Tuesday, May 07, 2013

recognizing our own limitations

The Torah writes that if a farmer will ask, “What will we eat if we can’t farm during shemita and yovel?” Hashem answers that he will command the fields to produce and abundant crop in advance.  Why does the Torah not say simply tell us Hashem promise – why does the Torah couch the bracha in the context of a question-and-answer shakla v’terya format?

I think the most popular answer is some variation on the one the Noam Elimelech writes in the name of his brother (posted about it here).  A true ba’al bitachon asks no questions.  He trusts that if Hashem says not to farm, he will survive in some way.  That’s exactly what will happen – someway, somehow, the food will last.  The teva cannot and will not contradict the belief of the ba’al bitachon.  What the Torah here is saying is that even if you do ask questions and therefore maybe you don’t deserve teva to be in harmony with your shmiras hamitzvos, you don’t deserve the food to last, still Hashem promises that so long as you are willing to do the mitzvah, he will force the food to be there by commanding his bracha to the fields.

I want to share with you the answer of the Maharasham (I saw this quoted by R’ Shmuel Ya’akov Rubenstein in his She’eiris Menachem, where he adds additional hesber that I am not going into, so here’s a link).  There is another place in the Torah where a promise appears in the context of a question and answer:  the Torah writes (Devarim 7:17) that if you should say when you enter Eretz Yisrael, “How can I conquer all these great nations?” don’t worry because Hashem promises that He will help get the job done.  Again, one can ask why the promise is couched in the context of shakla v’terya instead of being said straight out.  The Bina La’ittim answers (and I once quoted the same pshat from Sefas Emes) that the Torah is teaching that Hashem’s promise is conditional on our asking for it.  Meaning, we have to first recognize that we can’t do it ourselves; the job is too great and our ability is limited.  We have to say to Hashem that we need him.  If we do that, then Hashem promises to deliver the help we need.  If think we can do it ourselves, we fail to recognize our own limitations, then Hashem leaves it up to us, and of course, we can’t really succeed by ourselves.  The same is true of shemita.  The Torah prefaces the promise of Hashem's help with the farmer's question to teach us that Hashem will provide us with all the help we need to get through the years without farming – but we have to recognize that we need that help and ask for it. 

Monday, May 06, 2013

why halacha is like Beis Hillel

The gemara (Eiruvin 13) writes that the halacha follows Beis Hillel over Beis Shamai because Beis Hillel were “nochin v’aluvin,” they were humble and modest and therefore would first discuss Beis Shamai’s view and only then present their own opinion. 

It sounds at first glance like this is some kind of mystical segulah, that if you have good midos the schar is that you will hit the mark in psak halacha.  I saw R’ Zalman Nechemya Goldberg explains it differently. We know the general rule of thumb in psak is “hilchisa k’basra’ah,” the halacha usually follows a later authority over an earlier one.  This is because if you approach an issue after the fact, you have the advantage of hindsight and can better weigh the different options.  The halacha follows Beis Hillel because they reviewed Beis Shamai’s opinion first; they first considered the counter-argument carefully before arriving at their own view.  Therefore, their opinion was always the “basra’ah.” 

Friday, May 03, 2013

David haMelech - a model of mindfulness

We dealt with this Midrash before, but why not revisit it again: every single morning David haMelech would think about going to this place or that place, and lo and behold, his feet would carry him to the beis knesses or beis medrash.  This is what the Torah means when it says “Im b’chukosai teileichu…”
 
Let’s imagine… David haMelech gets up, plans to go somewhere, gets in his car and starts driving, but he is so absentminded that somehow he ends up in the beis medrash even though he intended to go elsewhere.  If it were me, I probably get back in the car and go to my intended destination, but not David haMelech -- once he got sidetracked and ended up in the beis medrash, there he remained, even though he never wanted to be there to begin with. And every morning this same mistake repeated itself. Could this possible be true?  Is it an ideal to emulate? 

Obviously, this is not what the Midrash means, explains the Sefas Emes.  David haMelech had many responsibilities as king, just as we have many responsibilities that require attending to.  A person can go through the day on autopilot, barely awake, and deal with most of the routine tasks in his job (trust me on this) and life.  We literally let so much of what happens in a day wash right by us without paying it any heed, all the while thinking that we will find deep meaning elsewhere in life, outside the daily routine.  David haMelech had a different attitude.  Instead of sleep-walking through the day, David haMelech practiced mindfulness – before acting, he took the time to think about where he wanted to go, what he wanted to do, what he could get out of the experience.  When a person has that attitude, he will find that he is always in the beis medrash, learning from every experience; he is always in the beis knesses, lit the “house of gathering,” as all of his energy is gathered and channeled toward a focused, deliberate goal, not mindlessly scattered.

