Wednesday, October 14, 2009

why include the story of creation

Rashi opens his commentary with the question of why the Torah concerns itself with the story of creation – why not begin with the first mitzvah, as ostensibly Torah is a book devoted to a discussion of mitzvos, not history or science. Ramban takes issue with Rashi’s question and argues that without the story of creation is essential to establish our faith in G-d as Creator.

One could explain the machlokes as a dispute over what the text of Torah shebk’sav should incorporate. Rashi might agree that belief in G-d as creator is an essential component of faith, but might see that belief as something which should or could be transmitted through tradition or torah sheba’al peh without necessitating a parsha in chumash. (I think it goes without saying that Rashi does not deny that belief in G-d as Creator is necessary; the mitzvah of Shabbos, among others, is stripped of meaning without that.) Read in this light, Rashi’s conclusion that the parsha is included as a means of justifying the Jewish people’s claim to Eretz Yisrael by virtue of its being gifted to them by G-d, the Creator, is not a philosophical justification for the parsha, but is simply an acceptance of the need for pragmatic public relations.

The Sefas Emes (5636) offers a more philosophical analysis of the machlokes in which he takes a different approach to the Midrashic lesson we learned yesterday about G-d’s offering Torah to Eisav and Yishmael and their rejecting it. Torah exists and can be read on many levels, from being a mystical code which consist completely of G-d’s name, as Ramban writes in his introduction, down to a practical manual that addresses the most mundane details of life. This is the meaning of the Midrash that G-d offered the Torah to Eisav and Yishmael – He created a Torah which can be understood not just by the most exalted saints, but which can even speak to an Eisav or a Yishmael on their level. While R’ Bloch focused on the rejection of Torah by the nations as evidence of its incompatibility with all else except the Jewish soul, Sefas Emes focuses on the hava amina of it being offered to others as a sign of Torah’s universal message.

Using this Midrash as background, Sefas Emes explains the difference between Rashi and Ramban by invoking a dichotomy he discusses in many places – emes vs. emunah, faith vs. truth. Faith is only needed in the absence of certainty or truth, and vice versa, truth, certain knowledge precludes the need for faith.

Rashi is not just addressing the narrow issue of what belongs in the text, but is begging the broader philosophical question posed by Ramban’s premise– why indeed is there a need for a parsha teaching “emunah” in G-d as creator? For the Jewish heart, G-d being the Creator and master of the universe is a truism, emes, and not merely the subject of faith.

Rashi’s answer is that that G-d did not only give us a Torah which presupposes the certainties of knowledge in the Jewish heart; He gave us the same Torah which He had offered to Eisav and Yishmael, a Torah which addresses even those for whom the truth is unclear. This is the meaning of the pasuk in Tehillim which refers to our receiving the “nachalas goyim,” the portion offered to the non-Jews. Existentially, the Jewish heart is predisposed to acknwoledge the emes of ratzon Hashem, but to serve as the conduit of the dvar Hashem to an imperfect world that does not always see the truth, we were given a Torah with teachings of emunah.

Monday, October 12, 2009

neshomos suited for Torah

Dashening the pasuk "Hashem m'Seir ba...." Chazal explain that Hashem went to Eisav and Yishmael and the other nations and offered them the Torah before giving it to the Jewish people. Each nation asked what was in the Torah before answering. When Eisav heard the Torah prohibits murder, they declined to accept it, as they could not imagine life without murder. After hearing the prohibitions of theft, of arayot, etc. nation after nation declined the Torah, each unable to fathom life without the particular slice of immorality that characterized their society. Only the Jewish people accepted Torah unconditionally, without even asking what it contained.

Of course G-d did not literally go nation to nation and consulting their Prime Minister or President as to whether they wanted the Torah. What the Midrash means, as the Maharal explains in Tiferes Yisrael, is that every nation of the world has ingrained in its neshoma some trait that is antithetical to a Torah lifestyle, be it murder, robbery, immorality. Only the Jewish people have the neshomos able to absorb the dvar Hashem in its totality.

Among the published correspondence (that I mentioned here) of my wife's grandfather, R' Dov Yehudah Shochet, is a tshuvah to him from R' Avraham Bloch, R"M of Telz, and his response regarding whether one may teach a Torah or Bible class to a non-Jewish audience. Chazal learn (Chagiga 13) from the pasuk, "Magid devarav l'Ya'akov..." that in addition to the prohibition of a non-Jew learning Torah there is a seperate prohibition against us teaching them Torah. R' Bloch interestingly suggests (without referencing this Maharal) that the reason behind this issur is this incompatibility between the neshoma of a non-Jew and words of Torah.

Interesting aside #1: R' Bloch proves from the fact (B.K. 92) that Avraham assumed the Plishtim were immoral because they first questioned him about his wife rather than offering food and lodging that there is a chiyuv even for non-Jews to learn those parts of Torah that teach midos and derech eretz. The kal v'chomer to what we should be learning and teaching is obvious.

Interesting aside #2: The teshuvah from R' Bloch opens with a mazal tov to RDYS on the birth of a girl (if I figured out the dates right, that newborn would be my MIL!) and a bracha l'gadla l'chupah u'lma'asim tovim. He then adds that perhaps he should use the nusach of the bracha l'gadla l'Torah l'chupah u'lama'asim tovim as in the climate of the times it is impossible to raise a bas Yisrael without giving her an appropriate Torah chinuch. The kal v'chomer to our times is obvious here as well.

Friday, October 09, 2009

simchas torah and what made Moshe unique

The Torah ends by referring to Moshe’s greatness in performing “signs and wonders”. Ramban asks what was unique about Moshe in this regard that deserves to be singled out for praise – many other prophets also performed miracles and wonders for the Jewish people?

