerous gemaras that point in this direction), the Sha'agas Aryeh concludes that everyone must agree that there is a mitzvah to read parshiyos at morning and night, b’shachbecha uv'kumecha. The only question, says the Sha’gas Aryeh, is whether the specific parsha (or parshiyos) of shema must be read, or whether m’doraysa any parsha may be read, and the designation of reading specifically the parsha (or parshiyos) of shema is derabbanan.

My wife’s grandfather, R’ Dov Yehudah Shochet, in passing in an article on a different topic mentions a proof to this Sha'agas Aryeh. Tosfos (Menachos 66a) writes that sefirah is only derabbanan, and since sfeika derabbanan l’kula, once may count during beis hashemashos, the time period of safeik day safeik night, without waiting for actual nightfall. Were krias shema really only a kiyum derabbanan, the same logic should apply; one should be allowed to read shema during beis hashemashos as well, without waiting until tzeis. Yet, the very first Mishna in Brachos tells us that the time for krias shema is tzeis, not earlier! It must be that the Sha'agas Aryeh is right -- everyone agrees that there is a mitzvah d’oraysa of some sort; the only question is whether a specific parsha is mandated or not.

the aseh of shemita - zman gerama?

Why according to the Chinuch are women obligated in the mitzvas aseh of shemitah (shnas shabason…) when it is zman gerama? As we once discussed (link), some Rishonim (see Tosfos Kiddushin 34a, Ramban) treat the case of an aseh which coincides with a lav as different than a regular aseh. Since women are obligated to keep the lav, the aseh tags along even though it is zman gerama. With respect to shemita, since women are obligated to keep the lav of not working the field, they are also obligated in the aseh as well.

The Ritva distinguishes between two types of mitzvos. The exemption of zman gerama applies where the mitzvah demands some act on the part of the individual, a chovas hagavra. However, where the mitzvah relates to the object instead of the person there is no zman gerama exemption. According to the Ritva the gemara does not classify milah as zman gerama mitzvah (See Tos Kiddushin 29) because the purpose of the mitzvah is to bring the child into the state of being nimol, not the actual act of cutting off the orlah.

The Minchas Chinuch applies the logic of the Ritva to shemita. The aseh of shemita is not a chovas hagavra on the individual, but is din in the land, i.e. the land must be given a year of rest. Therefore, women as well as men are obligated.

A number of other interesting conclusions follow from this chiddush. 1) If one asks an aku”m to work the land during shemita, one is not merely in violation of an issur derabbanan of amira l’aku”m, as on Shabbos, but rather one is in violation of the issur d’oraysa of shabason. Since the focus of the mitzvah is the land, not the farmer, causing the land to be disturned by work violates this aseh. 2) The M.C. further debates whether the aseh would be violated if one planted seed just before shemita and that seed took root on shemita. While no actual work was done during shemita in this case, there was an effect produced on the land.

My son asked me recently why we need a gezeiras hakasuv (see Shavuos 15b) to teach us that the beis hamikdash cannot be built on Shabbos or Yom Tov – since binyan mikdash is an aseh and yom yov is an aseh and a lav, the standard rule that ain aseh doche lo ta’aseh v’aseh should apply. A simple answer is that without the gezeiras hakasuv you might have thought that just like korbanos are doche shabbos and yom tov, the building of the mikdash itself should be doche yom tov. Also, it also does not seem from the gemara that all the amoraim agree that there is in fact an aseh associated with yom tov. I prefer a more lomdish answer. Perhaps the chiddush here is that the issur of building is not just a din in shabbos or yom tov, but is a din in the mitzvah of binyan mikdash. A nafka minah would be in a case where an aku”m is asked to do the building: if the issur were a regular hilchos shabbos din based on ain aseh doche lo ta’aseh v’aseh, then we would be dealing with a standard issur derabbanan of amira l’aku”m; however, if the issur is a din in binyan mikdash, meaning the mikdahs is precluded from being built on yom tov or shabbos, then the work of the aku”m would be an issur d’oraysa, similar to the sevara of the Minchas Chinuch with respect to shemita.

another unreasonable edict of gedolim

The gedolim have again decided to impose their standards of orthodoxy on the rest of the world. Their sparsely worded edict that offers no halachic explanation for its rationale, makes no attempt to address the arguments of competent rabbonim who disagree, no invitation was extended to the individual most adversely affected by this edict to present their side of the story, and no heed was taken of the minhagim and psak of other communities who also call themselves orthodox but follow different traditions.

No, I am not speaking of Rav Elyashiv and co., but rather I am speaking of the members of the RCA committee which recently declared smicha for women off-limits.

Yes, this is a poor attempt at satire. It's not that I am particularly enamored of the idea of having a woman get smicha. It's that I find it strange that those who routinely criticize Rav Elyashiv and other giants when their psak is seen as disenfranchising the so-called centrist camp are suddenly silent or even voicing agreement when their leaders and rabbonim do the same to others. Mai shena? If you don't like when intellectual stones are thrown at you, why throw them at others?

What should we do about Rabbi Weiss and his "smicha"? I don't really see why we need to do anything. Who cares what he calls his assistant, or whether he calls his shul "orthodox"? The question is entirely semantic. Most of us don't live in Riverdale -- why is it our issue? Instead of focusing on what Rabbi Weiss should do in his community, why not focus instead of making our own communities exemplars of Torah, avodah, and yiras shamayim? And when the time comes to hire a Rav, each of our communities can seek appropriate counsel from talmidei chachamim to help find an appropriate candidate.