Korach ben Yitzhar ben Kehas ben Levi - but not ben Ya'akov

Korach ben Yitzhar ben Kehas ben Levi…
Asks Rashi: why stop at Levi and not trace Korach’s yichus right up to Ya’akov Avinu? The Midrash answers that Ya’akov foresaw the rebellion of Korach and davened that his name not be associated with an evildoer.
The Questions: (1) Even if Ya’akov’s name is not mentioned, we all know that he is the great-great-grandfather of Korach, so what is the gained by the omission? (2) The implication of the Rashi is that had Ya’akov not davened, his name would have been recorded as part of the yichus. If there is a negative connotation to being mentioned in the yichus of a rasha, then even without his tefila, why should Ya’akov be mentioned? (3) And if there is a negative connotation, why does the Torah name Yitzhar, Kehas, and even Levi?
The Radomsker’s approach here is a delight (if you want to see it inside, it’s not on Korach, but on P’ Nitzavim, in the middle of the Rosh haShana derasha). He quotes the SHL”AH haKadosh who explains that the pasuk “v’zacharti es brisi Ya’akov v’af es brisi Yitzchak v’af es brisi Avraham’ is part of the tochacha itself and not a consolation. Davka because we are a ‘ben tovim’, a descendent of such fine forefathers who were role models of avodas Hashem, are we that much more culpable for failing to live up to their example. Here too, the Torah records Korach’s yichus not simply to identify him by lineage, but to reinforce his culpability. This was not some ordinary guy starting a rebellion, but this is “ben Yitzhar ben Kehas ben Levi”, a person who had such illustrious role models, yet who failed to absorb their teachings. Rashi’s question – if the Torah comes to condemn Korach as a rasha for failing despite such great yichus, why not put the final nail in the coffin and trace his lineage even back to Ya’akov Avinu!? To which the Midrash answers, although Ya’akov foresaw the evil of Korach, he davened that his name should not be used as a tool to prosecute even such a rasha.
(I have a neighbor who bought a Tiferes Shlomo because he knows I love it and my chavrusa has learned it as well; he read one mystical piece and threw in the towel. The key is to start with the pieces like this one!)

bikur cholim (II)

Yesterday I left off with the question of the shita mekubetzet: why is it that by hashavas aveida there is a ptur of ‘zakein v’aino l’fi kevodo’, i.e. the mitzvah is pre-empted by the kavod habriyos concern of an elderly person not debasing him/herself, yet by bikur cholim we find that the mitzvah obligates even a gadol visiting someone beneath him? If one adopts the gemara in sota 14 as the source for bikur cholim, placing it in the context of ‘v’halachta b’derachav’, the obligation to imitate Hashem’s actions, the question is resolved. No one can be greater than Hashem, yet we see that Hashem put aside his kavod and came to visit Avraham after his bris. The assumption of this answer is that v’halachta b’derachav’ is not only the source of the obligation of bikur cholim, but teaches its parameters as well. However, if the source of bikur cholim is as extension of ‘v’ahavta l’reiacha kamocha’ (as the Rambam Aveil 14:2 writes), then how does one answer the question? Perhaps one can distinguish between the relative value of an object viz. a viz. a person’s honor and the relative value of one human being vs. another person’s honor. I was thinking one could sharpen this idea using a little lomdus: the Torah does not obligate performing hashavas aveida on every stray object encountered. For example, if the object has been purposely placed in a location (hinuach), that is not considered an aveida that needs returning. Perhaps the ‘ptur of zakein v’aino l’fi kevodo’is not a ptur on the gavra, but a statement that an object which causes a sacrifice of kavod to return is not a cheftza which is mechayeiv hashavas aveida. But by bikur cholim, there are no dinim as to the definition of a choleh, so the ptur cannot apply.
One other note on the source for bikur cholim: the gemara in Nedarim 39 used the phrase ‘remez l’bikur cholim’, presenting the pasuk as a ‘hint’ to the idea. The Rambam in Sefer haMitzvos shoresh 3 writes with respect to stealing a kli shareis (‘koneiv es hakisva’) that the term remez indicates something is not implicit in the pasuk itself and is an asmachta b’alma. The Ramban (p. 70 in standard edition) compiles a long list of places where the term ‘remez’ is used to refer to a din d’oraysa. (Those who have learned Makkos may recall the line on the first daf ‘remez l’eidim zomimin min hatorah…’). As noted yesterday, the Rambam holds that the specific mitzvah of bikur cholim is a derabbanan institution as a means to achieve a kiyum d’oraysa of v’ahavta l’reiacha kamocha (see Shiurim l’Zecher Aba Mari vol I p. 57).
I recall hearing from R’ Y. Sacks (I think in the name of the Rav) that the parameters of chessed are not taught from a text, but are learned and inculcated by observing role models of proper behavior. We derive the idea of bikur cholim not from derashos or pesukim, but from the act of Hashem himself in visiting Avraham Avinu. It is our behavior more than our words which will impress the lesson of chessed upon our children and others.

