Blowing shofar on Shabbos - issur d'oraysa?

“V’ha’avarta shofar teru’a bachodesh hashevi’i b’asor lachodesh; bayom hakippurim ta’aviru shofar b’chol artzechem” (25:9)
Rashi explains the double instruction to blow shofar on “the tenth of Tishrei” and “Yom Kippur” as permitting shofar to be blown only on 10 Tishrei which falls on Shabbos, but not if Rosh haShana, 1 Tishrei, falls on Shabbos. Ramban immediately attacks Rashi for suggesting that tekiyas shofar is prohibited on Shabbos because of a pasuk in chumash – the gemara tells us that tekiyas shofar is prohibited only because of a gezeirah derabbanan lest someone may carry the shofar on Shabbos. How could Rashi suggest that this is a din d’oraysa? The simple explanation of Rashi is that he is citing an asmachta – the law is based on a din derabbanan which has a textual hint as a mnemonic. However, this seems a bit difficult – if an asmachta is just a mnemonic device, then how does it solve the pshuto shel mikra question of the double-wording of the pasuk? (See Ra’avad Mamrim 2:9 on asmachta). The Chasam Sofer writes that Rashi indeed meant that tekiyas shofar on Rosh haShana is prohibited min hatorah during a Yovel year (which is the context of the pasuk). The Ramban al haTorah writes that although the specific actions of doing business and many other dinei derabbanan are not formulated as issurim on Shabbos by the Torah, if one spends the day engaged in weekday activity, one has violated an issur d’oraysa of “shabbaton”. Shabbos must be a day of shvus, of resting, and destroying that spirit of the day even within the rubric of Torah-permitted activity is itself an issur d’oraysa. During the Yovel year, the blast of the Shofar served a business purpose – it announced the freedom of slaves for that year (according to the Rambam, the 10 days between Rosh haShana and Yom Kippur were celebratory days after which on Yom Kippur the slaves were completely free). With respect to Rosh haShana of any other year, Rashi agrees that the issur of tekiyas shofar is derabbanan. However, in consideration of the business implications – freedom of slaves, return of property – of the shofar blowing of yovel, Rashi held that tekiya of that Rosh haShana is an issur d’oraysa.

Ezra's takkanah to read Bechukosai before Shavuos

This Shabbos IY”H we will read the tochacha in Parshas Bechokosai. When we lived in Passaic, my Rebbe, R’ Yonasan Sacks shlit”a, would always point out on this Shabbos that this keriyas hatorah is not just a regular kiyum of reading parshas hashavua, but is a kiyum of a special takkana of Ezra (see Megillah 31b) to read the parsha of tochacha before Rosh haShana – Bechokosai is read before Azetert (Shavuos), which is called Rosh haShana for fruit of the tree, and the tochacha of Ki Tavo is read before Rosh haShana in Tishrei. (If I recall correctly, he would say to have kavanah to be yotzei the takanah through keriyas haTorah.) Even in the times of the Mishna when only the first and last oleh recited brachos on keriyas haTorah, there may have been a separate bracha on this keriya because of the takanah (see R’ Sacks’ article here ). Tosfos in Megilla points out that we do not want to read a parsha of kelalos just before a Yom Tov, so we intersprese Parshas BaMidbar in between the tochacha and Shavuos (see Tosfos with respect to the order of parshiyos in Tishrei). Food for thought: why is the tochacha read only before the “Rosh haShana” of Shavuos and not Pesach or Sukkot, which the Mishna also calls “Rosh[ei] haShana”?

Lag B'Omer and the 13 middot

Last week my wife was looking for some explanation of the recurring theme of 12 in R’ Akiva and RASHBI’s life: 12+12 years of learning for R’ Akiva, 12,000 pairs of students, 12 years in the cave for RASHBI followed by an extra year. I formulated my thoughts a little better in time for Lag B’Omer – full essay posted here (which will also explain that 13 middot are really 12+1, as one stands out from the others). My hesber is admittedly derush - feedback and better answers welcome.