Thursday, May 02, 2013

Netziv on the ethical cost of assimilation

Before getting to an interesting paradox the Netziv points out in the parsha that deals with a Jewish slave sold to a ger, let me start out by spelling out an assumption he makes: wealth and success comes from being careful in interpersonal relations, mitzvos bein adam l’chaveiro.  Chazal tell us (Shabbos 151b) that one who acts with mercy towards others will merit receiving mercy from Heaven.  Be nice to others, and G-d will be nice to you and keep you from becoming destitute.  We can debate whether that’s exactly what the gemara means (it sounds to me that the gemara doesn’t mean poverty is avoidable, but rather it means that if you show mercy toward the poor and treat them with dignity and respect, Hashem will see that even if you do become poor, you will still retain your dignity.)  We can debate whether other mitzvos, not just bein adam l’chaveito deeds, have the same effect.  But let’s put that aside for now, let’s grant the Netziv the point, and let’s see where he goes with it.

Rashi comments on “v’ki tasig yad ger v’toshav imach…” (25:47) that the reason this ger toshav has the wealth and ability to acquire slaves is because he is “imach,” – “dibuko imach” – he has decided to cast his lot in with you and connect with the Jewish people.   A ger toshav still eats cheeseburgers at McDonalds, but he is a humanitarian; he observes the mitzvos bnei noach, and, based on the yesod of the Netziv above, the ger toshav we are speaking about is very particular about observing mitzvos bein adam l’chaveiro.  He is the nice non-Jewish neighbor that gave a nice donation when they collected for the hurricane rebuilding effort, he knows to turn the light on for you on Shabbos if you forgot to set the timer, he acts like a mentch.  Since he acts with care towards others, Heaven cares for him and blesses him with riches.

Yet, in the very same pasuk the Torah describes the Jewish slave being purchased as “u’mach achicha imo.”  Rashi again comments on the word “imo” that the reason this individual has become destitute and forced to resort to becoming a slave is “dibuko imo,” because he has thrown his lot in life in with the goy.  Once again, based on the yesod of the Netziv, we are not just speaking of a person who may eat at McDonald’s (maybe he orders the fish) or who goes shopping on Shabbos like his goyish neighbors.  That alone would not do it – poverty is a result specifically of becoming lax in mitzvos bein adam l’chaveiro. We are speaking of a person who, as a result of assimilation, as a result of wanting to be like his goyish neighbor, ends up abandoning the traits of gemilus chassadim and rachmanus that characterize our people.  We are dealing with a selfish boor. 

But one second – who is the “imo,” the “him,” that this Jewish slave wants to emulate?  It’s the the same ger discussed earlier in the pasuk.  That ger toshav is not a selfish boor – he is a model of good midos, someone who so admires our traits of chessed and rachmanus that he practices them himself, and as a result has been blessed by Hashem!  So why is it that this Jewish slave who ends up assimilating because he wants to be like his ger toshav master ends up not only eating at McDonalds like that ger toshav, not only goes shopping on Shabbos like that ger toshav, but even worse than his ger toshav master, loses all semblance of humanity and becomes a degenerate?  Why doesn’t his master’s model of good midos have any effect?

If you have children or remember your own childhood, you might remember eating lunch or supper on some colorful plastic plate or bowl that costs next to nothing to buy in Ikea or someplace like that.  If you remember those days, then you know the answer to the Netziv’s question.  Why is it that the china dishes you use on Shabbos and paid a small fortune for break so easily if you drop them, but that plastic bowl that costs next to nothing can be thrown from a high chair across the room and not suffer a dent?  Kal v’chomer: if the cheap bowl doesn’t break, certainly you should get the same value from the china dishes!  But we know that’s not how it works.  The more precious something is, the easier it is to destroy and the uglier it becomes when ruined. 
 
