ya'arof ka'matar likchi

“Ya’arof ka’matar likchi” – Chazal darshen from the word “ya’arof” that Torah is mechapeir even on murder, just like eglah arufah. The kapparah of Torah goes above and beyond what can be accomplished by tefilah, by korbanos, but anything else. How does that work? The gemara (Sukkah 42) darshens “u’lekachtem lachem” that the mitzvah of netilas lulav is accomplished by picking up the lulav. Torah, says the Shem m’Shmuel, is called “likchi.” It picks a person up. Other means of kapparah work by trying to push away and eliminate the contamination of aveiros, like trying to clean the dirty stains off one’s garments. The kapparah of Torah is like picking onself up and out of those old garments and putting on something completely new and unsoiled.

“K’se’irim aley desheh v’k’revivim alei eisev” – “Se’irim” is a storm; "revivim" is the morning dew. Rashi says “desheh” refers to vegetation as a whole; “eisev” is the individual blade of grass. It’s not the same Torah, the same “likchi,” for everyone. For some people, Torah is like a hurricane. Other people can’t take that. They need Torah to fall gently, like the morning dew. There is the Torah that applies to the “desheh,” the community, and there is the Torah of each “eisev,” each blade of grass with its own needs.

How is the Torah like dew?   R’ Simcha Bunim m’Peshischa explained that when the dew falls, it has no noticeable effect on the plant. It’s only later, after time, that its effect is felt.  You can't open a sefer and expect a magic transformation to occur.  It takes time, but the growth will happen.

Final point -- a question: Ramban writes that Parshas Ha'azinu speaks of ultimate redemption with no conditions, no prequalifications -- it's going to happen, take it to the bank.  Yet the gemara (Sanhedrin 96) quotes R' Eliezer's view that geulah will happen only if Klal Yisrael does teshuvah.  R' Yehoshua disagrees only to the extent that he holds teshuvah itself is inevitable.  If Klal Yisrael doesn't do teshuvah of our own accord, then Hashem will cause us to be subjected to the decrees of an evil king Obama and that motivate us to do teshuvah.  Either way, it seems teshuvah is a prerequisite for geulah.  How does this fit with the Ramban?

chatzi shiur and a fishy Midrash

First a quick halachic point and then an amazing Chasam Sofer on a Midrash:

1) The 618:8 the Biur Halacha sneaks in a chiddush. Let’s say a person is c"v so sick on Y”K that he is allowed to eat even a full shiur, meaning a k’koseves within a k’dei achilas pras. He sits down with a full plate of food and starts to eat, and feels a little better. Now, says the M”B, he has to be careful. If he becomes well enough that he can space his eating out and get away with eating only a chatzi shiur, and he then continues and eats a full shiur, he would be chayav kareis. 

In other words: if a person ate a chatzi shiur b’heter (he is still sick and allowed that) and a chatzi shiur b’issur (the amount in excess of the chatzi shiur that he had no right to eat), he is chayav kareis.

Why should that be true? Why not say that since the person ate only a chatzi shiur b’issur, there should be no kareis?

Shu”T Binyan Shlomo 41 raises this as a safeik. It’s an interesting chiddush that there are a few ways to explain, so you can ponder it over the next two days : )

2) The Midrash (Braishis 11:4, quoted in Tos Kesubos 5a and by the Tur in Hil Y”K) tells the story of a tailor who erev Y”K went to the fish market to buy a nice fish to eat (who says the seudah ha’mafsekes has to be chicken?) l’kavod yom tov. At the same time, one of the servants of the local nobleman also came shopping for fish for his master. Unfortunately, there was only one fish left. A bidding war ensued, until finally the servant gave up and balked at paying an inflated price for a single fish. He returned to his master empty handed.  The master was angry and demanded to know who this was who was willing to spend such a fortune to get that fish. Forced to appear before the nobleman and explain himself, the tailor related that the day of Yom Kippur was coming and all our sins are forgiven; therefore, it was only appropriate for him to do his best to honor the day with that fish.  The tailor was allowed to go home in peace.  When he cut open the fish, he found in it a precious stone as a reward from Hashem.

What difference does it make if it was a tailor, a baker, or a candlestick maker who this story happened to? And what’s the big deal about having a fish? Couldn’t the tailor have had something else to eat?

Explains the Chasam Sofer (p. 70 in the Derashos): You look around Klal Yisrael and there are communities torn apart; there are families torn apart; there are people torn apart. We need “tailors” to sew the pieces together and make us whole.  That's who the Midrash is speaking about.

A fish never closes its eyes.  It is the symbol of Hashem's "eina pikcha" looking down and watching out for us.  The way to merit that is by creating peace and harmony, by looking at each other favorably, lovingly, in a caring way.  If we do that, Hashem in turn will look down at us in the same manner.  The fish the "tailor" was after for Yom Kippur was that "eina pikcha" of Hashem's loving gaze, brought about by the love between Jews.  

The gemara (Sanhedrin 98) writes that before Mashiach comes there will be a time when a sick person will need a little fish to be cured and none will be found.  There will come a time when the "eina pikcha" of Hashem is needed so desperately to make us better, but because of the way we look at each other, that fish is going to be really hard to find. 

“Eyn Hashem el yrei’av.”  The pshat is that the pasuk is speaking about how Hashem looks at us, but the Chasam Sofer explains it as follows: We, the yirei Hashem (at least I hope we are), should be blessed with the "eyn Hashem," with G-d's eyes, kavyachol.  We should see only the good in others.  We should see their needs and troubles so that we can help.  We should look beyond superficial nonsense that creates differences and see what really matters.

That's the way a "tailor" sees things.  If we learn to see things that way we too will merit a wonderful "fish" for our Yom Kippur.

Gmar chasima tovah!

why no shirah on Rosh haShana

1. R’ Abahu tells us that the malachim in shamayim ask why it is that Bnei Yisrael do not say shirah [i.e. hallel] on Rosh haShana and Yom Kippur. Hashem answers that it is impossible for Bnei Yisrael to do so when the books of life and death are open and their fate hangs in the balance.

Don’t the malachim also know that the sifrei chaim v’meisim are open? Don’t we say in nesaneh tokef that even the malachim tremble in fear knowing that these are days of din?  

My son quoted one of the Telzer Roshei Yeshiva as explaining that the malachim are afraid as well, but they view that fear as an unwelcome distraction.  The motivation for their avodah comes from the pure intellectual knowledge that Hashem’s din is only l’tovah no matter what comes out.  That's all that counts.

Hashem’s response is that the avodah he desires is not just avodah of the intellect, but avodah of the lev and emotion as well.  Hashem wants to be served by feeling people, not just abstracted minds. Captain Kirk is the hero and Spock is the sidekick, not the other way around.  If achieving that goal means sacrificing shirah because we are too consumed by the emotion of fear to give voice to it, it is a worthwhile sacrifice. 

