Rashi (12:6) explains that G-d ordered the Jewish people to take the korban Pesach four days before its shechita so they would have a mitzvah to engage in and garner merit to earn geulah. (The Netziv notes that in this case the preparation for the mitzvah, the hechsher mitzvah, is itself counted as a mitzvah). “The time to fulfill the promise I made to Avraham has arrived,” declared G-d, and therefore the Jewish people must do something to earn the promised redemption.
Rav Shteinman asks: since redemption was promised by G-d, whether the Jewish people earned it or not, redemption was inevitable. Why was this act of mitzvah performance to accrue merit necessary?
He answers that there are levels of geulah. Perhaps without the merit of mitzvos fewer people would have deserved redemption, or perhaps the geulah would not have included the experience of Yam Suf. Now that the Jewish people proved their obedience, they deserved a greater geulah.
I think it’s worth noting that R’ Shteinman’s question is almost the flipside of R’ Yerucham’s question (which we discussed last year) of why a promise of geulah was necessary -- Hashem could simply deliver geulah whenever we deserve it (or some other cheshbon) without advanced promises or notice. Perhaps the different questions indicate different perspectives: do we place our emphasis on G-d’s promise as the driving force for geulah and our merit is just added icing on the cake, or is geulah a result of our merit, and G-d’s promise is the added icing that requires explanation?
Perhaps one can answer R’ Shteinman’s question simply by saying that redemption was bound to occur, but a geulah which is “nahama d’kisufa” is far less meaningful than a geulah which one feels one has earned.
These overlapping reasons for redemption, the promise to Avraham and the merit of mitzvos, may also relate to two different aspects of gaulus. The Shem m’Shmuel (in one of the latter parshiyos in Braishis; sorry, I forgot where exactly) points out that there seems to be more than one explanation for galus Mitzrayim. On the one hand, Avraham was told that his children will be strangers in a foreign land for four hundred years. On the other hand, Chazal tell us that it was the conflict between Yosef and his brothers that caused the descent into galus. Which one was it?
The Shem m’Shmuel answers that there are two aspects to galus: there is the physical exile into a strange land, living at times under harsh rule and persecution, and then there is the spiritual element of galus, the loss of our ability to study torah and perform mitzvos properly. Avraham was told his children would suffer physical dispersal from the land, but it was the conflict between Yosef and his brothers that tore apart the achdus that is the foundation from which the spirituality of am Yisrael springs.
Hashem told Moshe, “Daber na b’oznei ha’am v’yishalu ish m’eis rey’eyhu v’isha m’eis re’usa klei kesef…” (11:2) It seems odd that the pasuk should call our Egyptian oppressors “rey’eyhu”, and tell us to speak to them so politely, saying “na”/please. The GR”A explains that the pasuk is not speaking about Egyptians, but about the Jewish people. Each person was told to go to his/her neighbor and ask to please borrow some item. At this crucial moment before geulah, all of Klal Yisrael would be engaged in performing an act of chessed, lending some item to his or her fellow Jew! (Might it be that the lending of garments by one girl to another described in the Mishna at the end of Ta'anis was the merit which caused so many shidduchim to occur on Tu b'Av?) By performing chessed one merits chessed in return, and the next pasuk continues that because of their chessed to each other the Jewish people would merit finding “chein” in the eyes of the Egyptians who would give them their wealth.
I would go a step further. It is not only the wealth of Egypt which was earned through this act of chessed, but it was an element of geulah itself. The physical release from Egypt was going to happen no matter what, but the release from spiritual captivity, the rebuilding of the spiritual foundations of our nation, was in our hands. The small act of chessed every Jew performed for his neighbor was the undoing of the animosity between Yosef and his brothers than landed us in spiritual exile.
To return to Rav Shteinman’s question, undoubtedly Hashem would fulfill his promise to release us physically from Egypt no matter what. But release from physical bondage while remaining in spiritual captivity is an incomplete geulah. It was through mitzvos, especially the mitzvah of korban Pesach which was shared among multiple families, eaten together at one table under one roof, that we earned our spiritual redemption.
One final thought: the power of little things! The neighbors borrowing from each other didn't really have a need, but were simply following Moshe's instructions to ask so as to create an opportunity for chessed. Yet, this small act of chessed transformed the Jewish people from humiliated slaves into people who found chein in the eyes of the Egyptians. It doesn't require running to Haiti on Shabbos to generate chein b'einei hagoyim -- we all have the opportunity to do so right at home, by applying ourselves to even small acts of chessed that can be done on a daily basis. These little acts of chessed can combine to create a tidal wave of chessed that will in turn release chasdei Hashem upon us all.
Friday, January 22, 2010
Thursday, January 21, 2010
a child's impressions
From "Witness" by Whittaker Chambers, pp. 116-117:
…In summer, my mother was a great pie maker and she had a way of holding up a pie on the fingertips of one hand while she trimmed the loose edges of crust with the other. She was doing this one day, when, in some rambling child’s conversation, I said something about “when G-d made the world.” I think I was trying it out on her. If so, the result was much better than I could have expected.
She froze with the pie in one hand and the trimming knife suspended in the other. “Somebody told you that,” she said with a severity she seldom used to me. “You picked that up somewhere. You must learn to think for yourself. You must keep an open mind and not accept other people’s opinions. The world as formed by gasses cooling in space.”
I thought about this many times. But it was not the gaseous theory of creation that impressed me, though I did not reject it. What impressed me was this it was an opinion, too, since other people believed something else. Then why had my mother told me what to think? Clearly, if the open mind was open (as I would say to myself later on, still turning over this conversation in my mind years afterwards), truth was simply a question of which opening you preferred. In effect, the open mind was always closed at one end.
The other experience also occurred in my early childhood…I stood up, on the other side, in a field covered from end to end, as high as my head, with thistles in full bloom. Clinging to the purple flowers, hovering over them, or twittering and dipping in flight, were dozens of goldfinches – little golden yellow birds with black, contrasting wings and caps. They did not pay the slightest attention to me, as if they had never seen a boy before.
The sight was so unexpected, the beauty so absolute, that I thought I could not stand it and held to the hedge for support. Out loud I said, “G-d.” It was a simple statement, not an exclamation, of which I would then have been incapable. At that moment, which I remembered through all the years of my life as one of its highest moments, I was closer than I would be again for almost forty years to the intuition that alone could give meaning to my life – the intuition that G-d and beauty are one.
…In summer, my mother was a great pie maker and she had a way of holding up a pie on the fingertips of one hand while she trimmed the loose edges of crust with the other. She was doing this one day, when, in some rambling child’s conversation, I said something about “when G-d made the world.” I think I was trying it out on her. If so, the result was much better than I could have expected.
She froze with the pie in one hand and the trimming knife suspended in the other. “Somebody told you that,” she said with a severity she seldom used to me. “You picked that up somewhere. You must learn to think for yourself. You must keep an open mind and not accept other people’s opinions. The world as formed by gasses cooling in space.”
I thought about this many times. But it was not the gaseous theory of creation that impressed me, though I did not reject it. What impressed me was this it was an opinion, too, since other people believed something else. Then why had my mother told me what to think? Clearly, if the open mind was open (as I would say to myself later on, still turning over this conversation in my mind years afterwards), truth was simply a question of which opening you preferred. In effect, the open mind was always closed at one end.
The other experience also occurred in my early childhood…I stood up, on the other side, in a field covered from end to end, as high as my head, with thistles in full bloom. Clinging to the purple flowers, hovering over them, or twittering and dipping in flight, were dozens of goldfinches – little golden yellow birds with black, contrasting wings and caps. They did not pay the slightest attention to me, as if they had never seen a boy before.
The sight was so unexpected, the beauty so absolute, that I thought I could not stand it and held to the hedge for support. Out loud I said, “G-d.” It was a simple statement, not an exclamation, of which I would then have been incapable. At that moment, which I remembered through all the years of my life as one of its highest moments, I was closer than I would be again for almost forty years to the intuition that alone could give meaning to my life – the intuition that G-d and beauty are one.
lo te'hey shemiya gedolah m'reiya
The Mishna (R”H 25) tells us that beis din which sees the new moon is allowed to declare Rosh Chodesh without witnesses testifying before them. “Lo te’hey shemiya gedolah m’re’iya” – hearing testimony cannot be greater proof than seeing the event itself.
Yesh lachkor: does this mean that beis din’s first hand observation is itself a substitute for eidus, a form of eidus without the formal process of testimony, or does this mean that where beis din is a first hand observer no testimony is necessary?
The Rambam holds that a single expert mumche judge is allowed to decide cases (i.e. a beis din of three is not required), yet he also holds (Sanhedrin 5:18) that an admission, a hoda’ah, in front of such a judge is not binding. The Tur disagrees. The Rambam is problematic: if a single judge is authorized to decide cases, why can he not pasken based on a hoda’ah made in his presence?
Rav Amiel (Darkei Moshe 1:1) suggests that the single judge in this case is both the witness to the hoda’ah as well as the judge empowered to decide the case, no different than the idea of lo tehey shemia hedolah m’reiya when three judges witness the sight of the new moon and act as the court declaring rosh chodesh.
The machlokes between Rambam and Tur hinges on our chakirah. The Rambam holds lo te’hey shemiya gedolah m’re’iya is a form of eidus. Testimony requires two witnesses, not one, and therefore a single judge cannot rule based on what he sees. The Tur, however, understands lo te’hey shemiya gedolah m’re’iya to mean that no testimony is needed. Therefore, even the single judge may rule based on a hoda’ah done in his presence.
Yet some more explanation is needed. True, eidus requires the presence of two witnesses, but monetary cases can be decided based on all manner of proof, including umdena, what seems reasonable. Even if the hoda’ah in front of a single judge cannot serve as eidus, why can it not serve as at least the equal of an umdena so that he can decide the case? Rav Amiel answers this question in his Midos l’Cheker HaHalacha (11:27) based on a chiddush of the Ch. haRI”M, but bl”n I want to share with you an idea of R’ Shimon Shkop in a future post.
Yesh lachkor: does this mean that beis din’s first hand observation is itself a substitute for eidus, a form of eidus without the formal process of testimony, or does this mean that where beis din is a first hand observer no testimony is necessary?
The Rambam holds that a single expert mumche judge is allowed to decide cases (i.e. a beis din of three is not required), yet he also holds (Sanhedrin 5:18) that an admission, a hoda’ah, in front of such a judge is not binding. The Tur disagrees. The Rambam is problematic: if a single judge is authorized to decide cases, why can he not pasken based on a hoda’ah made in his presence?
Rav Amiel (Darkei Moshe 1:1) suggests that the single judge in this case is both the witness to the hoda’ah as well as the judge empowered to decide the case, no different than the idea of lo tehey shemia hedolah m’reiya when three judges witness the sight of the new moon and act as the court declaring rosh chodesh.
The machlokes between Rambam and Tur hinges on our chakirah. The Rambam holds lo te’hey shemiya gedolah m’re’iya is a form of eidus. Testimony requires two witnesses, not one, and therefore a single judge cannot rule based on what he sees. The Tur, however, understands lo te’hey shemiya gedolah m’re’iya to mean that no testimony is needed. Therefore, even the single judge may rule based on a hoda’ah done in his presence.
Yet some more explanation is needed. True, eidus requires the presence of two witnesses, but monetary cases can be decided based on all manner of proof, including umdena, what seems reasonable. Even if the hoda’ah in front of a single judge cannot serve as eidus, why can it not serve as at least the equal of an umdena so that he can decide the case? Rav Amiel answers this question in his Midos l’Cheker HaHalacha (11:27) based on a chiddush of the Ch. haRI”M, but bl”n I want to share with you an idea of R’ Shimon Shkop in a future post.
Wednesday, January 20, 2010
torah sheba'al peh before matan Torah?
Thinking about the question of whether there was a mitzvah for Pharoah to listen to Moshe triggered my wondering about a somewhat related question. Rashi cites derasha after derasha in explaining the halachos of korban pesach defined by the pesukim in our parsha, Shmos ch. 12. The Netziv takes note of the Torah’s language in emphasizing (12:28) that Bnei Yisrael did “ka’asher tzivah Hashem es Moshe” – the term “tzivah” as opposed to “ka’asher diber” is inclusive of Rabbinic explication in addition to the words G-d spoke. Yet, if the basis for Rabbinic authority is the mitzvah of “lo tasur” (as the Rambam writes), there seems to be no compelling reason for Bnei Yisrael to have accepted Moshe’s interpretation and derush of these pesukim, as the mitzvah of “lo tasur” was yet to be given. Why then did they listen?
We already discussed a similar question in the past. The gemara (Shabbos 87) tells us that as a result of Moshe’s interpretation of Hashem’s command, he added an extra day into the calculation of when the Torah would be given. R’ Elchanan asks: Granted that this interpretation was done through Moshe’s use of the 13 midos of torah sheba’al peh, but what authority or basis did those midos have prior to the commandment of “lo tasur’ being given? I don’t understand – why is R’ Elchanan bothered by this gemara and not bothered by the derashos galore on our parsha? I think I must be missing something but can’t figure out what.
We already discussed a similar question in the past. The gemara (Shabbos 87) tells us that as a result of Moshe’s interpretation of Hashem’s command, he added an extra day into the calculation of when the Torah would be given. R’ Elchanan asks: Granted that this interpretation was done through Moshe’s use of the 13 midos of torah sheba’al peh, but what authority or basis did those midos have prior to the commandment of “lo tasur’ being given? I don’t understand – why is R’ Elchanan bothered by this gemara and not bothered by the derashos galore on our parsha? I think I must be missing something but can’t figure out what.
Tuesday, January 19, 2010
rescue efforts even on Shabbos
My BIL posted an article from the Jewish Post describing the relief efforts of Israeli doctors and other personnel in Haiti. The article mentions that, “Among the staff are Orthodox Jews who went to Haiti even though it was Shabbat. Reiss said they avoided performing unnecessarily tasks like shaving, but did everything needed to save lives.”
This makes for wonderful public relations, but I have no doubt that these individuals did not go to Haiti with the intent of scoring a public relations coup – they went because a Jew cannot help but react with compassion when he/she sees a fellow human being in distress. It is our instinctive nature to be rachmanim and gomlei chassadim, to act selflessly to help others.
This response resonates with our emotional and moral sensibilities, and yet I wonder if it is the correct response. Once a situation of ones has arisen all issurim are suspended. However, the Ba’al haMaor writes that a person cannot place him/herself in a situation of inevitable ones by choice. A person may not embark on a ship immediately before Shabbos because he/she will have to violate Shabbos if anything goes wrong onboard –once the ones is there one can do what is necessary to save the ship, Shabbos notwithstanding, but one may not intentionally enter into that situation by choosing to embark before Shabbos instead of at some other time.
Given the choice of volunteering to be among the first rescuers and doing melacha d’oraysa (which it would be very hard to avoid given the situation) for the sake of an aku”m (which there does not seem to be any clear cut heter for) on Shabbos or keeping Shabbos and waiting until the next day to mobilize the relief efforts, is the choice to render aid even on Shabbos so clear cut? Again, instinctively one feels that expedience is paramount when it comes to questions of human life, and I don’t think this instinctive reaction is due to a lack of appreciation of Shabbos on our part. Perhaps it is even correct to follow that instinctive reaction to save life and worry about sorting out technical legal details later. Perhaps it is not proper to raise even after the fact the sort of question I am posing when human life hangs in the balance. Is it? If it is, if we should concern ourself with the technical halachic issue either before or after the fact, how do we halachically justify the response? And finally, if in hindsight we conclude that technically one should not volunteer in cases like this, how do we square that with our moral instinct?
It goes without saying that this theoretical discussion is only with respect to the question of Shabbos, but certainly our compassion extends to those in Haiti desperately in need of the bracha of tov Hashem la'kol v'rachamav al kol ma'asav.
This makes for wonderful public relations, but I have no doubt that these individuals did not go to Haiti with the intent of scoring a public relations coup – they went because a Jew cannot help but react with compassion when he/she sees a fellow human being in distress. It is our instinctive nature to be rachmanim and gomlei chassadim, to act selflessly to help others.
This response resonates with our emotional and moral sensibilities, and yet I wonder if it is the correct response. Once a situation of ones has arisen all issurim are suspended. However, the Ba’al haMaor writes that a person cannot place him/herself in a situation of inevitable ones by choice. A person may not embark on a ship immediately before Shabbos because he/she will have to violate Shabbos if anything goes wrong onboard –once the ones is there one can do what is necessary to save the ship, Shabbos notwithstanding, but one may not intentionally enter into that situation by choosing to embark before Shabbos instead of at some other time.
Given the choice of volunteering to be among the first rescuers and doing melacha d’oraysa (which it would be very hard to avoid given the situation) for the sake of an aku”m (which there does not seem to be any clear cut heter for) on Shabbos or keeping Shabbos and waiting until the next day to mobilize the relief efforts, is the choice to render aid even on Shabbos so clear cut? Again, instinctively one feels that expedience is paramount when it comes to questions of human life, and I don’t think this instinctive reaction is due to a lack of appreciation of Shabbos on our part. Perhaps it is even correct to follow that instinctive reaction to save life and worry about sorting out technical legal details later. Perhaps it is not proper to raise even after the fact the sort of question I am posing when human life hangs in the balance. Is it? If it is, if we should concern ourself with the technical halachic issue either before or after the fact, how do we halachically justify the response? And finally, if in hindsight we conclude that technically one should not volunteer in cases like this, how do we square that with our moral instinct?
It goes without saying that this theoretical discussion is only with respect to the question of Shabbos, but certainly our compassion extends to those in Haiti desperately in need of the bracha of tov Hashem la'kol v'rachamav al kol ma'asav.
Monday, January 18, 2010
why Pharoh should have listened to Moshe
In the previous post I mentioned R' Shteinman's question as to why Pharoah should have been obligated to listen to Moshe -- the commandment to listen to a Navi is among the 613 mitzvos we are bound by, but not one of the 7 mitzvos bnei noach. R' Shteinman suggested that since it was obvious that Moshe was acting as the messenger of Hashem, Pharoah should have listened. In other words, as a comment put it, this is an extension of the basic mitzvah of emunah.
It occurred to me that one could answer the question based on an idea R' Elchanan elaborates on in Kuntres Divrei Sofrim which we discussed a few times in the past (see here). R' Elchanan suggested that the ratzon Hashem is its own mechayeiv -- that is, knowing what G-d wants, even if one is not explicitly commanded to act on that knowledge, demands a response. Bilam was punished for following the messenger's of Balak because he knew that G-d did not want him to curse the Jewish people, regardless of whether there was a formal command for him to desist from going. The Ramban maintains that we are bound to follow dinim derabbanan not because (as the Rambam writes) there is a command of "lo tasur", but simply because a din derabbanan is an expression of G-d's will. Here too in our case, it is not because a formal mitzvah to listen to a navi which obligated Pharoah to obey Moshe, but rather because Pharoah should have understood that Moshe's direction was the ratzon Hashem.