More hashgacha pratis questions

The gemara in Shabbos (32) says that Rava would not cross a bridge that an aku"m was sitting on lest Hashem judge the aku"m at that moment and collapse the bridge taking him down as well.
We touched before on the concept of Hashgacha pratis here . I do not understand how you read this gemara if you adopt the Besht’s idea that Hashem directly supervises every action in the world down to the movement of a falling leaf. Why should Rava have been afraid? Wouldn’t hashgacha pratis has protected him from injury if he was not deserving of punishment at that moment?
My wife raised a different question from this same gemara on the Rambam. According to the Rambam there is hashgacha pratis on an individual level only for people closely connected to Hashem, otherwise everything is hashgacha klalis. So how could there be a din specific to an individual aku”m sitting on a bridge – isn’t that hashgacha pratis on a very specific level?

Rabbi Akiva, Rashbi, and the number 12

My wife raised an interesting question: is there a connection between the units of 12 years that Rabbi Akiva learned for and the 12 years + 1 that Rashbi spent in a cave, and the 12,000 zugos of talmidim of R' Akiva who died? What is so special about this number 12 (yes, we know about zodiav and shevatim – you have to do better than that)? This took some thinking, but I finally came up with an idea that I posted here . Please feel free to chime in if you have any ideas.

The yichus of the megadef

We have been discussing the opinion of the Ramban who held that the child of the ‘ish mitzri’ was Jewish but with a ‘pagum’ status, as opposed to the opinion of the Chachmei Tzorfas who held he was a nochri until he was megayeir. Putting aside the Litvishe lomdus for a few minutes, the Divrei Elimelech has an interesting spin on the parsha. Rashi teaches that the parsha of the mekallel took place at the same time as the parsha of the mekoshesh eitzim; in fact they were cell mates in prison together. If we assume that the mekoshesh episode took place chronologically where the parsha appears (which is the opinion of Ramban in P’ Shlach; Rashi disagrees), then both episodes of mekoshesh and mekallel occurred immediately after the story of the meraglim. Why did this issue of the mekallel not having a place in the camp only arise then? The Divrei Elimelech explains that at the time of mattan Torah, ‘paska zuhamasam’, there was a spiritual elevation of the entire people. This effectively negated the ‘pgam’ that was the result of the relationship of the “ish mitzri” with his Jewish wife. However, after the episode of the meraglim, when the nation fell from this high spiritual level, the mekallel once again faced the stigma of being a ‘pagum’ and was rejected from the camp of the tribe of Dan. Although he was Jewish, the camps were based on the familial relationship of mishpacha, which follows the father’s yichus.

A ger bringing bikurim - the promise of a share in Eretz Yisrael

As we discussed, R' Shachter explained that the dispute between the Chachamei Tzorfas and the Ramban was not whether the Avos had a din ben noach or yisrael, but whether they had the din of yisrael as a nation (for which yichus follows the mother) or just a shem mishpachas yisrael (for which yichus follows the father). I thought this might answer a kashe of the Mishne l'Melech. The Rambam paskens like Rabbi Yehudah that a ger is permitted to read the parsha of bikkurim despite the reference in the parsha to the promise of Eretz Yisrael - this promise is inapplicable to a ger who receives no cheilek in Eretz Yisrael. The Rambam seems to contradict himself, as with respect to viduy ma’asrot the Rambam paskens that a ger is not permitted to read the parsha because of its reference to our share in Eretz Yisrael. Perhaps one could distinguish between the two parshiyot. With respect to bikkurim, the parsha references the land ‘asher nishbata l’avoteinu’, promised to our forefathers, to mishpachas yisrael. However, the parsha of viduy ma’asrot references ‘ubareich es amcha…v’es ha’aretz asher nasata lanu’, the nation of Klal Yisrael and the land promised to us. The Rambam paskens that a ger can read the parsha of bikkurim because a ger is included retroactively in mishpachas yisrael based on the principle that Avraham was ‘av hamon goyim’. However, a ger is not retroactively a member of Klal Yisrael as a nation - ‘ger shenitgayer k’katan shenolad’, geirus is like a new birth. Therefore, the ger is excluded from viduy ma'asrot which references am yisrael as a nation.