It is the Tiferes Shlomo (Radomsker) that clued me in to look at the end of the last pasuk in the Torah for an answer, but I am going to take a slightly different approach than he does. A thought experiment: Imagine if you could transport a nuclear reactor back in time to the Middle Ages and teach people how to harness its power and maintain it. Even with the mechanical knowledge of how to keep the reactor working, the people would undoubtedly view the whole production of energy as a miracle. Fast forward to 2009 and the perception of the reactor being a miracle vanishes. What’s the difference? The answer is that we not only know how to keep a reactor running, but also understand the theory behind how it works. Atomic reactions obey certain laws that have been discovered and explained. It’s not a miracle – that’s how the universe works.

To go a step beyond the Ramban, the magicians of Egypt could also perform “miracles” and suspected Moshe of being no different in ability than them. Why indeed was Moshe different? I think the answer goes beyond distinctions about the scale of the miracles or the size of the audience who witnessed them and relates to our example of the reactor. Other prophets, magicians, and the like performed miracles by becoming the channel for or channeling forces they could not understand and could not control into this world. They were “mechanics” or instruments in the hands of G-d. What made Moshe different was that he performed miracles “l’einei Bnei Yisrael,” as the last pasuk in the Torah tells us. It is the sages and scholars who are usually referred to as the “eini ha’eidah” because wisdom gives one the ability to discern what others miss. Moshe gave us not only miracles, but he gave us the context of a blueprint to the spiritual "laws" and theory that explained those miracles and made them possible.

R’ Chanina ben Dosa did not consider lighting a lamp filled with vinegar to be miraculous – “He who said oil should burn can also say vinegar should burn.” It’s only magical and miraculous if you don’t understand that there are spiritual laws just as there are physical laws and those laws can produce wonderful results.

The Minchas Chinuch famously asks why a person who violates a Torah law is not also inherently in violation of the prohibition against disobeying a prophet. This gets to the heart of why Moshe was unique. A prophet or miracle worker can describe the “what” of their experience and record it in a book of nevuah. The book of Moshe's deeds and prophecy is called Torah, not nevuah, because only Moshe explained the “why” and “how” and left a system that can be studied and used by all future generations.

Unlike other religious groups which change or collapse with the death of their central charismatic leader, the Jewish people were able to smoothly transition from Moshe to Yehoshua. Everything Moshe did was “l’einei Bnei Yisrael,” it fit into a system of thought and ideas that could live on beyond his personality and deeds.

The obsession with magical remedies and cults of personality in our times needs no elaboration. Simchas Torah reminds us that miracles and great leaders are valuable only to the degree that they help illuminate “einei Bnei Yisrael”, expanding our minds with a greater appreciation for Torah as a system of laws and values that we can study and live by. It is those laws and values that should capture our attention.

the lesson learned from the history of Dan

Moshe Rabeinu was shown all of Eretz Yisrael before his death, right up until the border of Dan (34:1). Rashi explains that Moshe was shown the people of Dan engaged in idol worship, but was also shown the rise of Shimshon who would redeem them. Why did G-d spoil Moshe’s final moments by showing him the Jewish people’s fall to idolatry? Why could He not allow Moshe to revel in the success and hopeful future of the Jewish people without burdening him with an image of their failure?

The Shem m’Shmuel answers that these two images – the idolatry of Dan and the rise of Shimshon from Dan – are not two separate visions, but go hand in hand. Hashem revealed to Moshe that even when the Jewish people fall to greatest depths, they can give rise to a Shimshon, a shofet so great that Ya’akov Avinu saw in him the potential to be Moshiach. Moshe now knew that his death and the inevitable retreat from the glorious heights attained by the “dor de’ah” would not lead to permanent downfall.

Thursday, October 08, 2009

why no bracha on sukkah on shmini atzeres

Rav Kasher has a beautiful overview of the Rogatchover’s thought in the intro. to the Devarim volume of the Rogatchover al haTorah where he presents some of the classic chilukim and conceptual constructs of the Rogatchover and gives examples of sugyos where these ideas can be applied. It is similar in content to the amazing Mefa’aneyach Tzefunos. One of the topics he addresses is why we sit in the sukkah on Shmini Atzeres but do not recite a bracha, unlike other mitzvos performed because of sfeika d’yoma which do warrant a bracha. According to the Rogatchover (into p. 22), dinim d’oraysa tell us about the halachic nature of reality, i.e. they are dinim in the cheftza; dinim d’rebbanan impose legal obligations on the gavra (see post here). The chachamim can impose a chovas hagavra to sit in a sukkah on shmini atzeres, but cannot create a halachic cheftza of sukkah once sukkos has ended. Without a cheftza shel sukkah, no bracha can be recited. (See this post where we discussed a similar distinction of the Rogatchover between eating in the sukkah as as a kiyum of defining the cheftza shel sukkah as a makom dirah vs. the chovas hagavra to perform the act of eating only while in a sukkah.)

I heard a different answer to this question in the name of R’ Soloveitchik that also uses a classic Rogatchover-ish sevara. When two halachic categories overlap, the result can be either a harkavah shechnit, e.g. the two categories co-exist side by side, or a harkavah mizgit, i.e. the two categories combine and form a new synthesis. For example: the halachic status of a chatzi eved chatzi ben chorin might be the same as the full status of eved and ben chorin overlapping and co-existing, or might be a completely new status that is a synthesis of both elements (see Avi Ezri, Hil. Pesachim). Another example: bein hashemashos may reflect overlapping states of day and night, or might be a new time status that contains elements of both day and night (see Shiurim l'Zecher Aba Mari). R’ Yosef Engel in Beis haOtzar similarly discusses whether yamim tovim which overlap with Shabbos have two seperate two kedushos hayom which co-exist, or whether there is a categorically new kedushas hayom formed from the combination of both. R' Soloveitchik applied this same chakirah to Shmini Atzeres, which is both a holiday in its own right as well as an extension of sukkos because of sfeika d’yoma. Instead of viewing those two identities as co-existing side by side, a harkavah shichnit, R’ Soloveitchik viewed them as combining to form a new unique halachic identity. This new synthesis kedushas hayom is not the same as the normal kedushas hayom of sukkos and therefore does not obligate reciting a bracha on sukkah.