It occurred to me that one could answer the question based on an idea R' Elchanan elaborates on in Kuntres Divrei Sofrim which we discussed a few times in the past (see here). R' Elchanan suggested that the ratzon Hashem is its own mechayeiv -- that is, knowing what G-d wants, even if one is not explicitly commanded to act on that knowledge, demands a response. Bilam was punished for following the messenger's of Balak because he knew that G-d did not want him to curse the Jewish people, regardless of whether there was a formal command for him to desist from going. The Ramban maintains that we are bound to follow dinim derabbanan not because (as the Rambam writes) there is a command of "lo tasur", but simply because a din derabbanan is an expression of G-d's will. Here too in our case, it is not because a formal mitzvah to listen to a navi which obligated Pharoah to obey Moshe, but rather because Pharoah should have understood that Moshe's direction was the ratzon Hashem.
Friday, January 15, 2010
some thoughts of R' Shteinman on Parshas Va'Eira
A few quick thoughts on the parsha:
1) Rashi interprets the pesukim at the beginning of the parsha as an admonishment to Moshe for complaining about the suffering of Bnei Yisrael. Hashem contrasts Moshe with the Avos, none of whom bemoaned their suffering, e.g. Avraham did not complain at having to pay top dollar for Me’aras haMachpeilah. Rav Shteinman in his Ayeles haShachar questions this comparison – surely the added affliction of the Jewish people is far more disturbing than extra cost for a piece of property! He does not offer an answer.
2) Rashi (7:3) indicates that the punishment of the Egyptians was supposed to ellicit a response of tshuvah from Bnei Yisrael. Obviously the Egyptians deserved punishment for their wrongdoing irrespective of whether Bnei Yisrael learned any lesson from their fate -- Bnei Yisrael being moved to tshuvah is a consequence, not a reason for the Egyptians’ suffering.
R’ Shteinman quotes R’ Simcha Zisel of Kelm as explaining that the descendents of Haman merited to learn Torah in Bnei Brak because Haman served as the instrument which led BN”Y to tshuvah. R’ Shteinman questions this idea. Can a rasha accrue merit for a wicked deed just because some unintended good emerges as a consequence? Does it make sense to say that Nimrod deserves credit for tossing Avraham into the kivshan because as a result Avraham’s fame spread far and wide?
3) On the topic of the hardening of Pharoah’s heart, R’ Shteinman notes that at first glance the ability of Pharaoh to resist is a great chilul Hashem. Pharoah undoubtedly thought he was going to come out the winner in this contest against Moshe and G-d and rallied his people around that idea. It’s only in retrospect, after all the makkos are over, that we appreciate that Pharoah was only being given those kochos of resistance to setup a bigger knockout punch at the end. “Kol po’al Hashem l’ma’anei’hu” means that all that occurs, even that which superficially appears to be a chilul Hashem, in the end fits into the larger plan of kiddush Hashem.
4) Pharoah is chastised for not listening to Moshe, “V’hinei lo shamata ad koh” (7:16). Obedience to a Navi's message is one of the 613 mitzvos, not one of the 7 mitzvos bnei Noach, so why should Pharoah have listened? R’ Shteinman explains that the truth of Moshe’s shlichus was a matter of inescapable and irrefutable logic; Pharoah should have obeyed because Moshe was obviously an agent of Hashem. "Nikarim divrei emes" is a mechayeiv in this context.
R’ Shteinman’s question made me think of Bilam, prophet to the nations of the world. There clearly is a chalos of nevuah, a position and status of navi, that exists globally, yet I am not sure what meaning such a position would have if there is no mitzvah on a ben Noach to listen to the navi.
1) Rashi interprets the pesukim at the beginning of the parsha as an admonishment to Moshe for complaining about the suffering of Bnei Yisrael. Hashem contrasts Moshe with the Avos, none of whom bemoaned their suffering, e.g. Avraham did not complain at having to pay top dollar for Me’aras haMachpeilah. Rav Shteinman in his Ayeles haShachar questions this comparison – surely the added affliction of the Jewish people is far more disturbing than extra cost for a piece of property! He does not offer an answer.
2) Rashi (7:3) indicates that the punishment of the Egyptians was supposed to ellicit a response of tshuvah from Bnei Yisrael. Obviously the Egyptians deserved punishment for their wrongdoing irrespective of whether Bnei Yisrael learned any lesson from their fate -- Bnei Yisrael being moved to tshuvah is a consequence, not a reason for the Egyptians’ suffering.
R’ Shteinman quotes R’ Simcha Zisel of Kelm as explaining that the descendents of Haman merited to learn Torah in Bnei Brak because Haman served as the instrument which led BN”Y to tshuvah. R’ Shteinman questions this idea. Can a rasha accrue merit for a wicked deed just because some unintended good emerges as a consequence? Does it make sense to say that Nimrod deserves credit for tossing Avraham into the kivshan because as a result Avraham’s fame spread far and wide?
3) On the topic of the hardening of Pharoah’s heart, R’ Shteinman notes that at first glance the ability of Pharaoh to resist is a great chilul Hashem. Pharoah undoubtedly thought he was going to come out the winner in this contest against Moshe and G-d and rallied his people around that idea. It’s only in retrospect, after all the makkos are over, that we appreciate that Pharoah was only being given those kochos of resistance to setup a bigger knockout punch at the end. “Kol po’al Hashem l’ma’anei’hu” means that all that occurs, even that which superficially appears to be a chilul Hashem, in the end fits into the larger plan of kiddush Hashem.
4) Pharoah is chastised for not listening to Moshe, “V’hinei lo shamata ad koh” (7:16). Obedience to a Navi's message is one of the 613 mitzvos, not one of the 7 mitzvos bnei Noach, so why should Pharoah have listened? R’ Shteinman explains that the truth of Moshe’s shlichus was a matter of inescapable and irrefutable logic; Pharoah should have obeyed because Moshe was obviously an agent of Hashem. "Nikarim divrei emes" is a mechayeiv in this context.
R’ Shteinman’s question made me think of Bilam, prophet to the nations of the world. There clearly is a chalos of nevuah, a position and status of navi, that exists globally, yet I am not sure what meaning such a position would have if there is no mitzvah on a ben Noach to listen to the navi.
Thursday, January 14, 2010
latest issue of Kallah Magazine
My wife just received from the printer her latest issue of Kallah Magazine and is now in the process of distributing in in the usual places. Look for it in the 5 Towns, parts of Brooklyn (Flatbush should get it today), Baltimore, Queens (prob. next week), etc. My two cents are in there in an article about Tu B'Shevat.
ta'amah ki tov sachara
Daughter #2 actually wanted to give a dvar torah at our little siyum (as opposed to myself and my son who do not look forward to speaking publicly even in front of extended family), so since she is dabbling in learning Mishlei in addition to her schoolwork she spoke about the pasuk of “ta’amah ki tov sachara lo yichbeh balayla neirah.” Meforshim read eishes chayil as a mashal for Torah, and explain this pasuk to mean that when the eishes chayil sees that business is good = when you recognize the beauty of Torah, you burn the midnight oil to try to accomplish more.
My daughter explained the pasuk (OK, she had a little help) as applicable to a siyum. Where does a person get the energy to keep learning day in and day out as part of a daf yomi or some other cycle? The gemara (Shabbos 118) tells us that Abayei would make a Yom Tov when a masechta was completed by the talmidim. In that light perhaps the pasuk can perhaps be read as follows: “Ta’ama ki tov sachara” – when a person has experiences the tov = the Yom tov celebrating the making of a siyum, then “lo yichbeh ba’layla neira,” then he/she is inspired to continue from one project to the next. Indeed, so many people got chizuk and were inspired to start their own sedorim from events like the siyum hashas of daf yomi that it makes one think that if only MSG was reserved for siyumim on Mishnayos, halacha, Nach, Yerushalmi, etc. how much more would be accomplished : )
My daughter explained the pasuk (OK, she had a little help) as applicable to a siyum. Where does a person get the energy to keep learning day in and day out as part of a daf yomi or some other cycle? The gemara (Shabbos 118) tells us that Abayei would make a Yom Tov when a masechta was completed by the talmidim. In that light perhaps the pasuk can perhaps be read as follows: “Ta’ama ki tov sachara” – when a person has experiences the tov = the Yom tov celebrating the making of a siyum, then “lo yichbeh ba’layla neira,” then he/she is inspired to continue from one project to the next. Indeed, so many people got chizuk and were inspired to start their own sedorim from events like the siyum hashas of daf yomi that it makes one think that if only MSG was reserved for siyumim on Mishnayos, halacha, Nach, Yerushalmi, etc. how much more would be accomplished : )
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
toras eretz yisrael vs. toras galus
There is an amazing Zohar on Parshas Shmos which darshens as follows:
Vayemareru es chayeihem b’avodah kasha
B’chomer – zu kal v’chomer
U’belveinim – zu libun halacha
U’b’chol avodas ha’sadeh – zu braysa.
R’ Nevenzal in his sichos on the parsha asks the obvious question: were the Egyptians throwing difficult gemaras and Rambam’s at the Jewish people? Is this the meaning of galus Mitzrayim?
In making the siyum on Yerushalmi I discussed some of the differences between the Bavli and Yerushalmi: 1) Differences in language: the Bavli refers to the language of the Yerushalmi as “lishna kelila” (B”K 6); 2) Corruption of the text: Rashba attributes the lack of study of Yerushalmi to the corrupt girsa and nusach; 3) Most importantly, there are differences in logic and methodology. The gemara (Sanhedrin 22) darshens “B’machshakim hoshivani” to refer to the Bavli; the gemara refers to the style of learning is Bavel as “makas chovlim” as opposed to the peaceful ways of the Yerushalmi. Many sugyos in the Yerushalmi leave off with unresolved questions; the gemara sometimes lets an Amora get off without explaining how his chidush fits with a Mishna or Braysa -- there is not the same sense of intellectual warfare in the Yerushalmi as there is in the Bavli. My brother-in-law commented in the same vein that we see the “darchei noam” of the Yerushalmi in one of the last halachos in the Yerushalmi, the case of a corpse which is rotten yet is still metamei (on a d’oraysa level!) because, explains the Yerushalmi, of kavod ha’adam. The entirety of the three Bava’s in Yerushalmi is barely equal in quantity of material to perek Chezkas haBatim in Baba Basra. The Bavli is concerned with sevara, intellectual debate and development of the halacha, while the Yerushalmi is far more concerned with derashos and mesorah, kabbalah of Torah in the sense of received knowledge. In contrast to Nezikin, Masechet Nazir with all its complex derashos and halachos that are not "sichli" is even longer in the Yerushalmi than it is in the Bavli.
Rav Kook in his Orot haTorah writes that the Yerushalmi is related more in its methodology to toras hanistar than the Bavli; he sees its roots in tefilah, direct engagement with G-d, rather than intellectual speculation. The Yerushalmi could develop only in Eretz Yisrael where the soil is blessed with the possibility of ruach ha’kodesh and nevuah. The Bavli, writes Rav Kook, is “torah hamishtameres”, which keeps us hanging in there in galus, but the Yerushalmi is “torah hamisbareches”.
Perhaps it is this distinction between the derech of learning unique to Eretz Yisrael and the derech of learning which developed as a result of our galus which the Zohar is trying to convey. The shakla v’terya, the layer upon layer of hava amina and maskana, the intellectual battles (and it’s interesting that the Zohar mentions kal v’chomer specifically, as this is the only one of the 13 midos that can be darshened based on logic alone without a mesorah) of the Bavli are all a result of the ohr of Torah being masked because of galus. Of course shibud Mitzrayim was all about physical hard work, but part of galus is also this intellectual shift, the demand for mental ameilus of a different kind to simply understand Torah.
The gemara relates that R’ Zeira fasted 100 fasts to forget what he learned in Bavel when he made aliya. (My son pointed out R' Zeira is highlighted in the last sugya in Horiyos as the exemplar of exceptional ability to be maksheh u'mefareik, so his transformation from a Bavli-Amora to a Yerushalmi thinker must have been a dramatic change.) The Talmud Yerushalmi is not simply another layer of learning, like starting to learn Tosfos on top of Rashi, or the Ran or Rashba in addition to Tosfos, otherwise why struggle to forget everything else? Talmud Yerushalmi in its ideal sense demands a different mindset, one that is fundamentally at odds with the galus-mentality thinking in learning that we are so familiar with.
v'Zhav ha’aretz ha’hi tov – zu toras Eretz Yisrael. Tzion b’misphat tipadeh = Talmud Yerushalmi in gematriya. The renewal of interest in the study of Yerushalmi, the Talmud of Eretz Yisrael, is a harbinger of geulah, as our intellectual kelim shift gears to once again absorb “torah hamisbareches” in a manner and form that can only be appreciated in Eretz Yisrael.
My brother-in-law noted that the first letter of the gemara and last letter in Yerushalmi (aleph and daled) spell aid – v’aid ya’aleh min ha’aretz. We know that Eretz Yisrael is blessed first with the rains that then nourish the entire world, and so too, the bracha in learning comes first through Yerushalmi, the first layer of explication ever done on Mishnayos.
Nu, so today is the start of a new cycle, Brachos daf aleph (first thing to forget from the Bavli: all those vortlach you’ve heard about why the Talmud begins with daf beis) – dig in!
Vayemareru es chayeihem b’avodah kasha
B’chomer – zu kal v’chomer
U’belveinim – zu libun halacha
U’b’chol avodas ha’sadeh – zu braysa.
R’ Nevenzal in his sichos on the parsha asks the obvious question: were the Egyptians throwing difficult gemaras and Rambam’s at the Jewish people? Is this the meaning of galus Mitzrayim?
In making the siyum on Yerushalmi I discussed some of the differences between the Bavli and Yerushalmi: 1) Differences in language: the Bavli refers to the language of the Yerushalmi as “lishna kelila” (B”K 6); 2) Corruption of the text: Rashba attributes the lack of study of Yerushalmi to the corrupt girsa and nusach; 3) Most importantly, there are differences in logic and methodology. The gemara (Sanhedrin 22) darshens “B’machshakim hoshivani” to refer to the Bavli; the gemara refers to the style of learning is Bavel as “makas chovlim” as opposed to the peaceful ways of the Yerushalmi. Many sugyos in the Yerushalmi leave off with unresolved questions; the gemara sometimes lets an Amora get off without explaining how his chidush fits with a Mishna or Braysa -- there is not the same sense of intellectual warfare in the Yerushalmi as there is in the Bavli. My brother-in-law commented in the same vein that we see the “darchei noam” of the Yerushalmi in one of the last halachos in the Yerushalmi, the case of a corpse which is rotten yet is still metamei (on a d’oraysa level!) because, explains the Yerushalmi, of kavod ha’adam. The entirety of the three Bava’s in Yerushalmi is barely equal in quantity of material to perek Chezkas haBatim in Baba Basra. The Bavli is concerned with sevara, intellectual debate and development of the halacha, while the Yerushalmi is far more concerned with derashos and mesorah, kabbalah of Torah in the sense of received knowledge. In contrast to Nezikin, Masechet Nazir with all its complex derashos and halachos that are not "sichli" is even longer in the Yerushalmi than it is in the Bavli.
Rav Kook in his Orot haTorah writes that the Yerushalmi is related more in its methodology to toras hanistar than the Bavli; he sees its roots in tefilah, direct engagement with G-d, rather than intellectual speculation. The Yerushalmi could develop only in Eretz Yisrael where the soil is blessed with the possibility of ruach ha’kodesh and nevuah. The Bavli, writes Rav Kook, is “torah hamishtameres”, which keeps us hanging in there in galus, but the Yerushalmi is “torah hamisbareches”.
Perhaps it is this distinction between the derech of learning unique to Eretz Yisrael and the derech of learning which developed as a result of our galus which the Zohar is trying to convey. The shakla v’terya, the layer upon layer of hava amina and maskana, the intellectual battles (and it’s interesting that the Zohar mentions kal v’chomer specifically, as this is the only one of the 13 midos that can be darshened based on logic alone without a mesorah) of the Bavli are all a result of the ohr of Torah being masked because of galus. Of course shibud Mitzrayim was all about physical hard work, but part of galus is also this intellectual shift, the demand for mental ameilus of a different kind to simply understand Torah.
The gemara relates that R’ Zeira fasted 100 fasts to forget what he learned in Bavel when he made aliya. (My son pointed out R' Zeira is highlighted in the last sugya in Horiyos as the exemplar of exceptional ability to be maksheh u'mefareik, so his transformation from a Bavli-Amora to a Yerushalmi thinker must have been a dramatic change.) The Talmud Yerushalmi is not simply another layer of learning, like starting to learn Tosfos on top of Rashi, or the Ran or Rashba in addition to Tosfos, otherwise why struggle to forget everything else? Talmud Yerushalmi in its ideal sense demands a different mindset, one that is fundamentally at odds with the galus-mentality thinking in learning that we are so familiar with.
v'Zhav ha’aretz ha’hi tov – zu toras Eretz Yisrael. Tzion b’misphat tipadeh = Talmud Yerushalmi in gematriya. The renewal of interest in the study of Yerushalmi, the Talmud of Eretz Yisrael, is a harbinger of geulah, as our intellectual kelim shift gears to once again absorb “torah hamisbareches” in a manner and form that can only be appreciated in Eretz Yisrael.
My brother-in-law noted that the first letter of the gemara and last letter in Yerushalmi (aleph and daled) spell aid – v’aid ya’aleh min ha’aretz. We know that Eretz Yisrael is blessed first with the rains that then nourish the entire world, and so too, the bracha in learning comes first through Yerushalmi, the first layer of explication ever done on Mishnayos.
Nu, so today is the start of a new cycle, Brachos daf aleph (first thing to forget from the Bavli: all those vortlach you’ve heard about why the Talmud begins with daf beis) – dig in!
Tuesday, January 12, 2010
self fulfilling prophecy
When Hashem charged Moshe with the mission of redeeming of the Jewish people, he told him, “V’sham’u l’kolecha…”(3:18), guaranteeing that the people would listen to and believe in Moshe. Yet, Moshe was not satisfied and he insisted that he would not be listened to or believed (4:1):
וַיַּעַן מֹשֶׁה, וַיֹּאמֶר, וְהֵן לֹא-יַאֲמִינוּ לִי, וְלֹא יִשְׁמְעוּ בְּקֹלִי:
In response, Hashem taught Moshe the signs of the staff turning into a snake, water changing to blood, and his hand becoming leprous and then changing back.