Were the Avos Jewish? (part III - the parsha of the mekallel)

We have been discussing the machlokes Chachamei Tzorfas and Ramban with respect to whether before mattan Torah there existed a status of Yisrael, or everyone had the same din of ben noach. The Torah introduces the parsha of the mekallel by saying “vayeitzei”, he went out. Rashi cites Chazal who explain that the mekallel “went out” defeated from the bais din of Moshe Rabeinu where he had gone to press his case for a place in the camp of Klal Yisrael as a full Jew. Apparently, his court case revolved around the very issues raised in this machlokes Chachamei Tzorfas and Ramban. Based on this, suggests the Malbim, Rashi’s reference specifically to the “bais din of Moshe”, not just any court, is intentional and meduyak. Recall that in parshas Shmos Moshe killed an Egyptian for striking a Jew. From that episode Chazal derive that any nochri who attempts to strike a Jew is chayav misa (Sanhedrin 58b). This conclusion would only have been warranted if there existed a distinct status of Yisrael even before mattan Torah! Therefore, the mekallel confidently assumed that Moshe would side with his claim. (As to why the mekallel was wrong, at least one approach should be obvious from previous posts, and there are others - I’ll leave it to you to work out :)

Were the Avos Jewish? (part II)

The Brisker Rav (al hatorah, parshas Bo) points out that the concept of geirus must pre-date mattah torah because we find that there was an issur for a nochri to eat the first korban pesach. This is difficult to understand if one assumes that before mattan torah there only existed a single category of ben noach. Hoewever, based on R’ Shachter’s chiddush, one could explain that before mattan torah there existed geirus to join the mihspacha of the Avos; after mattan torah there was a higher level geirus to join Klal Yisrael.
This chiddush also explains the opinion of the MahaRaL who holds that we do not apply the principle of ‘ger shenitgayer k’katan shenolad’ to the geirus of mattan torah (this MaHaRaL is referenced in the Shav Shamytza’s introduction). Although mattan torah is the paradigm of geirus for joining the Jewish nation, it did not dissolve the bonds of Jewish mishpacha which already existed beforehand, so no issurei arayos were lifted.

Were the Avos Jewish?

The Parashas Derachim is famous for the first two essays in the sefer which discuss whether ths Avos had the status of bnei noach or yisraelim before mattan torah. One of the mareh mekomos that seems to address this issue is found in this week’s parsha. A certain person who was “ben yisraelis v’hu ben ish mitzri” committed the cheit of being a “mekallel” and was punished for the offence. The Ramban cites the Chachmei Tzorfas who held that this person was in fact not Jewish – even though we pasken that a child of a Jewish mother is Jewish, this person joined Klal Yisrael before mattan Torah when lineage was based on the father’s identity. The Ramban takes issue with the Chachmei Tzorfas and writes that since the time of Avharam Avinu anyone who joined Klal Yisrael was granted Jewish identity based on his mother’s lineage. According to the analysis of the Parashas Derachim, the Rambam holds that even the Avos had the status of yisraelim, while the Chachmei Tzorfas disagree.
Rav Hershel Schachter in his sefer Eretz haTzvi takes a slightly different approach. R’ Shachter argues that lineage based on the father’s identity is a function of being subsumed in a family group – mishpachas av is called mishpacha, not mishpachas eim. We identify the child of a Jewish mother as a member of Klal Yisrael because of the unique din that the role of mishpacha is secondary and subsumed under the individual’s relationship to the nation of Klal Yisrael, which follows the mother’s identity. The machlokes Ramban and Chachmei Tzorfas is not whether Avraham had the status of a Yisrael, but whether that status of Yisrael which existed at the time of the Avos was based on the din of mishpacha or on the din of nationhood.