I wanted to explain the gemara based on an idea from R’ Yosef Engel we discussed a few months ago. The gemara says that David haMelech was criticized for saying, “Zmiros hayu li chukecha,” for comparing words of Torah to a zemer, a song. Why is that such a bad thing when our parsha tells us “Kisvu lachem es ha’shirah ha’zos” and calls Torah a shirah?

R' Yosef Engel distinguishes between the concept of zemer and the concept of shirah. Zemer is like the word zomer=pruning. It’s a means of clearing away that which is unneeded and that which inhibits growth. Torah of course helps clear away the bad midos, aveiros, and wrong thinking that prevents a person from turning into a ben Torah, but Torah is also much more than that – Torah itself is the energy that creates and inspires growth. Torah is a shirah, not just a zemer.

“Zamru l’Elokim zameiru…” The word “zemer” repeats itself multiple times in the perek of tehillim we recite before tekiyas shofar. R’ Levi Yitzchak m’Berdichev in his Kedushas Levi explains that on R”H and Y”K our avodah is one of zmirah, of pruning. We want to chop off any influence the midas ha’din may have and elevate the midas ha’rachamim.

The malachim were wondering what happened to “kisvu lachem es ha’shirah ha’zos,” our avodah of shirah. Hashem answered that on R”H and Y”K our avodah is “zamru l’Elokim zameiru.” Because the sifrei chaim and meisim are opened, our focus narrows to eliminating the danger of din more than on shirah.

2. On Rosh haShana man was created, and almost immediately he sinned and was expelled from Gan Eden. Why was he kicked out? The Torah explains, “V’atah pen yishlach YADO v’achal mei’eitz hachaim.” The Midrash comments, “Ain v’atah eleh lashon teshuvah.” Adam haRishon had a path back to his former state, a path of get to the eitz chaim through teshuvah.  Adds the Sefas Emes, YADO = yud = 10. These are the 10 days of teshuvah which we find ourselves in.

“Vayishlach Avraham es yado va’yikach es ha’ma’acheles.” “Yishlach es yado” is completely extraneous. (I think the Kotzker explained that every muscle of Avraham’s being could not act contrary to ratzon Hashem. Hashem’s will, which Avraham did not know yet, was for Yitzchak to not be offered as a korban. Therefore, Avraham had to make an effort to extend his hand – “vayishlach es yado” – because it didn’t want to obey.) Here too, explains the Sefas Emes, YADO = the 10 days of teshuvah. Avraham had to rise above the natural rachmanus which a father has for a son. He had to escape the world of teva and grab onto the eitz chaim.  That is the path of teshuvah, which forces a person to rise above his/her natural inclinations and reach for something which is higher and greater.

why not go for broke?

A question to think about:

The gemara (Baba Basra 147) writes that if the first day of Rosh haShana is hot, it means it will be a warm year. If it is cold, it means the year will be a cold year (sounds just like Farmer’s Almanac). The gemara asks, “L’mau nafka minah?” What difference does it make? The gemara I guess did not have a heating oil futures market to invest in, so the gemara says the nafka minah is for the tefilah of the kohen gadol on Yom Kippur.

Rashbam and Tosfos explain as follows: if it’s going to be a hot year, then the kohen gadol should daven for it to be not so hot; if it’s going to be a cold year, he should daven for it to be not so cold.

I don't understand.  Why not go for broke and ask for more?  I was reading a book recently and one of the characters is always telling his friend his wishes, like he wishes to be paid decently for his work that day so he can take off the next day.   His friend in turn always wonders why if he is wishing, he doesn't just wish for more -- why not wish for enough money that you don't have to work at all?  There's no limit on wishes.  I am bothered by the same thing here.  You can ask Hashem for anything.  Why accept that it’s going to be a hot year and just Hashem to make it a little less hot, or vica versa, when you can ask Hashem to make it seasonable, or whatever temperature you want? 

Whatever the answer to that is, one other point about tefilah: I saw R' Chaim Kanievsky quotes from the Chazon Ish that even though normally on Shabbos or Y"T one cannot make personal bakashos in tefilah, Rosh haShana is an exception.  I don't know the makor for such a din, but apparently the Chazon Ish said it.  So IY"H we should all daven for whatever we need (and the first thing to daven for I guess is that we have the brains to realize what we really need) and hopefully your tefilos and my tefilos will make a difference and we will all have a kesiva v'chasima tovah.

a mistake in blowing the kolos -- the chumra of the Chayei Adam

I’ve covered the machlokes Rashi and Tos on the shiur of tekiyos before, but want to revisit it because of an interesting Chayei Adam I noticed this year. The Mishna tells us that the length of a teruah is 3 yebavos. Rashi understands this to mean that the total length of a teruah is three very short tu sounds = 3 beats. Tosfos holds that the length of a teruah is three blasts of 3 yebavos = 9 beats.

The gemara writes that the length of a tekiya = that of a teruah. Therefore, according to Rashi a teruah must be at least 3 beats long; according to Tosfos it has to be 9 beats.

Tosfos points out that according to Rashi, each of the shevarim has to be less than 3 beats long.  If not, the shever turns into a tekiya.  Therefore, according to Rashi you have to blow 3 shevarim of no more than 2 beats each = 6 beats in total. According to Tosfos, you would not be not yotzei with this, since the minimum lenth of a tekiya, a teruah, or the shevarim = 9 beats.

R’ Soloveitchik came up with a solution to be yotzei both deyos: blow 5 shevarim of 2 beats each. Each shever will be less than 3 beats, fulfilling Rashi’s view, but the total will be 10 beats, fulfilling Tosfos’ requirement.

The minhag is to follow Tosfos’ view, but it’s still important to be aware of shitas Rashi because of a chiddush the Chayei Adam (141:12) quotes l’halacha which some poskim (e.g. R’ Elyashiv) take seriously. The halacha (in a nutshell) is that making a mistake blowing a totally pasul non-kol works out better than making a mistake blowing the wrong kol. If the ba’al tokea, for example, blows a tekiya and then blows a sound that is totally pasul, he can just blow the correct note and move on. However, if the ba’al tokea is supposed to blow teruah but instead starts to blow shevarim, even if he realizes his mistake and stops, he already blew it (sorry, I could not resist) and has to start again from the initial tekiya.

Says the Chayei Adam: since according to Rashi a one beat sound (not a 3 beat sound like Tos holds) is the first note of teruah, even a small toot of the shofar done in error is in reality a partial teruah. It’s a valid kol done in the wrong place, not just a bad pasul non-kol. Therefore, to correct the mistake the ba’al tokeah has to go back to the start of the set and blow the tekiya again.