Question: once Hashem had guaranteed that the people would listen to and believe Moshe, why did Hashem need to teach Moshe these signs as proof? Hashem could have simply reiterated in response to Moshe that the people would indeed believe.
R’ Tzadok (Pri Tzadik) answers that it was Moshe’s question which introduced the possibility of doubt into the equation. We live up to expectations. Because Moshe did not believe that the people would accept him, this became a self-fulfilling prophecy which undid Hashem’s guarantee, and now he had a need for proof. (See R’ Tzadok for an explanation of why Moshe did not accept Hashem’s guarantee – can G-d guarantee belief, or is it a matter of our collective free choice?)
While on the topic of the parsha, let me just tack on here that there is a Rabeinu Bachye on the pasuk “Va’ta’al shav’asam es haElokim” which mentions a halacha in his parshanut which is quoted by poskim. R’ Bachye says that the word “yisbarach” should not be separated from the precedeing sentence of “yehei she’mei rabbah… l’olam u’lulmei ulmaya”. Of course, there are those who disagree.
וַיַּעַן מֹשֶׁה, וַיֹּאמֶר, וְהֵן לֹא-יַאֲמִינוּ לִי, וְלֹא יִשְׁמְעוּ בְּקֹלִי:
In response, Hashem taught Moshe the signs of the staff turning into a snake, water changing to blood, and his hand becoming leprous and then changing back.
Question: once Hashem had guaranteed that the people would listen to and believe Moshe, why did Hashem need to teach Moshe these signs as proof? Hashem could have simply reiterated in response to Moshe that the people would indeed believe.
R’ Tzadok (Pri Tzadik) answers that it was Moshe’s question which introduced the possibility of doubt into the equation. We live up to expectations. Because Moshe did not believe that the people would accept him, this became a self-fulfilling prophecy which undid Hashem’s guarantee, and now he had a need for proof. (See R’ Tzadok for an explanation of why Moshe did not accept Hashem’s guarantee – can G-d guarantee belief, or is it a matter of our collective free choice?)
While on the topic of the parsha, let me just tack on here that there is a Rabeinu Bachye on the pasuk “Va’ta’al shav’asam es haElokim” which mentions a halacha in his parshanut which is quoted by poskim. R’ Bachye says that the word “yisbarach” should not be separated from the precedeing sentence of “yehei she’mei rabbah… l’olam u’lulmei ulmaya”. Of course, there are those who disagree.
shibuda d'oraysa and korban shevua
It seems like only yesterday I posted a nice kashe my son had on the last Mishna in Horiyos when he made a siyum on Mishnayos Nezikin, and now he is just about finished with the entire seder of gemara. In his siyum on Shavuos he chose a particularly complex sugya to speak about, so apologies if I don't capture this idea very well.
R’ Yochanan (Shavuos 37) holds that if Reuvain swears falsely that he doesn’t owe money to Shimon and two witnesses contradict him he is chayav a korban. However, if Shimon produces a shtar that says Reuvain owes the money, Reuvain does not have to bring a korban. The reason for the distinction: a shtar creates a lien on property and there is no penalty of a korban for swearing falsely with respec to property.
Tosfos (Shavuos 37b, B.M. 4b) asks: R’ Yochanan holds “shibuda d’oraysa” – every loan automatically creates a lien on property -- so how can anyone ever be chayav a korban shevua? Any dispute about a loan is essentially a dispute about property!
Tosfos answers that the case of korban must be where the person who made the loan forgives and is mochel this shibud.
Tosfos now goes a step further: the Chachamim made a takanah that says if Levi buys Reuvain's property unaware that Shimon already has a lien on it, if the agreement between Reuvain and Shimon was only an oral contract (milveh al peh), Shimon cannot collect the land bought by Levi; there is an automatic mechila of the lien on the property. This protects Levi (lekuchos) from having his land snatched because of circumstances he has unaware of. However, if a shtar was written, Shimon can take the land from Levi because Levi should be aware of a documented loan and lien against Reuvain's property that he purchased.
Based on this takanah, Tosfos works out that the case R’ Yochanan must be speaking of is where Reuvain sold land which had a lien on to Levi, and Reuvain has no other personal property left. Thus, R' Yochanan said: If there are witnesses but no shtar to the agreement between Reuvain and Shimon (i.e. it's a milveh al peh), Shimon can only collect directly from Reuvain (because the takanah does not allow him to collect from Levi), and Reuvain has no land in his possession. Since there is no property under dispute, Reuvain is chayav a korban if he lies under oath. However, if there is a shtar, Shimon can now try to collect the land which Levi bought from Reuvain. Since this dispute now involves property, Reuvain is not chayan a korban for lying under oath.
The Ran goes through the same basic question and answer as Tosfos, but omits the detail that Reuvain personally has no land. My son suggested that this omission is significant and reflects a fundamental disagreement between Tosfos and the Ran as to how this takanah which prevents Shimon from collecting from Levi in a case of milveh al peh works. R' Shach in hi Avi Ezri Ezri is choker whether the takanah means: 1) The Chachamim said a milveh al peh cannot create a lien or shibud; or 2) A milveh al peh creates a shibud, but the Chachamim negated the power to collect on it.
If the Chachamim said that milveh al peh cannot create a lien, then even if Reuvain himself owned land, Shimon could not collect it. However, if milveh al peh does create a lien, just the Chachamim blocked the ability to collect on that lien in order to protect lekuchos, that would not protect Reuvain himself. My son suggested that Tosfos takes the latter position and therefore writes that we are speaking of a case where Reuvain has no land; the Ran takes the former position and therefore has no need to include this detail.
There is a part II and even a part III to this that my son did not say over, but ad kan hakafah aleph.
R’ Yochanan (Shavuos 37) holds that if Reuvain swears falsely that he doesn’t owe money to Shimon and two witnesses contradict him he is chayav a korban. However, if Shimon produces a shtar that says Reuvain owes the money, Reuvain does not have to bring a korban. The reason for the distinction: a shtar creates a lien on property and there is no penalty of a korban for swearing falsely with respec to property.
Tosfos (Shavuos 37b, B.M. 4b) asks: R’ Yochanan holds “shibuda d’oraysa” – every loan automatically creates a lien on property -- so how can anyone ever be chayav a korban shevua? Any dispute about a loan is essentially a dispute about property!
Tosfos answers that the case of korban must be where the person who made the loan forgives and is mochel this shibud.
Tosfos now goes a step further: the Chachamim made a takanah that says if Levi buys Reuvain's property unaware that Shimon already has a lien on it, if the agreement between Reuvain and Shimon was only an oral contract (milveh al peh), Shimon cannot collect the land bought by Levi; there is an automatic mechila of the lien on the property. This protects Levi (lekuchos) from having his land snatched because of circumstances he has unaware of. However, if a shtar was written, Shimon can take the land from Levi because Levi should be aware of a documented loan and lien against Reuvain's property that he purchased.
Based on this takanah, Tosfos works out that the case R’ Yochanan must be speaking of is where Reuvain sold land which had a lien on to Levi, and Reuvain has no other personal property left. Thus, R' Yochanan said: If there are witnesses but no shtar to the agreement between Reuvain and Shimon (i.e. it's a milveh al peh), Shimon can only collect directly from Reuvain (because the takanah does not allow him to collect from Levi), and Reuvain has no land in his possession. Since there is no property under dispute, Reuvain is chayav a korban if he lies under oath. However, if there is a shtar, Shimon can now try to collect the land which Levi bought from Reuvain. Since this dispute now involves property, Reuvain is not chayan a korban for lying under oath.
The Ran goes through the same basic question and answer as Tosfos, but omits the detail that Reuvain personally has no land. My son suggested that this omission is significant and reflects a fundamental disagreement between Tosfos and the Ran as to how this takanah which prevents Shimon from collecting from Levi in a case of milveh al peh works. R' Shach in hi Avi Ezri Ezri is choker whether the takanah means: 1) The Chachamim said a milveh al peh cannot create a lien or shibud; or 2) A milveh al peh creates a shibud, but the Chachamim negated the power to collect on it.
If the Chachamim said that milveh al peh cannot create a lien, then even if Reuvain himself owned land, Shimon could not collect it. However, if milveh al peh does create a lien, just the Chachamim blocked the ability to collect on that lien in order to protect lekuchos, that would not protect Reuvain himself. My son suggested that Tosfos takes the latter position and therefore writes that we are speaking of a case where Reuvain has no land; the Ran takes the former position and therefore has no need to include this detail.
There is a part II and even a part III to this that my son did not say over, but ad kan hakafah aleph.
Monday, January 11, 2010
daf yomi on yerushalmi -- siyum and new cycle
Last night we had what I guess I could describe as a family simcha as we hosted a little celebration for multiple siyumim. Firstly, my son has done all of Seder Nezikin except for a few blatt in the first perek of Bava Kama (so he has something to do in shiur for the rest of the year), and he made a siyum on Shavuos (he wanted to review Horiyos one more time before making a siyum on it). Secondly, I made a siyum on Talmud Yerushalmi for the first time. Thirdly, and having alomost a chazakah in doing so already, my brother-in-law, R’ Yosef Bechhofer, made a siyum on his complete second cycle through Yerushalmi. My wife deserves enormous thanks for putting together the whole siyum with lots of delicious homemade food, including homemade yerushalmi kugel (what else do you serve for a siyum on yerushalmi?), and more important than just being there at the finish line, she was and continues to be there every step of the way to make my learning possible. My brother-in-law deserves the credit for being mezakeh me and getting me to undertake learning the Yerushalmi, so hats off to him. Hinei mah tov u'mah na'im sheves achim gam yachad, and I will take achim to include brothers-in-law as well. It is special to be able to come together for no other reason other than to celebrate torah.
For those of you who have not attempted the Yerushalmi, this is your chance – the next cycle (a daf yomi cycle on Yerushalmi was instituted by the Gerrer Rebbe, the Lev Simcha, in 1980) begins this Thursday I”YH and takes only 4 1/3 years to finish, just a bit longer than half the time it would take to finish the Bavli at the same daf yomi pace. As I said at the siyum, had my brother-in-law known how gullible I was when he told me how easy learning Yerushalmi would be I would probably have in my hand the deed to one of the city’s bridges right now signed by him. I won’t kid you: the language is hard, the nusach/girsa a challenge, and the sugyos themselves have little in the way of Rishonim to help. The dapim generally are shorter than those in the Bavli, but often take longer to puzzle through (but no one says you have to feel bound to do a daf a day). One thing you absolutely gain from learning Yerushalmi: you will discover just what a remarkable work Rashi is as you struggle to do without it! But be that as it may, the Yerushalmi is torah too, and you only live once (that is, unless you are here on a gilgul return trip), so why not try? I noticed that Artscroll now has a bunch of volumes out, my BIL has taped shiurim on just about every daf that you can download for free (see here), and there are other resources out there which do make it easier. There is still a lot to struggle through, but think of it as getting shares of Apple computer when Steve Jobs was still tinkering in his garage – you will be in on the ground floor of a Torah venture that can only bring unlimited rewards. By the time they get around to a siyum at Madison Square Garden you will be a baki already.
But why aspire to the next siyum being held in the Garden? If IY”H enough people join in, maybe we will be zocheh to hold the next siyum together in Yerushalayim, b’zechus learning the Yerushalmi. After all, as R’ Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld poinedt out, the gematriya of “Tziyon b’mishpat tipadeh” is Talmud Yerushalmi.
Bl”n I hope to share some of the divrei torah and derush that were said.
For those of you who have not attempted the Yerushalmi, this is your chance – the next cycle (a daf yomi cycle on Yerushalmi was instituted by the Gerrer Rebbe, the Lev Simcha, in 1980) begins this Thursday I”YH and takes only 4 1/3 years to finish, just a bit longer than half the time it would take to finish the Bavli at the same daf yomi pace. As I said at the siyum, had my brother-in-law known how gullible I was when he told me how easy learning Yerushalmi would be I would probably have in my hand the deed to one of the city’s bridges right now signed by him. I won’t kid you: the language is hard, the nusach/girsa a challenge, and the sugyos themselves have little in the way of Rishonim to help. The dapim generally are shorter than those in the Bavli, but often take longer to puzzle through (but no one says you have to feel bound to do a daf a day). One thing you absolutely gain from learning Yerushalmi: you will discover just what a remarkable work Rashi is as you struggle to do without it! But be that as it may, the Yerushalmi is torah too, and you only live once (that is, unless you are here on a gilgul return trip), so why not try? I noticed that Artscroll now has a bunch of volumes out, my BIL has taped shiurim on just about every daf that you can download for free (see here), and there are other resources out there which do make it easier. There is still a lot to struggle through, but think of it as getting shares of Apple computer when Steve Jobs was still tinkering in his garage – you will be in on the ground floor of a Torah venture that can only bring unlimited rewards. By the time they get around to a siyum at Madison Square Garden you will be a baki already.
But why aspire to the next siyum being held in the Garden? If IY”H enough people join in, maybe we will be zocheh to hold the next siyum together in Yerushalayim, b’zechus learning the Yerushalmi. After all, as R’ Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld poinedt out, the gematriya of “Tziyon b’mishpat tipadeh” is Talmud Yerushalmi.
Bl”n I hope to share some of the divrei torah and derush that were said.
Friday, January 08, 2010
"mei'Az basi" to "Az Yashir": emunah and shirah
The Midrash tells us that Moshe sinned with the word “az” when he complained “U’mei’Az basi el Phraoh l’dabeir b’shemecha he’ra l’am hazeh,” and he corrected his sin with the use of the same word “az” when he sang “Az yashir Moshe.” It's not the coincidence of a common word which the Midrash is emphasizing, but rather the thematic relationship between these pesukim and events.
The Beis HaLevi’s explanation of the Midrash is one of the more famous/popular ones: At the time of redemption we will be privileged to look back and understand how all that we thought was bad and to our determent was really a bracha in disguise. Moshe sang “Az yashir” with the realization that the suffering he complained of and questioned, “m’az basi el Pharoah,” was really all for the good.
Shifting from Brisk to Telz, R’ Bloch offers a different explanation which I found amazingly deep and insightful, but at the same time I am troubled by the message. The Midrash elsewhere tells us that despite the many miracles G-d performed before the redemption from Egypt, no one ever sang shirah until Yam Suf. Why not? Why did Avraham not sing shira when he escaped from the kivshan ha’aish? Why did Yitzchak not sing shirah when spared from akeidah? Why didn’t Ya’akov sing shirah when he escaped Lavan’s home?
R’ Bloch explains that this lack of shirah is not due to some failing on the part of those tzadikim, but aderaba, precisely because of their greatness. Emunah means accepting with complete equanimity that all that occurs in the world is ultimately, whether we see it as such or not, a means to greater kvod shamayim and an expression of Hashem's perfect plan. Avraham accepted that whether he personally lived through the kivshan or not, the result will ultimately be greater kvod shamayim, so why sing shirah at being spared? Why sing shirah or be surprised at salvation when one knows that Hashem runs the world according to a plan which guarantees good for the righteous and evil for wrongdoers?
Moshe Rabeinu, however, did not accept with equanimity the suffering and pain of the Jewish people. He questioned and cried out with “az” because he could not see how kvod shamayim was enhanced by the prolonging of galus. And precisely because Moshe had the capacity to be moved and pained by Jewish suffering that gave him the capacity to be moved and rejoice in shirah when seeing the redemption of the Jewish people.
R’ Bloch contrasts Moshe’s shirah with the shirah of David haMelech. Chazal tell us a harp was suspended above David’s bed which played when the North wind blew. Unlike Moshe’s shirah which was inspired by the shift in circumstance from the “az” of galus to the “az” of geulah, David’s harp played in shirah even while he was still asleep and not conscious or aware of the comings and goings in the world; David’s shirah played as the North wind, the wind that always exists in nature, blew. David haMelech’s shirah was not inspired by the miraculous, but was a shirah that celebrated the day to day presence of Hashem in the world. This is the shirah which we will sing with the coming of Moshiach.
The interpretation is brilliant, but am uncomfortable with the upshot of the message. Who is superior – those tzadikim who accept with equanimity Hashem’s hashgacha, those tzadikim who do not suffer at the experience of pain or rejoice in redemption because it is so clear to them that all is in Hashem’s hands and the proper outcome is inevitable, or those tzadikim whose souls cry out at tragedy and soar in joy? R’ Bloch sees the former as having a superior level of emunah, while describing the latter having a emunah which is contingent (to some degree) on circumstance. Emunah which accepts all with equinimaity is superior to emunah which is diminished and challenged by the perception of evil, but which is elevated when salvation arrives.
I am uncomfortable with this idea of placing emunah is conflict with what I can only decribe as one's humanity. Need empathizing with suffering and tragedy, even questioning suffering and tragedy, be seen as indicative of a shortcoming of belief? Or might one not argue that it is precisely a deep-seated belief in hashgacha that leads one to protest suffering and question what appears to be injustice? Without belief, there is no room for questions, as an uncaring mechanistic universe does not promise either justice or sympathy.
Chazal tell us that Chizkiyahu would have been Moshiach had he only sung shirah when Sancheirev was defeated. The Ch. haRI”M explains (akin to R' Bloch) that it was the tzidkus of Chizkiyahu that led him to not sing shirah -- so confident was Chizkiyahu in his emunah that he too, like other tzadikim, accepted with equanimity the defeat of Sancheirev without shock or surprise. Yet, it seems to me that the punchline of the gemara is that singing shirah is the higher madreiga, as that would have led to the complete tikun of the world and the arrival of Moshiach. Yes, perhaps the ability to experience the joy of singing shirah comes at the price of feeling the challenge to emunah of pain and suffering, but sometimes the price is one worth paying.
The Beis HaLevi’s explanation of the Midrash is one of the more famous/popular ones: At the time of redemption we will be privileged to look back and understand how all that we thought was bad and to our determent was really a bracha in disguise. Moshe sang “Az yashir” with the realization that the suffering he complained of and questioned, “m’az basi el Pharoah,” was really all for the good.
Shifting from Brisk to Telz, R’ Bloch offers a different explanation which I found amazingly deep and insightful, but at the same time I am troubled by the message. The Midrash elsewhere tells us that despite the many miracles G-d performed before the redemption from Egypt, no one ever sang shirah until Yam Suf. Why not? Why did Avraham not sing shira when he escaped from the kivshan ha’aish? Why did Yitzchak not sing shirah when spared from akeidah? Why didn’t Ya’akov sing shirah when he escaped Lavan’s home?
