Friday, June 14, 2013

the eternal parah adumah of Moshe

Rashi quotes R’ Moshe haDarshan as explaining that the parah adumah is a kapparah for the cheit ha’eigeil.  How does that work – is it some kind of gezeirah shavah. i.e. this is a cow, the cheit was done with a calf, so they somehow go together?  Obviously there has to be more to it than that.  What’s the midah k’negged midah? 

 Two possibilities based on Ksav Sofer:
 
1)  Bnei Yisrael were swayed by the eiruv rav to worship the eigel.  Rashi writes that the nations will challenge us to explain the logic of parah adumah, which is impossible to do.  By proving steadfast in our commitment to the mitzvah and remaining unswayed by their arguments, we undo the error of the past (the Beis haLevi has a similar explanation).

2) In a similar vein, the sin of avodah zarah is unique in that one is culpable even for the thought of committing idolatry.  Even though those who actually worshipped the eigel were killed, the rest of Bnei Yisrael needed kapparah for thinking about it.  Rashi writes with respect to parah adumah, “ain lecha reshus l’harhei achareha,” that even though it makes no sense, one is not allowed to question the process.  (Does he mean this l’halacha, just like there is a halachic issur of thinking of committing idolatry?  That would be a tremendous chiddush!  I am more inclined to read it homiletically.)

I would like to suggest a different approach.  The Midrash tells us that the parah adumah of Moshe remained (and still remains!) extant so that a little bit of its ashes could be mixed with subsequent paros.  Chazal darshen on the pasuk, “V’Yikchu eilecha parah adumah…” that all paros are called the paros of Moshe; Moshe’s name is forever associated with the mitzvah of parah adumah (see Maharal in Gur Aryeh!).

Why was the cheit ha’eigel done?  Because we gave up hope of seeing Moshe again.  Rashi writes that the satan projected a vision of Moshe’s bier being transported to heaven.  Moshe told us he would be back on a certain day; the time came and went (at least Klal Yisrael’s mistaken calculation of the time), and we felt abandoned by our leader.  Parah adumah is the antidote to the cheit ha’eigel because it teaches us that Moshe Rabeinu will never abandon us – his parah will always be with us. 

This helps answer another question as well.  Why was the parsha of parah adumah placed here?  The mitzvah of parah was given at Marah; the parah adumah had to have been used the first year after yetzi’as Mitzrayim to be metaheir those who needed it to bring korban Pesach.  Perhaps the answer is that it is only post-mei meriva, when we knew with certainty that Moshe would not lead us into Eretz Yisrael to bring the ultimate geulah, that we needed the parah adumah to remind us that even though Moshe physically would pass on, his presence would remain with us for eternity.

Thursday, June 13, 2013

words from someone who went off the derech

I won't tell you where the quote is from until the end:
Every once in awhile, the older youth tried to straighten us up.  Lectured us and admonished us not to act so silly.
“Stop trying to be so wild.”

Their efforts were entirely fruitless.  And it got so that most people just left us alone – except for our parents and the Rabbeim.  They never stopped lecturing, and they never stopped scolding.  The problem was, they never told us why we needed to behave.
Everything was preached from a solid foundation of what had always been.  Torah this.  Torah that.  We live this way because that’s the way it is.  We live this was because it’s the way our father lived.  We live this way, and we walk this path because it’s the only way, the only path we’ve ever known.

But they never explained why....  Only that we were and we did.
That sure made for some messed-up minds and messed-up lives.  Not for the drones – those who accepted without question what they were told.  But for anyone with a speck of spirit, it could get a little crazy.

Think about it.  You are in a box – a comfortable box, but a pretty confining one.  You wonder what’s outside.  You peek out a bit now and then, and peer around.  But deep down, you know that if you step outside that box, you are speeding directly down the highway to hell and could arrive at any instant.  Boom, just like that.
You can just picture the writer, probably was a teen in yeshiva somewhere, did not care for the dress code and other rules and regulations, was absent from the beis medrash more than there, is looking for something, someone headed off the derech if not already there. 

The book is Growing Up Amish by Ira Wagler.  The writer did go off the derech -- the derech of his Amish community.  I cheated and took the liberty of substituting the word "Rebbeim" for preachers and "Torah" in place of Amish, but other than that, the words are his.

Perhaps instead of looking only internally at our community to try to figure out why people go off the derech, maybe we should think more broadly about the issue and see how the problem manifests itself in other communities and how they respond.  Maybe we could even learn something from the failures and the successes of their educational institutions and support networks.  Maybe we could learn something from the voices of those, like Ira Wagler, who write about their journey.

One other heretical thought -- maybe instead of blaming the community, the yeshivos, Rebbeim, parents. etc. for not doing enough, we should recognize that rebellion happens.  It happens in all communities, it can happen to the best families within those communities, it can happen despite the best efforts to stop it.  Perhaps there are no solutions in our imperfect world. 

the Hafla'ah on Moshe's sin -- mei meriva

We once discussed (here) the amazing Chazal that says the “dibartem el ha’sela” that Moshe was supposed to do instead of hitting the rock was to learn Torah.  Chasam Sofer (brief version here at the end of Shu”T E”H 121, longer version in his commentary on chumash) adds another dimension to this interpretation that he heard from the Hafla’ah.  Chazal interpret the complaint of thirst in Parshas Beshalach as not just a thirst for water, but as a thirst for Torah; the takana of kri’as haTorah on Monday/Thursday was a response to this need.  No longer would there be “va’yelchu shloshes yamim b’li mayim;” no longer would there be three days without public learning.

The episode of mei meriva in our parsha occurred right after the death of Miriam.  It was in her zechus that there was a well in the desert; with her death, the well vanished.  The thirst of the people returned, but again, it was not just a thirst for water, but a thirst for Torah as well.  However, this time around Moshe and Aharon were in aveilus for their sister.  They could not learn torah or teach Klal Yisrael!  “Lu gavan’u b’gva acheinu lifnei Hashem,” the people complained – had we died earlier, it would at least have been “lifnei Hashem,” enveloped by ruchniyus; now, we have nothing. 

The Midrash says the sin of Moshe and Ahraon was not learning even one perek or one halacha to satisfy their needs. Explains the Hafla’ah, they could have learned perek “eilu megalchin; they could have learned a din in hilchos aveilus.  There is never a need or an excuse to completely abandon learning.