the situation in Israel

I have nothing to add to what you have undoubtedly read elsewhere about the situation in Israel, but do not want anyone to misconstrue silence as disinterest. I do not understand why here in chutz la’aretz there seems to be no sense of urgency about the situation and no vocal show of solidarity with the State. I usually daven shacharis in what could be described as a shule supportive of the State, which makes it a point of reciting hallel on yom ha'atzmaut, yet with soldiers poised to enter Gaza, with lives hanging in the balance, no one thought to say some extra tehillim after davening, no one called for extra limud haTorah, life goes on business as usual. Are you yotzei with hallel once a year and an orange ribbon!? Am Yisrael desperately needs leadership with courage, vision, and moral backbone to direct us in these difficult times, but no one seems to be able to step up to provide the needed inspiration. If you can, take a moment to reflect on the situation and maybe direct a tefilah or zechus of limud hatorah l’shem those living in and defending Eretz Yisrael. Every drop of chizuk counts.

education and learning - the Telzer derech

Just want to direct your attention to a true story posted by my wife on the attitude in the Telzer yeshiva (the Lithuanian one of old, not the Riverdale or Cleveland present day incarnations) toward secular education. This is not a second hand gadol story – the protagonist is my wife’s grandfather who learned in Telz and went on to be a Rav in Switzerland and Canada. My wife has done a string of postings on college education worth reading - she can share the perspective of having taught college and grad level courses as well as having been a student – I can’t. Should bnei Torah aspire to become ‘educated’ (however you define that), or just get a degree for better ‘parnasa’? Should we sanction cutting every corner possible to get that degree, or do we have a responsibility to ensure young men/women are educated human beings as well as talmidei chachamim or bnos torah? Check her blog for more thoughts. Maybe I’ll write about it another time.

parshas korach and the source for bikkur cholim

The gemara Nedarim 39 cites a “remez” from the pasuk in our parsha ‘Im k'mos kol adam y’musun eileh u’pekudas kola dam yipakeid aleihem…’ (16:29) that there is an obligation to be ‘pokeid’ and visit the sick. Interestingly, there are two other gemaras that point to completely different sources for the mitzvah of bikur cholim:
1) Sota 14 cites ‘achrei Hashem Elokeichem teileichu’, the obligation to imitate the middot of Hashem, as including bikur cholim – just as Hashem visited Avraham during his post-milah illness, so too we should visit the sick;
2) Bava Metziya 30b cites a derasha on ‘v’hodata lahem es haderech asher yeilchu bah’ to include various mitzvos such as gemilus chessed, bikur cholim, etc.
The multiplicity of sources for bikur cholim may be why the Rambam categorizes it under multiple mitzvos. In Sefer HaMitzvos Aseh 8 the Rambam quotes the gemara in Sota in the context of explaining the parameters of the mitzvah of ‘v’halachta b’derachav’, imitating Hashem’s middot. Yet earlier in Sefer haMitzvos, Shoresh 2, the Rambam illustrates the principle that derashos should not be counted as separate mitzvos by citing Bava Metziya as an example of multiple items all included under one mitzvah of ‘v’ahavta l’reacha kamocha’ (see also Ramban, Shoresh Rishon, p 22 in the standard text). Unlike the BH”G who counted bikur cholim as an independent mitzvah, the Rambam (Aveil 14:2) calls bikur cholim a ‘mitzvah m’divreihem’, implying it is only a chiyuv derabbanan, but adds that it and other chassadim are included in ‘v’ahavta l’reicha kamoch’ - apparently the Rambam’s held bikur cholim is a takanah derabbanan through which one achieves a kiyum d’oraysa of v’ahavta l’reicha kamocha.
The obvious question is whether there is any nafka mina between categorizing bikur cholim as a mitvah of v’halachta b’derachav or a mitzvah of v’ahavta l’reicha kamocha or an independent mitzvah. I don’t have answers myself yet on this one, but will point out a kasha of the shita mekubetzet (nedarim 39) which may hinge on this issue. The shita asks why is it that by bikur cholim the obligation is even for a gadol to visit a katan, despite it being beneath the gadol’s dignity, yet by the mitzvah of hashavas aveida we learn (B.M. 30) that a zakein is patur from a mitzvas aseh which is ‘aino l’fi kevodo’, which involves a diminution of his honor to perform? I'll give you time to mull it over yourself… to be continued.