R’ Bloch explains that this lack of shirah is not due to some failing on the part of those tzadikim, but aderaba, precisely because of their greatness. Emunah means accepting with complete equanimity that all that occurs in the world is ultimately, whether we see it as such or not, a means to greater kvod shamayim and an expression of Hashem's perfect plan. Avraham accepted that whether he personally lived through the kivshan or not, the result will ultimately be greater kvod shamayim, so why sing shirah at being spared? Why sing shirah or be surprised at salvation when one knows that Hashem runs the world according to a plan which guarantees good for the righteous and evil for wrongdoers?
Moshe Rabeinu, however, did not accept with equanimity the suffering and pain of the Jewish people. He questioned and cried out with “az” because he could not see how kvod shamayim was enhanced by the prolonging of galus. And precisely because Moshe had the capacity to be moved and pained by Jewish suffering that gave him the capacity to be moved and rejoice in shirah when seeing the redemption of the Jewish people.
R’ Bloch contrasts Moshe’s shirah with the shirah of David haMelech. Chazal tell us a harp was suspended above David’s bed which played when the North wind blew. Unlike Moshe’s shirah which was inspired by the shift in circumstance from the “az” of galus to the “az” of geulah, David’s harp played in shirah even while he was still asleep and not conscious or aware of the comings and goings in the world; David’s shirah played as the North wind, the wind that always exists in nature, blew. David haMelech’s shirah was not inspired by the miraculous, but was a shirah that celebrated the day to day presence of Hashem in the world. This is the shirah which we will sing with the coming of Moshiach.
The interpretation is brilliant, but am uncomfortable with the upshot of the message. Who is superior – those tzadikim who accept with equanimity Hashem’s hashgacha, those tzadikim who do not suffer at the experience of pain or rejoice in redemption because it is so clear to them that all is in Hashem’s hands and the proper outcome is inevitable, or those tzadikim whose souls cry out at tragedy and soar in joy? R’ Bloch sees the former as having a superior level of emunah, while describing the latter having a emunah which is contingent (to some degree) on circumstance. Emunah which accepts all with equinimaity is superior to emunah which is diminished and challenged by the perception of evil, but which is elevated when salvation arrives.
I am uncomfortable with this idea of placing emunah is conflict with what I can only decribe as one's humanity. Need empathizing with suffering and tragedy, even questioning suffering and tragedy, be seen as indicative of a shortcoming of belief? Or might one not argue that it is precisely a deep-seated belief in hashgacha that leads one to protest suffering and question what appears to be injustice? Without belief, there is no room for questions, as an uncaring mechanistic universe does not promise either justice or sympathy.
Chazal tell us that Chizkiyahu would have been Moshiach had he only sung shirah when Sancheirev was defeated. The Ch. haRI”M explains (akin to R' Bloch) that it was the tzidkus of Chizkiyahu that led him to not sing shirah -- so confident was Chizkiyahu in his emunah that he too, like other tzadikim, accepted with equanimity the defeat of Sancheirev without shock or surprise. Yet, it seems to me that the punchline of the gemara is that singing shirah is the higher madreiga, as that would have led to the complete tikun of the world and the arrival of Moshiach. Yes, perhaps the ability to experience the joy of singing shirah comes at the price of feeling the challenge to emunah of pain and suffering, but sometimes the price is one worth paying.
Thursday, January 07, 2010
shlichus l'dvar aveira (II)
Following up on the previous post: the Ketzos brought a proof from the fact that a shliach appointed to slaughter an animal for a ganav does not negate his shlichus if he does the shechita on Shabbos that if a shliach to bring a get coerces the woman to accept the get in violation of cheirem d’Rabeinu Gershom, his shlichus is also not negated. The Noda b’Yehudah, however, holds in this later case the shlichus is negated because ain shliach l’dvar aveira. We left standing the question of how the Noda b’Yehudah would distinguish between the case of get and the case the Ketzos uses as his proof.
Lots of nice comments on this one. Let’s start with a pragmatic chiluk: The shliach can certainly fulfill his task of shechita on a weekday as well as he could on Shabbos – the choice to commit chilul Shabbos, the act of chilul Shabbos, is completely independent of the job of tevicha. However, if the woman the shliach is assigned to deliver a get to refuses to accept it, there is no way for him to complete his shlichus except by coercing her to accept the get. The act of coerced nesina is inseparable from the act of nesina itself.
A more conceptual (this is suggested by Rav Amiel in his Midos l’Cheiker Halacha) answer hinges on a chiluk we discussed once before: there is a difference between the concept of shlichus and the concept of shlucho shel adam k’moso. A shliach sometimes is just a means to an end: the ganav wants meat, so he asks a friend who knows shechita to help him. Who does the shechita does not matter to the ganav or anyone else – all we care about is "where’s the beef". However, when it comes to delivery of a get, the shliach functions as more than just a messenger – the shliach must serve as a representative of the husband, because without the husband’s participation there can be no get! Delivery of a get requires shlucho shel adam k’moso – a representative form of shlichus. If the shliach serving as the husband’s representative does an aveira in the process of delivering the get, there is more of a reason to ascribe that aveira to the meshaleyach and invalidate the shlichus.
Just parenthetically, I enjoy R' Scheinberg's sefer "Mishmeres Chaim" because it is a treasure trove of these type questions. I began going through it many months ago on Friday nights/Shabbos with my son and have noticed that his ability to solve questions like this has increased dramatically -- I think it's not just that he knows more in general, but I think exposure to conceptual chilukim helps hone one's own ability to think along the same lines. One advantage to Rav Amiel's sefer over the Mishmeres Chaim is that it is organized around conceptual principles -- he sets out a type a chiluk or chakira and then illustrates it with example after example. The Mishmeres Chaim just groups questions according to the area of halacha they address, e.g. hil. eidus, hil. purim, hil. kidushin, etc. and you have to figure out chakiros and chilukim to apply at random. Perhaps a worthwhile project for someone with spare time and energy might be to re-organize the Mishmeres Chaim by principle, so you have the advantage of his wonderful questions along with a more organized presentation of the various types of logic used to derive the answers. Just an idea.
Lots of nice comments on this one. Let’s start with a pragmatic chiluk: The shliach can certainly fulfill his task of shechita on a weekday as well as he could on Shabbos – the choice to commit chilul Shabbos, the act of chilul Shabbos, is completely independent of the job of tevicha. However, if the woman the shliach is assigned to deliver a get to refuses to accept it, there is no way for him to complete his shlichus except by coercing her to accept the get. The act of coerced nesina is inseparable from the act of nesina itself.
A more conceptual (this is suggested by Rav Amiel in his Midos l’Cheiker Halacha) answer hinges on a chiluk we discussed once before: there is a difference between the concept of shlichus and the concept of shlucho shel adam k’moso. A shliach sometimes is just a means to an end: the ganav wants meat, so he asks a friend who knows shechita to help him. Who does the shechita does not matter to the ganav or anyone else – all we care about is "where’s the beef". However, when it comes to delivery of a get, the shliach functions as more than just a messenger – the shliach must serve as a representative of the husband, because without the husband’s participation there can be no get! Delivery of a get requires shlucho shel adam k’moso – a representative form of shlichus. If the shliach serving as the husband’s representative does an aveira in the process of delivering the get, there is more of a reason to ascribe that aveira to the meshaleyach and invalidate the shlichus.
Just parenthetically, I enjoy R' Scheinberg's sefer "Mishmeres Chaim" because it is a treasure trove of these type questions. I began going through it many months ago on Friday nights/Shabbos with my son and have noticed that his ability to solve questions like this has increased dramatically -- I think it's not just that he knows more in general, but I think exposure to conceptual chilukim helps hone one's own ability to think along the same lines. One advantage to Rav Amiel's sefer over the Mishmeres Chaim is that it is organized around conceptual principles -- he sets out a type a chiluk or chakira and then illustrates it with example after example. The Mishmeres Chaim just groups questions according to the area of halacha they address, e.g. hil. eidus, hil. purim, hil. kidushin, etc. and you have to figure out chakiros and chilukim to apply at random. Perhaps a worthwhile project for someone with spare time and energy might be to re-organize the Mishmeres Chaim by principle, so you have the advantage of his wonderful questions along with a more organized presentation of the various types of logic used to derive the answers. Just an idea.
Tuesday, January 05, 2010
shlichus l'dvar aveira
Tosfos (B.M. 10 acc. to one answer) writes that if someone appoints a shliach to do an aveira on his behalf, since ain shliach l'dvar aveira, the shlichus is nullified. The Noda b'Yehudah paskens on this basis that if a husband appoints a shliach to deliver a get and divorce his wife and the shliach violates the chareim d'Rabeinu Gershom by forcing the wife to accept the get against her will, the shlichus is nullified and the get is invalid.
The Ketzos (siman 182) disagrees. The Ketzos argues that the nullification of shlichus based on ain shliach l'dvar aveira applies only where the meshaleyach tells the shliach to perform an aveira on his behalf. However, if the meshaleyach appoints the shliach to act as his agent and the shliach of his own volition performs some aveira along the way, that does not cause the shlichus to be nullified.
The Ketzos proves his point by comparing the Noda b'Yehudah's scenario to a case discussed by the Mishne l'Melech (Hil. Geneiva ch 3). One of the exceptions to the rule of ain shliach l'dvar aveira is the case of slaughtering a stolen animal, e.g. if a thief asks a shochet to slaughter an animal he stole, the thief, not the shochet, is liable to pay the extra fine for tevicha/slaughtering the animal. What happens if the shochet slaughters the animal on Shabbos? Interestingly, so long as the meshaleyach did not explicitely tell the shochet to work on Shabbos, the meshaleyach (the thief) is chayav to pay the added penalty for the slaughtering of the animal and the shochet is chayav for breaking Shabbos. The fact that the shochet happened to do an aveira of chilul Shabbos while fulfilling the task the meshaleyach assigned to him does not constitute a shlichus l'dvar aveira and nullify his appointment.
So too, writes the Ketzos, the fact that the husband's agent happened to violate cheirem d'Rabeinu Gershom while fulfilling the task of delivering the get assigned to him does not constitute shlichus l'dvar aveira and nullify his appointment. So long as the husband did not order the shliach to act improperly, the shlichus is valid and the wrongdoing of the shliach is his own business.
What do you make of the Ketzos' proof? Can you draw a distinction between the case discussed by the Noda b'Yehudah and the scenario of the Mishne l'Melech?
The Ketzos (siman 182) disagrees. The Ketzos argues that the nullification of shlichus based on ain shliach l'dvar aveira applies only where the meshaleyach tells the shliach to perform an aveira on his behalf. However, if the meshaleyach appoints the shliach to act as his agent and the shliach of his own volition performs some aveira along the way, that does not cause the shlichus to be nullified.
The Ketzos proves his point by comparing the Noda b'Yehudah's scenario to a case discussed by the Mishne l'Melech (Hil. Geneiva ch 3). One of the exceptions to the rule of ain shliach l'dvar aveira is the case of slaughtering a stolen animal, e.g. if a thief asks a shochet to slaughter an animal he stole, the thief, not the shochet, is liable to pay the extra fine for tevicha/slaughtering the animal. What happens if the shochet slaughters the animal on Shabbos? Interestingly, so long as the meshaleyach did not explicitely tell the shochet to work on Shabbos, the meshaleyach (the thief) is chayav to pay the added penalty for the slaughtering of the animal and the shochet is chayav for breaking Shabbos. The fact that the shochet happened to do an aveira of chilul Shabbos while fulfilling the task the meshaleyach assigned to him does not constitute a shlichus l'dvar aveira and nullify his appointment.
So too, writes the Ketzos, the fact that the husband's agent happened to violate cheirem d'Rabeinu Gershom while fulfilling the task of delivering the get assigned to him does not constitute shlichus l'dvar aveira and nullify his appointment. So long as the husband did not order the shliach to act improperly, the shlichus is valid and the wrongdoing of the shliach is his own business.
What do you make of the Ketzos' proof? Can you draw a distinction between the case discussed by the Noda b'Yehudah and the scenario of the Mishne l'Melech?
Monday, January 04, 2010
hamalach hagoel: davening to angels
All of our tefilos are directed to Hashem, not to any intermediary. To avoid any confusion, many strike from tefilah any references that would give the impression that we are addressing angels, e.g. as my son put it, “Machnisei rachamim [at the conclusion of slichos] is a nice tune, just leave out the words.” R’ Chaim Volozhiner even avoided saying “Barchuni l’Shalom” in Shalom Aleichem as it implies that we are asking angels for a blessing. Yet, in last week’s parsha we have a famous pasuk where Ya’akov Avinu does seem to call on an angel to bless his grandchildren -- “HaMalach hagoel osi ‘mol ra yevareich es ha’nearim…”
Rishonim (e.g. Seforno) explain that Ya’akov is not calling on an angel. The pasuk of “HaMalach hagoel…” is a continuation of the previous pasuk where Ya’akov calls on Hashem to bless Epraim and Menashe; he continues that call to Hashem and requests that Hashem send a “Malach hagoel” should his grandchildren not be worthy of Hashem’s direct intervention. The Ohr HaChaim alternatively suggests that Ya’akov simply refers to Hashem’s intervention in the world as a “malach” (see HaKsav v’Hakabalah on this point).
The first answer makes sense in context, but that intended of calling on Hashem to send a malach is surely distorted when we quote the bracha of “HaMalach hagoel…” independently of the previous pasuk as we do in Shema al ha’mita, when given as a bracha to kids getting aliyos on Simchas Torah, or when sung to a baby before a bris. Is the contextual meaning really implicit or intended in our quote (as R’ Shteinman suggests)? Or are we really just relying on the other explanation of the term “malach”? R’ Shteinman suggests another novel idea (based on Rishonim elsewhere): the term “malach” by definition means “messenger of Hashem.” Therefore, implicit in the term "malach" is the idea that Hashem is ultimately doing the blessing. This would seem to solve the issue with “Barchuni l’Shalom malachai hashalom” as well.
Rishonim (e.g. Seforno) explain that Ya’akov is not calling on an angel. The pasuk of “HaMalach hagoel…” is a continuation of the previous pasuk where Ya’akov calls on Hashem to bless Epraim and Menashe; he continues that call to Hashem and requests that Hashem send a “Malach hagoel” should his grandchildren not be worthy of Hashem’s direct intervention. The Ohr HaChaim alternatively suggests that Ya’akov simply refers to Hashem’s intervention in the world as a “malach” (see HaKsav v’Hakabalah on this point).
The first answer makes sense in context, but that intended of calling on Hashem to send a malach is surely distorted when we quote the bracha of “HaMalach hagoel…” independently of the previous pasuk as we do in Shema al ha’mita, when given as a bracha to kids getting aliyos on Simchas Torah, or when sung to a baby before a bris. Is the contextual meaning really implicit or intended in our quote (as R’ Shteinman suggests)? Or are we really just relying on the other explanation of the term “malach”? R’ Shteinman suggests another novel idea (based on Rishonim elsewhere): the term “malach” by definition means “messenger of Hashem.” Therefore, implicit in the term "malach" is the idea that Hashem is ultimately doing the blessing. This would seem to solve the issue with “Barchuni l’Shalom malachai hashalom” as well.
Friday, January 01, 2010
placing Ephraim before Menashe
Ya'akov tells his grandchildren that future generations will be given the bracha, "Yesimcha Elokim k'Ephraim v'kMenashe," and in case we failed to notice, the pasuk tells us, "Vayasem es Ephraim lifnei Menashe," that Ya'akov placed Ephraim before Menashe (48:30).
Why does the pasuk state the obvious? Furthermore, the Ksav Sofer further asks: if Ephraim was the greater of the two, why not just give a bracha to be like Ephraim and bichlal masayim manah, the lesser bracha of Mensashe would be automatically included in the greater bracha of being like Ephraim?
Ephraim and Menashe each had unique qualities. Ephraim shone in his dedication to learning at the side of Ya'akov; Menashe shone at handling practical affairs of state. Yesh bichlal masayim manah applies when measuring quantities, but does not apply to qualitative differences. Ya'akov felt that the value of learning which Ephraim represented was superior in importance to the practical knowledge of Menashe, but one cannot exist without the other. The Torah stresses that Ya'akov placed Ephraim first, but the qualities of both children have to be transmitted to give complete bracha.
But this begs the question: So what if Menashe and Ephraim had different natures and Ephraim showed talent in those areas Ya'akov felt had more importance -- why didn't Ya'akov just give Menashe, the older brother, a bracha that he should embody those same important traits rather than reverse the order?
R' Chatzkel Levenstein explains with respect to the brachos of the Shevatim that a bracha can enhance a latest talent, it can help a trait flourish and grow, but it cannot make something from nothing. The isha haShunamis had to have a jug and a drop of oil for the bracha of more oil to be given to her, but without that no miracle could take place. Hashem gives each of us unique talents because those are the tools and keys to our individual shleimus and achievement of our individual mission. Menashe cannot be made into an Ephraim, but he can be given a bracha to achieve his potential in avodas Hashem using his own individual gifts.
Why does the pasuk state the obvious? Furthermore, the Ksav Sofer further asks: if Ephraim was the greater of the two, why not just give a bracha to be like Ephraim and bichlal masayim manah, the lesser bracha of Mensashe would be automatically included in the greater bracha of being like Ephraim?
Ephraim and Menashe each had unique qualities. Ephraim shone in his dedication to learning at the side of Ya'akov; Menashe shone at handling practical affairs of state. Yesh bichlal masayim manah applies when measuring quantities, but does not apply to qualitative differences. Ya'akov felt that the value of learning which Ephraim represented was superior in importance to the practical knowledge of Menashe, but one cannot exist without the other. The Torah stresses that Ya'akov placed Ephraim first, but the qualities of both children have to be transmitted to give complete bracha.
But this begs the question: So what if Menashe and Ephraim had different natures and Ephraim showed talent in those areas Ya'akov felt had more importance -- why didn't Ya'akov just give Menashe, the older brother, a bracha that he should embody those same important traits rather than reverse the order?
R' Chatzkel Levenstein explains with respect to the brachos of the Shevatim that a bracha can enhance a latest talent, it can help a trait flourish and grow, but it cannot make something from nothing. The isha haShunamis had to have a jug and a drop of oil for the bracha of more oil to be given to her, but without that no miracle could take place. Hashem gives each of us unique talents because those are the tools and keys to our individual shleimus and achievement of our individual mission. Menashe cannot be made into an Ephraim, but he can be given a bracha to achieve his potential in avodas Hashem using his own individual gifts.