The ger toshav shines as much as he can when he draws close to Klal Yisrael, but he is like a plastic bowl made to look like real china – the end result is a decent human being.  If it loses its shine, no great loss, it’s back to being just a plain bowl.  The Yisrael who becomes an eved and decides to assimilate is like fine china dropped to the floor – once it breaks, you have a thousand pieces of nothingness, total disintegration. 
It's a nice vort, but is it true?  The Netziv is basically saying that you cannot seperate a Jew's Jewishness from his humanity.  Slice off Shabbos, kashrus, etc., and inevitable you slice away morality and ethics as well.  The eved who tries to assimilate cannot give up one without also inevitably giving up the other.  We know in our society many people try to do just that -- they try to be good people, whatever that means -- without shmiras hamitzvos, and I am not sure we would call the effort a complete failure, at least in some cases.  Yesh l'chaleik, but it's something to think about.

Wednesday, May 01, 2013

dan l'kaf zechus - "assume positive intent"

From Decisive: How to Make Better Choices at Life and Work by Chip Heath and Dan Heath (p 108-109):
As in the marriage situation, our relationships at work are sometimes corrupted by negative assumptions that snowball over time.  A colleague speaks out against our idea at a meeting, and we think, He's trying to show off in front of the boss.  If this happens another time or two, we might consider him a "brown-noser," that label that will become self-sustaining, as in the marriage situation.
To interrupt this cycle, some organization leaders urge their employees to "assume positive intent," that is, to imagine that the behavior or words of your colleagues are motivated by good intentions, even when their actions seem objectionable at first glance.  This "filter" can be extremely powerful.  Indra Nooyi, the chairman and CEO of PepsiCo, cited it to Fortune as the best advice she even received.  (She learned it from her father.)
She said, "When you assume negative intent, you're angry.  if you take away that anger and assume positive intent you will be amazed...  You don't get defensive.  You don't scream.  You are trying to understand and listen because at your basic core you are saying, 'Maybe they are saying something to me that I'm not hearing.'"
A blogger names Rochelle Arnold-Simmons uses the "assume positive intent" with her husband: "When your husband does something and you immediately go to a negative place, ask yourself, 'What are other possibilities that may be more positive than what you are thinking?'  Assume he is trying to help, assume he does not need to be reminded, assume it is not his fault.  I try to ask the question, 'What's another possibility?'"
In case you were wondering, the book is great, as are their others, Switch and Made to Stick. 

no hope without hisore'rus

This has nothing to do with this week’s parsha, but I saw it recently and it’s a great hesber, so I’ll write it down now and label it and we’ll remind each other of it in a few months.  Why is it that of all the wrong things the dor hamabul did wrong, the one thing that pushed them over the edge and sealed their fate was the sin of theft?  Was that worse than arayos?  Worse than murder?

What makes people wake up in the morning and get out of bed?  The drive to accomplish.  Every normal person wants to do something with his/her life, whether it be to learn Torah, whether it be to heal patients, whether it be to paint houses or fix cars.  If nothing else, a person wants to make money.  We are all pushed by some force of hisore’rus to do something productive.

A thief is a person who quashes and squanders away that hisore’rus.  He/she would rather take what others have earned than make his/her own efforts to produce or accomplish anything.  What came to my mind was the gemara (Sanhedrin 25) that explains that certain types of gamblers are disqualified from giving eidus because they are not part of “yishuvo shel olam,” they contribute nothing to the world.  Their punishment is midah k’neged midah: They take from others, so Hashem takes something away from them.  What does he take?  Their hisore’rus.

No matter what wrongdoing a person is guilty of, so long as he/she is open to hisore’rus, there is always the possibility of change.  Maybe this will be the morning that person will wake up and respond to a calling to teshuvah and do something positive with their life.  However, if a person is incapable of hearing that voice of hisore’rus, if that has been robbed from him/her just as he/she robbed others, then there is no hope left.  If there is no drive or calling to do anything positive, then change for the better is impossible.  This is why, explain the Shem m’Shmuel, the dor hamabul’s fate was sealed davka by the sin of theft.

Tuesday, April 30, 2013

kohanim and bnei Aharon: two elements of kedushas kehunah

Ramban writes that the Torah uses the term “kohanim,” as opposed to just saying “bnei Aharo,” when discussing the prohibition of tumas kohanim at the beginning of Parshas Emor because the issur of becoming tamei is not limited to bnei Aharon, i.e. those kohanim who are serving in the Mikdash and doing avodah, but encompasses anyone who identifies as a kohen. 