The Chasam Sofer (al haTorah) adds his own two cents to this idea.  Why in the earlier episode of thirst in Parshas Beshalach was Moshe commanded to hit the rock but this time he was told to speak to it?  There are different ways to combat the yetzer ha’ra.  One way is the brute force method – crush it into oblivion.  That method is symbolized by the hitting of the rock that took place shortly after yetzi’as Mitzrayim.  Forty years later a more mature Bnei Yisrael was ready to appreciate another approach to combating the yetzer – “mashcheyhu l’beis ha’medrash,” redirecting its energy to a positive goal.  Moshe was supposed to engage in talmud torah to demonstrate that the stubborn rock could be harnessed for good as well.

the hebrew school education that could have been

Nat Hentoff has a great article here which he opens as follows:
My Jewish parents had changed their lives – inner and outer – by coming to America. When their son was old enough to go to school, they were determined not to send him to the prestigious Hebrew school on the street next to where they lived in Boston.
No, the boy was to be more fully Americanized by taking a sizable walk to the William Lloyd Garrison public elementary school in the neighborhood.
More American even than most Americans, Hebrew school was not for Nat.  His parents wanted him to absorb the values of truth, justice, and the American way (if only those values could be re-released and re-invigorated as easily as a movie!)
Nat continues:
Were they here, my parents might have asked, “What happened to America?”
“His name,” I would tell them, “is Barack Obama.”
To Nat's credit, unlike most other so-called civil libertarians who beat the drum for civil liberty only when they can use it as a weapon to attack Republican administrations, he has been consistent in his criticisms of both Bush and Obama.  The vast majority, however, remain blind to their vision of a great liberal society being destroyed.  I feel bad for folks like Nat.  The gave up so much for the American dream only to wake up (those few who do wake up!) and discover that it was exactly that -- just a dream. 

Dear Nat: It's never too late to come back to get that Hebrew school education. 

P.S. Hello NSA, IRS, etc. snoopers here to add me to the enemies list : )

Friday, June 07, 2013

winning sometimes means losing

“V’haya ha’ish asher yivchar Hashem hu ha’kadosh…" (16:7)  Of course the person Hashem chooses is proven to be holiest of the group – what’s the chiddush?  Why did Moshe need to spell this out to Korach and his minions?

The Ksav Sofer offers a number of answers, but the one I liked most is built on a clever pshat of the Chasam Sofer as to why Mordechai was “ratzuy l’rov echav,” but was not looked upon so highly by the Sanhedrin after the events of the Megillah.  What did they want from the guy – he saved Klal Yisrael!?  So it might have entailed some bitul Torah, as Chazal tell us, but weighed against the danger of Haman, how can you fault Mordechai for closing his gemara to go do something about it?

Chazam Sofer answers that of course Mordechai was right to use his talent and position to save Klal Yisrael, even though he had to give up learning time to do so.  But there are many paths to save Klal Yisrael that are open to Hashem.  Doesn’t Mordechai himself tell Esther that if she doesn’t step forward, “Revach v’hatzalah ya’amod la’yehudim m’makom achier?”  Yet the very fact that the hatzalah came through Mordechai, forcing him to take away learning time, and not through some other means, proved that somehow Mordechai’s torah, Mordechai’s learning, suffered from some shortcoming (obviously we are speaking about a fault on a level we cannot even imagine).  Otherwise, says the Chasam Sofer, Hashem would have worked things out so that Klal Yisrael would be saved without disrupting Mordechai’s precious limud haTorah.  This was the criticism of the Sanhedrin. 

One might have thought that the person elected to be Kohein Gadol, who must devote time and effort to filling a leadership position, is someone whose torah and avodah in other areas is less valuable to Hashem, otherwise why would Hashem take that person out of the beis medrash?  Moshe therefore tells Korach that in this instance, that’s not the case.  The person selected by Hashem, “Hu hakadosh,” he is the holiest member of the group and is the most worthy. 

Let me end off with a little question that I don’t know the answer to: so how do we know the difference?  If a person is thrust into a position where he/she feels that he must take on a public role at the expense of private avodah and/or torah learning, how does a person know whether that means he is a Mordechai and at the end of the day will be only “ratzuy l’rov echav,” or whether he is an Aharon, “Hu hakadosh?”  I don’t think a person can really know and perhaps it shouldn’t bother him anyway.  Let Hashem take care of the cheshbonos.

hallel without hodu

A few weeks ago I wrote with respect to hallel on Yom ha’Atzmaut that if you hold that hallel should be said b'toras reading of tehillim as opposed to a formal kri’as hallel that may require a takanas Chazal to institute, then it seems to me that the responsive “hodo” after “yomar na yisrael,” “yomru na beis aharon,” etc. should be omitted.  These responses to the sha”tz (and the doubling of pesukim at the end of hallel) are specific facets of formal kri’as hallel (see Sukkah 38); if someone were just saying tehillim, it would not be done this way. 

Maybe there’s a bit of proof to my point from hallel of Rosh Chodesh, which is just a minhag.  Look at what the Rambam writes (Hil Chanukah 3:8):

 ומדלג ואומר "מה אשיב, לה'" (תהילים קטז,יב), עד "הללו יה" (תהילים קטז,יט); ומדלג ואומר "מן המצר,

Notice: no recitation of hodu at all!

The GR”A (Ma’aseh Rav) had a practice that seems counterintuitive, but actually makes perfect sense now that we know the Rambam.  On Rosh Chodesh, he would listen to the sha”tz say the pesukim of “yomar na…,” “yomru na…” etc., fulfilling his obligation of kri’ah through shome’a k’oneh, exactly like the sugya in Sukkah 38 dictates, and he would just answer “hodu” to the shat"z.  However, on Yamim Tovim he would not rely on shome’a k’oneh and would read all the pesukim.  Why would he follow the minhag as set down in the gemara on Rosh Chodesh, where hallel is just a minhag, and not on Yom Tov?

The reason we don’t rely on shome’a k’oneh like the gemara says is because it’s hard to do -– it’s easy to miss a word.  On Tom Yov, where you need to read everything, the GR"A made sure to say every word.  However, on Rosh Chodesh, where according to the Rambam you can omit all of hodu, the GR"A was not concerned if he missed a word by relying on shome'a k'oneh.

Thursday, June 06, 2013

hafrashas challah -- an opportune time for tefilah

There may not be any makor (at least that I know of) for gathering precisely 43 women to bake challah together as a special zechus and having everyone recite amein in unison to the bracha of hafrasha, but there is a good makor for using the opportunity of hafrashas challah as a time to daven.  The last Teshuvos Maimoni in the back of the Rambam Zera’im (link) ends off with an aggadic discussion of challah.  He writes that the name Chanah is an acrostic formed from the three mitzvos given especially to women, Challah, Nidah, and Hadlakas ner Shabbos.  Because Chanah was especially scrupulous in these mitzvos, her tefilos for a son was answered.  Every women, he writes, should take Chanah as a model and use the opportunity presented by these mitzvos as a time for tefilah, especially tefilah for sons who are tzadikim.  Based on this I guess women should say the same special tefilah they recite after hadlakas neiros Shabbos when they are mafrish challah. 