Off topic post: what do you like to read?

Totally non-Torah post, with apologies for the digression (I'm allowed one of these every one in awhile when I get tired, so bear with me): my wife discovered a new book club forming in the jblogsphere, and without her prodding the group chose to read one of her favorite novels, Villette, by Charlotte Bronte (my wife’s dissertation focusses on the work of Bronte). I’ve read this one myself and it is not light – far more complex than Jane Eyre, which is a high school standard. Now, my wife’s club consists of all females reading a female author, which got me curious as to what books people out there who read my blog (which I do not think attracts any female readers, at least none who have ever offered a comment) like to read. Yes, I’m a bit jealous that she is part of a book club and I'm not, but I’m not starting one here - just curious as to what people’s tastes are. When I mentioned Paul Revere’s Ride by David Hackett Fischer a few weeks ago and compared Fischer to David McCullough someone took umbrage, so I know there must be at least one history buff out there, but what else? Fiction or non-fiction? Escapism or serious reading? Do you read a single book start to finish, or work through multiple titles at the same time (my wife insists on the former, while I do the latter much to her consternation). I admit to being an avid reader with very eclectic tastes, but I guess I should be fair and answer my own question with a title or two. I’ll stick to fiction for now and highlight two authors who are favorites, and that should give you an inkling as to my taste: first is Umberto Eco, particularly for The Name of the Rose and Foucault’s Pendulum, and second, Robertson Davies, for The Deptford Trilogy and for The Cornish Trilogy, the best of which is the middle volume, What’s Bred in the Bone. I am willing to bet many of you have read or at least heard of Eco, yet far fewer have read or even heard of Davies. If anyone claims they have actually read anything by James Joyce or have completed Thomas Pynchon’s Gravitys' Rainbow and are telling the truth, I tip my hat to you. And if you have no idea who any of these people are and your favorite book is Talmud Bavli by Ravina and Rav Ashi, I also tip my hat to you for other reasons : )
More lomdus tomorrow bl"n!

shiur of challah vs reishis hageiz - R' Chaim Brisker (II)

We asked yesterday, why is it that shutafim who jointly own a total shiur of 43 1/5 beitzim of dough (same as an individual) are chayavim in hafrashas challah, but shutafim who jointly own 5 sheep are not chayav in reishis hageiz? Why according to the Rambam does the chiyuv of resihis hageiz require 5 sheep per owner and not 5 sheep b’shutfus in total?
Bill Selliger nailed this one in the comments, so this is just a recap. R' Chaim uses a classic Brisker gavra/cheftza split on this one. The shiur of 43 1/5 beitzim measures a cheftza shel issur; as long as the proper volume of dough is present, even if owned in partnership, the issur of tevel applies until hafrashas challah occurs. However, with respect to reishis hageiz, the mitzvah obligates giving a portion of wool to the kohein but does not create any issur on the shearing. The shiur of 5 sheep is not a measure of a cheftza shel issur, but a measure of who is a bar chaiyuva in giving wool. Since owning 5 sheep b’shutfus is not the same as exclusive possession of 5 sheep, the Rambam paskens that unless each partner individually possess 5 sheep he is not a bar chiyuva.