You could argue (as other poskim do) that a kol blown without any intention to be a teruah is not a teruah at all – it’s just a mistake. The Chayei Adam, however, disagrees.

ha'ri'u lifnei hamelech Hashem -- ahava v'reyus

I had written something completely different that got lost due to technical difficulties -- hopefully I can fix that before Y"T and post it.  In the mean time, something quick on the parsha:

 

Atem nitzavim ha'yom kulchem...  everybody together.  Ba'chatzotzros v'kol shofar ha'ri'u lifnei hamelech Hashem. The Radomsker (in a piece on P' Ki Teitzei) explains the word ha'ri'u as coming from the word reyus -- v'ahavta l're'acha kamocha. The kol shofar is not just meant to connect us to Hashem -- it's meant to connect us to each other. Ha b'ha talya: it's only when we do connect with each other, when there is achdus v'reyus, that we can have the privilege of standing lifnei hamelech Hashem.

 

V'shav v'kibetzcha m'kol ha'amim asher hefitzcha Hashem Elokecha shama (30:3). Continues the very next pasuk, "Im ni'hiyeh nidacha bi'ketzei Hashem m'sham yikabetzcha... u'm'sham yikachecha." Isn't that just a repetition of the promise made in the previous pasuk? And if we are talking about the ingathering of exiles, shouldn't we be talking about the ends of the earth -- why "bi'ketzei ha'shamayim?" 
Rav Kook (quoted by R' Druckman in his sefer Tzam'ah Nafshi) explains that the first pasuk is talking about physical ingathering from exile. Hashem promises to bring us to Eretz Yisrael from wherever we are. But it's not just physical distance which is an obstacle to escaping galus. Some of us are spiritually distant as well. The second pasuk promises that even from "bi'ketzei ha'shamayim," the very edges of the spiritual universe (shamayim = ruchniyus), Hashem will bring a person back as well. 

Sefas Emes asks on that same pasuk why we need the extra words "mi'sham?" Why not just say "Hashem yikabetzcha v'yikachacha?" He answers that "mi'sham" here means the cause, the sibah.  From within whatever depths you sink to you can find the means, the energy, and the impetus to do better. The yeridah to that place will itself become the springboard to become better. 

That's a nice thought to take into Rosh haShana.
 

nusach hatefilah as a makor for halacha

Tosfos (R”H 17) quotes a machlokes Rishonim as to what the 13 midos are. According to R”T, Hashem Hashem counts as two midos: there is Hashem’s rachmanus before the cheit, even though he knows the person will fail, and then there is rachmanus after the cheit. R’ Nisim Gaon disagrees. He reads the pasuk that introduces the midos as follows: “Va’ya’avor Hashem al panav vayikra Hashem,” Hashem called out and recited 13 midos, “Hashem K-l erech apayim…” etc. In other words, the first Hashem is connected to “vayikra…,” not to the list of midos. To get to 13 he counts notzer chessed as a separate midah from l’alafim.

The Rosh brings proof that R"T right form the nusach we all use when we say slichos. Have you ever heard a shat”z say, “Va’ya’avor Hashem al panav Vayikra Hashem,” and then pause? Neither have I. It’s always, “Va’ayavor Hashem al panav vayikra,” pause, then the midos, “Hashem Hashem…” Awhile back when I discussed this with my son I told him that given that we say the 13 midos so many times, especially in the slichos of erev Rosh haShana, it would be clever of a shat”z who knows this machlokes to read the pasuk like R’ Nisim Gaon and put the pause in a different place maybe once in order to be yotzei his shita. After thinking about it again this year I don’t know if that would be right. R’ Nisim Gaon probably knew the nusach we use too -- maybe it was even the nusach in his shul -- but maybe he didn’t care.  Who says nusach can serve as a proof? Rav Wahrman here collects a bunch of examples where the text of a bracha is used as evidence as to the nature of a mitzvah or a halacha, e.g. (since it's the season) whether the bracha is lishmoa/litko’a/or al tekias may indicate to whether the mitzvah of shofar is listening or blowing. Here though, it’s not the text which is in question –- it’s the same words whether R”T or R’ Nisim Gaon is right -- but it’s the nusach hatefilah, how you punctuate the sentence, which changes. 

Whatever R”N Gaon held, you see that the Rosh took the nusach seriously enough to pasken from it. The Rosh thought the nusach should accurately capture and reflect the meaning of the words.   Sometimes a well meaning chazzan tries to stick a nice tune into the tefilah to get people involved and singing, but the meter doesn’t quite fit -- a word from phrase A gets tacked to phrase B, or a word gets dropped that should be there, etc.  When you chop up phrases the wrong way, the nusach obscures the meaning. It’s nice to sing, but it’s also nice for the words to make sense. 

The Rama writes that we don’t tamper with the nusach hatefilah of R”H and Y”K – it is as much part of the mesorah as the words are. Way back when I was in YU I remember Chazan Beer giving a seminar to the smicha students and bringing out this point with a story about the Chofetz Chaim. The C”C was called up for an Aliya on R”H or Y”K and paused for a long time before he finally said the brachos. When asked about the pause, he explained that he could not remember the tune, the nusach, and had to give himself a minute until it came to mind. He didn’t want to just say the brachos like it was an ordinary Shabbos – he wanted to make sure to use the right nusach. 

arur asher lo yakim -- chiddush of the Chasam Sofer

The meforshim struggle to understand what exactly “arur asher lo yakim es divrei haTorah ha’zos la’asos osam” refers to. If it is a catch all (see Rashi), then it effectively eliminates uniqueness of the other arurim. Ramban writes that the pasuk is referring to those who disobey mitzvos because they lack belief. If someone is overcome by temptation and eats a treif hamburger, that’s an issur of neveilah. If he does not believe that G-d prohibited treif hamburger, that’s “arur asher lo yakim…”  (Orthopraxy doesn't work.)  Ramban quotes another pshat from the Yerushalmi that those who have power and authority to stop others from doing aveiros must do so.

Chasam Sofer says what I think is a chiddush l’halacha. Chazal tell us that there are two aveiros which, if violated, are tantamount to rejecting the entire Torah: 1) avodah zarah; 2) shabbos. In parshas Shlach the Torah spoke about avodah zarah; here, the Torah speaks about shabbos. If a person sits in a hammock all day Saturday does not do any melacha, that’s not Shabbos, says the Chasam Sofer – that’s just being lazy. If you want to observe Shabbos, which counts as keeping kol ha’Torah, then you need “la’asos osam,” to do something to mark the day as significant. The “shamor” has to have a “zachor” that goes along with it. It’s a pretty remarkable statement – you have someone that technically did nothing wrong, but is still included in an arur. (See haKsav v’haKabbalah for a different pshat that also stresses the “la’asos osam” ending of the pasuk.)

Ramban's pshat is quoted by the M”B l’halacha, though if you are not up to Hil Y”K yet you may not have seen it. The M”B writes that there is a chiyuv tochacha to try to dissuade people from doing aveiros, including meting out punishment if necessary.  Who can do that?  Ramban writes that the “arur” of “asher lo yakim” applies to the king or his officers who have the power to be "makim" and force people to change their behavior.  An individual who has no authority and power has no obligation to coerce ba’alei aveira to get back on track.  Here too, says the M"B, coercion should be undertaken by beis din, not any individual. 