(Parenthetically, I recently saw that R’ Elyashiv was asked why saying this tefilah is not a problem of saying a tefilas bakasha on Shabbos, which we try to avoid.  The GR”A even went so far as to omit the Harachaman… parts of bentching.  The answer is that a bakasha of ruchniyus is not a problem, but I am not sure I understood the point correctly, so don’t trust me on that.)
 
R’ Ya’akov Shapira, R”Y of Merkaz haRav, said (link) that his father used to give tzedaka and daven for cholim just before the time of hadlakas neiros based on this Hagahos Maimoni.  Even though the hadlakah is usually done by women, the chiyuv of hadlakah applies to men as well (if there is no women at home, a man needs to light for himself).  Since men share in the kiyum mitzvah, it is a zman of tefilah for them as well. 

Wednesday, June 05, 2013

Aruch haShulchan on gerama vs. being goreim gerama

I’m having a hard time understanding a chiddush the Aruch haShulchan comes up with in Y.D. 276:36-37 (link).  The gemara (Shabbos 120) writes that there is no issur of erasing Hashem’s name if done through a gerama.  Example: someone has the shem Hashem written on his skin and has to go to mikveh.  Even though the shem will be erased by the water, it’s an indirect consequence, and so going to the mikveh is permitted.  The conclusion of the sugya seems clear and is brought by the Rambam l’halacha, but is not quoted in Shulchan Aruch.  The Ah”S wants to know why.

The Ah”S suggests that even though gerama is permitted, to be “goreim gerama,” to deliberately cause a gerama to take place, is prohibited.  For example: if a person had the shem Hashem written on his skin and deliberately stood under water for the sake of erasing the shem, that is the same as just taking an eraser and rubbing it out.  Just because the water is doing the work and not the person makes no difference.  Therefore, since the gemara’s heter of gerama applies in such a limited uncommon scenario like going to mikveh, the Shulchan Aruch omits the topic entirely.

I don’t know how to make sense of the Ah”S’s chiddush once we take it out of the context of erasing shem haShem and try to apply it to other areas.  The gemara writes that melacha is prohibited on Shabbos, but gerama is permitted.  The gemara gives an example: placing barrels of water in the path of a fire, so that when the fire hits the barrels and explodes them, the water will extinguish the fire.  According to the Ah”S, why is this permitted – isn’t it being “goreim gerama” since the intent obviously is to extinguish the fire and setting the barrels in its path is just a ruse to indirectly accomplish that goal? 

Tuesday, June 04, 2013

halachic proof vs. archeological proof

I have not investigated the issue of techeiles enough to even begin to have a thought on the matter, but I want to just call attention to what I think is an interesting methodological point R’ Asher Weiss makes in discussing the topic.  From the response, it appears that the person writing to R’ Weiss made the argument that the vast numbers of purpura/murex shells found in Eretz Yisrael proves that this species was used to make techeiles.  Rav Weiss responds that he recognizes that this type of argument/evidence carries weight in various fields, particularly archeology, where the goal is to construct a theory that best explains the available facts.  However, a theory, no matter how plausible, is not proof.  Whatever explanation is offered for the evidence remains just one of many possible explanations, some more likely than others, but none of which can be said with certainty to be true.  Halacha demands proof – not just a logical or plausible theory. 

Sorry if this cut and paste of an image of the relevant part is a bit sloppy:
 


 

missing the trees for the forest

Moshe asked the meraglim to investigate, “Ha’yesh bah eitz im ayin?” whether Eretz Yisrael has trees.  Rashi already is bothered by this very strange question.  Did Moshe really think Eretz Yisrael (which he knew was eretz za’is shemen u’devash!) had a shortage of trees?  And were botanical questions really critical to ask at this time?  What was Moshe after?

The key to the answer lies in the story of creation.  Hashem commanded that “eitz pri” (Braishis 1:11) appear – trees that were fruit, meaning the bark of the fruit tree was supposed to be as edible as the fruit itself.  However, the trees did not do that.  Instead, out of the ground came “eitz oseh pri,” trees that produced fruit, but were themselves inedible. 

Rav Kook (Orot Teshuvah ch 6) explains the Midrash as a metaphor.  Fruit is the desired end; the tree is the means of producing it.  Ideally, the means to a goal should themselves have some inherent value.  Reality, however, does not live up to the ideal. We perceive our stuggles toward various goals as obstacles to be overcome rather than as valuable experiences and endeavors in their own right.  (Gush's VBM has a nice shiur on this here.) 

If the trees did not fulfill the command of Hashem, why does the Torah says “Va’yehi kein” on that third day of creation?  The Nezer haKodesh explains that it was only the trees of chutz la’aretz which disobeyed; the trees of Eretz Yisrael did exactly as Hashem commanded.

In light of Rav Kook’s metaphor, what this means is that in chutz la’aretz there is no inherent value to farming, building, etc.  These are just means to an end, and if we could skip the intermediate steps and get what we wanted some other way, all the better.  Not so in Eretz Yisrael.  There, ends and means are one and the same; the tree is as tasty as the fruit it produces.  The process of building the land is valuable in its own right and deserving of reward.

Now we can understand, explains R' Ya'akov Moshe Charlap, the great student of Rav Kook, what Moshe wanted.  “Do you see trees, like you do in chutz la’aretz”, he asked the spies, “Or are you able to see that Eretz Yisrael is a land of fruit alone?”  Moshe was challenging the spies to report that in Eretz Yisrael the ta’am ha’eitz is the ta’am ha’pri, it’s all edible, everything has value, there is no difference between means and ends.  Eretz Yisrael fulfills the ideal that Hashem commanded for creation.

Had Moshe brought us into Eretz Yisrael, this is what we would have seen.  And, says R’ Charlap, is we are zocheh, we can and will find the trees like this in Eretz Yisrael – trees that are really fruit, ta’am ha’eitz k'ta’am ha’pri, just as Hashem commanded.

Friday, May 31, 2013

an obligation to speak out

“Va’yamusu ha’anashim motzi’eiy dibas ha’aretz ra’ah… v’Yehoshua bin Nun v’Kalev ben Yefuneh chayu min ha’anashim ha’heim h’holchim la’sur es ha’aretz.” (14:37-38)  This entire second pasuk seems redundant.  Once the Torah mentions the punishment given to the other meraglim, to the exclusion of Yehoshua and Kalev, isn’t it obvious that they went unpunished?  There are many answers – I just want to share two:

Some see a hint here to the idea in Chazal that a tzadik can receive the portion in olam ha’ba of a rasha, and vice versa, the rasha can receive the bad lot that might have been in store for the tzadik.  The pasuk is not just telling us that Yehoshua and Kalev went unpunished, but more than that – they received the reward that was in store for the other meraglim had they not gone astray.