shutfus by challah vs. reishis hageiz - r' chaim brisker

The Rambam paskens (Bikkurim 10:14) that if partners own a flock of 5 sheep b’shutfus, they are patur from reishis hageiz, but if the flock contains 10 sheep, the two partners are chayavim. The Minchas Chinuch writes that the Rambam paskens like R’ Ilayei, that shutafim are pturim from reishis hageiz - 5 sheep owned by two partners means each one individually lacks the necessary shiur to fulfill the mitzvah. Where there are enough sheep so each partner independently can be said to own a sufficient shiur to be chayav (e.g. 10 sheep), the Rambam ignores the ptur of shutfus and writes that each partner is indeed chayav. R’ Chaim Brisker disagrees, and points out that the gemara applies the machlokes R”I and the Chachamim to terumah, where there is no minimum shiur required. No matter what quantity of tevel is owned it is chayav in terumah, yet R' Ilayei still holds shutafim would be exempt! One is forced to say that the exemption of shutfus is based on it being a qualitatively different type of ownership and excluded from the mitzvah, not simply based on each partner's share being less than the necessary shiur to be chayav. Even if there are 10 sheep in a flock, R’ Ilayei would hold shutafim are pturim, while the Chachaim, like whom the Rambam paskens, hold the shutafim are chayav. However, according to this approach, we are left with a question on the Rambam. By challah (to come back to another topic of late!) the Rambam paskens (Bikkurim 6:4) shutafim are chayavim if the total amount of dough owned is 43 1/5 beitzim, the same shiur that applies to an individual owner. By reishis hageiz, however, the Rambam paskens a flock of 5 sheep is not chayav – the chiyuv applies only if there are 5 sheep per owner. If 43 1/5 beitzim in total owned by shutafim is chayav in challah, why should 5 sheep in total not be chayav in reishis hageiz?
This is a warm up to get the gavra/cheftza juices flowing… if you’ve heard a few R’ Chaim’s, you should be able to get this one.

chakira in how shutfus works as a ptur from certain mitzvos

I want to get back on track with some more lomdus. The ambiguity over whether kesivas sefer torah can be fulfilled b’shutfus (see previous posts) is created in part because the topic is not addressed by the sugya in Chullin 135. The gemara cites a dispute between R’ Ilayei and the Chachamim whether shutafim (partners) are obligated in the mitzvah of reishis hageiz, donating the first shearings of sheep to a kohein, and debates whether the dispute is local to reishis hageiz or applies to other mitzvos as well, i.e. are shutafim obligated in terumah, challah, mezuzah, tzitzis, etc., to give a few examples mentioned in the sugya. Where two partners own a flock of five sheep (the minimum shiur for reishis hageiz), one can understand the debate between R’ Ilayei and the Chachamim in two different ways: 1) the focus of debate is whether each partner is viewed as the owner of all five sheep owned, meeting the shiur to be chayav, or is each partner considered the owner of only two and a half sheep, less than the shiur; 2) each partner is considered to own the minimum quantity of five sheep necessary to be chayav, but the debate is whether ‘coroporate’/shutfus ownership is considered qualitatively different than personal ownership and does not create an obligation in the mitzvah. The first approach sees the issue of shutfus purely in quantitative terms, the debate focussing on how much is owned by each party; the second approach focuses on the qualitative difference between shutfus and other forms of ownership irrespective of the amount owned between the partners. To be continued...

kesivas sefer torah - purchasing seforim to fulfill the mitzvah

The achronim (see Sha'agas Arye) question the Rosh's assertion that in our times one can fulfill the mitzvah of kesivas sefer torah through the purchase of seforim. Although the reason behind the mitzvah may be to insure that there are texts available to learn from, the majority of views in chazal hold that the reason for a mitzvah does not determine the parameters of the din, but just adds to our hashkafa. Furthermore, if the purpose of writing a sefer is simply a means to limud haTorah, why is one not yotzei with a sefer that was inherited or written for someone else? The Aruch haShulchan proposes a novel reading of the gemara in Sanhedrin 21 we quoted last week in the discussion of shutfus to address this question. Rava darshens 'kisvu lachem' to teach that one must write one's own sefer and is not yotzei with an inherited sefer. Implicit in Rava's statement are two presumptions: 1) there is a mitzvah incumbent on each individual to write a sefer; 2) the sefer must be written exclusively for each person who wishes to be yotzei. Abaye challenged Rava from a braysa which darshens that only a king must use a sefer written exclusively for himself, to which the gemara answers that Abaye's din refers to the second sefer of the melech. The simple reading of the gemara is that Abaye was challenging only the second presumption of Rava as not applying to a hedyot. However, the A.H. suggests that Abaye was challenging both presumptions - Abaye held a hedyot was not obligated at all to write a sefer! The gemara's answer only defends Rava's first assertion about the mitzvah being incumbent on all, but abandons Rava's second assertion that one is not yotzei with an inherited sefer. Therfore, the Rosh held that one indeed would be yotzei with a sefer written for someone else and inherited, in consonance with the idea that the purpose of the mitzva is simply to have seforim to learn from.