Anyway, I can't stop listening to this:

the unbearable absence of "why"

1. Does the heter of shvus d’shvus b’makom mitzvah work on yom tov sheni, where the mitzvah in question is only a derabbanan? The Aruch haShulchan (end of siman 586) writes that he doesn’t understand why this should even be a question. Shvus d’shvus is permitted where there is a tzoreh gadol. Surely a mitzvah derabbanan should count no less than a mundane tzorech gadol! (Is that so pashut? If I want to go on a picnic on Yom Tov, mitoch allows me to carry my picnic basket because there is a tzorech for me, but according the the Sha’agas Aryeh I can’t carry a lulav for the sake of a woman who wants to fulfill the mitzvah -- the picnic is more of a tzorech than a kiyum mitzvah. Is a chiyuv derabbanan better than a kiyum d’oraysa? I don’t know.)

What about a shvus d’shvus for the sake of hidur mitzvah, e.g. you have a kosher esrog, but can ask an aku”m to do an issur derabbanan and get you a better one? See the M.B. in 586:86 who says “efshar” a shvus d’shvus is allowed to get a ram’s horn shofar (a hidur) even if you have a perfectly kosher shofar from another animal. Why not use the Aruch haShulchan’s argument, i.e. a kiyum d’oraysa of hidur can’t be less of a tzorech than a great personal need, can it? Why is this just "efshar" and not a certainty?   (see the Sha’ar haTziyun)

2.  haven't read Andrew Sullivan in years, but this column of his about the dangers of technology "addiction" was worth a look.  The last three sentences: "And its [technology's] threat is not so much to our minds, even as they shape-shift under the pressure. The threat is to our souls. At this rate, if the noise does not relent, we might even forget we have any."

I think he figured that out without going to an asifa or reading it in a kol korei.  We probably should be able to do the same.

3. Getting to the parsha, most of the meforshim understand ‘V’hiflah Hashem es makoscha…” (28:59) to mean that the punishments of the tochacha will be unbelievable, extraordinary – a “peleh.” The Netzi”v offers a different interpretation based on a Chazal. The Midrash writes that the death of a talmid chacham is a greater catastrophe than anything described in the tochacha and even greater than the churban itself. The Midrash’s proof: the calamities of the tochacha and the churban are described using a single iteration of “peleh”, but the navi calls the death of a talmid chacham a “haflei va’peleh.” The death of a talmid chacham is a tragedy, but it's not a supernatural event. People were saddened when R’ Elyashiv and R’ Ovadya passed away, but their deaths at their advanced age could not have been unexpected. In what sense is it a “peleh?” (HaKsav vha’Kabbalah always has interesting things to say about language, and here too, he addresses the same issue.)

In Parshas Shoftim we read “Ki YIPALEI davar la’mishpat…” The Torah tells us that if you have a misunderstanding as to what the halacha is, the address to go to is the Sanhedrin sitting in Yerushalayim. The p-l-a root here simply means something not understood, not something unbelievable, miraculous or extraordinary. What makes the death of a talmid chacham a “peleh” is that it robs us of our understanding – we lose that individual’s insight and wisdom.

The same is true of the churban. The purpose of coming to the makom mikdash was not to see a miracle show. It was to gain understanding, particularly greater self-understanding.

The “peleh” of “HIFLAH Hashem es makoscha” is that we don’t understand what’s going on. If there was some order to the punishments, or if we understood what the underlying cause for the particular onesh was, then we would know how to react and hopefully correct cause. But when we are faced with wanton violence  and destruction, when the pesukim seem to have no order to them, when we can't make sense of the precise midah k'neged midah, then we feel helpless and do not know how to respond.  I haven't read Viktor Frankl in years, but still remember one line from his book: "Those who have a why to live can bear with any how."   The reason the tochacha is so unbearable is not the "how" and the "what" of the onesh, but the fact that we are robbed of seeing the "why."

remembering what Miriam had done

The Midrash writes that Moshe told Hashem that either he should heal Miriam or Moshe himself will do the job. Very strange – Moshe could do something without Hashem?

Ksav Sofer explains that Moshe was not sure what Miriam was guilty of – was it an issur bein adam laMakom or bein adam l’chaveiro? The Mishna tells us that Hashem does not give kapparah on a bein adam l’chaveiro unless and until the injured party is mochel. Moshe said to Hashem as follows: if Miriam is guilty of a bein adam laMakom, then Hashem, you give her mechilah and kapprah; if Miriam is guilty of a bein adam l’chaveiro and it’s all up to me, then I will do the job and pardon her.

It seems a little strange to me to categorize Miriam's wrongdoing did as a bein adam l’chaveiro. One of the ikkarim is that “lo kam navi k’Moshe.” Miriam is not considered guilty of violating ikkarei emunah, as it was only through Hashem’s response to this episode that this ikkar was revealed, but still, once Hashem did reveal that Moshe is in a class by himself, isn’t it also clear that Miriam’s wrongdoing should be considered a bein adam laMakom?

Rambam/Ramban disagree as to whether “rapo yirapeh” is a reshus for those who are not on the level of relying completely on Hashem to cure all ailments, or whether it is part of the necessary hishtadlus a person must make in order to live. Perhaps this was Moshe’s safeik – was he required to do something to cure Miriam, or was he supposed to leave it completely in Hashem’s hands? (Granted that since Miriam was suffering from tzara’as, it is hard to see what Moshe could have done.)

Chasam Sofer writes that part of what we are supposed to remember about this episode with Miriam is the fact that Bnei Yisrael waited for her for seven days before travelling. Chazal tell us that this was a reward / hakaras ha’tov for Miriam having waited a few minutes on the banks of the Nile to see what would happen to baby Moshe after the basket he was in was put in the river. Why is Miriam rewarded davka here for what she did so many years earlier?

Chasam Sofer explains that there are two ways to look at Miriam's actions.  You could say that she waited for baby Moshe simply because she was her sister.  The fact that normally a parent is more concerned for a son/daughter than a sibling, and we know that Yocheved and Amram did not stand and watch what happened, underscores the amount concern and love Miriam had for her little brother.  For that, she deserves some reward.  But there is another way to look at it.  Why did Miriam alone spend the extra few minutes watching what would happen to baby Moshe? Because Miriam more than anyone else believed and had prophesized that this was not just her brother and not just any baby, but this was the moshian shel yisrael – a one of a kind.  The reward for that type of emunah, says the Chasam Sofer, is not something that can be given in tangible goods of olam ha’zeh.  A reward that great can only come in olam ha'ba.

Had it not been for this espisode of Miriam speaking against Moshe, then Hashem would have judged her l'kaf zechus and credited her not just with being a concerned sister, but for having emunah that her brother was the one who would redeem all of Klal Yisrael from galus and for helping to bring that dream to fruition.  However, since Miriam failed to judge her brother l'kaf zechus -- since she spoke against Moshe without giving him the benefit of the doubt -- Hashem did not give her the benefit of the doubt.  Waiting for Miriam for seven days in exchange for her waiting on the banks of the Nile and watching after Moshe is not a reward – it’s a punishment!  Instead of her getting a super reward in olam ha’ba, she was now paid out in the paltry currency of olam ha’zeh for the lesser good of the two.