temporary ownership - kinyan l'zman

On the first day of Sukkos you need to own a lulav to be yotzei ("lachem"). You can't borrow a lulav, but you can accept someone else's as a matanah, a gift. The giver has a right to stipulate that the lulav must be returned, a matanah al menas l'hachzir. The Rosh writes that to satisfy this condition the borrower must be makneh the lulav back to the original owner with a formal kinyan (which is why this would not work with a child, who has no right to be makneh things). As we once discussed, the Ketzos (241) disagrees and says a matanah al menas l'hachzir works so long as the object is returned, even without a formal kinyan. According to the Ketzos, matanah al menas l'hachzir is a "kinyan l'zman", a form of temporary ownership in effect for a specific duration of time., e.g. so long as it takes to perform the mitzvah of netilas lulav Once the time is up, the original owner automatically resumes control without a formal kinyan being required. At the heart of the dispute is the following question: is temporary ownership sufficient to satisfy the requirement of “lachem”?

Last post we discussed the case of stolen schach that m’derabbanan is considered part of the sukkah for the duration of sukkos (i.e. the thief has no obligation to dismantle the sukkah and return the stolen goods), but after sukkos, once the sukkah is dismantled anyway, must be returned. The Avnei Miluim (28:53) offers this case as proof that he is right -- ownership of the schach even for the limited duration of a week is considered sufficient to fulfill the mitzvah of sukkah even according to those Tana’im who require "lachem" md’oraysa for sukkah.

Is this proof really ironclad? My son suggested that one can distinguish between these cases. In the case of matanah al menas l’hachzir of lulav, it is the choice by the owner to grant temporary ownership instead of full ownership which is seen by the Rosh as limiting the kinyan, diminishing “lachem”. In the case of the stolen goods, the kinyan lasts only for a week not because of any choice by the owner or recipient, but simply because the chachamim re-imposed the obligation to return the goods after the sukkah was dismantled. (R’ Scheinberg draws a similar distinction in Mishmeres Chaim vol. II.)

does a kinyan derabbanan have a chalos d'oraysa? - stolen schach

Before R"H a fellow blogger bemoaned the lack of attention paid to the Ketzos these days, as bnei torah spend more time delving into the brisker lomdus of the great roshei yeshivos rather than reading classics. Maybe we should devote more time in the coming year to the Ketzos, Shmaytza, and Avnei Miluim... this sukkos piece is a good place to start, as it is two parter; you get twice the lomdus for the same mareh mekomos.

There is a mitzvah to return stolen goods. If you steal a beam and use it in your home, the chachamim made a special takanah as an incentive to tshuvah and allow you to pay for the beam rather than force you to dismantle your home to return it. What if the stolen beam was used in a sukkah? The gemara says that for the duration of sukkos the beam is considered owned by the thief -- he is obligated to repay the original owner, but we do not force the dismantling of the sukkah any more than we would force the dismantling of a home. However, once sukkos is over and the sukkah is dismantled anyway, the original beam must be returned.

Yesterday we discussed whether a kinyan derabbanan has a chalos d'oraysa (parenthetically, someone asked a great kashe in the comments that is worth taking a look at). The Sha'ar haMelech suggests that this case of the stolen beam can help us resolve that issue. Min haTorah the stolen beam is not owner by the thief -- it should be returned. It is only the takanah derabbanan that allows the thief to keep it. QED: by virtue of a takanah derabbanan we have a chalos of a sukkah that is kosher min hatorah!

The Avnei Miluim (28:33) rejects this proof. There is a basic difference between a stolen lulav (for example) and a stolen sukkah (actually, stolen schach). A stolen lulav is pasul because the Torah requires ownership of the lulav as a condition of fulfilling the mitzvah; a thief is not the lulav's true owner. A stolen sukkah is pasul not because the Torah requires ownership of a sukkah -- the reason a stolen sukkah is pasul is simply because stolen goods are unacceptable for a mitzvah purpose (mitzvah haba'ah b'aveira). A kinyan derabbanan may not have a chalos d'oraysa in the sense of being "yours" from a Torah perspective, but a kinyan derabbanan is certainly sufficient to remove the label of "stolen goods" from the object. Think about it this way: if you make a kinyan derabbanan on an item without a kinyan min haTorah, whether or not the object is truly "yours", it is inconceivable that min haTorah you should be considered a thief!

The Avnei Miluim uses this same case as proof in a different controversy - stay tuned for part II.

Wednesday, October 07, 2009

do kinyanei derabbanan have a chalos d'oraysa?

Does a kinyan derabbanan create a status of ownership on a d'oraysa level? This question is debated by the classical Achronim and comes into play on sukkos where the first day requires ownership of lulav and esrog to fulfill the requirement of "lachem". (We once discussed a proof of the Ketzos to resolve this question.)

Perhaps this question is at the heart of the machlokes Rambam and Ran regarding the gemara's warning (Sukkah 46) not to give a lulav and esrog to a child on the first day of sukkos before fulfilling one's own mitzvah. The gemara explains that a child can be koneh the 4 minim, but cannot be makneh the items back. Ran writes that the gemara must be speaking only of a very young child, because the Chachamim made a takanah that slightly older children (p'eutos) can buy and sell things, otherwise sending a child to the grocery story to buy something would be impossible. The Rambam, however, does not draw any distinction.