The Kli Chemdah explains that there are two distinct kedushos to kehunah: 1) Kedusha that comes from being connected to the lineage of Aharon; 2) Kedusha that comes from one’s own identity as a kohen.  When it comes to avodah, it is one’s own identity as a kohen which counts most.  The avodah of a chalal, whose lineage is tainted, b’dieved is acceptable, but the avodah of a ba’al mum, where the blemish is associated with self, is completely unacceptable.  The opposite holds true with respect to tumah.  Here, the kedusha of lineage is paramount, and therefore a ba’al mum is prohibited from becoming tamei, but someone who is a chalal is not.

It’s a nitpick, but wouldn’t you have expected the terms used to be reversed?  I would have though the term “bnei Aharon” stresses lineage as opposed to self, while the opposite is true of the term “kohanim.”  But that’s not how they are used.  Ramban writes that “bnei Aharon” is used in the context of avodah, which depends on self, while in our parsha the term “kohanim” is added to stress the connection to lineage.

Chasam Sofer raises the more critical question: If the prohibition of tumah relates to the kedusha of “kohanim,” why does the Torah mention the term “bnei Aharon” here at all?  He answers derech derush that Chazal derive from the double-language of amira in the parsha the principle of “l’hazhir gedolim al ha’ketanim,” that one must safeguard even children from the issur of tumah.  If the Torah uses the term “bnei Aharon” when it talks about the kohanim working with kodshei kodashim in the Mikdash, the term is equally appropriate for discussing how they relate to the greatest kodshei kodashim, their children. 

(OK, forget the derashos, what’s the “real” answer?  I don’t know.  If you see or think of something good, tell me.)

Friday, April 26, 2013

Lag b'Omer -- holiday of ahavas Yisrael

The Chidushei HaRI”M teaches that every single person has a special chein, some special quality that makes him/her beloved, in the eyes of Hashem.  No one else has that special quality, and no matter how low a Jew has fallen, that special quality remains.  If you think you know what that quality is, why Hashem loves you and thinks you are special, then you are on the wrong track, because it’s something hidden deep within a person, not something you feel or think you know in your consciousness.

Every Jew corresponds to a letter in Torah.  Just as there are different levels of understanding within every dot of Torah – pshat, remez, derush, and sod – so too, within every Jew there is what you see on the surface, but then there are deeper and deeper levels, down to the level of sod, that hidden nekudah of chein. 

R’ Akiva’s students died because they related to each other based on what they saw on the surface.  By that I don’t mean that students of R’ Akiva judged one another based on the color of their suit or tie or what model car they drove – that may be true of us, but I can’t image that it was true of them.  What I mean is that even if your friend doesn’t understand a Rashba as well as you do, that is also just a superficial judgment, and you can still be guilty of “lo nahagu kavod” for thinking any less of him (and I don’t pretend to be anything less than a doresh v’aino me’kayeim here).  Even if your friend doesn’t know what a Rashba is, there is still a nekduah of chein that only your friend has that you need to love him for.

This was the great revelation of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai.  We all know that RaShB’Y was a master of the hidden aspects of Torah, the sod.  RaShB”Y was also a master of the sod within every Jew as well.  Just as he looked beyond the surface meaning of Torah and penetrated to its most mystical depths, so too, he didn’t just look at the surface of a Jew, but was able to penetrate to the depths and find at the nekudas chein. 

R’ Moshe Wolfson in his Emunas Itecha explains that the punishment of R’ Akiva’s students stopped on Lag b’Omer, the day we celebrate the life of RaShB”Y, because RaShB”Y was the tikun of “lo nahagu kavod zeh ba’zeh.”  Lag b'Omer is a chag of ahavas Yisrael, when we learn to appreciate the sod that makes every individual special.

Thursday, April 25, 2013

witness to evil

The Netziv points out that the punishment of the mekalel was carried out with the participation of the witnesses as well as Beis Din (24:14).  The same is not true with respect to the punishment inflicted on the mekoshesh.  Why did the witnesses need to be involved in the process?  Once they did they duty and testified, let everything else be carried out by the court?

The Netziv reminds you of a Tosefta that you may have missed when he discussed it in Parshas VaYikra (5:1)

וְנֶפֶשׁ כִּי תֶחֱטָא וְשָׁמְעָה קוֹל אָלָה וְהוּא עֵד אוֹ רָאָה אוֹ יָדָע אִם לוֹא יַגִּיד וְנָשָׂא עֲו‍ֹנוֹ:

Why does the pasuk start with the words “nefesh ki techetah?”  The sin is not in the act of witnessing something wrong, as described in the first clause of the pasuk, but is in withholding testimony, as described in the pasuk’s ending.  The words “ki techetah” should appear at the end of the sentence?!