This, says the Chasam Sofer, is the mussar the Torah is telling us about lashon ha'ra.  The way you look at others and judge them is exactly the way Hashem will look at you and judge you.

That sounds a little scary, so let me end on a more positive note.  In one of R’ Ya’akov Shapira’s (R”Y of Merkaz haRav) sichot he deals with the same question but puts a positive spin on the answer. Hakaras ha’tov can only be fulfilled if a person is fully cognizant of the value of the gift he/she receives. For example, if someone were to give a child a toy made of solid gold, even if the child says thank you, to him/her it’s just a thank you for a shiny new toy. Later in life, when the child understands the true value of that “toy,” he/she hopefully will say thank you again with a different sense of appreciation. Miriam had undoubtedly been thanked for having been the one to look after baby Moshe. However, that thank you was like the thank you of the child who does not understand the full value of his/her gift. It is only after Hashem revealed at this moment that Moshe was in a class by himself, far above any other navi, that the true value of Miriam’s act could be appreciated as well. It was not just her brother that she saved and looked after, not just a future navi, not just the moshi’an shel yisrael, but someone the likes of whom would never exist again. In that light, the thank you and hakaras ha’tov of the past was not sufficient.  Bnei Yisrael had to delay on her account and an expression of hakaras ha’tov that showed renewed appreciation for what she had done.     

yarei m'aveiros b'yado

I must be missing something, but I do not understand the din that someone who davens slichos should serve as shat"z for the rest of the tefilos of the day because "ha'maschil b'mitzvah omrim lo gmor."   Why not say every day that whoever daven shacharis should serve as shat"z for the rest of the day because "ha'maschil b'mitzvah omrim lo gmor?"  Obviously we don't say that.  So why is there such a din by slichos?

Rashi quotes the view of R’ Yosi that the “ha’yarei v’rach ha’leivav” who is given a deferment from battle (20:8) is someone who is afraid because of the “aveiros b’yado.” Doesn’t the peshuto shel mikra fit much better with R’ Akiva’s view that we are speaking “k’mashma’o” (as Rashi writes) about someone who is simply afraid of going to war?  Why does R' Yosi think that's not the fear the pasuk is talking about?  

Sefas Emes: Of course the pasuk is speaking about someone who is afraid to go to war -- even R’ Yosi agrees that’s what the words mean. What R’ Yosi (and Rashi, by quoting him) is explaining is the cause of that fear -- where does it come from? Not from cowardice, but “mei’aveiros b’yado,” because the person is weighed down by aveiros.

Why is that such a bad thing? Isn’t yiras shamayim an ideal?

It could be that the key word here is “b’yado” – a person should not be narrowly focused on their own plight to the exclusion of everyone and everything else.

The Sefas Emes has a different approach, based on an explanation he has in a few places (posted here) as to how Sarah, when challenged by G-d, could deny laughing at the malach’s promise that she would have a son.  He explains that teshuvah can literally erase the past – it is like the wrongdoing never happened. When a person is a true yarei shamayim, it inspires that type of teshuvah. When Sarah laughed, she immediately realized her error and regretted it; Sarah immediately did complete teshuvah. “Lo tzachakti” – Sarah was correct in saying that she did not laugh, because her teshuvah erased it -- “ki yarei’ah,” because she was on a level of yiras shamayim that engenders such great teshuvah.

Someone who is “yarei mei’aveiros b’yado” lacks that true yiras shamayim. To the contrary, the obsession with wrongdoing indicates a failure to do full teshuvah and rise above the past.

divrei rivos b’she’arecha - but not in Yerushalayim

Rashi’s comments on “lo tasur… yamin u’smol” that even if the Chachamim tell you right is left and left is right, you still have to listen. Chasam Sofer explains that Rashi is referring to a case where the Beis Din itself could not resolve the issue and was left with a sfeika d’dina. Let’s take bein ha’shemashos as an example (an admittedly very bad example). Is it day or is it night? Since Beis Din cannot resolve the issue, a person has to be machmir both ways. If you want to daven mincha, then Beis Din will tell you that it’s too late – we treat it as night. If you want to read kri’as shema, then Beis Din will tell you it’s too early – we treat it as day. If you say right, they say left; if you say left, they say right. What if the person comes to Beis Din says that he is absolutely certain that it is day (or that it is night)? He claims he has a mesorah or a proof that clinches the case. If not for Rashi, you might have thought that his claim of vaday outweighs the safeik of Beis Din. Kah mashma lan, this is not the case.

The simple reading of the pesukim is that Beis Din will be able to resolve any question brought to their attention. The Torah describes there being “divrei rivos b’she’arecha,” disagreements outside of Beis Din in Yerushalayim, but when “v’kamta v’alisa el hamakom asher yivchar Hashem,” when you come to the Beis Din in Yerushalayim, the issue gets settled. R’ Shaul Yisraeli asked a very simple question: Why should this be the case? Maybe Beis Din will be divided and the same disputes and disagreements that raged outside will cause an internal split among its members as well?

Anyone who has learned Yerushalmi will appreciate why this would never happen. Almost every page of the Bavli is filled with shakla v’terya, back and forth, as each side struggles to not only marshal proof for its own view, but also to prove its opponent wrong. Chazal themselves tell us “B’machshakim hoshivani” – this is the Talmud Bavli. There is turmoil, disagreement, a darkness in the intellectual battles fought on its pages. The Yerushalmi is far more mellow, for lack of a better word. In the Bavli you sometimes have sugyos where the gemara does not even finish quoting a braysa before there is an interruption and some challenge raised. In the Yerushalmi, an Amora can ask a question on an opposing view and the gemara does not even record an answer – it’s like both sides are happy to have expressed their opinions and leave it at that. "Noam" - eilu talmidei chachamim she'b'Eretz Yisrael (Sanhedrin 24). This is the segulah of toras Eretz Yisrael -- "hamakom goreim." There may be “divrei rivos b’she’arecha,” but that will not spill over to Beis Din, to the dialogue and interaction among and between the Chachamim in Beis Din HaGadol, in Yerushalayim. Somehow, issues will get resolved and harmony will reign.

After telling us (17:8) “V’kamta v’alisa el hamakom **asher yivchar Hashem Elokecha bo,**” the Torah echoes the same phrase again at the conclusion of the story, commanding us to follow the psak issued "min ha'makon ha'hu **asher yivchar Hashem.**" (17:10)  Why the repetition and reiteration of this phrase "asher yivchar Hashem?"  Netziv explains that if Beis Din must be followed simply because they are the greatest scholars, the most brilliant lamdanim, an individual might argue that in fact he is a greater scholar or that he is the more brilliant lamdan.  The Torah therefore tells us that's not the reason to follow Beis Din.  The reason why their view trumps all others is because they are privileged to be sitting in the place "asher yivchar Hashem."  There is special siyata d'shemaya that comes from the place where there is hashra'as haShechina.  It's not about who you are, but it's about where you are -- in Yerushalayim, near the Mikdash, in a place above all others. 