How does this work -- how can I get someone else’s portion of olam ha’ba?  R’ Ahron Kotler (Mishnas R’ Ahron) explains that it’s always easier to do mitzvos and learn Torah when you see your neighbor doing the same, and vica versa.  The tzadik who overcomes the negative influence of his neighbor acting wrongly deserves double reward – the reward for the good itself, as well as the reward for not being pulled down by the influence of his neighbor.  The rasha deserves a double punishment – punishment for the wrong itself, and punishment for the influence it has on others.  (Let’s remind ourselves of his hesber in a few week’s when we get to Chazal’s derasha on “nachamu nachamu” that there was a double nechama for the double sin that caused galus and we ask ourselves what this idea of a double sin means.)

The Ohr haChaim writes that surely there were tzadikim other than Yehoshua and Kalev in Bnei Yisrael.  Yet, we don’t find that these other tzadikim were spared punishment – they too, like the rest of the dor hamidbar, died before reaching Eretz Yisrael.  The extra pasuk comes to tell us that it was only the fact that Yehoshua and Kalev were “min ha’anashim ha’heim” and could have been part of the cabal, but instead took an independent stand l’shem shamayim, going against the grain, that saved them. 

In other words, when there is a moment of crisis, you can be the biggest tzadik, but that’s not going to save you from punishment if all you do is sit on the sidelines and watch.  Sometimes there is an obligation to protest, and I would add, even if, as in the case of Kalev and Yehoshua, there are greater people (like Moshe and Aharon) in charge, and even if it comes to naught. 

Thursday, May 30, 2013

40 years in the desert -- a reward, not a punishment

Yom la’shanah, yom la’shanah…  Why is it that Hashem punished Bnei Yisrael one year per day of the mergalim’s misadventures?  Usually there is a balanced proportion between the crime and the punishment, midah k’neged midah.  Here, the punishment is (in duration) far in excess of the time spent on the crime?  (See previous post on this.)

The Akeidah explains that Bnei Yisrael sent the meraglim with the best of intentions.  They probably spent 40 days davening on the spies behalf, eagerly awaiting their return with a report of how to best conquer Eretz Yisrael so they could finally be on their way.  Mashal l’mah ha’davar domeh: think of how the great ba’alei mussar spent the 40 days from Rosh Chodesh Elul until Yom Kippur davening and preparing themselves.  The 40 years in the desert was not a punishment – it was the schar for these 40 days!  By rights, Hashem could have wiped out the entire generation in one shot, but instead he extended their lifetimes for years and years.

The She’eiris Menachem adds that with this we can understand a seeming contradiction in Rashi’s comments.  Rashi explains “kulam anashim,” that all the people appointed as meraglim were all tzadikim.  Yet, later in the parsha Rashi tells us that the meraglim departed with bad intentions in mind just as their return report was delivered with bad intentions.  Which is it – were they tzadikim, or were they plotting something evil from the get-go?  (Maharal's answer posted here.) 

The answer is that both are true.  “Shlucho shel adam k’moso.” Klal Yisrael meant well when they sent the meraglim, and so the meraglim gained the benefit of being invested with the positive energy of that shlichus.  It is only when the spies returned with a bad report that Bnei Yisrael had a change of heart.  However, on a personal level, the mergalim were already plotting to spoil the mission from the get-go. 

(An amazing story brought by R’ Noson Gestetner in the name of the Tchebiner Rav:  One of R’ Akiva Eiger’s daughters became engaged to someone in another town.  RAK”E was already old and could not travel there, so he sent R’ Ephrayim Zalman Margolias in his place as his shliach to celebrate the engagement.  Unlike the Beis Ephraim’s usual practice of not lingering at a simcha, in this case he stayed and stayed for the whole party.  When asked about it afterwards, R’ E. Z. Margolias explained that shlucho shel adam k’moso, so he wanted to take advantage of every second he could be R’ Akiva Eiger!)

Wednesday, May 29, 2013

targets

The Wall Street Journal headline wonders, "Did the tax agency [the IRS] also target groups that support Israel?"  In one case:

Asked about the slow pace of approval, the IRS auditor on the case, Diane Gentry, said the application was taking so long because auditors were supposed to give special scrutiny to groups "connected with Israel." Ms. Marcus says Ms. Gentry further explained that many applications related to Israel had to be sent to "a special unit in D.C. to determine whether the organization's activities contradict the Administration's public policies."
Sadly, this will only be seen as a positive by the vast majority of our brothers and sisters who will continue to vote Democat and thank Washington for reining in the "extremists" among us.  I could write about this stuff day in and day out, but it's a bracha l'vatala. 

why didn't Hashem warn Moshe that sending spies was a bad idea?

Rambam, Hil Rotzei'ach 12:14
וכן כל המכשיל עור בדבר והשיאו עצה שאינה הוגנת או שחיזק ידי עוברי עבירה שהוא עור ואינו רואה דרך האמת מפני תאות לבו הרי זה עובר בלא תעשה שנאמר ולפני עור לא תתן מכשול הבא ליטול ממך עצה תן לו עצה ההוגנת לו:

Rambam, Hil Rotzei'ach 1:14
כל היכול להציל ולא הציל עובר על לא תעמוד על דם רעך. וכן הרואה את חבירו טובע בים. או ליסטים באים עליו. או חיה רעה באה עליו. ויכול להצילו הוא בעצמו. או ששכר אחרים להצילו ולא הציל. או ששמע עובדי כוכבים או מוסרים מחשבים עליו רעה או טומנין לו פח ולא גלה אוזן חבירו והודיעו. או שידע בעובד כוכבים או באונס שהוא בא על חבירו ויכול לפייסו בגלל חבירו להסיר מה שבלבו ולא פייסו וכל כיוצא בדברים אלו. העושה אותם עובר על לא תעמוד על דם רעך:

There is an issur of standing by idly and watching your friend come to harm.  There is an issur of providing bad advice and of abetting someone who is on the wrong path.  So how is it, asks R' Noson Gestetner (link), that Hashem allowed Moshe to send spies into Eretz Yisrael?  Hashem surely knew that no good would come from the mission, so shouldn't he have warned Moshe that it was a bad idea and would lead to harm?

I'm struggling to understand the question.  If Hashem were to intervene in that way, would it not rob us of our free will? 