Sfeika d'oraysa l'chumra

The Rambam (Issurei Biya 15:29) is mechadesh that a child who does not know who is parents are (a shtuki or asufi) is still permitted to marry a women who might be an ervah to him - e.g. a child who does not know who his father is does not have to worry that the girl he marries is his father's daughter/his sister. The Rambam proves his chiddush from the pasuk "u'mala'ah ha'aretz zimah" - the Torah warns that znus might lead to mamzeirus by a brother marrying a sister when neither knows who their father is. If it was true that anyone of unknown lineage could not marry anyone who might possibly be an ervah to him, there should defacto never be such a chashash of mamzeirus! Only because we do allow people to marry even if their father was unknown is the Torah's warning of "zimah" necessitated.

The Chasam Sofer writes that this is the source of the famous opinion of the Rambam that sefeika d'oraysa l'chumra is only a din derabbanan, but min hatorah we are not required to be machmir on a safek. Despite the safeik that boy X might share the same father as girl Y (where the father of one of them is unknown), we allow them to marry. (I would raise 2 points: (1) I'm not sure why we would not say the heter is based on rov, but in a 50-50 safeik we should be machmir; (2) the assumption of the Chasam Sofer is you need a makor to be makeil on a s'feika d'oraysa - one could easily take the opposite position and assume that the norm should be to be mekeil unless one can provide a makor to be machmir, and with that I have opened a new can of worms).

Ahavas Yisrael = Ahavas Hashem

One of the most famous teachings of Judaism is Hillel’s dictum “Do not unto others as you would not want done unto you”. However, misunderstood is who the “others” refer to. Rashi (Shabbos 31a, in his first pshat) writes that “re’acha” actually refers to Hashem. Hillel’s summary of the entire Torah is, “Do not disregard the words of Hashem just as you would not like your words disregarded” – quite different than the usual spin! The meforshim (see Pri Tzadik) point out that Rashi’s reading in still consistent with the simple interpretation of the pasuk as a command to love one’s fellow Jew. Ahavas yisrael is based on more than a social contract, but is an extension of ahavas Hashem (see Tanya ch 32). If one truly loves G-d, one will love each Jew, because by definition each Jew has within them a connection to Hashem. The further a Jew is from G-d, the more it behooves us to remind him/her through our love they they still have that unseverable connection to Hashem (Rav Kook). Through ahavas Hashem one comes to ahavas Yisrael, which leads in turn to tshuvah m'ahavah.