(It seems that v'nahapoch hu, that in our times it is davka in Eretz Yisrael that there seems to be the greatest friction between factions within Klal Yisrael, be it dati and chiloni, or datli leumi and chareidi, or between any of the many other flavors in the ice cream shop.   Someone who had lived in Eretz Yisrael once remarked at how beautiful it is here in the US, where by and large there is less friction between the various groups within a single community.  My feeling is that there is less friction perhaps because we are so pareve about everything -- we lack the same fervor and passion as our brothers in Eretz Yisrael.  Be that as it may, while we still have a long way to go, I think we see davka in Eretz Yisrael, at times of need, the greatest achdus.  Remember when those three teens were kidnapped?  Even Yair Lapid davened!  Every Jewish heart was united in prayer.  I don't recall something like that ever taking place in chutz la'aretz.  Underneath all the squabbling and fighting there is a unity that I don't think has a parallel in any other Jewish community or in any other nation.  We just need to work on bringing it out when there is no tragedy or crisis.)

aseh doche lo ta'aseh

1. Our parsha (16:8) tells us that matzah is eaten for six days; another pasuk tells us it is eaten for seven days.  Rashi (in his first answer) explains that matzah made from chadash can be eaten for the last six days of Pesach, but not on the first day before the korban ha'omer is offered. 

Gur Aryeh writes that Rashi is alluding to the chiddush din quoted in Tosfos (Kiddushin 38) that we do not say that the mitzvas aseh of matzah can be doche the lo ta'aseh of chadash.  Tosfos gives two reasons why not: 1) mitzvas matzah was commanded before matan Torah and therefore has a special status; 2) if you allow a person to eat a k'zayis for the sake of the kiyum mitzvas aseh he might eat more than that, which would not be allowed.  (It sounds like this second answer holds that m'dorasya matzah would be doche chadah, but m'derabbanan we do not allow a person to chance it.  It also assumes that if you eat more than the shiur required to fulfill the mitzvah, there is either no kiyum mitzvah at all, or that a kiyum mitzvah without a tzivuy is not enough to be doche a lav.)  The Gur Aryeh offers his own reason.  The only time we say aseh doche lo ta'aseh is when it is impossible to fulfill both -- there is a direct clash between the two.  For example, it is impossible for there ever to be a scenario of yibum that does not also entail a clash with the issur of eishes ach (whether yibum works through aseh doche lo ta'aseh or some other mechanism is a topic for some other time).  Here, even if a person only has one matzah and it happens to be made of chadash, the Maharal does not see that as a clash.  I think what he means is that the mitzvah of chadash does not logically preclude fulfilling the mitzvah of matzah.  You may run into a scenarios where practically you cannot fulfill one without violating the other, but a practical roadblock is not enough. 

I am a little confused by one point: is the fact that we don't say that matzah can be doche chadash derived from the fact that the pasuk says to eat matzah for six days?  The rule the Maharal invokes, i.e. that you only say dechiya when there is an inevitable clash. is not unique to matzah -- it is a general rule that applies in every case of aseh doche lo ta'aseh.  So why do we need a special limud here to tell us that matzah is not doche chadash? 

2. The gemara (Sanhedrin 71) quotes R' Eliezer's view that if even one mezuzah is found in an ir ha'nidachas it is enough to salvage the city and spare it from destruction.  (There is a view in Chazal that there can never be an ir ha'nidachat.  The L. Rebbe is quoted as saying that if he heard a city was going to be declared an ir ha'nidachat, he would go there and put a mezuzah up on someone's door, so the city would never be destroyed.  There is a lesson there that goes beyond the halachos of ir ha'nidachas.)   The Toras Chaim and many other Achronim ask why don't we apply the rule of aseh doche lo ta'aseh?  Why does fulfilling the mitzvah of destroying the city allow for the burning of the mezuzah? 

One approach is that you only say aseh doche lo ta'aseh when the entire aseh is being fulfilled.  Here, burning the single mezuzah is just part of the larger mitzvah, which is to destroy the entire city.  (Whether this chiddush is true and why it is true is something to look into.)

Once upon a time I did a post on the Ohr Sameiach hil chameitz ch 6 who writes that you only say aseh doche lo ta'aseh on an issur gavra, not an issur cheftza.  The question of Tos quoted above regarding matzah being doche chadash must assume, as the Ohr Sameiach discusses, that chadash is not an issur cheftza -- chadash is inherently heter, just cannot be eaten before the korban ha'omer is brought.  The lav of "lo ta'aseun kein l'Hashem Elokeichem" which prohibits burning the mezuzah is an issur cheftza.  Based R' Eliyahu Baruch Finkel suggests that therefore is not pushed aside by the chovas hagavra of destroying the ir ha'nidachas.

the missing words in "atah yatzarta"

On the rare occasion of Shabbos Rosh Chodesh we daven "atah yatzarta..." for tefilas musaf.  The Aruch haShulchan (425:2) makes an interesting point:

ודע שמעולם תמהתי על הנוסח שלנו, שבסוף "אתה יצרת" שאחר ל"מחילת עון" אומרים: "כי בעמך ישראל בחרת... ושבת קדשך..." – למה אין אומרים "קדשנו במצותיך ותן חלקנו... והנחילנו... וינוחו בו ישראל מקדשי שמך, כי בעמך ישראל..."? והרי כל יום טוב שחל בשבת, וראש השנה ויום הכיפורים שחלו בשבת, אומרים בסוף הברכה האמצעית נוסח זה, שזהו תורף קדושת שבת. ולמה לא יאמרו זה בראש חודש שחל בשבת? ובנוסח ספרד ישנו באמת זה הנוסח. ולעניות דעתי בנוסח אשכנז חסר זה מהדפוס, ואני נוהג לאומרה, ואין שום טעם שלא לומר זה. ולא מצאתי מי שהעיר בזה.

consequences, not punishments

1. When my kids do something wrong and have to correct the mess they created, my wife likes to tell them that this is not a punishment, but rather a consequence.  Our parsha teaches the same idea.  The Midrash quotes the pasuk, “Mi’pi elyon lo teitzeh ha’ra’os v’ha’tov,” Hashem does not bring about both good and bad things, and explains that when we do good, we benefit as a consequence, and when we do bad, we suffer as a consequence.  If a person puts his hand in a fire, he gets burned not because Hashem at that moment decreed this punishment upon him, but rather because nature is such that if you stick your hand in a fire, you get burned.  The same is true when a person suffers because he/she has done aveiros.  Hashem has not decreed some arbitrary sentence -- the suffering is just a natural consequence of the path the individual has chosen for him/herself.  (If you run a red light, you only get a ticket if a policeman is watching.  It's not like sticking your hand in a fire  -– there is no natural consequence.  Maybe mitzvos/aveiros work that way?  See this post from a decade ago on this issue. [I can't believe this blog has been up for 10 years!]) 