Apparently the Ran understood that the takanah empowering children to buy and sell is sufficient to allow them to be makneh the lulav back so its owner fulfills "lachem" on a d'oraysa level. The Rambam, however, did not think a kinyan derabbanan has any validity on a d'oraysa level.

The problem with such an approach is that there seem to be many proofs that the Chachamim can through hefker beis din make takanos that have a chalos d'oraysa. A few sugyos in shas (e.g. Kesubos 3) refer to the ability of the Chachamim to annul a marriage by declaring the kesef kiddushin ownerless. Clearly the women effected by such a takanah is not merely no longer married on a derabbanan level!

R' Shlomo Eiger's suggests (Shu"t RAK"E 221) that Chazal may be able to effect removal of ownership on a d'oraysa level, but cannot effect a transfer of ownership to a new party.

The Telzers (both R' Shimon Shkop and R' Y. L. Bloch) reject this distinction. Hefker without the ability to transfer ownership is an incomplete hefker because it has no effect on anyone other than the original owner. (This question fits well with R' Shimon's rejection of the Ketzos' model of hefker that we discussed back here.) R' Yosef Leib concludes that even the Rambam accepts the idea that a takanah derabbanan can effect a chalos d'oraysa in monetary matters. Where the Rambam and Ran differ is regarding the scope of this rule. According to the Ran, once the cat is out of the bag and there exists a takanah to allow children to shop in a grocery store, the same takanah has a chalos d'oraysa with respect to lulav. The Rambam disagrees and argues that the chalos d'oraysa is limited in scope to the narrow context that motivated the takanah's original creation. (Very Telzerish sevara -- the "sibah" is the geder hadin.) In the case of kesef kiddushin, the marriage is annuled; in the case of minor's kinyanim, only with respect to shopping is there a chalos d'oraysa to the kinyan. However, consequences that are a byproduct of the original takanah, e.g. now the child who can go shopping can also return a lulav, are not included in the scope of the chalos d'oraysa.

R' Bloch and R' Shimon's point relates more globally to how dinim derabbanan function. As opposed to dinim d'oraysa that say something inherent and intrinsic about a person or an object, dinim derabbanan just serve a functional need, but do not change the legal status or nature of things. This is a powerful sevara that explains many other ideas.... maybe more another time.

Tuesday, October 06, 2009

mitzvah haba'ah b'aveira

The Torah says that the lulav used for the mitzvah must be owned, "lachem," and therefore a stolen or borrowed lulav is disqualified on the first day of Yom Tov. After the first day, when the mitzvah is only derabbanan, even a borrowed lulav is acceptable. The gemara at the beginning of the third perek of Sukkah quotes a machlokes between R' Yochanan and Shmuel regarding whether a stolen lulav is usable on the remaining days of Yom Tov. R' Yochanan writes that a stolen lulav is disqualified for the duration of Yom Tov because of mitzvah haba'ah b'aveira. Shmuel argues that since a borrowed lulav is acceptable on the remaining days, a stolen lulav is also acceptable. Tosfos asks, a lulav or esrog which is disqualified because it is not hadar is unacceptable for all eight days of Yom Tov -- why does the disqualification of not being hadar apply for the duration of Yom Tov but not the disqualification of being stolen? How does the fact that a borrowed lulav may be used justify using a stolen lulav?

Perhaps one could answer the question by using the chakirah of the Brisker Rav which we discussed in the past -- is the takanah of taking lulav for the duration of Yom Tov done zecher l'mikdash an extension of the mitzvah of lulav or a new chiyuv of making a zecher l'mikdash? If it is a new chiyuv of zecher l'mikdash, one can perhaps distinguish between the psul of hadar, which is inherent and visible in the object of lulav and esrog, and the psul of gazul, which relates to the behavior of the person performing the mitzvah but has no visible effect on the object.

Since I mentioned my wife's grandfather's Telzer roots, I can't resist offering a Telzer answer. R' Yosef Leib Bloch explains that the machlokes R' Yochanan and Shmuel revolves around how to define mitzvah haba'ah b'aveira. The Sha'ar haMelech suggests that mitzvah haba'ah b'aveira applies only where the performance of a mitzvah could not be accomplished if not for the aveira. Based on this, the gemara's explanation of Shmuel -- "m'toch she'yotzei b'shaul yotzei b'gazul" -- makes perfect since. The very possibility of borrowing a lulav disconnects the act of theft from being an integral part of the mitzvah and disqualifying it.

R' Yosef Engel (Lekach Tov 12:2) takes a more pilpulish approach. He notes that Rashi on the mishna explains the requirement of hadar based on the pasuk of "zeh K-li v'anveihu", which is the source for hidur mitzvah with respect to all mitzvos. Why would Rashi not cite the pasuk of "pri eitz hadar" which applies specifically to the 4 minim instead of the more general din of hidur mitzvah? R"Y Engel explains that the psul of "hadar" written by the 4 minim is me'akeiv even bdi'eved; the general rule of hidur mitzvah is not. What disqualification the Mishna is referring to underlies the dispute between R' Yochanan and Shmuel. The Mishna lumps together the disqualifications of a stolen lulav and a lulav that is not hadar. If the Mishna is referring to the general din of hidur mitzvah, than just as it is not me'akeiv, so too the psul of gazul is not me'akeiv as a disqualification on other days except for the first. If the Mishna is referring to the specific din of hadar, then just as it is me'akeiv throughout sukkos, so too, the din of not taking a stolen lulav is me'akeiv.

Monday, October 05, 2009

careful who you lend your lulav to!

My wife observed a young man in shul after davening acting very gentlemanly by handing his lulav to his kallah-to-be in the ladies' section so she could fulfill the mitzvah of netilas lulav. My wife immediately turned to me and raised a halachic red alert: did the kallah-to-be just become the kallah!? It's five months until Purim, but my wife remembered the Rama (O.C. 695) that says a man should not send mishloach manos to a single woman lest it be taken as an indication that she is mekudeshet to him. The same should apply to the mitzvah of lulav.