Perhaps this case is different because Moshe directly asked Hashem whether he should send the spies; however, R' Gestetner does not mention that factor as being crucial in formulating the question, and if indeed there was a moral obligation to save Moshe from harm like the moral obligation to save a drowning person, what difference does it make if he asked or didn't ask?  Even if the person drowining doesn't cry out for help (or can't cry out for help), that doesn't absolve you of the obligation to save him. 

Perhaps you could argue that Hashem has already given us all the clues we need to make the right decisions; it's our own shortcoming if we can't follow directions.  However, Moshe had no way to determine whether sending spies was the correct course of action or not, so Hashem should have intervened.  I don't buy this distinction.  The fact that someone should have learned how to swim better doesn't absolve you of the obligation to jump in and save him if he is drowning.  Secondly, there are plenty of decisions where people are at a loss of what to do and they even daven for Hashem and ask for help -- according to R' Gestetner's reasoning, where are the answers? 

Friday, May 24, 2013

seeing in the dark

א"ר חנינא אמר הקדוש ברוך הוא עינים שיש בך יש בתוכן לבן ושחור ואין אתה רואה מתוך הלבן אלא מתוך השחור ומה אם עיניך שיש בתוכן שחור ולבן אין אתה רואה אלא מתוך השחור הקב"ה שכולו אורה הוא צריך לאורה שלכם

We expect that we will see Hashem from the lavan, the white and bright parts of life, the areas we put our kochos into, and I am speaking even of avodas Hashem.  However, writes the Sifsei Tzadik, the truth is that we see best from the shachor, from the amidst the darkness.  That's where we will experience growth and closeness to Hashem.  Hashem doesn't need our ohr; he can find us amidst the darkness as well.

A few weeks ago by Lag b'Omer I mentioned the yesod of the Ch. haRI"M that there is a nekudas chein that every Jew has in G-d's eyes.  Whatever you think that nekudah is, you are guaranteed to have it wrong, as "ha'adam yireh l'ynayim v'Hashem yireh l'leivav," so whatever we see, Hashem is looking at something even deeper. 

When Bnei Yisrael start complaining in our parsha, Moshe grows angry and then he turns to Hashem and asks, "Lamah lo matzasi chein b'einecha..." (11:11 - easy to remember).  What Moshe was asking was why it is that he not able to also see that nekudas chein which Hashem can see with his eyes. 

Thursday, May 23, 2013

ger she'nisgayeir k'katan she'nolad

The gemara (Zevachim 101b) raises the question of who could examine Miriam’s tzara’as.  Moshe?  Can’t be, says the gemara, because Moshe was not a kohen.  Aharon?  Also can’t be, says the gemara, because Aharon is a relative and you can’t pasken on this issue for a relative.  The only choice left is Hashem.

Question: why did the gemara exclude Moshe because he is not a kohen, forcing the gemara to pose the question with respect to Aharon and then come up with a new answer – why not exclude Moshe on the basis of his being a relative, and m’meila we wouldn’t even have to raise the question about Aharon because the same reason obviously would apply?  Why not kill two birds with one stone if you can?

We once mentioned (link - see hesber there) the chiddush of the Maharal (quoted by the Shev Shmaytza in his intro) that the principle of ger she’nisgayeir k’katan she’nolad does not apply to a forced geirus, which includes the geirus of mattan Torah since kafah aleihem har k’gigis.  This is why in our parsha Bnei Yisrael were crying (as interpreted by Chazal) over the arayos that became prohibited.  Even though m’doraysa a ger  has fewer issurei arayos, as he is like a newborn severed from all his part familial relationships, this din did not apply to the geirus of mattan Torah.

Based on this, the Kotzker (see R’ Wahrman’s She’eiris Yosef here) suggests a brilliant explanation of the gemara in Zevachim.  Aharon had Sinai held over his head – he was part of the forced geirus of mattan Torah.  The rule of ger she'nisgayei k'katan she'nolad did not apply to him, and therefore his relationship with Miriam was not severed.  Moshe, however, was on the mountain – his geirus was not forced.  The din of l'katan she'nolad would apply in his case, and therefore the gemara needed to offer an alternate explanation as to why he could not treat Miriam’s tza’ra’as.
 
Two other points worth noting:

What’s the hesber for this chiddush of the Maharal?  The Kli Chemdah in Parshas VaYigash explains that the concept of geirus means divorcing oneself from one’s previous allegiance to nation and family and joining a new people. Conceptually, it makes no sense when applied to geirus en masse of the Jewish people.  We did not leave some other nation to become Klal Yisrael at mattan Torah; we were and always will be the Jewish nation.  We simply affirmed our identity and relationship to the Avos.  According to this approach, it is not the element of coercion which negated the din of ger she’nisgayeir k'katan she'nolad at mattan Torah; it’s the fact that the experience of mattan Torah was unique in occurring to the Jewish people.  This same logic would apply to Moshe Rabeinu as well.

Secondly, the Chasam Sofer in his chiddushim and al haTorah (in last week’s parsha) writes that his whole life he wondered what the makor for this din of ger she’nisgayei k’katan shenolad is.  The Meshech Chocha in Parshas VaEschanan has an answer.  Bnei Yisrael were told to separate from their wives in preparation for mattan Torah.  Immediately afterward, Hashem commanded, “Shuvo lachem l’ohaleichem,” allowing them to return to their previous marriages.  Says the Meshech Chochma: what would happen if someone was married to a woman who is an ervah by Torah law but  was permitted to a ben Noach?  How could this person return to his wife who is now an issur arayos to him?  It must be, says the Meshech Chochma, that the heter of “shuvo lachem l’ohaleichem” is mechadesh that ger she’nisgayeir k’katan shenolad and therefore issues of arayos are moot.

If the Maharal is right that the din of ger shenisgayeir k’katan she'nolad did not apply by mattan Torah, then the Meshech Chochma’s proof does not hold water.

a protest without a plan

Some people are good with just rolling with the punches; I prefer to at least have some idea of a plan before running with an idea.  You can read this post as a criticism if you like, but I prefer to say I simply don’t understand what the present chareidi leadership in Israel is thinking.  Let us imagine for a moment that the chilonim were all gone and out of the equation – that Israel was a theocracy, with the chareidi leadership in full control.  Could such a state succeed?  How would it defend itself when the entire population claims exemption from army duty?  How would the economy function when the vast majority of the population requires government assistance to survive?  How would there be doctors, accountants, engineers, etc. if all secular studies are off-limits?  In short, what’s the plan? 

Simply protesting any change to the status quo is not an answer.  The status quo is untenable and unsustainable.  If we are being called upon to listen to da'as Torah, then da'as Torah must articulate a vision of how a society can be built and function given the constraints chareidi leaders are imposing. 