The Tosefta answers that it’s not by accident that an individual happens to be in the right place at the right time to witness a crime.  It’s only because that individual is him/herself guilty in some way, he/she is a “nefesh ki techetah,” that Hashem arranges for him/her to have the misfortune of seeing wrongdoing.   

The witnesses who heard the mekalel commit such a heinous act of blasphemy had to participate in meting out justice as a kaparah for themselves, as they had to make a cheshbon hanefesh to understand why Hashem would cause them to hear and see such a horrible spectacle. 

Anyone who learns this Tosefta and walks away klerring whether it means you have to actually see the bad thing to be guilty or whether seeing it on a TV screen or a website counts as well is beyond missing the point.  I honestly don’t know how to relate to such a vort.  You walk down the streets of NY, you ride the subway, you read a newspaper, etc. and you can’t help but be assaulted with sights and sounds that should revolt any normal human being.  Maybe it’s a bracha that we have become so desensitized that it makes no impression anymore, because if it did, a person would go nuts.  Just the fact that we have to live in such an environment is itself an onesh. 

On a positive note, the Tosefta promises that those who are zakai will see zechuyos.  When you see someone rushing to do a mitzvah, learning Torah, doing chessed, it’s not just their good deed, but it means you’ve done something right as well to be able to witness such a wonderful occurance.

who broke the mold?

You know world has forgotten you when you don’t even get your own Wikipedia entry.  R’ Moshe Avigdor Amiel, who I mentioned yesterday, was a man of towering intellectual ability, a lamdan, a Zionist leader, a great darshan, yet he is probably known today only in the YU world because he beat out R’ Soloveitchik for the post of Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv.  Wikipedia only gives him a short mention under the history of the Jewish community in Antwerp, where he first served as Rav.  I have to raise a general question that has long bothered me.  What happened to all the people like this?  When was the mold broken?  We don't even remember that people like this existed, much less seek to emulate them.  How did that happen?  Forget all the lomdus in his Midos l’Cheiker HaHalacha.  Forget the beautiful derashos collected in his Dershos El Ami.  I am sure you can list other great lamdamin and darshanim.  But how many of those people can also discuss machlokesin between Decartes and Kant and quote Ahad ha’Am (as Rav Amiel does in his sefer L’Nevochai HaTekufa)?  What has driven gedolim who have a broad and deep knowledge of the outside world into extinction? 
 
Those in the YU world will point to the Rav and R’ Ahron Lichtenstein as comparable role models, which is true, but these figures are also a generation or two removed from the present.  So different people, same question – What caused this sea change?  I don’t think these people were aberrations, completely outside the norm.  Their abilities were/are surely exceptional, but that is a different in kamus, not eichus.  I remember someone telling me that he once had the privlilge in Eretz Yisrael of giving a ride to a gadol of the previous dor and he was amazed when his passenger began to recite poety of Bialik b'al peh from the back seat.  Today, you have stories about gedolim who (as I saw mentioned in a book I thumbed through at the seforim store) don’t even know what a food processor is, and this is held up as an example to admire and emulate.  It’s not that ignorance is accepted because we can’t do better – it’s that ignorance has become an ideal because we don’t want to do better.

My wife thinks that things are as they are as a reaction to the Holocaust, which created a distrust of outside culture in any form that lingers to this day.  Western thought has proven itself a poor moral bulwark against the forces of evil, and so we have withdrawn inward.  Perhaps such withdrawal was necessary, as we struggled to rebuild what was lost.  If you would like to put a positive spin on it, perhaps the rise of the State of Israel has inspired renewed interest in uniquely Jewish poetry, writing, and culture, to the exclusion of outside ideas.  My own thought is that the Chassidic movement has had an enormous post-war influence that has reshaped our expectations.  Talmidei chachamim these days are expected to be like Rebbes, not intellectuals.  People want brachos and segulos, not to be challenged with Kant. 

All this is armchair speculation.  Bottom line is that the memory of what once was is fading and is being replaced by a less enlightened and less interesting world. 