There is, however, a difference between lulav this year and mishloach manos. Mishloach manos is a gift which is meant to be kept; a lulav (on all days except the first) is merely borrowed for use to fulfill the mitzvah. Additionally, it is not that we suspect the mishloach manos of being used for kiddushin -- the suspicion (see M.B.) is that the kiddushin already took place and the mishloach manos are engagement gifts (sivlonos) after the fact. While mishloach manos are indeed meant as gifts, a lulav is not.

All that being said, the Halichos Beisa concurs with my wife and recommends that a man avoid giving his lulav to a single woman. Be careful who you lend your lulav to -- you may be getting more than you bargained for!

(For those who are already married, there is another halachic problem that comes up when we perform the mitzvah on the first day of Sukkos. On the first day only the mitzvah must be "lachem", meaning you must own, not borrow, the lulav and esrog. However, the halachic rule is "mah she'kansa isha kansa ba'alah" -- a woman has not independent ability to acquire property or goods; whatever she buys or takes possession of belongs to her husband. How then can she ever acquire her own lulav and esrog? Whether mah she'kansa isha... blocks kinyanim on a d'oraysa level and if it does how and whether we need to circumvent it is a discussion for another time, as it is a non-issue this year. See the notes at the end of the Bikurei Ya'akov.)

stolen food on the first night of sukkos: mitzvah haba'ah b'aveira?

R' Chaim Brisker's explains that the psul of mitzvah haba'ah b'aveira is a disqualification of the cheftza shel mitzvah. One proof: according to the Rambam listening to tekiyos from a stolen shofar is not a mitzvah haba'ah b'aveira because the cheftza shel mitzvah is the sound produced by the shofar, not the shofar itself.

Given this framework, my son said over a nice chakirah from R' Baruch Ber: if one ate stolen food on the first night of sukkos, would that be a mitzvah haba'ah b'aveira? Is the cheftza shel mitzvah the sukkah, or since there is a unique chiyiuv on the first night to eat a k'zayis (as we discussed last week) in the sukkah, it is the food which is the cheftza shel mitzvah?

I think the answer depends on the machlokes Rishonim regarding whether there is a mitzvah on the first night to eat a k'zayis in the sukkah even in the rain: According to the Rambam who opines that there is no chiyuv in the rain, that chiyuv to eat a k'zayis is just a means of fulfilling yeshivas sukkah -- where the mitzvah of sukkah does not apply (e.g. in the rain), there is no chiyuv to eat. The cheftza shel mitzvah according to this view would be the sukkah. However, according to those Rishonim who hold one must eat a k'zayis in the sukkah even in the rain, the chiyuv is one of the eating, not one of sukkah; hence there is no exemption because of rain. The cheftza shel mitzvah according to this view would be the food. In short, what the cheftza shel mitzvah is depends on whether you define the special mitzvah on the first night as one of achila or dirah.

Friday, October 02, 2009

ishbitza on sukkos

The Ishbitza contrasts the mitzvah of sukkah, which can be fulfilled passively by sitting or sleeping, with the mitzvah of lulav, which is done by waving the lulav and esrog. Sukkah represents the innate abilities Hashem gives each person; lulav represents that which we acquire through our efforts and labor. With this distinction we can explain why there is a halacha of “lulav hagazul” but no halacha of “sukkah hagazul” (see the sugya of karka eina nigzeles, sukkah 31). One is born with a precise measure of talent and ability, no more and no less; however, one can intrude on another’s cheilek through one’s actions. We can also better understand why on Shabbos, the day when we celebrate Hashem’s actions and curtail our own, we perform the mitzvah of sukkah but refrain from taking the lulav. I would suggest that taking the different species of lulav, esrog, hadasim, and aravos together is seen as a metaphor for Jewish unity because unity is something we must create through our efforts, not something which we can take for granted as innate.

In another teaching, the Ishbitza explains that we always encounter sukkah after victory. The first mention of sukkah in the Torah appears after Ya’akov’s victory over the angel he battled and his safe escape from Eisav. When the Jewish people left Egypt victorious over their enslavers they fled from Ra’amses to Sukkos. When we emerge victorious from the days of judgment we immediately celebrate by building a sukkah.

I think there is a connection between these teachings. Victory invites the danger of hubris, “kochi v’otzem yadi.” Victory can also be temporal and fleeting, as success is often followed by letdown; life seldom progresses in a linear trajectory upward, but meanders in fits and bursts, ratzo v’shav. Sukkah returns our focus from what we have achieved to who we are, from doing to being.

Thursday, October 01, 2009

when it rains on sukkos

There is rain in the forecast for this weekend in NY, so it pays to review the halachos of yeshivas sukkah on the first nights beforehand to be prepared for contingencies. If it is raining enough to spoil your meal in the sukkah, under normal circumstances you should leave the sukkah and eat indoors. Remaining in the sukkah under those circumstances is not a “chumra” of any kind; it is an act of foolishness. The first night of sukkos, however, may be different. The gemara derives from a gezeirah shava to Pesach that just like there is a mitzvah to eat matzah on the first night of Pesach, there is a mitzvah to eat a k’zayis in the sukkah on the first night of Yom Tov. This is why we wait until dark before eating in the sukkah – just like the Pesach seder cannot be done before dark, this mitzvah of eating in sukkah cannot be done before dark. The Mishna Berurah has an interesting chiddush based on an extension of this idea: just as (according to the GR”A) there is a kiyum mitzvah in eating matzah all 8 days of Pesach, so too there is a kiyum mitzvah in eating in the sukkah all 8 days of the chag.