Kesivas sefer torah b'shutfus (II) and challah

The mitzva of writing a sefer torah is derived from the pasuk 'kisvu lachem es hashira hazos'. We raised the issue whether the plural 'lachem' in the pasuk can include a sefer jointly owned and written by a partnership, a shutfus. Rava (Sanhedrin 21b) darshens 'kisvu lachem' to teach that a sefer torah must be written for oneself - one is not yotzei by yarshening or buying a sefer written for someone else. Abaye challenged Rava from a braysa which darshens 'v'kasav lo' in the parsha of melech to teach that a king must use a sefer written exclusively for himself - the implication is that everyone else can be yotzei with a sefer written for others. The gemara resolved the issue by saying both halachos are true - Rava's derasha applies to a regular sefer, but we need the braysa's derashsa for to teach us the halacha for the second sefer a melech is obligatedd to write. If writing a sefer b'shutfus is acceptable, why could the gemara not answer that the extra limud by a king comes to exclude shutfus?
Appropos of parshas hashavua, the Ohr Sameiach uses an analogy to challah to address this proof. Dough jointly owned by a yisrael and aku"m is patur from hafrashas challah - the aku"m is not just personally exempt from the mitzvah, but his ownership causes even the portion of dough owned by the yisrael to be exempt. If a king were a shutaf with a yisrael is writing a sefer, the yisrael could not make use of the sefer to learn from because a king's property cannot be used by a hedyot. Since the yisrael fails to fulfill his obligation of writing a sefer with this shutfus (because the entire toeles of the mitzvah is to have a sefer one can use for learning), even without the pasuk of 'v'kasav lo' it is understood that the king is not yotzei b'shutfus, just like a yisrael cannot be obligated in challah if half his dough is owned by someone who has no kiyum mitzva of challah.
Is this analogy to challah convincing? A yisrael is a bar chiyuva in the miztva of kesivas sefer torah, but is precluded from using the sefer for a side reason having to do with hilchos melachim; an aku"m is not a bar chiyuva in challah. I need to mull this one over...

The Maggid Meisharim's teaching on Shlach - love of Eretz Yisrael can overcome the darkest gezeirah

The Magid Meisharim, a collection of torah taught to the Bais Yosef by a malach (yes, I wrote that just to annoy pure rationalists), highlights three difficulties in the episode of the meraglim: 1) “Shlach” presents the idea of meraglim as an initiative of Moshe taken al pi Hashem, while the story as presented in Sefer Devarim sounds like Bnei Yisrael took the initiative in approaching Moshe and demanding the mergalim be sent (see Josh Waxman's post); 2) How could Moshe have sent spies to determine whether Eretz Yisrael is ‘ha-shemeina hi im raza’, is it fertile or not, when Moshe knew that Eretz Yisrael is ‘zvas chalav u’devash’ and under constant supervision by Hashem? 3) Moshe sent the spies to determine “if” the land was beautiful and easily conquered, implying there was a choice whether or not to go there. Moshe knew that Bnei Yisrael were destined to enter Eretz Yisrael – how could he have presented this as a matter of choice? The Maggid explained to the Bais Yosef that because of the complaints of Bnei Yisrael there already was a decree over that generation not to merit entering the land. Despite the fact that they were not worthy, Hashem provided one last opportunity for the people to merit Eretz Yisrael – if they could prove their love for the land and desire to go there, the decree would be annulled. The episode of the spies was the final chance. Moshe was instructed “shlach”, give in to the people’s desire to send spies, encourage the spies to report on the land and its beauty, let the people start planning the conquest of the land, let them choose of their own volition to enter Eretz Yisrael, and in the merit of that great yearning, despite their many chataim, the gezeirah would be overturned and they would indeed merit entering the land. Tragically, even this final opportunity resulted in failure. The sefer Eim HaBanim Smeicha quotes this teaching of the Magid Meisharim and adds the obvious mussar haskel. Our love and yearning for Eretz Yisrael has the power to overcome any chataim and gezeiros that may hang over our nation; if we truly desire Eretz Yisrael, Hashem will provide the opportunity for it to be ours.