A rant on the problem of MO values and chinuch

My kids learned nothing this week about Yom haAtzmaut, yet their schools are blameless. No, I have not changed my hashkafos overnight, but I respect that there is a view (and some would argue it is the dominant view) among gedolei yisrael who would say that this day should not be given prominence. Yet, it raises the question of why I would send my kids to a school which teaches a hashkafa I disagree with. I am going to risk engaging in broad brushstrokes to make a point here, but in doing so I do not mean to suggest every person or community is the same, nor to offend anyone, only to share my experiences. My kids have been in two different schools, one that could be labelled RW/C, one LW/C. My daughters used to be in an environment where they were the only ones who never wore pants on Sunday, we were the only family with no TV, where not going “mixed swimming” was a sign of zehirus. Now, they are in an environment where their external behavior (skirts only, no TV, etc.) is far closed to the median. To me, the hashkafa of the Rav and Rav Kook means having serious limud haTorah and zehirus in halacha PLUS a love of medinat yisrael, belief in the value of secular wisdom, etc. (I do not mean to provide a comprehensive definition of centrist/dati orthodoxy). It is not orthodoxy MINUS anything, certainly not in halacha or limud haTorah. Yet, in my experience,in certain segments of the community, modern orthodoxy somehow became "minus" orthodoxy. Somehow the heter to study Shakespeare or for a girl to learn gemara turned into a heter for mixed swimming or women wearing pants (I mean to use those as sociological standards, not get into the halachic parameters). Yes, of course, even in the “RW” community there are those who are not careful in halacha or kovea ittim, but the question is whether that guy views himself and is viewed by society as bucking the trend, a yotzei min haklal, or just another average Joe. When you say you went away on vacation and enjoyed the time on the beach, there are some shules where those around you will have their jaws drop, and others where the discussion will start over which resort has the better beach. You can unually figure out who sends to which schools by the reaction. This past week, a local shule hosted a guest lecture by R’ Shachter and R’ Rozensweig. The place was ½ empty. I took my son along just to show that there is such a thing as a clean shaven talmid chacham with a PhD (R’ Rozensweig) –this is the model of “MO” orthodoxy I want him to see, not the e-mails from members of the same community that provide weekly updates on how a certain guy on some reality TV show is doing. My kids chinuch is narrow and the poorer because they miss out on Shakespeare and Yom haAtzmaut, yet, those values cannot come at the expense of halacha or limud haTorah. I can only hope that some day they will find a balance for themselves. (Apologies if this offended anyone).

Is it a reason or seperate mitzva? - "umal'ah ha'aretz zimah"

This is your SH”M bonus week. “Al techalel et bitcha l’haznota, u’mal’ah ha’aretz zimah”. Rashi explains that when a father encourages his daughter in znus (the first half of the pasuk), then the fruit of the land will become destroyed in punishment (the second half of the pasuk. The Rambam in his fifth shoresh sets out as a guideline that one should count only a lav, but not the reason for the lav, as a mitzvah. One of the Rambam’s examples is this pasuk: the issur is “al techalel et bitcha”, while “umal’ah ha’aretz zimah” is just a reason that gives added weight. The Ramban on chumah and in his gloss to SH”M takes issue with this approach and writes (to defened the BH”G’s count) that the end of the pasuk is actually a separate lav that applies to the zonah and her partner – how, asks the Ramban, would we derive such as an issur from the first half of the pasuk, which addresses itself only to the father? The achronim point out that our pasuk is actually part of a broader issur of “lo t’heye kedeisha”, which prohibits a man or woman from having relations without kesubah and kiddushin (see SH”M lav 365; the Ramban there defines the issur znus differently, but that is another discussion). The Rambam subsumes our pasuk under that general issur, but does not count it as a separate lav, and interestingly the Ramban in his gloss there notes his agreement with the Rambam’s understanding! Meaning, (I think), that Ramban concurs with the Rambam that the seifa of the pasuk is not just an aggadic addition (as Rashi understood), but has halachic significance - the question is whether it is a mitzvah (BH"G) or just an offshoot din d'oraysa.

Does 'kedoshim' count as 1 of the 613 mitzvos?

Before Pesach I said I wanted to do a series on Sefer haMitzvos (henceforth: SH"M) to have some focus – there have been too many other nice things to write about, so that has not gotten off the ground. Consider this a late start. Rashi understands “kedoshim t’hiyu” to be an additional warning about the issurei arayos which are recorded at the end of Acharei Mos (is Rashi’s real concern the smichus haparshiyos?) The Rambam, in a famous comment, writes that “kedoshim t’hiyu” is a separate mitzvah to live a life of holiness, which means acting not only within the technical framework of the law, but within the spirit of the law as well. The Ramban's approach here is similar to his comments to “v’asita hayashar v’hatov” – unless one appreciates the value system conveyed by the law and acts in accordance with it, one risks becoming a “naval b’reshus haTorah”, a person who has not violated any specific injunction but is nonetheless ethically abhorrent. Id the Ramban means literally that this is counted as a mitzva, we run afoul of one of the basic principles in counting mitzvos. In the fourth shoresh in SH"M, the Rambam tells us that a general instruction cannot be counted as a mitzvah. If this were not true, our mitzvos would number in the hundreds, as each general command to keep mitzvos itself would count as another mitzvah. The Ramban in his gloss to the Sefer haMitzvos defends the BH”G’s count of “v’heyisem kedoshim” as a mitzvah which prohibits eating sheratzim, but he interestingly makes no mention of his own interpretation of this pasuk. Perhaps the Ramban understood that the overarching idea of kedusha in a din d’oraysa, but it is not formally counted an one of the 613.