The Rishonim debate whether this mitzvah of eating a k’zayis on the first night applies even if it rains. There are two possible ways to explain the debate: 1) Is the chiyuv to eat learned from the gezeirah shavah an independent din with its own parameters or an extension of the chiyuv of mitzvas sukkah? If it is an extension of the chiyuv of sukkah, then the same exemption for rain that ordinarily applies to sukkah applies in this case as well; if it is a new independent chiyuv, then the exemption from the mitzvah of sukkah in case of rain has no bearing. 2) A second possible explanation: Does rain exempt the chovas hagavra of the person to eat in sukkah, or does it disqualify the cheftza of the sukkah? If rain disqualifies the sukkah, there is no point to eating therein. If rain exempts the individual from the normal mitzvah of sukkah, there still remains on the first night the additional obligation of eating k’zayis generated by the gezeirah shava. The Rama (639:5) paskens like the view of the Ra"n that there is a chiyuv to eat in sukkah even if it rains; the Vilna Gaon paskens like the view of the Rambam that there is no chiyuv. Since we are faced with a machlokes regarding a mitzvah d’oraysa, the best bet is to try to wait and see if the storm passes and one can avoid the situation of safeik. The Magen Avraham writes to wait until midnight (but not later because, returning to our limud from Pesach, the latest time for the seder is midnight), but the Mishna Berurah quotes other Achronim who note that there is no formal shiur -- the amount of time to wait depends on one’s tolerance and that of one's familty, taking into account the mitzvah of simchas yom tov.

If the rain does not stop, kiddush should be recited in the sukkah and a k’zayis of challah eaten without a bracha of leishev ba’sukkah (to avoid a safeik bracha). If the rain lets up and one is still awake, one should go out to the sukkah, eat a k'beitza of challah (see the first comment to this post), and recite leishev ba'sukkah. One would therefore be yotzei the mitzvah of sukkah even according to the view that holds the k'zayis eaten in the rain does not count.

The only difference between the second night and the first according to Mishna Berura is that on the second night one can start the meal inside and eat a k’zayis afterwards in the sukkah. The reason we do the opposite on the first night (we start with the k’zayis in the sukkah) is to avoid having to add an extra bracha of she’hechiyanu, once at the start of the meal during kiddush and once at the end of the meal when eating the k'zayis and sitting in sukkah for the first time. On the second night this is not an issue because she’hechiyanu on sukkah was already recited the night before.

The Magen Avraham writes that on the second night one need not eat a k’zayis in the sukkah in the rain. This view seems easy to explain using the principle of sfeik sfeika: safeik whether it is Yom Tov or chol, and even if it is Yom Tov, safeik whether the halacha is like the Ran who requires eating k’zayis in the sukkah in the rain or not. (One might argue further that m’ikar hadin Yom Toc sheni is not even a real safeik but is vaday a weekday, but we treat it as Yom Tov because of minhag/takanah.) The Aruch haShulchan writes that the minhag follows this Magen Avraham, but again, the Mishna Berurah disagrees. Mishna Berura further writes that one should preferably wait before eating even on the second night.
(Please do not rely on this post for psak: see the S"A in siman 639 and the relevant Achronim. And hopefully this post will not be relevant l'ma'aseh anyway and we get some nice weather.)

Wednesday, September 30, 2009

bal tosif: adding a new mitzvah vs. modifying an existing mitzvah

A few years ago in honor of the occasion of my MIL's donation of a sefer torah, my wife’s uncle edited and published a small collection of the correspondence and writings of my wife’s grandfather, HaRav Dov Yehudah Shochet, who was among the talmidim muvhakim of Telz (see my BIL's article on Telz) and a Rav in Basel, the Hague, and Toronto, and in whose memory (along with others) the sefer was written. By coincidence, one of the few full length shiurim (I only recently got my hands on the kuntres) is devoted to the topic of bal tosif which we have been discussing as of late. I am sorry I can only write up a smattering of an idea from this brilliant shiur (and I am adapting the idea, so the errors are mine); the small amount printed is rav b'eichus on many levels despite being miyut b'kamus, and I hope bl"n to share more.

The shiur draws a distinction between two types of bal tosif: changing the tzurah of an existing mitzvah vs. fabricating a new mitzvah. (This is similar to the distinction I cited from Avi Ezri between adding a chiyuv vs. changing the kiyum mitzvah.) As we learned, the Rashba writes that takanos of Chazal do not violate bal tosif because they are justified by the need for legislation. The Turei Even asks: the gemara (R”H 28) writes that R’ Eliezer holds if the blood of a korban requiring the sprinkling of dam 4 times gets mixed with the blood of a korban that requires sprinkling only once, sprinkling the blood 4 times is prohibited because of bal tosif. Why doesn't the need to perform zerikas hadam 4 times not override the issur of bal tosif just like the need to enact a takanah overrides bal tosif? Based on the distinction between the two types of bal tosif, this question is easily answered: given the need for legislation, creating new takanos does not violate bal tosif; however, no matter what the need, the parameters of an existing mitzvah cannot be altered. Because one of the korbanos demands zerika no more than one time, the mitzvah of zerika cannot be modified and done four times.

Is adding tekiyos d’meyushav an addition of a new mitzvah or a change to the existing mitzvah of tekiyas shofar? That essentially is the difference between Rashba, who justifies tekiyos d’meyushav as a takanah and therefore excluded from bal tosif, and Tosfos, who suggests a different sevara and explains that doing a mitzvah 2 times is allowed. The question I ended my last discussion of this topic with (see this post) -- why does the Rashba's sevara not answer Tos' question -- does not get off the ground. Tosfos could not use the Rashba’s sevara because changing the parameter of an existing mitzvah, as opposed to adding a new takanah, would be a kum v’aseh violation of bal tosif which Chazal have no license to do.