Moshe's bracha to Yehoshua and an opporunity lost

The gem in Archin (32) writes that the name of Yehoshua is written chaseir in Nechemya 8 because he failed to eradicate the yetzer hara for avodah zarah and his mission was incomplete. Moshe was unable to do so because he lacked the zechus of Eretz Yisrael, yet Yehoshua should have taken care of it - instead the problem lingered until generations later. The Radomsker (Tiferes Shlomo) asks why the gemara is so critical of Yehoshua and not any of the other shoftim, nevi'im, and tzadikim who might have also been mevateil the yetzer hara in their day. Aren't these other historical figures equally guilty for their complacency? The Radomsker explains that the yetzer hara serves a function in creating the opportunity for bechira. Had we not had an inclination to do evil, we would lack free choice. Even the nevi'im and tzadikim were not enpowered to void the principle of bechira by eradicating the yetzer hara. However, in order to insure kibush ha'aretz Moshe was mispallel "K-h moshiacha m'atzas meraglim", that Yehoshua not be tempted by the advice of the mergalim. Yehoshua's free will was already negated in part by Moshe's tefilos! Therefore, specifically Yehoshua, who transcended pure bechira, had that power to be mevateil the yetzer, but he did not seize the opportunity.
I want to add one point to the Radomsker's chiddush. It seems safe to assume (at least as far as what Moshe's impression might have been) that Moshe's prize student would not fall prey to the temptation of an actual sin in deed. However, there was still the danger that in the back of Yehoshua's mind there would be some measure of doubt, even if never voiced, that one day might resurface to cloud his judgement. Moshe therefore gave his talmid a bracha that "K-h", the letters Yud and Key that refer to the higher sefiros of thought, chochma and bina, "moshiacha m'atzas meraglim", should give you the strength to overcome even the poisonous thoughts of the spies. Chazal teach that only for the cheit of avodah zarah Hashem is metzaref machshava l'ma'aseh, that one is judged even for the thought of wrong even if not acted upon. Perhaps it was this added bracha of protection on the deepest level of his thoughts which gave Yehoshua and no one else the potential to uproot the yetzer of avodah zarah from even from the thoughts and consciousness of Klal Yisrael.

Meraglim and minyan - how many?

The Torah uses a double expression of 'ish echad ish echad' to describe the meraglim sent by each sheivet. Common knowledge is that one spy was sent from each sheivet; however, Tosfos (Sota 34a) cites the opinion of R' Akiva quoted in the Yerushalmi who derives from the double language that in actuality 2 spies (ish-ish) went from each sheivet for a total of 24 (R' Yishmael disagrees). The difficulty with this approach is that we learn that 10 people form a minyan from the fact that the 10 bad meraglim are called an eidah - according to R' Akiva, there were many more than 10 bad spies! (R' Akiva Eiger).

kesivas sefer torah - is one yotzei b'shutfus?

I heard in a shiur that the campaigns to collect donations for writing a letter/pasuk in a sefer torah are not a kiyum of kesivas sefer torah because the person donating does not personally own the sefer being written, which is a basic criteria of the mitzvah. The Rambam writes that the mitzvah is to write a 'sefer torah l'atzmo', which the person giving the shiur compared to all other mitzvos sheb'gufo like hanachas tefillin. The last point strikes me a wrong because one can appoint a shliach for the kesiva. However, the first point is a significant objection. At the time I argued that one indeed does own the sefer being written - all those who contribute form a shutfus of joint ownership. Does one need exclusive personal ownership to fulfill the mitzvah? This issue is debated by the Minchas Chinuch and the Ohr Sameiach at length. One objection raised focuses on the toeles of the mitzvah, which is to create a sefer that can be learned from. The Rosh takes this so far as to write that in our times the mitzvah of kesivas sefer torah is fulfilled through the purchase of seforim. The moment one party of the shutfus takes the sefer to learn, does that not render it inaccessible to all the other parties to learn from and negate the mitzvah? My thinking was that the potential for any party to have access is sufficient, but the point can be debated. A textual proof: in Sanhedrin 21a Rava says one is not yotzei kesivas s"t by inheriting a sefer - the mitzvah is kisvu lachem, writing it for yourself. Abaye quotes a braysa that derives from 'v'kasav lo' that specifically a king 'lo yisna'eh b'shel acheirim', cannot be yotzei with a sefer written for someone else - the implication being that an ordinary person would be yotzei with such a sefer written for someone else. The gemara answers that the braysa's halacha is referring to the unique second sefer torah that must be carried by a king; Rava's din refers to the sefer everyone is obligated to write. Achronim ask: if one is yotzei kesivas s"t b'shutfus, why did the gemara not answer Abaye's question by saying the braysa's din of 'v'kasav lo' excludes a king from sharing with 'acheirim' in the form of shutfus because no one else can use royal property; however, an ordinary person is yotzei b'shutfus and is only excluded based on Rava's din from being yotzei b'yerusha? I'll give you some time to think it over...