Thursday, December 31, 2009
all hands on deck
I had anticipated that most people would want more posts on parsha, as this is one area we share in learning every week, yet surprise, surprise, lomdus is the big winner in the poll. But I can’t ignore parsha, can I? A few gems from R’ Shteinman’s “Ayeles haShachar”:
Commenting on the placement of Ya’akov’s hands on Ephraim and Menasha (48:14), Rabeinu Bachye notes that in many places we see the laying on of hands in particular is connected with bracha, e.g. birchas kohanim, the smicha of Moshe to Yehoshua. R’ Shteinman in Ayeles haShachar uses this as a springboard to address an interesting question: The gemara tells us that R’ Chisda would use more than the required measure of water for netilas yadayim and he attributed his receiving bracha for this meritorious behavior. The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 158) writes that one should try to emulate this practice and use more than enough water for washing. Yet, we do not find in halacha that being toivel in a mikveh that has more than the necessary 40 se’ah of water is any more meritorious than being toivel in a mikveh that has exactly the shiur. Why the difference? R’ Shteinman suggests that the halacha may be based on the particular connection of the hands with bracha. I don’t know if I’m satisfied with the answer, but I like the question.
Reuvain is told that his haste in disturbing his father’s bed cost him additional bracha: “Pachaz ka’mayim al tosar ki alias mishkivei avicha…” (49:4 ) Yet, we know from a previous Rashi (37:29) that Reuvain did tshuvah for this act. R’ Shteinman notes that apparently tshuvah is not enough to recover the lost ma’alos which Reuvain could have have had if not for his impetuousness.
“Lo yasur sheivet m’Yehudah u’mechokek m’bein raglav” (49:10) Rashi explains mechokek refers to the Nasi in Eretz Yisrael. R’ Shteinman explains that the Nasi is not described with the term “sheivet” because unlike the Reish Galusa in Bavel, the Nasi had no political power to enforce his will. For a more detailed discussion of the differences between these two rulers based on a chiddush of the Dvar Avraham, see this post.
Commenting on the placement of Ya’akov’s hands on Ephraim and Menasha (48:14), Rabeinu Bachye notes that in many places we see the laying on of hands in particular is connected with bracha, e.g. birchas kohanim, the smicha of Moshe to Yehoshua. R’ Shteinman in Ayeles haShachar uses this as a springboard to address an interesting question: The gemara tells us that R’ Chisda would use more than the required measure of water for netilas yadayim and he attributed his receiving bracha for this meritorious behavior. The Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 158) writes that one should try to emulate this practice and use more than enough water for washing. Yet, we do not find in halacha that being toivel in a mikveh that has more than the necessary 40 se’ah of water is any more meritorious than being toivel in a mikveh that has exactly the shiur. Why the difference? R’ Shteinman suggests that the halacha may be based on the particular connection of the hands with bracha. I don’t know if I’m satisfied with the answer, but I like the question.
Reuvain is told that his haste in disturbing his father’s bed cost him additional bracha: “Pachaz ka’mayim al tosar ki alias mishkivei avicha…” (49:4 ) Yet, we know from a previous Rashi (37:29) that Reuvain did tshuvah for this act. R’ Shteinman notes that apparently tshuvah is not enough to recover the lost ma’alos which Reuvain could have have had if not for his impetuousness.
“Lo yasur sheivet m’Yehudah u’mechokek m’bein raglav” (49:10) Rashi explains mechokek refers to the Nasi in Eretz Yisrael. R’ Shteinman explains that the Nasi is not described with the term “sheivet” because unlike the Reish Galusa in Bavel, the Nasi had no political power to enforce his will. For a more detailed discussion of the differences between these two rulers based on a chiddush of the Dvar Avraham, see this post.
new year -- secular holiday or avodah zarah?
Rav Aviner was quoted recently (link) as saying that wishing “Happy New Year” on Jan 1 is prohibited because the Xstian new year is connected with idol worship and wishing happy new year would be a positive acknowledgment of an idolatrous celebration.
I e-mailed (though I’m not sure I had the right address) the ba’al hablog to see if it was possible to get some more information or clarification on this psak. I am curious as to why Rav Aviner defines the new year as a religious holiday and not a secular or civil holiday. The origin of celebrating Jan 1 as the start of a new year goes back to the Roman Empire, long before the rise of Xstianity. For centuries the Xstian world celebrated March 25 as its new year, not Jan 1. The establishment of Jan 1 as the new year on the Gregorian calendar may have more to do with this Roman precedent than religion. Jan 1 is celebrated as the start of a new year in countries like China, where it seems to be only a secular, civil holiday, as other dates are celebrated as the start of a new religious/traditional year (i.e. Chinese New Year). Interestingly, Wikipedia identifies Israel as the only country that does not celebrate Jan 1 as a new year.
Update -- I received the following reply from R' Friedfertig, who writes up the torah for the Rav Aviner blog, and am posting it with his permission: While it seems that the date was originally established for a "secular" purpose (although it is hard to know if it was not connected to idol worship in some way), in Western countries it is clearly part of the calendar which is related to Christianity. Rabbenu Ha-Rav Tzvi Yehudah was adamant that we not use the Christian date because of its association with idol worship and obviously saying "Happy New Year" would be included in that.
I e-mailed (though I’m not sure I had the right address) the ba’al hablog to see if it was possible to get some more information or clarification on this psak. I am curious as to why Rav Aviner defines the new year as a religious holiday and not a secular or civil holiday. The origin of celebrating Jan 1 as the start of a new year goes back to the Roman Empire, long before the rise of Xstianity. For centuries the Xstian world celebrated March 25 as its new year, not Jan 1. The establishment of Jan 1 as the new year on the Gregorian calendar may have more to do with this Roman precedent than religion. Jan 1 is celebrated as the start of a new year in countries like China, where it seems to be only a secular, civil holiday, as other dates are celebrated as the start of a new religious/traditional year (i.e. Chinese New Year). Interestingly, Wikipedia identifies Israel as the only country that does not celebrate Jan 1 as a new year.
Update -- I received the following reply from R' Friedfertig, who writes up the torah for the Rav Aviner blog, and am posting it with his permission: While it seems that the date was originally established for a "secular" purpose (although it is hard to know if it was not connected to idol worship in some way), in Western countries it is clearly part of the calendar which is related to Christianity. Rabbenu Ha-Rav Tzvi Yehudah was adamant that we not use the Christian date because of its association with idol worship and obviously saying "Happy New Year" would be included in that.
Wednesday, December 30, 2009
brachos, parents and children
1) "Kachem na eilei v'avaracheim" (48:9)
Ya'akov tells Yosef to bring his sons to him and he will bless them.
Rav Amiel (Hegyonos El Ami) beautifully writes that there are many people who believe in the brachos of a tzadik without believing in the tzadik. What does that mean? To run to this Rebbe or that tzadik to ask for a bracha is easy. But what makes those brachos work? It's because the tzadik giving them lives a certain lifestyle in accordance with certain values. If you truly believe those values and lifestyle make a tzadik, then there is no excuse for not aspiring to incorporate them into your own life. But you have a tartei d'sasrei: people will run after the brachos, but reject the values.
When Ya'akov said to bring Ephraim and Menashe to him, he wasn't talking about physical proximity -- he meant that Yosef must first bring Ephraim and Menashe to adopt and appreciate the values of Ya'akov the tzadik, and only then could his bracha, the bracha of a tzadik, have meaning.
2) One other point from Rav Amiel that rings so true: the Torah tells us that Ephraim stood to the right of Yosef which was to the left of Ya'akov, and Menashe stood to the left of Yosef which was to the right of Ya'akov.
Ya'akov and Yosef -- could there be any closer father and son? Yet, the Torah tells us that what to Yosef was right, to Ya'akov was left; what to Yosef was left, to Ya'akov was right... and so it is always between parents and their children.
Ya'akov tells Yosef to bring his sons to him and he will bless them.
Rav Amiel (Hegyonos El Ami) beautifully writes that there are many people who believe in the brachos of a tzadik without believing in the tzadik. What does that mean? To run to this Rebbe or that tzadik to ask for a bracha is easy. But what makes those brachos work? It's because the tzadik giving them lives a certain lifestyle in accordance with certain values. If you truly believe those values and lifestyle make a tzadik, then there is no excuse for not aspiring to incorporate them into your own life. But you have a tartei d'sasrei: people will run after the brachos, but reject the values.
When Ya'akov said to bring Ephraim and Menashe to him, he wasn't talking about physical proximity -- he meant that Yosef must first bring Ephraim and Menashe to adopt and appreciate the values of Ya'akov the tzadik, and only then could his bracha, the bracha of a tzadik, have meaning.
2) One other point from Rav Amiel that rings so true: the Torah tells us that Ephraim stood to the right of Yosef which was to the left of Ya'akov, and Menashe stood to the left of Yosef which was to the right of Ya'akov.
Ya'akov and Yosef -- could there be any closer father and son? Yet, the Torah tells us that what to Yosef was right, to Ya'akov was left; what to Yosef was left, to Ya'akov was right... and so it is always between parents and their children.
ne'emanus of an eid echad
In this previous post we left off with comparing the Rambam, who holds that once an eid echad establishes that a piece of meat is cheilev a person can receive malkos for eating it, with Tosfos, who holds that a chiyuv misa cannot be predicated on an eid echad’s prior testimony that a woman’s husband is dead. Is this case identical to the cheilev case?
R’ Shimon Shkop argues that you can be mechaleik. The Torah gives ne’emanus to an eid echad to tell us whether meat is cheilev or kosher. According to Tosfos (Yevamos 88), the ability of woman to remarry based on the testimony of an eid echad is only a takanah derabbanan based on the combined factors of dayka u’minsiba, the fact that a woman would not remarry without verifying and being certain her first husband is dead, and the word of the eid echad (who otherwise would not be acceptable in a case of devar sheb’ervah). It's not that the Chachamim gave the eid echad ne’emanus – rather, the Chachamim said that despite the lack of ne’emanus which an eid echad has, a woman is still entitled to remarry to avoid an agunah situation. If at a later point that situation leads to a question of dinei nefashos, the fate of the first husband is still viewed as an unresolved issue.
R’ Shimon Shkop argues that you can be mechaleik. The Torah gives ne’emanus to an eid echad to tell us whether meat is cheilev or kosher. According to Tosfos (Yevamos 88), the ability of woman to remarry based on the testimony of an eid echad is only a takanah derabbanan based on the combined factors of dayka u’minsiba, the fact that a woman would not remarry without verifying and being certain her first husband is dead, and the word of the eid echad (who otherwise would not be acceptable in a case of devar sheb’ervah). It's not that the Chachamim gave the eid echad ne’emanus – rather, the Chachamim said that despite the lack of ne’emanus which an eid echad has, a woman is still entitled to remarry to avoid an agunah situation. If at a later point that situation leads to a question of dinei nefashos, the fate of the first husband is still viewed as an unresolved issue.
Tuesday, December 29, 2009
paradoxical minchas chinuch: safeik pikuach nefesh in the case of a rodef
The Minchas Chinuch has what sounds to me like a paradoxical chiddush with respect to the mitzvah of saving a nirdaf from his attacker (#600). The halacha is ain holchin b’pikuach nefesh achar harov. For example, even if the majority of a city is not-Jewish (and m’dina d’gemara one cannot be machelel Shabbos for a goy), if there is any doubt as to identity of someone who needs help, one should be mechalel Shabbos on their behalf and not assume based on rov that they are a goy. Similarly, the mitzvah of saving the nirdaf only applies if he is Jewish, but, writes the Minchas Chinuch, if there is any doubt, even if the majority of the city is not-Jewish, ain holchin b’pikuach nefesh achar harov and one can do whatever is necessary to stop the rodef, even killing him.
Why does this make sense? True, in a case of safeik, even if there is a rov, we act to preserve life, but in this case we are sparing the life of the nirdaf at the potential cost of killing his attacker, the rodef. Why would we not invoke the safeik/rov and argue to spare the life of the rodef on that basis? And even if it is inevitable that one of the two will die, shev v’al ta’aseh adif, what gives the onlooker the right to interfere in a situation of safeik in a way that will cost a life?
Why does this make sense? True, in a case of safeik, even if there is a rov, we act to preserve life, but in this case we are sparing the life of the nirdaf at the potential cost of killing his attacker, the rodef. Why would we not invoke the safeik/rov and argue to spare the life of the rodef on that basis? And even if it is inevitable that one of the two will die, shev v’al ta’aseh adif, what gives the onlooker the right to interfere in a situation of safeik in a way that will cost a life?
Monday, December 28, 2009
when an eid echad can cause a chiyuv misa
I admit that I’m surprised at how much interest there is lomdish posts based on the little poll posted on the side, but the poll is still open and results can change. Thank you to everyone who bothered to put in their 2 cents -- much appreciated. My guess is people like chakiros and also like being me'dameh milsa l'milsa and making chilukim. Unfortunately for me thinking of sugyos in those terms is very hard to do when one has a regular job taking up most of the day.
The gemara (Chulin 96) offers a proof that eyewitness recognition, teviyus ayin, is stronger proof than simanim: if two witnesses come forward and say they recognize a murderer, their testimony is enough to create a chiyav misa and cause the murderer to receive the death penalty. However, if two witnesses do not recognize the murderer, but identify him through simanim, certain marks or features, that is not sufficient to convict.
Tosfos challenges the gemara’s assertion that the death penalty cannot be given on the basis of simanin with the following case: A woman may rely on simanim to establish that her first husband is dead. If she then remarries and is not faithful to her second husband, she is guilty of adultery and punished. Without the simanim proof that her first husband is dead and she is legally married to her second husband, there would be no way to establish the woman’s guilt (you can't commit adultery if you are not legally married). Therefore, we see that simanim can provide a basis for the death penalty.
Tosfos is forced to conclude that if the death of the first husband is established either through simanim or a single witness alone the adulteress would not be punished.
Compare this Tosfos with the following chiddush of the Rambam (Hil. Sanhedrin ch 16):
אינו צריך שני עדים למלקות, אלא בשעת מעשה; אבל האיסור עצמו, בעד אחד יוחזק. כיצד: אמר עד אחד חלב כליות הוא זה, כלאי הכרם הם פירות אלו, גרושה או זונה היא אישה זו, ואכל או בעל בעדים אחר שהותרה בו--הרי זה לוקה, אף על פי שעיקר האיסור בעד אחד.
If a single witness says that Reuvain ate cheiliev, Reuvain gets no punishment -- two witnesses are needed to establish guilt. However, if a single witness testifies that a piece of meat is cheilev, and then afterwards two witnesses come forward and testify that Reuvain ate that piece of meat, Reuvain would get malkos. Even though we only have the say-so of a single witness that the meat is cheilev, since that one witness is believed before the fact, Reuvain is chayav.
Does Tosfos argue on this Rambam? Is there a difference between convicting Reuvain of eating meat we know to be cheilev based on the prior testimony of only one witness and convicting a woman of adultery based on the prior testimony of only one witness that her first husband is dead and she is legally married to her second husband?
The gemara (Chulin 96) offers a proof that eyewitness recognition, teviyus ayin, is stronger proof than simanim: if two witnesses come forward and say they recognize a murderer, their testimony is enough to create a chiyav misa and cause the murderer to receive the death penalty. However, if two witnesses do not recognize the murderer, but identify him through simanim, certain marks or features, that is not sufficient to convict.
Tosfos challenges the gemara’s assertion that the death penalty cannot be given on the basis of simanin with the following case: A woman may rely on simanim to establish that her first husband is dead. If she then remarries and is not faithful to her second husband, she is guilty of adultery and punished. Without the simanim proof that her first husband is dead and she is legally married to her second husband, there would be no way to establish the woman’s guilt (you can't commit adultery if you are not legally married). Therefore, we see that simanim can provide a basis for the death penalty.
Tosfos is forced to conclude that if the death of the first husband is established either through simanim or a single witness alone the adulteress would not be punished.
Compare this Tosfos with the following chiddush of the Rambam (Hil. Sanhedrin ch 16):
אינו צריך שני עדים למלקות, אלא בשעת מעשה; אבל האיסור עצמו, בעד אחד יוחזק. כיצד: אמר עד אחד חלב כליות הוא זה, כלאי הכרם הם פירות אלו, גרושה או זונה היא אישה זו, ואכל או בעל בעדים אחר שהותרה בו--הרי זה לוקה, אף על פי שעיקר האיסור בעד אחד.
If a single witness says that Reuvain ate cheiliev, Reuvain gets no punishment -- two witnesses are needed to establish guilt. However, if a single witness testifies that a piece of meat is cheilev, and then afterwards two witnesses come forward and testify that Reuvain ate that piece of meat, Reuvain would get malkos. Even though we only have the say-so of a single witness that the meat is cheilev, since that one witness is believed before the fact, Reuvain is chayav.
Does Tosfos argue on this Rambam? Is there a difference between convicting Reuvain of eating meat we know to be cheilev based on the prior testimony of only one witness and convicting a woman of adultery based on the prior testimony of only one witness that her first husband is dead and she is legally married to her second husband?
Thursday, December 24, 2009
aval asheimim anachnu
R' Elchanan highlights one pasuk in particular from the parshiyos of Yosef and his brothers as holding a profound moral lesson: "Aval asheimim anachnu al achinu" -- we are guilty for causing what has transpired (42:21). We look at events and wonder why things are as they are; human nature dictates that we assign blame to someone or something else where there is blame to be apportioned and point the finger at ourselves only when there is credit for the taking. Not so the brothers of Yosef -- they recognized that the fault for their suffering rested on their shoulders alone. It's not the economy, stupid, or any other force out there that dictates the fate of Klal Yisrael. It's asheimim anachnu.
I would just add a few points. As the Rishonim point out, the brothers do not confess to being wrong in their judgment of Yosef, but express remorse at not listening to his pleas for mercy. At times we must take unpleasant action, but that does not mean we should savor unpleasantness or be deaf to reconsideration or reconciliation. The brothers realized that even this small degree of callousness carried with it an enormous price.
This expression of guilt is years after the sale of Yosef. Undoubtedly the brothers did not act in haste and did not sell Yosef without careful consideration and deliberation. I don't think there was an expectation that what they did would come back to haunt them in the way that a criminal (l'havdil) has perhaps a sense of foreboding that his crime will be discovered (e.g. Dostoevsky's "Crime and Punishment"). Yet, there apparently is nothing else which occurred in the intervening years which the brothers could attribute their bad fortune to and they were forced to reconsider what they had done. Amazing.
I would just add a few points. As the Rishonim point out, the brothers do not confess to being wrong in their judgment of Yosef, but express remorse at not listening to his pleas for mercy. At times we must take unpleasant action, but that does not mean we should savor unpleasantness or be deaf to reconsideration or reconciliation. The brothers realized that even this small degree of callousness carried with it an enormous price.