We can explain the debate on a deeper level by returning R’ Akiva Eiger’s question (which we discussed here) on Tos’ comparison of tekiyos d’meyushav to a kohein doing birchas kohanim for a second time in one day. R’ AK”E argues that there is an obvious difference: the kohein has a new chiyuv of birchas kohanim every time he enters a shul that is up to duchaning; the ba’al tokeya has no new chiyuv to blow shofar once he has fulfilled his mitzvah d’oraysa. Chasam Sofer answers that the ba’al tokeya’s obligation of shofar is in fact incomplete by dint of arvus so long as others still have not heard shofar.

Tosfos may have held like the Chasam Sofer and viewed tekiyos d’meyushav as an extension of the mitzvah of tekiyos already in progress. The Rashba, however, may have sided with R’ Akiva Eiger and viewed tekiyos d’meyushav as a new mitzvah, the old mitzvah of tekiyos already having been completed with the conclusion of one round of tekiyos.

bal tosif in adding to the 4 minim

In the last post I did on bal tosif I left a question hanging that I will try to return to bl”n, but first this...

The Rambam (Lulav 7:7) writes that one may take extra hadasim with the lulav because having a full bouquet looks more beautiful. However, one may not take more of the other minim; taking an extra lulav, esrog, or aravah does not add to the beauty of the mitzvah and violates bal tosif. The Ra’avad disagrees and writes that he does not understand why taking extra minim disqualify the mitzvah. Since lulav does not require eged, meaning there is nothing which unites whatever you pick up and defines it as a single halachic bundle, there is no connection between the extra items picked up and the items which are part of the mitzvah requirement. An extra lulav, esrog, or aravah serves no function and has no effect on the character of the mitzvah.

Recall our discussion before Rosh haShana regarding bal tosif: according to the Rambam bal tosif occurs when adding chiyuvim; e.g. were Chazal to give the impression that a din derabbanan is actually a chiyud d’oraysa they would be in violation of bal tosif. Ra’avad sees bal tosif as a function of changing a kiyum mitzvah, e.g. adding an extra bayis to tefillin.

The Avi Ezri extends that discussion to explain our machlokes as well. According to the Rambam whether or not the extra items technically count as part of the cheftza shel mitzvah bundle of 4 minim is irrelevant -- the disqualification of bal tosif is caused by the attempt by the person to alter the chiyuv of the mitzvah by adding minim. The Ra’avad who looks only at the kiyum mitzvah as the measure of bal tosif sees no problem in this case because since there is no eged the kiyum mitzvah is unchanged.

Tuesday, September 29, 2009

closing thoughts on Yom Kippur

Some closing Yom Kippur thoughts:

1) The Kohein Gadol's prayer ended with a special plea for the safety of the residents of the Sharon whose homes collapsed every few years because of the weather conditions where they lived. Isn't it a strange way to end off the tefilah which otherwise includes general requests for the welfare of Klal Yisrael by focusing on a specific group of people? I think the answer is that these people demonstrated a remarkable trait. The residents of the Sharon could have simply packed up a moved to some other area where their homes would not continue to collapse, but they chose to remain put rather than abandon this area of Eretz Yisrael. The tenacity and commitment to the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisrael deserves extra bracha.

2) The gemara tells us that the Kohein Gadol would make a Yom Tov in celebration of completing the avodah successfully. What the gemara apparently means is that the Kohein Gadol would make a seudah and invite others to join him. R' Tzadok is medayeik: why does the gemara not simply say the Kohein Gadol would make a seudah -- why phrase it as making a "Yom Tov"?

If, for example, I got a new car, I might tell you about my car, let you test drive my car, invite you to a little car party to celebrate my car, etc. all of which you might enjoy and partake of, but at the end of the day the car will still just be my car and the party my party. The celebration of the Kohein Gadol was not like that. The joy upon completion of the avodah was infectious. It wasn't the Kohein Gadol's party that others joined, but it became their party, i.e. there was a sense of personal joy that each and every person experienced.

Why is that the case? I think it has to do with the role played by the Kohein Gadol, and in our times, the shaliach tzibur. We sometimes lose sight of the fact that the shliach tzibur is no more than our agent -- in fact, the Mishna in Brachos applies the idea of "shlucho shel adam k'moso" to the shat"z. We depend on the shat"z or the Kohein to fulfill the job we assign to them, but their success depends on more than going through the motions of an assigned task. The shat"z and the Kohein carry with them the kochos hanefesh, the hopes and aspirations and thoughts of the tzibur, without which tefilah and avodah is an empty shell. Their success means the emotions which we invested in them have been accepted, and we therefore we each have good reason to make a Yom Tov.

3) The transition from Yom Kippur to Sukkos may seem for some like going m'igra rama l'beira amikta as we switch gears from the solemnity of tshuvah to the joy of Yom Tov. I think the following story is a good response to that. In one of the Shlomo Carlebach bios there is the tale of a Jew who davened with R' Shlomo on the Yamim Noraim and afterwards complained that he just didn't feel uplifted by the tefilah. R' Shlomo replied that he noticed that whenever he was singing this individual did not join in; "You never responded when I said 'Give me harmony!'" The Jew answered that he was so focused on praying and repenting that he did not feel much like singing. R' Shlomo replied, "Don't you know that just like you can pray your way to Heaven you can also sing and dance your way to Heaven?"

On Yom Kippur we repent and pray our way to Heaven. On Sukkos we sing and dance our way there. And on that note, time to start preparing for the next chag.

Friday, September 25, 2009

when disagreement with sanhedrin is allowed

The Mishna (Kerisus 6:3) records a machlokes between R' Eliezer and the Chachamim whether a person can voluntarily bring an asham taluy. Baba ben Buti, the Mishna tells us, in accordance with R' Eliezer's view would bring an asah talauy every day except the day after Yom Kippur .