R’ Moshe Shternbruch spoke recently (link) at a protest and posed the following question: “The authorities today are not threatening to draft the Arabs or scheming against them. What is the difference between the chareidim and the Arabs? Legally speaking, their status is identical: both groups are citizens who are not drafted.”  B’mechilas kvodo, the Rosh Yeshiva may be correct as far as the legal argument goes, but it is incredible to me that he does not see the moral distinction.  Our obligations to the State do not stem from legal status, but rather stem from the chiyuvim of yishuv ha’aretz, of ahavas yisrael and living in harmony with our brethren (secular and religious), of fighting milchemes mitzvah.  How can one dream of comparing the loyalty and love a Jew should feel toward the State to that which an Arab feels? 

I cringe when I see the word “shmad” applied to the Jewish state.  That word should have no place in our internal debates.  Disagree with everything the government does, but I don't see how you can compare asking for a few years of service in Tzahal with the forced conscriptions into Czarist armies that our people suffered a hundred years ago.  Yet, R’ Shternbruch goes even a step further and quotes the Brisker Rav as saying (and I even hate to write this!), “…the Zionists were worse than the SS.”  Yes, I have taken the words out of context, but b’mechilas kvodam, and afar anochi tachas raglam, but I simply cannot fathom any context in which those words can be justified. 
 
The whole situation is a sad mess.

Wednesday, May 22, 2013

two quick points on the mitzvah of aliya la'regel and the mitzvah of viduy

Over Shavuos I dabbled a bit in the Sefer haMitzvot of the Rambam, which Rav Kook recommended learning on leil Shavuos.  Two quick observations:

1)  In mitzvas aseh 52, the Rambam writes that, “This commandment is that each man, together with each male child capable of walking on his own, must travel to the Temple…” (translation taken from the Chabad website).  The Rambam in S”hM usually seems to give just a bare bones formulation of each mitzvah.  Why then would he include here that “each male child” must be brought on aliya la’regel?  That's just a din in chinuch, not part of the mitzvah d’oraysa of aliya laregel (see Rashi Chagiga 2a d”h eizehu katan)?

2)  In mitzvas aseh 73, the mitzvah of viduy, which we read in last week’s parsha, after proving that viduy must be said even outside the context of bringing a korban, the Rambam quotes another derasha from Chazal: “We still only know of the obligation of vidui in Israel. How do we know it applies even in exile? This we learn from what Daniel said, 'They will then recite vidui for their sins and the sins of their fathers,' and from the verse, 'To You, G‑d, there is charity, and to us there is shame' "  (again, translationfrom Chabad).  This is a very interesting hava amina.  The mitzvah of viduy is a mitzvah sheb’gufo.  Why would we even entertain the thought that it applies only in Eretz Yisrael?  (Were the mitzvah to do teshuvah, I would say it by definition it entails coming closer to Hashem, and that can only fully be achieved in Eretz Yisrael.  But the Rambam formulates the mitzvah as viduy – not teshuvah – and so I think that argument is a little harder to make.)

Tuesday, May 21, 2013

givers and takers

Rashi explains the smichus haparshiyos between the parsha of bringing matnos kahuna and the parsha of sota (Bamidbar 5) as a warning that if you withhold from the kohen his due, then you will end up having to come to the kohen to deal with the tragic circumstance of sota. 

If the idea is a midah k’neged midah, that failing to come to the kohen for the positive end of bringing matnos kahuna will lead to coming to the kohen for some negative consequence, then why illustrate the point specifically with the parsha of sota?  Why not the parsha of metzora, which was a severe punishment that required the intervention of the kohen?  The Shem m’Shmuel’s answer should be required reading for all married folks and those who plan to be married.

Life is filled with transactions between givers and takers, mashpi’a and mekabel, tzurah imposing itself on chomer.  It’s usually very easy to spot which side of the equation is which.  Not so when it comes to matnos kahuna.  Even though the farmer must surrender part of his crop to the kohen or levi, it is the kohen who is the mashpi’a, the tzurah.  The farmer receives far more from the relationship than what he gives up in material goods.

If someone doesn’t get the message and thinks that relationships are only measured by tangible net gain/ loss, if a person thinks he gets nothing in return for what he gives to the kohen and therefore keeps his matnos kehuna, then he will inevitably have a shalom bayis / sota problem to deal with.  A husband who, for example, brings home a bouquet of flowers, is not the mashpi’a – he is the mekabeil, because he will receive the benefit of an improved relationship with his spouse that will help be mashlim him as a person.  The return is far more valuable than the few dollars invested in the roses that are gone a week later. 

Monday, May 20, 2013

week of tashlumin for korbanos of Shavuos

The gemara (Rosh Hashana 6) records that Rav Papayus offered a cow as a korban shelamim on Pesach and then offered it’s calf as a shelamim on Sukkos.  The gemara wrestles with the question of why Rav Papayus delayed so long – why didn’t he bring the calf as a korban on Shavuos, the first opportunity for aliya l’aregel after Pesach?  Isn’t there a mitzvah to not delay bringing a korban?

The Turei Even wonders why the gemara did not entertain the possibility that Rav Papayus was talking about a year in which Shavuos fell on Shabbos.  Since the Yom Tov of Shavuos is only one day, and it would have been impossible to offer a voluntary korban offering on that one day if it fell on Shabbos, that would cancel any penalty for delaying.  You can’t be liable for bal t’acher if there is an issur of bringing the korban!

The Turei Even answers that since with respect to korbanos there is tashlumin for seven days, i.e. if someone did not bring their olas re’iya on Shavuos, they still get a week to make it up, viz a viz voluntary korbanos as well, the entire week, not just the first day, counts as being part of the regel. 

R’ Wahrman in his She’eris Yosef (vol 2) points out that the shakla v’terya of the Turei Even raises a fundamental question about the nature of tashlumin: is tashlumin an opportunity to bring korbanos ha’chag once the chag has passed, or is tashlumin an indication that to some degree the cheftza of Yom Tov, the kedushas ha’chag, lingers and has not passed, even though there is no issur melacha?

If the chag is over, then then bal t’acher should not apply to korbanos which could not be brought on the first day.  But if tashlumin is an extension of Yom Tov, then even if one could not bring korbanos nedava on the first day, one would be liable for bal t’acher for failing to do so on the remaining tashlumin days, as it still counts as if one had the opportunity to bring the korban on Y"T.

This question may be behind the different minhagin as to whether tachanun is said in the week after Shavuos.  If the chag is over and tashlumin is just a korbanos make-up opportunity, then tachanun should be said.  If tashlumin means the chag itself continues, then it would seem that there is more license to omit tachanun. 