This expression of guilt is years after the sale of Yosef. Undoubtedly the brothers did not act in haste and did not sell Yosef without careful consideration and deliberation. I don't think there was an expectation that what they did would come back to haunt them in the way that a criminal (l'havdil) has perhaps a sense of foreboding that his crime will be discovered (e.g. Dostoevsky's "Crime and Punishment"). Yet, there apparently is nothing else which occurred in the intervening years which the brothers could attribute their bad fortune to and they were forced to reconsider what they had done. Amazing.
some thoughts on the article on R' Shachter
Thoughts on the Mishpacha magazine article about R' Shachter (linked to it for those like myself who do not subscribe):
1) I am surprised that certain blog writers did not start saying hallel when they saw the article (maybe they did?), as their joy seems boundless over the notion of someone like R' Shachter being accepted by the right (assuming that Mishpacha magazine is a barometer for what is passable in the chareidi world). Is there such a sense of insecurity about modern orthodoxy that the stamp of approval by those in the "other" camp means so much?
2) OK, so you made it into the RW world, but what at what price? I recall a YU Rosh Yeshiva once say that he never saw the Rav open a secular book. Rav Shachter is quoted as saying that he never heard the Rav mention philosophy in shiur execpt once. I was never in the Rav's shiur (he was no longer saying shiur way before my time at YU), but judging his legacy from the fruit it has borne certainly leads me to think that his impact is greater than only the chiddushei Torah he left behind. What of the Talmud shiur at Stern? Religious Zionism? And that just scratches the surface. Is it worth forgetting about all that for the sake of acceptance?
3) And who are those applauding the article so happy to be accepted by? By other shallow people who would otherwise reject the Rav if they had a more complete picture of his legacy? Lo heim v’lo scharam. I reject as equally silly those who view (as expressed in comments to some of my posts) the opinions of R’ Elyashiv and other “chareidi” gedolim as irrelevant to their MO world and those who view the Rav as treif or call him JB because he does not fit into their expectations. Why should those of us who respect the Rav as a gaon (which it is possible to do even if you disagree with his stance on each and every issue) care whether some segment of the community closes themselves off to his voice? It’s their loss, not ours. I guess it matters to you if you are concerned with the politics of the community as a whole and feel that you need to raise your voice and demand acceptance by the public, but I that is largely a wasted effort and the energy can better be spent doing other things. Of course, I have no pulpit and no public position, no children to marry off at the present time, or any other similar concerns, so I am free to care less what other people think, but I'm in no rush to change : )
4) In general, my family does not read Mishpacha and I try to keep other Jewish newspapers away except as needed for certain ads (for the sake of shopping or my wife's business). Why? Because if I read the NY Times and get upset at its bias, its shallowness, its politics, I just dismiss it as the nuts at the Times. But if I read a Jewish publication and see the same politics, shallowness, bias, and other nonsense, it's the nuts in my backyard, and I feel the pain of being part of a community that celebrates this low level of discourse and builds readership by providing more and more of the same. Why should I invite this stuff into my home to just get angry or depressed? For example, a few weeks ago a newspaper that I thought was a little better had an article which described certain chassidism as "hooligans". Whatever the point being made was, couldn't it have been made without using that word? It's not hilchos lashon hara that should be the only concern, but also the idea of saying "lo tahor" instead of "tamei", the tone of writing. I try to toss that paper in the garbage if I see it in the house. And I haven't even gotten started on the topic of the crass materialism which is marketed to the "frum" consumer. Maybe the article on R' Shachter is nice, but I would not subscribe to a publication on the basis of one article any more than I would buy a TV for my home because PBS sometimes has a nice program on. Maybe I'm just a fanatic, but that's how I see it.
1) I am surprised that certain blog writers did not start saying hallel when they saw the article (maybe they did?), as their joy seems boundless over the notion of someone like R' Shachter being accepted by the right (assuming that Mishpacha magazine is a barometer for what is passable in the chareidi world). Is there such a sense of insecurity about modern orthodoxy that the stamp of approval by those in the "other" camp means so much?
2) OK, so you made it into the RW world, but what at what price? I recall a YU Rosh Yeshiva once say that he never saw the Rav open a secular book. Rav Shachter is quoted as saying that he never heard the Rav mention philosophy in shiur execpt once. I was never in the Rav's shiur (he was no longer saying shiur way before my time at YU), but judging his legacy from the fruit it has borne certainly leads me to think that his impact is greater than only the chiddushei Torah he left behind. What of the Talmud shiur at Stern? Religious Zionism? And that just scratches the surface. Is it worth forgetting about all that for the sake of acceptance?
3) And who are those applauding the article so happy to be accepted by? By other shallow people who would otherwise reject the Rav if they had a more complete picture of his legacy? Lo heim v’lo scharam. I reject as equally silly those who view (as expressed in comments to some of my posts) the opinions of R’ Elyashiv and other “chareidi” gedolim as irrelevant to their MO world and those who view the Rav as treif or call him JB because he does not fit into their expectations. Why should those of us who respect the Rav as a gaon (which it is possible to do even if you disagree with his stance on each and every issue) care whether some segment of the community closes themselves off to his voice? It’s their loss, not ours. I guess it matters to you if you are concerned with the politics of the community as a whole and feel that you need to raise your voice and demand acceptance by the public, but I that is largely a wasted effort and the energy can better be spent doing other things. Of course, I have no pulpit and no public position, no children to marry off at the present time, or any other similar concerns, so I am free to care less what other people think, but I'm in no rush to change : )
4) In general, my family does not read Mishpacha and I try to keep other Jewish newspapers away except as needed for certain ads (for the sake of shopping or my wife's business). Why? Because if I read the NY Times and get upset at its bias, its shallowness, its politics, I just dismiss it as the nuts at the Times. But if I read a Jewish publication and see the same politics, shallowness, bias, and other nonsense, it's the nuts in my backyard, and I feel the pain of being part of a community that celebrates this low level of discourse and builds readership by providing more and more of the same. Why should I invite this stuff into my home to just get angry or depressed? For example, a few weeks ago a newspaper that I thought was a little better had an article which described certain chassidism as "hooligans". Whatever the point being made was, couldn't it have been made without using that word? It's not hilchos lashon hara that should be the only concern, but also the idea of saying "lo tahor" instead of "tamei", the tone of writing. I try to toss that paper in the garbage if I see it in the house. And I haven't even gotten started on the topic of the crass materialism which is marketed to the "frum" consumer. Maybe the article on R' Shachter is nice, but I would not subscribe to a publication on the basis of one article any more than I would buy a TV for my home because PBS sometimes has a nice program on. Maybe I'm just a fanatic, but that's how I see it.
why no "aseh doche lo ta'aseh" by gezel? (II)
I posted a poll on the side to see what topics people like best. I have my hunch, but let's see what you have to say.
Getting back to our story, why is it that you don't say aseh doche lo ta'aseh to allow stolen matzah?
The rule of aseh doche lo ta'aseh only applies when the kiyum mitzvah and violation of the lav are simultaneous (though see Piskei Tos. at the end of Zevachim), but I headed off that problem in the question by asking you to imagine a scenario where the theft and kiyum occur at the same time, e.g. you eat the matzah right off the table without picking it up first.
Another technical possibility mentioned in the comments is that matzah may require ownership, lachem (whether this is true or not is worth discussing, but grant the assumption). Since the aquisition of the matzah, the ownership, did not precede the kiyum hamitzvah, this scenario does not work.
The most popular answer was along the lines suggested by R' Shimon (Ch. to Mes. Nedarim). Aseh doche lo ta'aseh works when the aseh and the lav are isolated to the same person. For example, the Torah does not want you to wear kilayim, but the Torah's desire for you to fulfill the miztvah of tzitzis overrides the negative. When it comes to gezel, it's not just that the Torah wants you to avoid stealing, an issur gavra, but the Torah's aim is to protect the property of your fellow man, the nigzal. Your mitzvas hagavra can override your issur gavra, but not the harm caused to the nigzal. (Notice how R' Shimon's answer assumes something about the reason behind the issur, the sibah. Brisk would not be happy.)
Another example of the same principle at work: the gemara tells us that a neder can be chal on sukkah and prevent your fulfillment of the mitzvah. The Rashba asks: let the mitzvas aseh of sukkah be doche the lav of violating the neder? R' Shimon explains that neder is an issur cheftza, meaning the purpose of neder is to place the object off limits. The mitzvas hagavra of sukkah can override the personal chovas hagavra issur of breaking one's word, but it cannot make an object which is off limits suddenly usable.
No one got the idea suggested by R' Amiel, which is really built on a yesod of R' Shimon in Sha'rei Yosher. Why do we say safeik mamon l'kula - i.e. hamotzi m'chaveiro alav hara'aya, if you want my money, prove it's yours, but until then I am not turning it over. Shouldn't I be concerned that I may be holding money that is really yours, and sfeika d'oraysa (of gezel) l'chumra so I should turn it over?
The key to the answer is knowing which is the cart and which is the horse so we know what comes first. Am I the owner of an object because there is an issur of gezel on anyone else taking it, or is the issur of gezel a function of my ownership? R' Shimon opts for the latter definition. First clarify the rules of the marketplace, what ownership means, how property is aquired, etc. and then we can apply the rules of issur v'heter. If the rules of commerce establish my ownership of an object, I need not be concered with a safeik issur gezel because of someone else's claim. R' Amiel calls this the realm of the mishpati, commercial law, which is distinct from all other areas of halacha.
Aseh doche lo ta'aseh works in the realm of issur v'heter, but not in the realm of the mishpati. There is no commercial meaning to the mitzvah of matzah which would allow me to trespass on another person's property. This idea has a lot of ramifications, but enough for one post.
Getting back to our story, why is it that you don't say aseh doche lo ta'aseh to allow stolen matzah?
The rule of aseh doche lo ta'aseh only applies when the kiyum mitzvah and violation of the lav are simultaneous (though see Piskei Tos. at the end of Zevachim), but I headed off that problem in the question by asking you to imagine a scenario where the theft and kiyum occur at the same time, e.g. you eat the matzah right off the table without picking it up first.
Another technical possibility mentioned in the comments is that matzah may require ownership, lachem (whether this is true or not is worth discussing, but grant the assumption). Since the aquisition of the matzah, the ownership, did not precede the kiyum hamitzvah, this scenario does not work.
The most popular answer was along the lines suggested by R' Shimon (Ch. to Mes. Nedarim). Aseh doche lo ta'aseh works when the aseh and the lav are isolated to the same person. For example, the Torah does not want you to wear kilayim, but the Torah's desire for you to fulfill the miztvah of tzitzis overrides the negative. When it comes to gezel, it's not just that the Torah wants you to avoid stealing, an issur gavra, but the Torah's aim is to protect the property of your fellow man, the nigzal. Your mitzvas hagavra can override your issur gavra, but not the harm caused to the nigzal. (Notice how R' Shimon's answer assumes something about the reason behind the issur, the sibah. Brisk would not be happy.)
Another example of the same principle at work: the gemara tells us that a neder can be chal on sukkah and prevent your fulfillment of the mitzvah. The Rashba asks: let the mitzvas aseh of sukkah be doche the lav of violating the neder? R' Shimon explains that neder is an issur cheftza, meaning the purpose of neder is to place the object off limits. The mitzvas hagavra of sukkah can override the personal chovas hagavra issur of breaking one's word, but it cannot make an object which is off limits suddenly usable.
No one got the idea suggested by R' Amiel, which is really built on a yesod of R' Shimon in Sha'rei Yosher. Why do we say safeik mamon l'kula - i.e. hamotzi m'chaveiro alav hara'aya, if you want my money, prove it's yours, but until then I am not turning it over. Shouldn't I be concerned that I may be holding money that is really yours, and sfeika d'oraysa (of gezel) l'chumra so I should turn it over?
The key to the answer is knowing which is the cart and which is the horse so we know what comes first. Am I the owner of an object because there is an issur of gezel on anyone else taking it, or is the issur of gezel a function of my ownership? R' Shimon opts for the latter definition. First clarify the rules of the marketplace, what ownership means, how property is aquired, etc. and then we can apply the rules of issur v'heter. If the rules of commerce establish my ownership of an object, I need not be concered with a safeik issur gezel because of someone else's claim. R' Amiel calls this the realm of the mishpati, commercial law, which is distinct from all other areas of halacha.
Aseh doche lo ta'aseh works in the realm of issur v'heter, but not in the realm of the mishpati. There is no commercial meaning to the mitzvah of matzah which would allow me to trespass on another person's property. This idea has a lot of ramifications, but enough for one post.
Wednesday, December 23, 2009
why no "aseh doche lo ta'aseh" by gezel?
R' Moshe Amiel wrote an interesting sefer called "HaMidos l'Cheiker HaHalacha" ( 3 volumes available on hebrewbooks.org) which I wish I had time to read. The only comparable I am aware of is R' Kasher's "Mefa'aneiyach Tzefunos". Just like R' Kasher takes various chilukim and chakiros of the Rogatchover's and traces them through tens of sugyos to show how the Rogatchover applied them, R' Amiel tries to isolate certain logical principles and demonstrate how they apply across multiple sugyos, along the way explaining the central points of various machlokesin, resolving questions of Achronim, etc. As he writes in the introduction to one of the volumes, what makes the sefer unique is that instead of being organized around a masechta or around the Rambam, it is organized around these "midos", these logical constructs. My small critique after a cursory glance is that there are many, many sub-principles which he creates which makes things a bit complex, and he also has exceptions on top of the rules. That being said, the sefer is a tour de force of lomdus, for what is lomdus if not the translation of case-law into conceptual and logical principles.
Case in point as an illustration: Achronim ask why we never say aseh doche lo ta'aseh on an issur like gezel. For example, if you ate your friend's matzah so that the eating and theft were simultaneous, the halacha does not say that the mitzvah of matzah is doche the lav of gezel -- you are instead not yotzei. Why should this be so? R' Amiel's answer to this particular problem interestingly differs from that of his rebbe, R' Shimon Shkop, but at the same time is consistant with yesodos which R' Shimon sets down in other places. But before posting an answer let me leave the question out there and give people time to ponder.
Case in point as an illustration: Achronim ask why we never say aseh doche lo ta'aseh on an issur like gezel. For example, if you ate your friend's matzah so that the eating and theft were simultaneous, the halacha does not say that the mitzvah of matzah is doche the lav of gezel -- you are instead not yotzei. Why should this be so? R' Amiel's answer to this particular problem interestingly differs from that of his rebbe, R' Shimon Shkop, but at the same time is consistant with yesodos which R' Shimon sets down in other places. But before posting an answer let me leave the question out there and give people time to ponder.
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
what financial crisis?
The ads for the trips to Israel, the cruises (glatt kosher, daf yomi, all included) etc. for midwinter vacation are old hat. What caught my eye this year was the ad for an African safari. I think it was for something like 10 days in the bush where you can see the jungle and animals, and I apologize for not recalling if a daf yomi rebbe would be travelling along with this one as well.
We hear so much about the financial crisis currently affecting families, institutions, and schools, but if I didn't know better I would be asking, "What financial crisis?" With so many ads in "heimishe" publications for vacations that can easily set a budget back by a few thousand or tens of thousands of dollars, one is forced to either assume that a lot of kosher tour companies are going to go under soon or that hundreds of frum families have a these extra thousands of disposable income to toss away. The news I heard after Sukkos about hotels being packed pointed to the latter rather than the former.
Do people who work hard and reap the financial rewards of their efforts deserve a nice vacation? Absolutely. But I can't help but ask myself why some many institutions are toppling today when communally we have (or seem to have) so much more wealth and success than any prior generation? Undoubtedly the answer to that question is complex and multi-faceted and cannot be answered in a short post, but it's a question that begs asking on the commual level.
We hear so much about the financial crisis currently affecting families, institutions, and schools, but if I didn't know better I would be asking, "What financial crisis?" With so many ads in "heimishe" publications for vacations that can easily set a budget back by a few thousand or tens of thousands of dollars, one is forced to either assume that a lot of kosher tour companies are going to go under soon or that hundreds of frum families have a these extra thousands of disposable income to toss away. The news I heard after Sukkos about hotels being packed pointed to the latter rather than the former.
Do people who work hard and reap the financial rewards of their efforts deserve a nice vacation? Absolutely. But I can't help but ask myself why some many institutions are toppling today when communally we have (or seem to have) so much more wealth and success than any prior generation? Undoubtedly the answer to that question is complex and multi-faceted and cannot be answered in a short post, but it's a question that begs asking on the commual level.
Monday, December 21, 2009
the miraculous in the day-to-day
The Beis Yosef asks why we celebrate Chanukah for eight days when there was enough oil found to last at least one day. We should celebrate only the seven days in which the oil miraculously continued to burn, not the first day in which nothing miraculous happened?
R' Simcha Zisel explains that the miraculous seven days of oil burning help us appreciate that Hashem's will, not mere laws of nature, is what governs the universe, and that is what causes oil to burn even on that first day. As the Ramban writes at the end of Parshas Bo, every day is filled with concealed miracles -- Hashem is always present, if only we take the time to notice.
It's perhaps after Chanukah is over when we return to the day to day that R' Simcha Zisel's message becomes all the more meaningful. The menorah may be in the closet, but the light which it revealed can still illuminate our perspective.
R' Simcha Zisel explains that the miraculous seven days of oil burning help us appreciate that Hashem's will, not mere laws of nature, is what governs the universe, and that is what causes oil to burn even on that first day. As the Ramban writes at the end of Parshas Bo, every day is filled with concealed miracles -- Hashem is always present, if only we take the time to notice.
It's perhaps after Chanukah is over when we return to the day to day that R' Simcha Zisel's message becomes all the more meaningful. The menorah may be in the closet, but the light which it revealed can still illuminate our perspective.
Friday, December 18, 2009
basar m'ikara azlinan and neiros chanukah (III)
To wrap up the series on basar m’ikara azlinan (links: part I, part II), we left off with the question posed to R’ Tzvi Pesach Frank: according to the Nimukei Yosef, lighting a fire creates a chiyuv of mazik because we view the damage the fire will cause as if it occurred already from the moment the arsonist struck the match. If so, the second we light Chanukah candles on Erev Shabbos, well before nighttime, it should be considered as if the candles' burning is a fait accompli. How then are we yotzei the mitzvah of hadlakas neiros later in the night if the candles are considered already consumed before dark?
R’ Tzvi Pesach Frank suggests a different pshat in the Nimukei Yosef that answers this question. The Nimukei Yosef did not mean to suggest that the damages caused in the future by a fire or an arrow are considered as if they already occurred the second arrow is shot or the fire is lit. Rather, the Nimukei Yosef meant that even though the damages have not happened, even though the arrow has not yet reached it target or the fire destroyed anything, the archer or the arsonist already becomes liable from the moment the arrow is shot or the fire lit. The chiddush of the Nimukei Yosef has to do with the hischayvus of the gavra, the liability of the individual, not with the cheftza, the assessment of when damages occured to the destroyed object. (This implicitly is counter to the Ketzos we looked at in part II.)