Hallel, sefira, nissim, and questions to ask yourself today

Just some random mareh mekomos:
(1) The gemara (Shabbos 118) tells us that there is an issur of reciting hallel unnecessarily. The gemara (Ta’anis 28) tells of Rav who came to Bavel and heard hallel recited on Rosh Chodesh. Being unfamiliar with the minhag, Rav was going to stop them. When he heard that they were skipping while reading (i.e. reading chatzi hallel), he let them continue. Based on this gemara, it would seem that reciting chatzi hallel does not violate the issur of unnecessarily reciting hallel.
(2) There are many things which push aside the practice of aveilus. For example, a ba’al bris can shave on the day of his son’s mila because it is his Yom Tov. One may push aside the issur of eating meat during the aveilus of “shavua sh’chal bo 9 Av” if one celebrates the personal Yom Tov of making a siyum (as is regularly done in summer camps).
(3) The Chayei Adam records that he established a personal YomTov for himself to mark the day he was saved from a fire. He celebrated yearly with a seudas mitzvah. The Chasam Sofer (191, 208) concurs with this approach, and suggests that celebrating being saved from a life threatening situation miraculously is nothing less than a chiyuv d’oraysa.
Irrespective of the practical issues, the fundemental question of hashkafa one must ask on this day is whether one identifies the State of Israel as a positive religious value for the Jewish people. And if you answer in the affirmative, I think it is worth considering whether that value is adequetly conveyed in the chinuch our children are given. I'm not giving answers, just raising the questions.

Mah yom m'yomayim? - a true story, and a true letter

A true story:
After we moved, we realized in the first year that our daughters were enrolled in a school that did not meet their needs and which we were not comfortable with. Not wanting them to miss much class time, we used Yom haAtzmaut to take them to a different school to meet the principal, so they were only missing a chagiga. The school in question was having a normal day. As we were about to leave, the assistant said to the principal that they are missing the fun in order to see him. He was absolutely bewildered – he had no clue what the assistant was referring to, or why the day was in any way special. Yes, he had heard of Yom haAtzmaut, but he had no clue it was on that day – it was like knowing there is a Canadian independence day, but it is not marked on your calendar. Mah yom m’yomayim?

A true letter, Michtav M’Eliyahu (vol 3 p. 352), by R’ E.E. Dessler z”l, dated Elul, 1948:
Our living now in the Holy Land is difficult to define as ‘aschalta d’geula’, but nevertheless, it marks great chessed [in being able to go] from one extreme to another - from the extreme of the destruction of six million of our bretheren, to the extreme of our people settling in our State in the Holy Land. From this one must learn and fix emunah in one’s heart. Woe to one who will come to the Day of Judgment still blind to seeing a matter as concrete as this.

(BTW, my kids switched to a better match, though not that particular school. My views on chinuch are for another post, but suffice it to say that I would rather sacrifice a chagiga today and have them in a class where wearing a skirt all the time (including non-school days), not owning a TV, and having high limudei kodesh expectations are closer to the norm than the exception. I regularly bemoan the fact that I can't have both.)