("Mi’pi elyon lo teitzeh ha’ra’os v’ha’tov” -- see the Harchev Davar on why tov is in the singular but ra'os is in the plural.)

2. A beautiful question from the Meshech Chochma: The Meshech Chochma (13:4) quotes a Sifri (based on the GR"A's pshat) that teaches that the prophecy of a navi sheker is not disqualified retroactively.  In other words, you don't say that if Ploni gave a nevuas sheker today, the nevuah he gave yesterday must also have been a lie.  It could be that Ploni was a tzadik up until today, and things for whatever reason suddenly changed.

The gemara (Chulin 10) has a whole sugya discussing the source for the din of chazakah.  Why, asks the Meshech Chochma, does the gemara not use this as a makor?  Just like in the case of an eid zomeim (a little tie in for those learning Bava Kama) we rely on the chezkas kashrus of the eid and do not retroactively disqualify any of his testimony, so too here, we rely on the chezkas kashrus of the navi and do not disqualify any of his prophecy retroactively, and here we have a limud from the pasuk?    

3. Is it Elul already?!

starting off on the right foot

Rashi comments on “v’limadtem osem es bneichem l’daber bam…” that when a child can speak a father must teach him “Torah tzivah lanu Moshe….” (The Chayei Adam adds a few other things, like bentching – see Emes l’Ya’akov). The difficulty in the pasuk that Rashi is trying to address is the switch in verbs from limud – “v’limadtem” – to dibur – “l’daber bam.” If not for Rashi, you might have argued that “l’daber” qualifies “u’lemadtem,” i.e. the kiyum of talmud torah must be through speaking. The Beis Yosef, unlike the GR”A, holds that there is no birchas haTorah said over thoughts of Torah – you have to articulate your learning to be able to say a bracha on it. While the M.B. writes that this is a din in bracha and not a din in the geder hamitzvah of talmud torah, perhaps one might suggest otherwise based on our pasuk, namely that limud is defined as an act of duibur. Rashi precludes this whole reading. The Torah is not telling us how to fulfill limud, but rather is telling us a new concept, that dibur qua dibur is important. When a child gains the ability to speak, he needs to consecrate that new ability. The way to do so is by immediately using the new skill for Torah.  When you are given a new gift by Hashem, you need to start off on the right foot and use it for good.

Rashi in last week’s parsha also tells is that you get credit only if you complete a mitzvah and do the whole job, “kol hamitzvah.” Based on this din, Maharal in Gur Aryeh writes that you can’t have one person do milah and another do priya since milah absent priya doesn’t count for anything – it’s only a partial mitzvah. Maharal then hedges his bets and says maybe his chiddush is not correct. We find by korbanos that even though there is one mitzvah to bring a korban olah, for example, the work of bringing the korban can be divided among different kohanim, e.g. one person (even a zar) might do shechitah and another do kabbalah and zerikah. If there is no credit for doing part of a mitzvah, wouldn’t it be better for one person to do the whole job, start to finish? Apparently in some cases doing a partial job does count for something. So what’s the geder hadin – when does it count and when doesn’t it?  Something to think about…

Last but not least, Rashi (10:12) quotes the gemara (Kesubos 30) that “ha’kol b’yedei shamayim chutz m’yiras shamayim.” Maharal explains this based on the law of noncontradiction (A and not-A cannot be simultaneously true). By definition, emotions come from within – they cannot be imposed from without. If Hashem were to force someone to have yiras shamayim from without, it would by definition not be true yiras shamayim. (He has another hesber as well.)

the fruits of Eretz Yisrael

The parsha promises a bounty of brachos that will come to Klal Yisrael when they conquer and settle in Eretz Yisrael.  Sefas Emes asks: schar mitzvah b'hai alma leika?  You could answer by distinguishing between the yachid and the tzibur, but the S.E. answers (5648) by distinguishing between Eretz Yisrael and everywhere else.  Just like Shabbos is mei'ein olam ha'ba in time, Eretz Yisrael is mei'ein olam ha'ba in space.  You can't get schar mitzvah in hai alma, but Eretz Yisrael already touches another world.

"V'achalta v'savata u'beirachta..."  We understand that the eating and enjoying is a benefit Hashem is promising to give us.  Shouldn't the pasuk end "u'tevareich," commanding us to say a bracha?  Why is it phrased as if too is part of what Hashem is giving us?

The Sefas Emes answers that u'beirachta is in fact part of the promise.  When one partakes of the food of Eretz Yisrael and enjoys its bounty, one is inevitable inspired to bracha.  It doesn't have to be commanded -- it is a natural outcome.

However, if you read the pesukim that follow, "Hishamer lecha pen tishkach es Hashem..." they are filled with admonitions and warnings to stay in line.  Chasam Sofer explains that enjoying the fruits of Eretz Yisrael is not a positive end in itself like S.E. seems to suggest.  The fruits of Eretz Yisrael have value only if they are used properly to give one strength for avodas Hashem and learning -- they are the means to an end.  There has to be a "hishamer lecha" to make sure the gift is used for the right purpose because doing so is not an inevitable, natural outcome.

This machlokes echoes a machlokes betweeh the Tur and the Bach.  The Tur (208) writes that when one says a bracha mei'ein shalosh, one should omit the words "v'nochal m'pirya v'nisba m'tuva," as there is no inherent value in just enjoying the fruit of Eretz Yisrael.  The gemara rhetorically asks, "Did Moshe Rabeinu want to enter Eretz Yisrael just to eat its fruit?"  The assumption is that to say so would be ludicrous.  The Bach disagrees.  He writes that the fruits of Eretz Yisrael are nourished by the Shechina itself, and by eating, we connect with G-d. 

I would like to suggest another parallel.  The Rosh writes that the nusach of the bracha of bareich aleinu should read "v'sabeinu m'tuvecha..."  We are asking for Hashem to bestow his goodness upon us for rain, good crops, parnasa.  The GR"A, however, writes that the correct nusach is "v'sabeinu m'tuvah," that we should enjoy the fruit of Eretz Yisrael.  (I checked two popular siddurim and found that the Artscroll follows the nusach of the Rosh; the Koran R' Sacks siddur follows the GR"A.  Neither note the other variant nusach.)  Why are we sticking in a request to enjoy the bounty of Eretz Yisrael in the middle of a bracha for our parnasa?  The answer comes from our parsha as well.  "Eretz asher Hashem Elokecha doreish osa" -- Chazal ask: isn't Hashem doresh every land, all over the world?  They answer that of course Hashem does, but it is through Eretz Yisrael that that derisha occurs.  The affairs of the entire world are seen kavyachol by Hashem through the lens of Eretz Yisrael.  Therefore, by asking "v'sabeinu m'tuva," wherever we are, we will partake of bracha as well.