Halachos of carpool: schirus or not?

My wife got involved in a rather heated discussion in the comments section of another blog regarding the following scenario: a carpool driver was on the way to bring a bunch of first graders to school. En route, the driver passed a neighbor who had a broken leg and was painfully struggling to make a train and get to work. Should the driver pick up the neighbor and go a few minutes out of the way to bring them to the train at the cost of the kids being a few minutes late to school, or is getting the kids to school exactly on time (something one of the other carpool members obsessed over) the priority? My wife's view is that from the perspective of chinuch, the lesson of stopping to pick up the person outweighs getting the kids to school exactly on time. Her analogy was to a kohein gadol stopping to attend to a mes mitvah en route to bring the korban pesach . In other words, she was weighing one mitzvah against another and considering whether to employ the rule of osek b'mitzvah (of bringing the kids to school) patur min hamitzvah when efshar l'kayeim shneihem (machlokes rishonim). While practically I think the correct answer here is to pick up the neighbor, I formulated the issue very differently. It seems to me that car pool is a form of schirus, like 'nachesh imi v'anachesh imach' - you drive one day in exchange for the 'payment' of your friend driving tomorrow. There is an implied contract with tna'ei schirus involved. Osek b'mitzvah is a ptur from mitzvos, but not from financial obligations, i.e. you cannot tell your boss you are exempt from work because you have a mitzvah to do. In the case of carpool you are effectively contractually employed to drive the kids on your day in exchange for others driving the other days. The issue is a purely contractual debate: when people enter into the implied contract called carpool, does the agreement allow for a driver to deliberately delay getting the kids to school by a few minutes for the greater good of a gemilus chessed like picking up someone with a broken leg? I would hope so, otherwise that is not a good carpool to be in! Any other ideas on the parameters of how such an agreement works al pi din? Should a kinyan be required to set it up to begin with?

Construction of the menorah and the mitzvah of binyan hamikdash

The Midrash (cited by Rashi) says that Moshe had difficulty understanding the construction of the menorah; Hashem was forced to show him an image of a fiery menorah as a visual model. According to some views this was not enough to clarify matters, as we find a dispute as to exactly who made the menorah - Betzalel, Moshe himself, or it was ‘na’aseis m’eilav’, it made itself miraculously because Moshe could not figure out how to do it. On Shabbos the question was raised why the menorah was singled out to be made by Moshe himself and not by Betzalel, who was entrusted to make all the other kelim. I think the simple answer is that even if Moshe understood based on the image of the menorah how to make it, he could not communicate that idea to Betzalel the way he could verbally describe the other kelim. As to why this was true only by the menorah, I am sure you can relate some unique aspect or symbolic idea of the menorah to a unique quality of Moshe, but that is more along the lines of derush. I want to focus on one other point made by the MaHaRaL. Assuming Moshe could not figure out how to make the menorah even after seeing an image of it, what was the point of this communication? Ultimately the menorah was na’aseis m’eilav, so why did Hashem not cut to the chase and just do it for Moshe without providing an incomprehensible tzivuy? The Maharal answers that you have to say according to all opinions Moshe was involved in some way in the menorah’s construction – the issue is simply the extent of that involvement. Moshe had to toss the gold in and strike it with a hammer to form it, but it was na'asis m'eilav in the sense that the completed product was beautiful beyond the capability of its maker, indicating some miraculous force was at work. Maharal writes that one is forced to say Moshe did something, otherwise how was the mitzvah of making klei hamikdash fulfilled? I am not sure what the Maharal means by this argument. The Maharal seems to assume that there is an independent mitzvah of making kelim, yet neither the Rambam or the Ramban count such a mitzvah. Either the kelim are included as part of the mitzvah of binyan hamikdash, or are hechsherim to do avodah (see Ramban’s gloss to mitzvas aseh #34 is sefer hamitzvos), but are not independent commandments. If kelim are simply parts of the mikdash, as long as one does part of the mitzvah of building the mikdash, even if one did not do every task, the mitzvah of building the mikdash has been fulfilled. Certainly according to Rashi and Tos (R”H 17) who hold that the third bais hamikdash will descend from shamayim, one must say that the small human intervention done to complete the building is sufficient to fulfill the mitzvah of binyan habayis even if the majority of the building is completed miraculously (see Maharil Diskin).
According to the Maharal we understand that Moshe ultimately was involved in making the menorah and therefore needed to see the image to know what to do. However, what the Maharal does not explain is why Hashem first attempted to verbalize the instructions if they could not be comprehended even by Moshe. Hadra kushya l'duchta, why not just show Moshe the image to begin with? See Bnei Yisaschar in his chanukah discussion...