Cooking on Yom Tov for Shabbos (II)

We previously touched on the machlokes Rabbah and Rav Chisdah (Pesachim 46b) as to why it is permissible to cook on Y”T in preparation for Shabbos. Rabbah holds that ‘tzorchei Shabbos na’asin b’Yom Tov’, that there is inherently no issur (as some rishonim explain, because the two days share an identical kedusha) of preparation, while Rav Chisda holds there would theoretically be an issur, but we say that ‘ho’il v’iy mikalei lei orchim’, were guests to come on Y”T this cooking would be for their Y”T benefit, hence the cooking act is not defined purely as preparatory for Shabbos. The Aruch haShulchan (495:18) writes that there seems to be some dispute in the Rishonim as to the scope of Rav Chisda’s chiddush. Is Rav Chisda a chiddush in din or a chiddush in metziyus? Does ho’il teach that there is no such theoretical issur as cooking for Shabbos, or in reality there is an issur, but in the context of of guests possibly arriving, what you are doing is defined as cooking for Y”T and not for Shabbos? The Rambam seems to take the former position. Rashi, however, writes that the case the gemara is addressing is cooking after you finished lunch, where the context gives away the fact that you are preparing for the next day. Rav Chisda is a chiddush in metziyus - since the context has changed because there is the possibility of guests, this is not b’metziyus defined as cooking for the next day. The nafka minah is the MG”A previously discussed. According to the Rambam, cooking at for Shabbos is always permitted on Y”T because by definition there is no issur of preparing for Shabbos. According to Rashi (who the MG”A is machmir for), it is only the potential for guests’ arrival which removes the issur; cooking late in the day when Y”T guests are no longer going to arrive would be prohibited.

Is the mitzva of tza'ra'as on the kohein to investigate tumah or on the yisrael to come forward?

What drew me to have a look at that Chinuch was really a different issue. The Ramban asks why there is no pasuk instructing "dabeir el Bnei Yisrael" by tza'ra'as. He answers the kohein was enpowered to be metamei people even withou their consent if he found tumah, and thus the command is addressed to kohanim. However, the Chinuch writes that there is a mitzva to seek out the kohein if you see a nega tza'ra'as. Sounds like a machlokes to me, but in Chavel's notes on the the Ramban he cites the Kli Chemdah who does not think so. Kli Chemdah asks why the Ramban ignores the obligation on the people and answers that since they were not in Eretz Yisrael yet it was inapplicable.

Hashgacha pratis: the Besh"t vs. the Chinuch

The Besh”t is to have proven the power of hashgacha pratis to his talmidim. He had them follow an individual leaf which feel from a tree and watched as it landed atop a worm trapped out in a sunny field to provide it a little shade. I could not find the exact makor for this, but you can find it referenced here, here, here, here (this one takes patience), here (#2) – etc. etc.
Contrast with the Sefer HaChinuch in Parshas Metzora (169), which I quote -
"There are groups of people who think hashem's hashgacha encompases everything in the world, all living creatures [I.e. animals] and all other things, meaning nothing moves in this world without G-d decreeing so, so that they think if a leaf falls from a tree it is because G-d decreed for it to fall, and it is impossible for it to fall a second earlier or later than that appointed time. This concept is far removed from intelligence (rachok harbeh min haseichel)."
The Chinuch goes on to say that to deny hashgacha completely is also wrong. The correct philosophy is that there is a general providence, "hashgacha klalit", on all living things, so that no species should become extinct, but not on particular creatures. (Incidentally, even before the advent of the theory of evolution, this is why dinosaur bones cause such a ruckus even to Christian theologians, who shared a similar view re: extinction – here was evidence of mass extinctions having occurred contrary to this view of the Chinuch and other rishonim.) The Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim takes essentially the same view: hasgacha klalit applies to all mankind, but he excludes animals completely. I discussed this with a talmid chacham over Shabbos who could not offhand name a single rishon who held of the broad view of hashgacha the Besh"t spoke of.
Can anyone explain how and why chassidus just dropped the approach of the rishonim on this issue (and please don't just give me the mareh makom to the Rebbe's sicha - I do not fully understand it, so you have to explain it if you do)?