Perhaps the Rosh's point is that if we can ask to connect to Hashem and receive m'tuvecha, why not ask for the end goal and not m'tuvah, which is the means.  And perhaps the GR"A in turn holds like the Bach, like the Sefas Emes, that enjoying the fruits of Eretz Yisrael is an end, is a way to connect with the Shechina directly.

Chasam Sofer takes on Copernicus

An interesting tidbit in the Chasam Sofer on last week's parsha here.  He heard that there is a chacham in the umos ha'olam called Copernicus who came up with the idea that the earth revolves around the sun rather than it being the other way around.  Chasam Sofer presents the logic as follows: it is unreasonable for the great, powerful sun to serve in orbit around puny earth. 

The Chasam Sofer being the Chasam Sofer engages in a little pilpul: if you shoot an arrow straight up and the earth is moving, then shouldn't the arrow land in a different spot than the point from which you shot it?  The tietutz obviously is that not only is the earth moving, but its atmosphere, including the arrow, moves along with it.  Everything moves together, so the arrow comes back to the same spot.

Chasam Sofer goes on to say that the assumption of Copernicus makes sense only if you are one of the umos ha'olam.  L'shitaseinu, the earth's diminutive size relative to the sun doesn't matter -- earth is the tachlis ha'bri'ah, the telos of all creation.  The whole universe exists only for us.  Therefore, it's not so strange that we should be at the center of it all, the point around which all else revolves.

He weaves this into derush in the pasuk and a pshat in a gemara in Baba Basra that you can take a look at.  What I find interesting is that the C.S. lived long after Copernicus, and even long after Galileo.  I wonder why he refers only to Copernicus and not Galileo?  Could he have never heard of the latter, or maybe he saw Copernicus as the father of heliocentrism and therefore credits him?  In either case, did the Chasam Sofer really think the earth was the center of the universe?

va'eschanan -- matnas chinam and the gift of Eretz Yisrael

“Al zeh ha’ya daveh libeinu…” (Eicah 5:17) D”VH = gematriya 15, the corruption of the midah of hod=15. Like an algebraic equation, if something happens on one side of the scale, it has to be balanced on the other side. “Lo hayu yamim tovim k’T”u b’Av” (Ta’anis 26) = 15 Av, gematriya of K-h.

If the seesaw tips to one side, it eventually will tip back the other way, and like a seesaw, the greater the dip in one direction, the greater the movement back the other way. It’s davka after cheit ha’eigel, a tremendous low, that Moshe asks, “Hareini na es kvodecha” and “V’niflinu ani v’amcha.” It’s davka after the low of 9 Av that we have the greatest of yamim tovim, 15 Av.

(For more on 15 Av, see my wife's Times of Israel blog piece.)

On to the parsha...

Of the many possible words to use for prayer (the Midrash tells us that there are 10), the Torah uses the not very common term “va’eschanan” in describing Moshe’s tefilah. Rashi interprets “va’Eschanan” as related to the term “matnas chinam,” a free gift. Rashi tells us that even though tzadikim have a right to stake a claim for rewards based on their zechuyos, they don’t do that – they instead ask for and view what they receive as a gift, not as something they’ve earned.

Maharal in Gur Aryeh asks: but don’t we find by Chanah (Shmuel I 1:10), “Va’tispalel el Hashem?” Don’t we find by Chizkiyahu (Melachim II 20:2), “Vayispallel el Hashem?“ If tzadikim only ask for matnas chinam, a free gift, as Rashi says, then shouldn’t all the tefilos of tzadikim use the expression “va’eschanan?” Why is it only here, in connection with Moshe’s tefilah, here that the Torah uses this term?

Maharal answers that Moshe’s tefilah is the binyan av, the paradigm. One you know that tzadikim are only asking for matnas chinam, as we learn from Moshe, then all the other expressions of tefilah are simply additional icing on the cake. They complement the request for a matnas chinam, but do not supplant it.

The Sefas Emes connects the use of va’eschanan davka here with a gemara (Brachos 5a) quoting RsHb”Y that there are three gifts, matanos, which Hashem has given the Jewish people. One of the three is Eretz Yisrael. There are certain things that are so great and so holy that they cannot be earned -- there is no price in spiritual “currency” that can be placed on them. The only reason we have them is because Hashem chooses to bestow them as gifts.

Chazal compare Moshe Rabeinu to the sun and Yehoshua to the moon. Moshe was the source of light – he was a giver. Yehoshua was the ultimate talmid, soaking up and receiving everything his rebbe could give him. When you are a giver like Moshe, by definition being on the receiving end of gifts is not in your character. It’s a contradiction to your whole essence.

The is the shakla v’terya between Moshe and Hashem. Moshe used the expression “va’eschanan” = matnas chinam davka here because he knew that Eretz Yisrael could only be received as a matanah. Hashem’s response was “rav lach…,” you are too great -- you are beyond receiving gifts and cannot assume that role. Yehoshua, the talmid, the mekabeil, he is the one who can fulfill that mission.

odds and ends

 "Va’ta’anu va’tomru eilay chatanu la’Hashem…” (1:41) Why did Hashem not accept Bnei Yisrael’s teshuvah for the cheit ha’meraglim? HaKsav v’HaKabbalah answers that the key is one word: EILAY. Bnei Yisrael should have expressed their regret directly to Hashem. Instead, they came to Moshe and proclaimed their remorse to him.  It's like saying sorry to the Rabbi if he sees you doing wrong.  It's not the Rabbi you need to apologize to -- it's his "boss" you need to talk to. 

Since I mention the HaKsav v’HaKabbalah, I have to point out his take on the “shiv’im lashon” Torah was written in (see Rashi 1:5 “be’er heitev”). It does not mean, he explains, that the Torah was translated into 70 languages. When you learn gemara and there are two versions of a statement, the gemara calls one the “lishna kamma” and one the “lishna basra.” That means there are two interpretations, two explanations, of what was said – not that the Amora spoke two languages.  Here too, the “shivi’im lashon” means seventy different interpretations.

 

Rashi quotes a Midrash that "Rav lachem sheves ba'har ha'zeh" (1:6) is a bracha -- you gained so much at Har Sinai: you made a Mishkan [I don't know why this comes first], a menorah [I don't know why menorah is singled out], kelim, received the Torah, and appointed the members of Sanhedrin..."  The Kli Yakar, however, sees this as the first tochacha given by Moshe.  "Rav lachem" means you have tarried too long around the mountain.  The mission is to conquer and settle Eretz Yisrael, to live Torah.  Remaining fixed in place at the mountain, even at the mountain where mattan Torah occurred, is a rejection of that Divine plan.

 

No time to write more, but if you are baffled by what the description of Og's bed at the end of the parsha is all about, take a look at the Chizkuni for a mechudash peshat.