The Septateuch

According to one opinion in Chazal the parsha of 'Vayehi Binso'a' is set off with special simanim because it is an independent sefer (Shabbos 116). The minimum shiur of letters which define a sefer as having kedushas sefer torah is 85, corresponding to the 85 letters in the sefer of vayehi binso'a (85=gematriya 'peh' - see Noam Elimelech). If so, asks the Rashash, the idea of chamisha chumshei Torah is a misnoner. We should be referring to the Septateuch instead of the Pentateuch!

Ohr Sameiach on Moshe's humility

How could Moshe Rabeinu with all his gadlus have been 'anav m'kol adam asher al pnei ha'adamah'? I have never really seen humility as being in conflict with greatness (see Netziv), but many meforshim ask this kashe. The Ohr Sameiach at the end of his Kuntres haKol Tzafuy v'haReshus Nesuna (hil tshuvah) quotes a pshat from his grandfather to answer this question. Davka because Moshe Rabeinu was so great and witnessed speaking to Hashem face to face did he feel a sense of humility. Moshe ascribed his achievements in Torah and tzidkus not to his own efforts, but to the fact that he was in a position to see the gadlus Hashem in a way that no other mortal experienced. Someone who is not blessed with that gift, a regular joe 'al pnei ha'adamah', not in shamayim speaking to Hashem, is all the more worthy for the achievements attained in spite of the obstacles of living in olam hazeh.
(See the machlokes in the Sifri what 'kol adam al pnei ha'adamah' comes to be m'ma'et, discussed by the O.S. and the Chasam Sofer al hatorah as well. This O.S. is consistant with the Meshech Chochma intro to sefer shmos that Moshe had no bechira to do wrong - l'fum tzara agra, so Moshe held someone who is engaged in struggling on avodas Hashem is greater than himself.)

When hashkafa subverts halacha: creationsim and the international date line

Because Gil linked to it, I ended up seeing this article on creationism on a site I usually self censor myself from reading. But having seen it, I can’t resist a comment. Here is a summary of Yated’s argument: science relies on inductive reasoning to determine the past from the laws of nature operating today. Since by (their) definition the laws of nature were radically different during the six days of creation, scientific inductive reasoning cannot tell us anything about the mystery or act of creation. M’meila, the entire science of cosmology is out the window. It seems to me that this argument amounts to cutting off one's nose to spite one's face. If the laws of nature did not exist during the period of ma’aseh braishis, or as Yated puts it,”that this six day period obeyed laws of quite a different nature than the physical ones that the world obeys now”, then how can halacha assume a normal 24 hour solar day existed, or the cycle of tekufos remains unchanged from the moment of the sun's creation, or that the sun’s orbit has been constant, or that any of the laws of solar and lunar astronomy existed pre-shabbos Braishis? Some examples: 1) the calculation of tekufos is based on assuming the same regular cycle of solar astronomy from the moment of the sun’s creation through our time (Rambam, Kiddush haChodesh 12:9); 2) the debate regarding the international date line hinges on determining where the sun was at its initial moment of creation and then assuming regular 24 hour days (see Chazon Ish’s ‘Kuntres 18 Sha’os’, O.C. siman 64 for a lengthy discussion, including his addressing a problem of one of the days of ma’aseh braishis missing time!); 3) birchas hachama is said every 28 years when the sun appears on the same day and place as at the moment of its creation (or something like that – because of messy calendar math this is not exact). Yated complains that if one assumes natural law was constant, “In our terminology, we would say that this guy "has to say a shiur" on the formation of the universe within the parameters of natural law. No mysterious periods allowed”. But Yated’s own calculation of 5766 as historical reality (and not a legal fiction employed for the sake of calculating the luach, which is how a non-literalist might view things) is arrived at by assuming a regular cycle of 24 hour days, seasonal tekufos, and regular laws of physics governing at least the solar system from the very moment of creation - no “mysterious periods” allowed. I guess one has to "say a shiur" to fit the natural law halacha ascribes to the earliest moment of creation with the hashkafic assertion that no such natural law existed. I don't look forward to it.