The Tiferes Yisrael asks an interesting question. How could Baba ben Buti ignore the majority opinion of the Chachamin in favor of R' Eliezer when the Torah tells us acharei rabim l'hatos? How could the kohanim have accepted his korban on a daily basis when according to the majority view it was chulin b'azarah? Even in the famous debate (Baba Metziya 59) over tanur shel achna'i where R' Eliezer had miracles and a bas kol on his side, the Chachamim rejected his view because majority wins. Not only that, but what is a zakein mamrei if not someone who acts based on his own interpretation of the law in contradiction to the psak of the majority of Sanhedrin?

Why then was R' Eliezer (or Akavya ben Mehalalel in Ediyos 5:7) not a zakein mamrei? The Tif. Yisrael answers that though he disagreed with the majority of the Chachamim in theory, in practice R' Eliezer bowed to their view. Baba ben Buti, however, disagreed in practice. My son did not like this distinction. He pointed out that the gemara (B.M. 59b) says openly that the Chachamim burned the taharos of R' Eliezer, implying that he had relied on his own opinion in practice.

The truth is that we find in other places that individual Tana'im acted in practice based on their own minority view. The gemara tells us that in R' Eliezer's town they would chop wood on Shabbos if needed for milah because he held machshirei milah are doche Shabbos against the majority view; R' Yosi would eat chicken and milk together because he held that there was no rabbinic prohibition of doing so, against the majority view. R' Elchanan in Kuntres Divrei Sofrim explains these cases as having occurred before the issue was formally brought to a vote and decided by the Sanhedrin. In other words, historically there may have been a period of flux during which different traditions were accepted and practiced, some more widely adopted than others, and Sanhedrin took no pains to intervene. Once the issue did come to a vote and was resolved, the minority view became unacceptable in practice. Based on this approach perhaps Baba ben Buti was free to do as he pleased because there had not yet been a formal vote on the issue.

Chazal famously darshen (cited by Rashi in P' Shoftim) that one must obey the Sanhedrin even if they appear mistaken and declare that right is left and left is right. Yet the gemara in Horiyos implies that even a talmid who knows Beis Din is mistaken should not follow their psak. The Ramban in Sefer haMitzvos resolves the contradiction using the same logic as R' Elchanan: Before Beis Din hears out the talmid, he is entitled to stick to his guns and follow his own interpretation irrespective of the majority's disagreement. However, if Beis Din hears out the talmid's objections and formally rejects them and rules otherwise, then the talmid must conform in practice to the psak of the majority or risk being labeled a zakein mamrei.

What remains unclear to me is why certain issues were to be taken to a vote and resolved and other issues remained unresolved. For example, it seems (Chagigah 16) that the issue of whether a korban should get smicha on Yom Tov was debated for centuries. The Margoliyas HaYam in Sanhedrin discusses why this was the case; i.e. why a vote and final psak was not given. Whatever the answer in that particular case (I don't recall his solution offhand), I think the question needs to be raised more broadly and I don't know that we have enough information to formulate an intelligent answer (at least I don't, but mareh mekomos welcome).

Thursday, September 24, 2009

R' Chaim Shmulevitz on Yonah

Yonah did not want to deliver his prophecy to Ninveh because if Ninveh would do tshuvah it would make Klal Yisrael look bad for their lack of repentance. We all know the story of Yonah's attempt to flee, the storm that follows his boat, his being swallowed by a fish, and his eventual delivery of the message. Why, asks R' Chaim Shmulevitz (Sichos Mussar, Shoftim 1971), did Hashem "need" Yonah? Why try to force him off the boat, why miraculously keep him alive in a fish (actually there were two different fishes that swallowed him), why keep after him alone to go to Ninveh? Surely Hashem could find another prophet willing to deliver his message if Yonah refused!

R' Chaim Shmulevitz answers that it was precisely because Yonah fled that no substitute could fill his place. The sensitivity shown by Yonah in trying to avoid any action that might cast the Jewish people in a bad light is what endeared Yonah to Hashem. Who could be more deserving of being Hashem's prophet than someone who evinces such caring?

piyus

There is a din to ask mechila before Yom Kipur from people one may have harmed, so in that spirit I hope my reading audience includes mechila of me in their tefilah zakah (or earlier!) We say after every amidah: "Elokei, netzor leshoni mei'ra... Psach libi b'torasecha" -- we ask Hashem to guard our tongue from speaking ill and to open our hearts to Torah. I can't recall where I saw written that the reason these sentiments are placed in the same tefilah is because the former is a precondition to the latter. Perhaps one should recite the same tefilah before blogging. Undoubtedly there is room for my improvement in the tone of posts and comments (sometimes harsh, sarcastic, vitriolic) , the choice of topics, and other areas. All things considered, I hope the gain in posting outweighs the downside, and ask your forbearance for those times it doesn't.

Wednesday, September 23, 2009

a political note

My coworker unfortunately decided to keep his radio on to listen to Obama's speech to the UN this morning. Perhaps I should bring in a radio to listen to Glenn Beck or Rush or Mark Levin, but I'm too nice. Anyway, for anyone who is still delusional and thinks this President is a friend of Israel, WAKE UP! In case you missed it, Obama declared, "America does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements" and to called for "...A viable, independent Palestinian state with contiguous territory that ends the occupation that began in 1967." This is not a political blog so I don't want to get into a wider discussion of the issues, but I think it is very important to recognize the danger that American foreign policy now poses for Israel. Sorry for this brief break from our regular program -- I just had to get that out of my system.

For those of you who can't remember what happened last time a deal was made regarding settlements, here's a little reminder of what we lost. And what did we gain?
Warning: watch with a tissue nearby to catch the tears.