Friday, May 17, 2013

what the nazir can teach us about celebrating isru chag

Why does the nazir bring a korban chatas when he completes his nezirus? 

Ramban answers that a korban chatas is required because the nazir’s return to everyday life is a step down from the spiritual heights he reached during his nezirus.  A return to the everyday world is a surrender to the drives and desires that the nazir avoided while in his higher spiritual state of nezirus.

Rabeinu Bachyei disagrees.  We never find, he writes, a korban chatas offered for future sins that have not yet been committed; a chatas is only brought after one has already sinned.  When the nazir steps back into the mundane everyday routine that may include drinking wine, taking a haircut, etc., he has not yet done anything wrong.   

The korbanos of the nazir, explains R’ Bachyei, are not brought because of any sin (he does not say it explicitly, but it seems that this chatas is an exception to the norm because it is brought together with the olah and shelamim).  The root of the word korban is k-r-v, to draw closer; the purpose of the nazir’s korbanos is to draw him closer to the source of his spiritual energy, to give him a final boost that he can carry into his regular day to day.  “V’achar yishteh ha’nazir ya’yin” – the Torah ends the parsha by telling us that the nazir should return to his everyday life of the past.  The purpose of nezirus is not to escape from the mundane world, but to learn how to live in it properly.

Hopefully your Shavuos was celebrated with intense immersion in talmud torah and kabbalas haTorah, and so it’s only natural to feel a bit letdown on isru chag.  Rabeinu Bachyei’s perspective reminds us that islands of spirituality are not meant as an oasis of temporary escape from the day to day, a momentary high from which we must fall, but are meant to give us the spiritual vitamins we need so our day to day becomes infused with that spiritual intensity and energy as well.

Tuesday, May 14, 2013

amoni v'lo amonis and the definition of modesty

The gemara (Chagiga 4b) writes that when Shmuel was raised from the grave by Shaul, he thought he was facing din in shamayim and so he brought Moshe Rabeinu wih him to testify on his behalf.  Moshe did not know every detail of Shmuel’s life, but, says Tosfos (d”h d’leika), Shmuel wanted was Moshe’s confirmation that his derasha from pesukim and his actions on that basis were justified. 

What derasha is Tosfos referring to?  The Sefas Emes explained that we see from the sugya in Yevamos 76-77 that there was tremendous debate whether David haMelech could be appointed king or whether the fact that he was a descendent of Rus, an Amonis, disqualified him.  It was testimony that the beis din of Shmuel had ruled that only Amoni, males of the nation of Amon, but not Amonis, females of that nation, were disqualified, that settled the issue.  As a result of that ruling Shaul eventually lost the kingship and David was appointed in his place.  Shmuel haNavi wanted confirmation that he was correct in making that derasha and acting to support David. 
 
(According to this interpretation, the halacha of “Amoni – v’lo Amonis” is based on a derasha.  The Brisker Rav reads the conclusion of the sugya that the din was a halacha l’Moshe m’Sinai.  Something to discuss another time maybe).

 If I were giving a women’s shiur this chag, this issue would be a tempting choice to speak about.  The nation of Amon is excluded from intermarrying with Bnei Yisrael for failing to extend food and drink to Bnei Yisrael when they passed through their territory.  Doeg ha’Adomi argued that this criticism applied equally to the men of Amon as well as the women and both should be barred.  The gemara (76b) asks: but women normally do not go out to greet strange men – tzniyus!?  The gemara answers that the Amonite men could have gone to greet the men of Bnei Yisrael and the Amonite women could have gone out to the women.  We could have put up a big mechitza!  If the women failed to go out, argued Doeg, they are equally to blame. 

This question was the show stopper that would have disqualified David haMelech if not for the fact that someone remembered that Shmuel’s beis din had already paskened the issue otherwise.  However you understand why Shmuel’s beis din was the final word in the matter (halacha l’Moshe m’Simai or an irrefutable derasha), the gemara grants the point.  But what of Doeg’s tremendous kashe – how do you respond to his argument?  The gemara answers: “Kol kvuda bas melech pnima.” 

One way to read the gemara’s conclusion is that mechitza or no mechitza, it’s still unreasonable to expect women to go out and greet strangers.  If this is correct, the whole shakla v'terya can be reduced to simply a matter of metziyus, a debate about the facts on the ground: is the expectation that the Amonite women should go out and bring food to their Israelite sisters reasonable or not?  Originally the gemara thought Doeg had a great kashe and the expectation was not unreasonable, kah mashma lan that it was.

I prefer to avoid making a debate about an issue of metziyus.  Instead, I think the gemara’s shakla v’terya gets to the root of what modesty is all about.  There are two elements to modesty: 1) avoiding promiscuous behavior, especially intermingling of the sexes; 2) behaving with restraint and reserve.   The Midrash (BaMidbar Rabbah 1:3) tells us that before there was an Ohel Moed, G-d spoke to Moshe from a burning bush in Midyan, G-d spoke to Moshe in Egypt, G-d spoke to Moshe from Har Sinai. However, now that there was an Ohel Moed G-d spoke only privately from that tent to fulfill the ideal of "hatzne’ah leches".  Obviously we are not speaking about the intermingling of the sexes here.  When the Midrash speaks of hatzne’ah leches, it means comportment, a certain type of behavior, a “madreiga pnimis,” as the Maharal describes it.  See this post for more.  So often we get caught up in issues of skirt and sleeve length that we forget all about this very important second element.

Doeg thought that given the need to do chessed, it is enough if the Amonite women were sensitive to that first element of modesty, avoiding intermingling of the sexes, but they should have put aside that second element in order to help Bnei Yisrael.  So long as that mechitza was in place, there was no excuse for their inaction.  The gemara in the end rebuts this argument.  “Kol kvudah bas melech pnima” means that this second aspect of modesty, modesty of character, is primary.  If the Amonite women chose to modestly stay indoors rather than go out and greet strangers, their behavior cannot be condemned, even if it meant the sacrifice of an opportunity to do chessed.

Perhaps this gemara alerts us to another possible reason for the reading of Megilas Rus on Shavuos.  Chazal (see Rashi Shmos 34:3) tell us the fanfare and public spectacle involved in the giving of the first luchos led to their being shattered, which teaches us “ain lecha yafah min ha’tzeniyus,” there is nothing nicer than modesty.  On the first day of Shavuos we relive the lightning and thunder of Sinai, the public display of awesomeness.  The second day of Shavuos reminds us that as great as that experience was, there is yet a greater value – the value of modesty. 

vayichan yisrael -- what's even better than finding chein in each other's eyes?