There is no problem with lighting Shabbos candles not because we view the entire burning process as already having occurred at the moment the fire is lit, but rather because we assess liability and responsibility for the lighting at that time, and at that time it is not Shabbos. There is no reason to suggest, based on this approach, that the Chanukah candles are considered burned through at the moment they are lit, well before dark.
Seems to me that you can answer the kasha asked to R’ Tzvi Pesach Frank a little more simply. Even if you assume the candles are considered completely consumed from the moment they are lit, that’s a din, not a metziyus. You can argue that basar m’ikara azlinan means an object dropped from a roof is considered broken the second it is dropped, but that halachic reality does not change the fact that it will hurt if it hits your head. In terms of dinei mamonos, your candles may no longer be considered candles by the time night roles around, but in terms of pirsumei nisa, the fact is you do have lights burning in your window.
And perhaps there is yet another solution. The Rishonim already discuss the question of how to understand the idea of lighting early on Friday: is the zman hadlakah really meant to be after dark, but since that is impossible we light early and just keep the candles burning, or does the zman hadlakah change and get pushed back earlier? If one takes the second position, there is no question to begin with, as lighting on Friday is no different than lighting any other night. So long as you light in the proper time, even if you treat the entire process of burning as occurring at that moment, you fulfill the mitzvah of hadlakah.
Let me end off with a question for thought (these type questions are oneg Shabbos). The gemara (B.K. 26) says that if a living person is pushed off a roof, someone who stabs the falling victim is chayav for murder. Yet, as we learned, since basar m'ikara azlinan, if you smash a falling object on its way down from the roof, you would not be chayav because the object is considered already broken. What's the difference between a falling body and a falling object? If you got the chiddush of R' Tzvi Pesach Frank this is easy, so I'll make it a little more challenging and ask for a second answer that works according to the Ketzos.
R’ Tzvi Pesach Frank suggests a different pshat in the Nimukei Yosef that answers this question. The Nimukei Yosef did not mean to suggest that the damages caused in the future by a fire or an arrow are considered as if they already occurred the second arrow is shot or the fire is lit. Rather, the Nimukei Yosef meant that even though the damages have not happened, even though the arrow has not yet reached it target or the fire destroyed anything, the archer or the arsonist already becomes liable from the moment the arrow is shot or the fire lit. The chiddush of the Nimukei Yosef has to do with the hischayvus of the gavra, the liability of the individual, not with the cheftza, the assessment of when damages occured to the destroyed object. (This implicitly is counter to the Ketzos we looked at in part II.)
There is no problem with lighting Shabbos candles not because we view the entire burning process as already having occurred at the moment the fire is lit, but rather because we assess liability and responsibility for the lighting at that time, and at that time it is not Shabbos. There is no reason to suggest, based on this approach, that the Chanukah candles are considered burned through at the moment they are lit, well before dark.
Seems to me that you can answer the kasha asked to R’ Tzvi Pesach Frank a little more simply. Even if you assume the candles are considered completely consumed from the moment they are lit, that’s a din, not a metziyus. You can argue that basar m’ikara azlinan means an object dropped from a roof is considered broken the second it is dropped, but that halachic reality does not change the fact that it will hurt if it hits your head. In terms of dinei mamonos, your candles may no longer be considered candles by the time night roles around, but in terms of pirsumei nisa, the fact is you do have lights burning in your window.
And perhaps there is yet another solution. The Rishonim already discuss the question of how to understand the idea of lighting early on Friday: is the zman hadlakah really meant to be after dark, but since that is impossible we light early and just keep the candles burning, or does the zman hadlakah change and get pushed back earlier? If one takes the second position, there is no question to begin with, as lighting on Friday is no different than lighting any other night. So long as you light in the proper time, even if you treat the entire process of burning as occurring at that moment, you fulfill the mitzvah of hadlakah.
Let me end off with a question for thought (these type questions are oneg Shabbos). The gemara (B.K. 26) says that if a living person is pushed off a roof, someone who stabs the falling victim is chayav for murder. Yet, as we learned, since basar m'ikara azlinan, if you smash a falling object on its way down from the roof, you would not be chayav because the object is considered already broken. What's the difference between a falling body and a falling object? If you got the chiddush of R' Tzvi Pesach Frank this is easy, so I'll make it a little more challenging and ask for a second answer that works according to the Ketzos.
Thursday, December 17, 2009
basar m'ikara azlinan and neiros chanukah (II)
In Part I we saw Tosfos’ distinction between the case of dropping an object and the case of shooting an arrow at an object with respect to the issue of basar m’ikara azlinan. The Ketzos (390:1) claims that not all Rishonim agree, and one of his proofs comes from a very famous question of the Nimukei Yosef.
The gemara (B.K. 22) quotes R’ Yochanan’s view that damage caused by fire is similar to damage caused by shooting an arrow (isho m’shum chitzo): the person who starts the fire or shoots the arrow has no control over what subsequently happens, but is still responsible for the result. If I shoot an arrow and five minutes later it hits and destroys and object, even though I may be sitting under a tree when the damage occurs, it is as if I took a hammer at that moment and smashed the object; the same is true if I light a fire and it later burns down a house. The Nimukei Yosef asks: if so, how am I allowed to light Shabbos candles? Even though when the candles are burning I am sitting and enjoying my seudah, just like the archer sitting under a tree is viewed as if he at that moment smashed whatever the arrow hit, so too, I should be viewed as if I were engaged in the act of kindling for the duration of the candle’s burn!
The way the Ketzos interprets the Nimukei Yosef’s answer takes us back (see part I) to the case of an object dropped from the roof (disclaimer: it is by no means it clear that this is actually what the N.Y. meant). The reason the person who dropped the object is liable for breaking it and not the person who swings at it and smashes it on its way down is because basar m’ikara azlinan, we view the object as if it was broken from the second it was dropped, even before it actually hits the ground. So too, the person who shoots an arrow or lights a fire is not chayav because he is considered to be causing damage later when the arrow hits or the fire rages, but rather he is chayav because basar m’ikara azlinan, we anticipate the damage which will occur and consider it done already from the moment the arrow leaves the bow or the fire is lit.
Why are you allowed to light Shabbos candles? Because the principle of basar m'ikara azlinan tells as that the burning which occurs later is considered to have already happened the moment the candle was lit.
But didn’t Tosfos tell us that this sevara of basar m’ikara applies only when you act directly on an object, like dropping it off a roof, not when you indirectly cause damage, like shooting an arrow at it? QED, says the Ketzos, the Nimukei Yosef disagrees with Tosfos.
This is the context which (in my opinion) is needed to appreciate the question posed to R' Tzvi Pesach Frank. Here we go: I understand that I am allowed to light Shabbos candles because the candles which burn as I eat my meal are treated halachically -- basar m'ikara azlinan -- as if their burning was done already before Shabbos even started. However, this Friday I also have to light Chanukah candles, and those candles must burn after dark for me to fulfill my mitzvah. If I light those candles before Shabbos starts, and based on the N.Y. I treat the burning of the candle in the future as a fait accompli from that moment it is lit, how am I yotzei the mitzvah of lighting neiros Chanukah after dark? The lighting and burning finished their job before Shabbos started, while it was still light out!
I think there is more than one way to skin this cat. Bl"n I'll follow up with R' T.P. Frank's answer.
The gemara (B.K. 22) quotes R’ Yochanan’s view that damage caused by fire is similar to damage caused by shooting an arrow (isho m’shum chitzo): the person who starts the fire or shoots the arrow has no control over what subsequently happens, but is still responsible for the result. If I shoot an arrow and five minutes later it hits and destroys and object, even though I may be sitting under a tree when the damage occurs, it is as if I took a hammer at that moment and smashed the object; the same is true if I light a fire and it later burns down a house. The Nimukei Yosef asks: if so, how am I allowed to light Shabbos candles? Even though when the candles are burning I am sitting and enjoying my seudah, just like the archer sitting under a tree is viewed as if he at that moment smashed whatever the arrow hit, so too, I should be viewed as if I were engaged in the act of kindling for the duration of the candle’s burn!
The way the Ketzos interprets the Nimukei Yosef’s answer takes us back (see part I) to the case of an object dropped from the roof (disclaimer: it is by no means it clear that this is actually what the N.Y. meant). The reason the person who dropped the object is liable for breaking it and not the person who swings at it and smashes it on its way down is because basar m’ikara azlinan, we view the object as if it was broken from the second it was dropped, even before it actually hits the ground. So too, the person who shoots an arrow or lights a fire is not chayav because he is considered to be causing damage later when the arrow hits or the fire rages, but rather he is chayav because basar m’ikara azlinan, we anticipate the damage which will occur and consider it done already from the moment the arrow leaves the bow or the fire is lit.
Why are you allowed to light Shabbos candles? Because the principle of basar m'ikara azlinan tells as that the burning which occurs later is considered to have already happened the moment the candle was lit.
But didn’t Tosfos tell us that this sevara of basar m’ikara applies only when you act directly on an object, like dropping it off a roof, not when you indirectly cause damage, like shooting an arrow at it? QED, says the Ketzos, the Nimukei Yosef disagrees with Tosfos.
This is the context which (in my opinion) is needed to appreciate the question posed to R' Tzvi Pesach Frank. Here we go: I understand that I am allowed to light Shabbos candles because the candles which burn as I eat my meal are treated halachically -- basar m'ikara azlinan -- as if their burning was done already before Shabbos even started. However, this Friday I also have to light Chanukah candles, and those candles must burn after dark for me to fulfill my mitzvah. If I light those candles before Shabbos starts, and based on the N.Y. I treat the burning of the candle in the future as a fait accompli from that moment it is lit, how am I yotzei the mitzvah of lighting neiros Chanukah after dark? The lighting and burning finished their job before Shabbos started, while it was still light out!
I think there is more than one way to skin this cat. Bl"n I'll follow up with R' T.P. Frank's answer.
basar m'ikara azlinan and neiros chanukah (I)
There is an interesting tshuvah of R’ Tzvi Pesach Frank (in Har Tzvi) on a Chanukah issue where, while both the questioner and the response fail to mention it, without knowledge of a Ketzos I think you will largely miss the point (maybe they just assumed you would make the connection because once upon a time, as Havolim once wrote, the Ketzos was the bread and butter of every lamdan.) I’m going to break this post into chunks to make it easier to digest (I hope!).
The owner of an animal that stomps on an object is chayav to pay back its full price in damages. However, if instead of touching the object directly, the animal kicks a stone at the object and breaks it, the owner pays only half; this is the unique din of tzeroros.
The gemara (B.K. 17b) discusses the case of an object dropped off the roof of a building which is then smashed by someone else on its way down: Do we look at the object as already broken once it left the roof – basar m’ikara azlinan – or do we say that it’s not broken yet, and the one who smashes it pays? Rava raises the question; Rabba opines that we treat the object as already broken.
What if an arrow is shot at the object, and before it hits its target, someone else smashes the object? Sounds parallel to the gemara's case, but Tosfos says there is a distinction. In the gemara’s case the object itself is acted on by the party who drops it from the roof. In the case of shooting an arrow, the person firing the arrow does not act directly on the object; therefore, he is not liable; the person who smashes the object before the arrow hits is.
Tosfos proves the point: if shooting at an object is the same as acting directly on an object, then we’ve eliminated the distinction we started with between stomping on an object, which is one of the avos nezikin, and kicking a stone which later hits an object (tzeroros).
Given that there is a distinction between the cases, the question that begs asking is why. There are a number of possibile explanations, but I’ll keep it simple and put it this way: relative to the person who takes a swing at the object on the way down, the person who already acted directly on the object in a way that would destroy it bears greater liability. But relative to the person who has only indirectly acted on the object by shooting an arrow at it, the person who acts directly on the object by taking a swing at it is more liable.
The Ketzos (390:1) suggests that some Rishonim may not agree with Tosfos, and in part II I'll give you his proof and then tie that in to R' Tzvi Pesach Frank on Chanukah bl"n. Stay tuned.
The owner of an animal that stomps on an object is chayav to pay back its full price in damages. However, if instead of touching the object directly, the animal kicks a stone at the object and breaks it, the owner pays only half; this is the unique din of tzeroros.
The gemara (B.K. 17b) discusses the case of an object dropped off the roof of a building which is then smashed by someone else on its way down: Do we look at the object as already broken once it left the roof – basar m’ikara azlinan – or do we say that it’s not broken yet, and the one who smashes it pays? Rava raises the question; Rabba opines that we treat the object as already broken.
What if an arrow is shot at the object, and before it hits its target, someone else smashes the object? Sounds parallel to the gemara's case, but Tosfos says there is a distinction. In the gemara’s case the object itself is acted on by the party who drops it from the roof. In the case of shooting an arrow, the person firing the arrow does not act directly on the object; therefore, he is not liable; the person who smashes the object before the arrow hits is.
Tosfos proves the point: if shooting at an object is the same as acting directly on an object, then we’ve eliminated the distinction we started with between stomping on an object, which is one of the avos nezikin, and kicking a stone which later hits an object (tzeroros).
Given that there is a distinction between the cases, the question that begs asking is why. There are a number of possibile explanations, but I’ll keep it simple and put it this way: relative to the person who takes a swing at the object on the way down, the person who already acted directly on the object in a way that would destroy it bears greater liability. But relative to the person who has only indirectly acted on the object by shooting an arrow at it, the person who acts directly on the object by taking a swing at it is more liable.
The Ketzos (390:1) suggests that some Rishonim may not agree with Tosfos, and in part II I'll give you his proof and then tie that in to R' Tzvi Pesach Frank on Chanukah bl"n. Stay tuned.
Wednesday, December 16, 2009
wisdom trumps all: R' Simcha Zisel on Pharoah's appointment of Yosef
Despite the unflattering description of Yosef by the Sar haMashkim as a na’ar, an educated boy, an Ivri, a foreigner, Pharoah still gave Yosef the chance to interpret his dream. As a result of Yosef’s correct interpretation he was appointed second in command of Egypt, and when the Egyptians complained to Pharoah that Yosef demanded that they perform milah before he would release the food stores, Pharoah dismissed their complaints and ordered them to obey Yosef. We see in this little episode an interesting clash of values. On the one hand, Pharoah would certainly be as inclined as the Sar haMashkim to be dismissive of this young Ivri foreigner. On the other hand, Ramban tells us that Pharoah was a man of great intelligence, someone who could not fail to recognize the superior wisdom of Yosef. Which trait won out? -- the trait of wisdom, earning Yosef his position. R’ Simcha Zisel (Chochma u’Mussar #140) writes that it is inherent in the nature even of a rasha who is a wise person to defer to what they recognize as true wisdom.
We see this reflected in Yosef’s words to his brothers, “VaYisimeini l’av l’Pharaoh u’ladon l’chol beiso” (45:8). Ibn Ezra explains the term av here means father of an idea, like “avi tofeish kinor.” We see from a careful reading of the pasuk the difference between Pharoah and all others. To the Egyptian populace Yosef was an “adon”, a master who must be obeyed willy-nilly, but to Pharaoh he was an “av”, a source of ideas and wisdom, someone whose advice should be followed because it was the wisest course of action.
I don’t have much familiarity with R’ Simcha Zisel’s writings so maybe it’s just me, but this idea seems to run counter to what I thought was classical mussar. Classical mussar as I perhaps misunderstand it addresses itself to the perfection of midos because chochma alone is not enough to direct behavior and attitude. Chochma can be led astray and corrupted. For example, R’ Elchanan explains that we are all capable to fulfilling the mitzvah of emunah because the intelligence to do is innate; the reason so many “intelligent” people fail the test and become atheists is because intelligence can be corrupted by desire and will. Yet, here R’ Simcha Zisel tells us that Pharoah, despite all his rishus (and R’ Simcha Zisel does call him a rasha), is able to overcome his distaste for Yosef precisely because love of wisdom trumps other values. Is this a contradiction? Maybe someone out there who knows more about R’ S.Z. has an explanation.
We see this reflected in Yosef’s words to his brothers, “VaYisimeini l’av l’Pharaoh u’ladon l’chol beiso” (45:8). Ibn Ezra explains the term av here means father of an idea, like “avi tofeish kinor.” We see from a careful reading of the pasuk the difference between Pharoah and all others. To the Egyptian populace Yosef was an “adon”, a master who must be obeyed willy-nilly, but to Pharaoh he was an “av”, a source of ideas and wisdom, someone whose advice should be followed because it was the wisest course of action.
I don’t have much familiarity with R’ Simcha Zisel’s writings so maybe it’s just me, but this idea seems to run counter to what I thought was classical mussar. Classical mussar as I perhaps misunderstand it addresses itself to the perfection of midos because chochma alone is not enough to direct behavior and attitude. Chochma can be led astray and corrupted. For example, R’ Elchanan explains that we are all capable to fulfilling the mitzvah of emunah because the intelligence to do is innate; the reason so many “intelligent” people fail the test and become atheists is because intelligence can be corrupted by desire and will. Yet, here R’ Simcha Zisel tells us that Pharoah, despite all his rishus (and R’ Simcha Zisel does call him a rasha), is able to overcome his distaste for Yosef precisely because love of wisdom trumps other values. Is this a contradiction? Maybe someone out there who knows more about R’ S.Z. has an explanation.
Tuesday, December 15, 2009
Rav Amiel on the dispute between Shamai and Hillel over how many candles to light
Some of you liked the last idea posted from R’ Amiel from his Derashos El Ami, so let’s go for another round.
Rav Amiel echoes the approach taken by a number of meforshim who fit the machlokes between Beis Hillel and Shamai whether to increase the number of candles lit each night or decrease (Shabbos 21b) into a more general pattern that runs through their disputes throughout shas. Beis Hillel usually look b’poel at the actual, while Beis Shamai look at the koach, potential. For example, Shamai holds shtar ha’omeid l’gvos k’gavuy, a contract, such as a kesubah, is treated as money in hand because it stands to be collected. Hillel disagrees; until the money is actually in hand b’poel, the potential for it to be collected is meaningless. Here too, Shamai looks at the diminishing potential for the miracle of Chanukah to continue, while Hillel looks at the actual day to day increase in the miracle’s duration.
Rav Amiel suggests another unique approach. B”H and B”Sh may be l’shitasam of a different dispute. A person who visits the mikdash on Yom Tov brings an olas reiya and and a korban chagiga. If one has a limited amount of money to spend, B”H holds that preference is given to buying a bigger korban chagigah because it is eaten; B”Sh holds preference is given to buying a bigger korban olah because it is offered exclusively to Hashem.