Rashi famously comments that the pasuk “VaYichan sham Yisrael neged ha’ar…” uses the singular tense because Klal Yisrael was united “k’ish echad b’lev echad,” like one person with one heart in preparation for kabbalas haTorah.  R’ Yitzchok of Vorke explained the word “vayichan” comes from the word “chein.”  If every person can see the chein in his or her neighbor, then we can be united as ish echad b’lev echad.

 Beautiful vort, right?  But the Shem m’Shmuel (5762) is not satisfied.  Sure, it’s easy to get along with your neighbor if you see their chein.  The trick, though, is to get along with your neighbor even when you don’t see that chein, even when you disagree and don’t see eye to eye.  This is the level that Bnei Yisrael rose to at mattan Torah.  The Shem m’Shmuel gets this from Chazal’s statement that “Moshe hosif yom echad m’da’ato,” Moshe used his “da’as” and added an extra day to the waiting period before mattan Torah.  Here’s how:

 The word “da’as” seems to have two opposite meanings.  On the one hand, da’as means to connect on the deepest level, like the connection between a husband and wife, “V’ha’adam yada es Chavah ishto…”  On the other hand, da’as refers to the ability to discriminate and distinguish.  The Yerushalmi writes that we say havdalah in the bracha of “chonein hada’as” because without da’as there would be no havdalah, we could not draw distinctions. 
 
The truth is that there is no contradiction between the meanings; they supplement each other.  No matter who it is, if you look at every detail of a person, there is going to be something there you don’t like.  The person is great, but they like chocolate ice cream and everyone knows vanilla is better, or vica versa.  That person is a great ba’al chessed, but wears an ugly tie.  We can all come up with a million examples.  How can you ever have the da’as of connection and companionship if everyone is flawed in some way?  Answer: by having the da’as of distinction, knowing how to put to the side those nitpicky details and focus on the good that there is.

I put it in language that we can relate to; the Shem m’Shmuel says it a little deeper.  The bad taste in ice cream, the ugly ties, etc. – all these are superficial details.  If you dig into the core of a person, you are going to find a G-dly neshoma, and what’s not to like and be able to connect to about that?  If we want the da’as of connection, we need da’as to discriminate between the pnimiyus, the G-dly core, and all the other chitzoniyus that we see on the outside.

“Moshe hosif yom echad m’da’ato” – Moshe introduced this factor of da’as into the process of mattan Torah.  K’ish echad b’lev echad means that Klal Yisrael dug into the pnimiyus of who they were and what their mission was, and through that, they realized that all the differences really don’t matter at the end of the day, they are just superficial distractions.

Anochi Hashem Elokecha -- even if only one individual gets the message

Rashi explains that the first of the Aseres Hadibros, “Anochi Hashem Elokecha…,” is written in the singular, as if Hashem was speaking only to Moshe, so that Moshe would have an argument in Bnei Yisrael’s defense when they sinned in the cheit ha’eigel and be able to claim the command was given only to him.

Of course the mitzvah of “Anochi Hashem Elokecha…” was given to all of Klal Yisrael.  What Rashi means, explains the Sefas Emes, is that the singular tense is used to show that even if an entire generation has sinned, so long as there is even one individual who does what’s right, Torah still has meaning.

Monday, May 13, 2013

kabbalas haTorah as a mechapeir

An amazing Yerushalmi (Rosh haShana 4:8): By all the korbanos of the chagim it says "se'ir izim echad l'chatas," except for Shavuos, where there is no mention of cheit -- it just says "se'ir izim echad l'chapeir aleichem."  (Bamidbar 28:30)  The Yerushalmi explains that as a result of kabbalas haTorah Hashem wipes away all previous sins, so it is as if there was no cheit to speak of.

ר' משרשיא בשם ר' אידי בכל הקרבנות כתיב חטא ובעצרת אין כתיב חטא אמר להן הקב"ה מכיון שקיבלתם עליכם עול תורה מעלה אני עליכם כאילו לא חטאתם מימיכם:

anticipation for kabbalas haTorah

The Zohar’s (VaYikra 97b) writes that one of the goals of Shavuos night is “l’natra dachya ila’ah d’mati aleh b’hahu ley’lya.”  The word “l’natra” is the equivalent of the Hebrew word “lishmor,” but, says the Shem m’Shmuel, don’t think it means “to guard” in a passive sense, like a shomer takes care of an item entrusted to his care.  Rather, it should be understood in the same sense the Torah uses the word when describing Ya’akov’s reaction to Yosef’s dreams: “v’Aviv shamar as ha’davar,” i.e. he waited with eager anticipation.  Contrary to popular behavior, Shavuos night is not about downing enough coffee and cake to be “yotzei” staying up all night so that one re-experiences mattan Torah with a full belly, albeit a somewhat fuzzy mind.  The korban Pesach is ne’echal al ha’sova, but I don’t think the same din applies to mattan Torah.  It's all about anticipation and enthusiasm.   

The Sm”S writes that this idea helps answer a question raised by his father, the Sochotchover.  The Sochotchover assumed that there is no din of simchas Yom Tov on the night a Yom Tov starts because simcha is elicited by the performance of the mitzvos of the chag.  It’s only after Pesach has started that we can eat matzah; it’s only after Sukkos has started that we can eat in the sukkah -- the simcha kicks in the next day, after we have had a chance to do the mitzvos.  But what about on Shavuos – there are no mitzvos to do; nothing is missing when Yom Tov starts, so why  does the din of simcha not apply immediately?  Shem m’Shmuel answers that there is something we need to do: “l’natra dachya ila’ah” is an active, eager waiting, not a passive lack of activity.   

If you want to see the difference then take note on your way to work as you pass by kids waiting at their bus stop for the schoolbus to arrive on a spring day.  The kids will be joking with each other, talking, eating, etc.; in short, they will be doing anything and everything short of looking down the road to see if the bus is close.  As far as they are concerned, the further away the bus is the better! Now take a look at adults waiting by the bus stop or subway stop on their way to work.  Their necks crane every 30 seconds as they peer anxiously down the road or down the track to see when the next bus or train is coming, they tap their feet and shuffle around anxiously, they listen to every traffic report or announcement with trepidation lest there be some unanticipated delay.  That’s the “natra” the Zohar is talking about. 

The Maharal writes on the pasuk “U’Moshe alah el ha’Elokim va’yikra eilav Hashem min ha’har leimor…” that Moshe had to make the first move and ascend the mountain before Hashem came down to speak with him.  Kabbalas haTorah starts by our demonstrating the desire to receive Torah; one cannot wait passively for it to drop in one’s lap.