The Hasmonean dynasty started its reign with great religious fervor as a result of the Chanukah rebellion, but its political and economic reach, coming off a civil war, was limited. Over the generations in which the dynasty continued that initial religious fervor waned, but the economic and political clout of the kingdom increased. Beis Hillel which preferences the chagigah, the human enjoyment of the korban meal, celebrates the increase in the kingdom’s power, even at the expense of the fervor which started the rebellion. Beis Shamai which preferences the exclusive dedication of the olah to G-d sees the zenith of the Hasmonean dynasty in its initial religious expression of zeal, but the continuation of the rein, while offering increased material prosperity and security, was a spiritual decline.
For some advice on how this machlokes Beis Hillel and Beis Shamai relates to shalom bayis and shidducim, see my wife's post here.
Rav Amiel echoes the approach taken by a number of meforshim who fit the machlokes between Beis Hillel and Shamai whether to increase the number of candles lit each night or decrease (Shabbos 21b) into a more general pattern that runs through their disputes throughout shas. Beis Hillel usually look b’poel at the actual, while Beis Shamai look at the koach, potential. For example, Shamai holds shtar ha’omeid l’gvos k’gavuy, a contract, such as a kesubah, is treated as money in hand because it stands to be collected. Hillel disagrees; until the money is actually in hand b’poel, the potential for it to be collected is meaningless. Here too, Shamai looks at the diminishing potential for the miracle of Chanukah to continue, while Hillel looks at the actual day to day increase in the miracle’s duration.
Rav Amiel suggests another unique approach. B”H and B”Sh may be l’shitasam of a different dispute. A person who visits the mikdash on Yom Tov brings an olas reiya and and a korban chagiga. If one has a limited amount of money to spend, B”H holds that preference is given to buying a bigger korban chagigah because it is eaten; B”Sh holds preference is given to buying a bigger korban olah because it is offered exclusively to Hashem.
The Hasmonean dynasty started its reign with great religious fervor as a result of the Chanukah rebellion, but its political and economic reach, coming off a civil war, was limited. Over the generations in which the dynasty continued that initial religious fervor waned, but the economic and political clout of the kingdom increased. Beis Hillel which preferences the chagigah, the human enjoyment of the korban meal, celebrates the increase in the kingdom’s power, even at the expense of the fervor which started the rebellion. Beis Shamai which preferences the exclusive dedication of the olah to G-d sees the zenith of the Hasmonean dynasty in its initial religious expression of zeal, but the continuation of the rein, while offering increased material prosperity and security, was a spiritual decline.
For some advice on how this machlokes Beis Hillel and Beis Shamai relates to shalom bayis and shidducim, see my wife's post here.
Monday, December 14, 2009
dmus d'yukno shel aviv v'imo
At the threshold of falling prey to temptation at the hands of Eishes Potifar, Yosef sees the image of his father (Rashi based on Sotah 36) and it is this image which causes him to desist from sin. The Yerushalmi (Horiyos 2:5, 10a in Vilna ed) adds according to anothe view that he saw the image of his mother.
It's a simple point, but one I think that is worth spelling out: It's not a halacha in the Rambam or a law of Egypt or even a sense of morality that causes Yosef to pause. All these are but minor obstacles that the yetzer hara can easily surmount. What grabs Yosef's attention is the image of Ya'akov the tzadik, Ya'akov his father. We ship our kids off to school and shul to learn and memorize rules and regulations, do's and don't's, but when push comes to shove, it's not a memorized rule that will guide their behavior -- it's dmus d'yukno of Aviv v'Imo. It's the image we present as parents that will stick in our children's minds.
What is the significance of the Yerushalmi's insight that Yosef saw his mother's image? My wife suggested a pshat that beat any idea I had. Midrashim indicate that Eishes Potifar saw in the stars that she was fated for Yosef. There was truth to this vision, as it was her daughter who became Yosef's wife. Seforim also compare Eishes Potifar's desire for Yosef with that of Tamar for Yehudah -- both had the purest motives in wanting to be with a tzadik and bring his children into the world. Yosef could easily have justified succumbing to her advances as a surrender to the inevitable dictates of fate. Yet, he remembered the image of his mother Rachel, who was fated and destined and desired becoming Ya'akov's wife, yet gave all of that up for the sake of Leah. Rachel's heroic action for the sake of heaven against what fate decreed was the impetus for Yosef's own heroic resistance.
It's a simple point, but one I think that is worth spelling out: It's not a halacha in the Rambam or a law of Egypt or even a sense of morality that causes Yosef to pause. All these are but minor obstacles that the yetzer hara can easily surmount. What grabs Yosef's attention is the image of Ya'akov the tzadik, Ya'akov his father. We ship our kids off to school and shul to learn and memorize rules and regulations, do's and don't's, but when push comes to shove, it's not a memorized rule that will guide their behavior -- it's dmus d'yukno of Aviv v'Imo. It's the image we present as parents that will stick in our children's minds.
What is the significance of the Yerushalmi's insight that Yosef saw his mother's image? My wife suggested a pshat that beat any idea I had. Midrashim indicate that Eishes Potifar saw in the stars that she was fated for Yosef. There was truth to this vision, as it was her daughter who became Yosef's wife. Seforim also compare Eishes Potifar's desire for Yosef with that of Tamar for Yehudah -- both had the purest motives in wanting to be with a tzadik and bring his children into the world. Yosef could easily have justified succumbing to her advances as a surrender to the inevitable dictates of fate. Yet, he remembered the image of his mother Rachel, who was fated and destined and desired becoming Ya'akov's wife, yet gave all of that up for the sake of Leah. Rachel's heroic action for the sake of heaven against what fate decreed was the impetus for Yosef's own heroic resistance.
R' Shimon Shkop on ain issur chal al issur (II)
Last week I posted a question of the Sha'ar HaMelech to which R' Unterman, in an article in the Sefer haYovel for R' Shimon Shlop, found R' Shimon's answer so compelling that he and other talmidim were completely taken by R' Shimon's derech. I'm not going to rewrite the whole kashe -- here is a link. We left off as follows: If a shevua on chatzei shiur is chal on top of the issur neveilah because it adds the potential for malkos for eating a smaller shiur than a k'zayis, why is the issur neveilah not chal on top of the issur achila of Yom Kippur -- the issur achila on Yom Kippur is on a k'koseves, but neveilah adds malkos for a smaller shiur of k'zayis?
As I predicted, the Brisker answers are first out of the gate with a gavra/cheftza chiluk. The issur shevua is chal because a shevua is an issur gavra, as opposed to neveilah which is an issur cheftza; Yom Kippur and neveilah are both categorically identical issurei cheftza. I don't want to get too bogged down in a discussion of this sevara, but there is certainly room to debate whether the issur of food on Yom Kippur, which is only for one day, can really be called an issur cheftza (see R' Yosef Engel in Esvan D'Oraysa regarding issurei zman). And the sevara begs the question: why can categorically different issurim be chal when these categories make no practical difference in terms of what the person may or may not do?
R' Shimon took a different approach. Even if two issurim have different shiurim, they cannot overlap. Since chatzi shiur asra torah, the smallest piece of neveilah is already prohibited because all food in any shiur may not be eaten on Yom Kippur. Why then is the issur of chatzi shiur chal because of shevua when chatzi shiur of neveilah is already assur? Because in that case the consumption of the food per se is not the sibas ha'issur -- the sibas ha'issur, the root cause of the law, stems from the violation of one's oath that the eating demonstrates.
You can see the difference between R' Shimon's approach and a Brisker approach. R' Shimon is less concerned with categories, and more willing to speculate on the why, or the root cause of issurim. R' Yosef Engel has a whole essay on differences between kamus and eichus and one can easily see that distinction working here almost as a middle ground between R' Shimon and Brisk: the issurim of neveilah and Yom Kippur are different in kamus, while shevua is different in eichus.
Parenthetically, in the past I've made reference before to R' Shimon's first shiur on Nedarim in the chiddushim in which he attempts to distinguish between issurei gavra and cheftza (I'm not aware of any Brisker-authored attempts to define the terms that they helped make popular). Interestingly, R' Unterman references this specific shiur in his essay and remarks that the talmidim were not at all taken by R' Shimon's approach.
As I predicted, the Brisker answers are first out of the gate with a gavra/cheftza chiluk. The issur shevua is chal because a shevua is an issur gavra, as opposed to neveilah which is an issur cheftza; Yom Kippur and neveilah are both categorically identical issurei cheftza. I don't want to get too bogged down in a discussion of this sevara, but there is certainly room to debate whether the issur of food on Yom Kippur, which is only for one day, can really be called an issur cheftza (see R' Yosef Engel in Esvan D'Oraysa regarding issurei zman). And the sevara begs the question: why can categorically different issurim be chal when these categories make no practical difference in terms of what the person may or may not do?
R' Shimon took a different approach. Even if two issurim have different shiurim, they cannot overlap. Since chatzi shiur asra torah, the smallest piece of neveilah is already prohibited because all food in any shiur may not be eaten on Yom Kippur. Why then is the issur of chatzi shiur chal because of shevua when chatzi shiur of neveilah is already assur? Because in that case the consumption of the food per se is not the sibas ha'issur -- the sibas ha'issur, the root cause of the law, stems from the violation of one's oath that the eating demonstrates.
You can see the difference between R' Shimon's approach and a Brisker approach. R' Shimon is less concerned with categories, and more willing to speculate on the why, or the root cause of issurim. R' Yosef Engel has a whole essay on differences between kamus and eichus and one can easily see that distinction working here almost as a middle ground between R' Shimon and Brisk: the issurim of neveilah and Yom Kippur are different in kamus, while shevua is different in eichus.
Parenthetically, in the past I've made reference before to R' Shimon's first shiur on Nedarim in the chiddushim in which he attempts to distinguish between issurei gavra and cheftza (I'm not aware of any Brisker-authored attempts to define the terms that they helped make popular). Interestingly, R' Unterman references this specific shiur in his essay and remarks that the talmidim were not at all taken by R' Shimon's approach.
aveilus: accepting nechama
After a few weeks of posting insights from R' Shteinman on the parsha on Fridays I apologize for missing. One quick point:
The Torah tells us that Ya'akov refused to be comforted, to receive nechama, when he heard of the loss of Yosef. R' Chaim Brisker held that it is not only a mitzvah on the menachamim to console the mourner, but there is a mitzvah for the mourner to receive the consolation. R' Shteinman cites the gemara in Brachos which tells us that Rabban Gamliel was "mekabeil tanchumin" after his educated slave Tevi died; we see from here as well that consolation must be received. The Mesorah journal (Adar 5751, available here) quotes this same chiddush with what I think are two added points. 1) R' Soloveitchik held that this halacha of kabbalas tanchumin is part of the practices of mourning, nihugei aveilus. This is why mourning on the last day of shiva, where only part of the day is observed in aveilus, technically ends when the menachamim depart. What do the presence of menachamim have to do with whether the mourner is still obligated in aveilus? Because their very presence and the reception of their nechama demonstrates that aveilus is still being observed. 2) R' Soloveithik suggested that the mourner must actively acknowledge the nechama, e.g. nod his head, and not simply remain passive. This chiddush is based on a Midrash which says that Hashem continued to console the Jewish people after the churban habayis until they acknowledged his consolation.
It's not germane to this point, but an interesting chiddush in the journal article worth noting: the common practice is to address all the mourners as a group and wish them nechama. R' Soloveitchik suggested that this poses a problem of doing mitzvos chavilos chavilos and it is better to address each aveil seperately.
The Torah tells us that Ya'akov refused to be comforted, to receive nechama, when he heard of the loss of Yosef. R' Chaim Brisker held that it is not only a mitzvah on the menachamim to console the mourner, but there is a mitzvah for the mourner to receive the consolation. R' Shteinman cites the gemara in Brachos which tells us that Rabban Gamliel was "mekabeil tanchumin" after his educated slave Tevi died; we see from here as well that consolation must be received. The Mesorah journal (Adar 5751, available here) quotes this same chiddush with what I think are two added points. 1) R' Soloveitchik held that this halacha of kabbalas tanchumin is part of the practices of mourning, nihugei aveilus. This is why mourning on the last day of shiva, where only part of the day is observed in aveilus, technically ends when the menachamim depart. What do the presence of menachamim have to do with whether the mourner is still obligated in aveilus? Because their very presence and the reception of their nechama demonstrates that aveilus is still being observed. 2) R' Soloveithik suggested that the mourner must actively acknowledge the nechama, e.g. nod his head, and not simply remain passive. This chiddush is based on a Midrash which says that Hashem continued to console the Jewish people after the churban habayis until they acknowledged his consolation.
It's not germane to this point, but an interesting chiddush in the journal article worth noting: the common practice is to address all the mourners as a group and wish them nechama. R' Soloveitchik suggested that this poses a problem of doing mitzvos chavilos chavilos and it is better to address each aveil seperately.
Friday, December 11, 2009
Yosef's beauty
The appointment of Yosef to be in charge of Potifar’s home and dealings is followed by his physical description (in terms, as my wife noted, which are usually used to describe women) as “Y’fei to’ar v’yefei mareh” (39:6). Yosef did not suddenly become beautiful -- one is born either handsome or ugly, and while makeup and grooming can enhance certain features, they cannot make an ugly duckling into prince charming. So why interject this description here?
Rashi and Ramban offer different answers. Ramban explains that the description of Yosef’s beauty is an introduction to the upcoming parsha; Yosef’s beauty led to Eishes Potifar’s advances and attempts at seduction. Rashi connects the pasuk to the previous parsha’s description of Yosef’s rise to power. Now that he was released from hard labor Yosef become too focused on his own grooming and appearance.
The Ramban’s approach takes Yosef to be the innocent victim of Eishes Potifar’s attackes, but Rashi opens the door to assigning at least some of the to Yosef himself. Eishes Potifar’s attack was a punishment and perhaps a direct result of Yosef’s flaunting his beauty around the home of his master.
The Netziv follows in Rashi’s footsteps in assigning blame to Yosef, but for a different reason. The Netziv writes that immersion in Torah has the effect of diminishing a person’s external beauty. The statement that Yosef appeared beautiful is the Torah’s subtle way of telling us that Yosef was not as involved Torah as much he should have been. As a result, he lost the miraculous protection which Torah study affords and was tempted and subject to attempted seduction.
One perhaps need not invoke the power of miraculous protection to understand the parsha along the lines of the Netziv. The Hollywood stereotype of the student immersed in books as the nerdy type not caring about appearance or grooming reflects a certain truth. Immersion in study of any sort should focus one’s mind on higher ideals than superficial appearance. Yosef’s concern with beauty tells us that he lost some of that focus; he became a person who cared about appearance and was therefore both tempted by and prey for Eishes Potifar.
I think it is not by accident that it is dmus d’yukno shel Aviv, the image of Ya’akov his father, which appeared to Yosef and brought him back to reality. Despite Keats’ memorable lines on a Grecian urn, beauty is not always true, nor is truth always beautiful. The superficial splendor and beauty of material culture is at often odds the values and truth of Torah. Chanukah celebrates our reliving the test of Yosef and embracing “titein emes l’Ya’akov” over the aesthetic beauty of Yavan.
Rashi and Ramban offer different answers. Ramban explains that the description of Yosef’s beauty is an introduction to the upcoming parsha; Yosef’s beauty led to Eishes Potifar’s advances and attempts at seduction. Rashi connects the pasuk to the previous parsha’s description of Yosef’s rise to power. Now that he was released from hard labor Yosef become too focused on his own grooming and appearance.
The Ramban’s approach takes Yosef to be the innocent victim of Eishes Potifar’s attackes, but Rashi opens the door to assigning at least some of the to Yosef himself. Eishes Potifar’s attack was a punishment and perhaps a direct result of Yosef’s flaunting his beauty around the home of his master.
The Netziv follows in Rashi’s footsteps in assigning blame to Yosef, but for a different reason. The Netziv writes that immersion in Torah has the effect of diminishing a person’s external beauty. The statement that Yosef appeared beautiful is the Torah’s subtle way of telling us that Yosef was not as involved Torah as much he should have been. As a result, he lost the miraculous protection which Torah study affords and was tempted and subject to attempted seduction.
One perhaps need not invoke the power of miraculous protection to understand the parsha along the lines of the Netziv. The Hollywood stereotype of the student immersed in books as the nerdy type not caring about appearance or grooming reflects a certain truth. Immersion in study of any sort should focus one’s mind on higher ideals than superficial appearance. Yosef’s concern with beauty tells us that he lost some of that focus; he became a person who cared about appearance and was therefore both tempted by and prey for Eishes Potifar.
I think it is not by accident that it is dmus d’yukno shel Aviv, the image of Ya’akov his father, which appeared to Yosef and brought him back to reality. Despite Keats’ memorable lines on a Grecian urn, beauty is not always true, nor is truth always beautiful. The superficial splendor and beauty of material culture is at often odds the values and truth of Torah. Chanukah celebrates our reliving the test of Yosef and embracing “titein emes l’Ya’akov” over the aesthetic beauty of Yavan.
Thursday, December 10, 2009
rambam/ra'avad -- hadlakas hamenorah l'shitasam in philosophy
The debates over the merits of rationalism may be relevant to inyana d'yoma of Chanukah. The Rambam (Hil Bi'as Mikdash ch. 9) paskens that the menorah may be lit by a non-kohen and then placed in its proper spot in the heichel. Only the hatavah, the preparation of the menorah with oil and wicks, must be done by a kohen. The Ra'avad disagrees (as we discussed once before).
R' Moshe Amiel (parenthetically, you can read an essay of his in the Sefer haYovel for R' Shimon I mentioned last post) in his Derashos El Ami on Chanukah (first essay) explains the machlokes l'shitasam. The Rambam, who assimilated Aristotelian philosophy into Judaism, held that the "who" and "where" of lighting menorah does not matter -- the source of the light of chochma does not matter -- so long it is brought into the mikdash. The Ra'avad disagreed with the Rambam's view of philosophy and l'shitaso holds that it's not enough to bring the light of the outside world into the mikdash, but the source of the light must come from a hadlakah done in the mikdash itself. (It's derush, not lomdus.)
R' Moshe Amiel (parenthetically, you can read an essay of his in the Sefer haYovel for R' Shimon I mentioned last post) in his Derashos El Ami on Chanukah (first essay) explains the machlokes l'shitasam. The Rambam, who assimilated Aristotelian philosophy into Judaism, held that the "who" and "where" of lighting menorah does not matter -- the source of the light of chochma does not matter -- so long it is brought into the mikdash. The Ra'avad disagreed with the Rambam's view of philosophy and l'shitaso holds that it's not enough to bring the light of the outside world into the mikdash, but the source of the light must come from a hadlakah done in the mikdash itself. (It's derush, not lomdus.)
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)