Wednesday, April 24, 2013

Rambam/Ra'avad on the Corporeality of G-d

Rav Moshe Avigdor Amiel in his sefer "L’Nevochei HaTekufa" writes that there are two different ways that one can come to recognize G-d: 1) Yediya - philosophical speculation; 2) Hakara – intuitive recognition.  Chazal tell us that Avraham was three years old (according to one view) when “hikir es Bor’o,” he recognized his Creator -- it does not say “yada es Bor’o,” but rather hikir,  because Chazal are not speaking of metaphysical knowledge (a three year old is not Aristotle); Chazal speaking of an intuitive grasp.  The philosophers apprehended G-d through yediya, and as a result, they perceived G-d as distant and removed; the prophets apprehended G-d through hakara, and therefore they perceived G-d as close and intertwined with their lives.

Rambam and Ra’avad famously disagree as to whether someone who believes in the corporeality of G-d is an apikores.  The Rambam writes (Hil Teshuvah ch 3) that someone who thinks that G-d has a body or a form is a heretic.  Ra’avad sharply retorts that wiser and greater people than the Rambam have entertained such a belief based on their simple reading of the Biblical text; therefore, it cannot be categorized as heresy.  (The Ra’avad’s response is not a logical argument or based on a sugya of gemara, but rather sounds like a simple appeal to authority – "Rambam, you must be wrong because greater people than yourself thought differently.")  What is the point of disagreement between the two opinions? 

R’ Chaim Brisker is said to have explained that the machlokes revolves around whether there is a din apikores b’shogeg.  The Ra’avad does not mean that one can accept that G-d has a body; he simply is arguing that people who arrive at such a belief inadvertently, based on their mistaken reading of Tanach, cannot be called guilty of willful heresy.  The Rambam, on the other hand, held that “nebech an apikores,” someone who is arrives at wrong beliefs simply out of ignorance, is still an apikores. 

R’ Amiel takes a different approach entirely, and here’s a link to the page for you to see inside and maybe help me understand it.  He sees the Rambam and Ra'avad's disagreement as based on this chiluk between yediya and hakara.  From the perspective of yediya, when wearing the hat of the philosopher, it is impossible to conceive of any relationship between G-d and bodily form.  However, when you look at things from the perspective of hakarah-intuition, the idea is not foreign at all.  To the contrary, it is precisely the fact that we feel G-d as immanent and present even within our selves, our bodies, that gives rise to hakara! 
 
If I understand him correctly, what Rav Amiel is suggesting that that the Ra’avad does not mean to defend the idea that c”v G-d has a bodily form.  What he is saying is that G-d can be felt as being immanent in a body, which is a different thing entirely.  If this is correct, I don’t understand why the Ra’avad is so sharply critical of the Rambam, as surely the Rambam would not disagree.  I also don't understand what the Ra’avad means when he argues that those who disagree with the Rambam were led down that road by their reading of “mikra.”  What does that have to do with the intuitive sense of G-d that comes from hakara?  Does  he mean to say that it is the perspective of the prophet, hakara, that the Tanach is built around, as opposed to the perspective of the philosopher, that is what gives rise to this view?  That seems a bit of a stretch…  I just don’t see how it fits the words.  I love Rav Amiel's writing, the chiluk between yediya and hakara is useful in many contexts, but am struggling here with the Rambam/Ra'avad connection.

Tuesday, April 23, 2013

Lo Sa'amod Al Dam Rei'echa

One of the explanations of the name “Adam” is that it is a combination of “aleph,” representing the “Alufo shel olam,” the singular presence of G-d, and “dam,” physical flesh and blood.
 
“Lo sa’amod al dam rei’echa..”  (VaYikra 19:16) The Torah is warning not to get hung up about the “dam” portion of our neighbors.  So what if that person does not look so pretty or walk and talk just like us?  “Ani Hashem,” the real essence of a person is the “aleph,” the portion of the “alufo shel olam” that is inside.  (Tiferes Shlomo)

Monday, April 22, 2013

Rashi and Ramban on Kedoshim Te'hiyu

1) Rashi interprets “kedoshim te’hiyu” to mean “perushim min ha’arayos u’min ha’aveira.”  Ramban argues that Rashi cannot be right, as his interpretation contradicts two derashos in the Toras Kohanim: 1) The T.K. explains  kedoshim to mean “perushim – stam,” not specifically connected to arayos; 2) The T.K. darshens, “Yachol kamoni – talmud lomar ‘Ani Hashem’,” that perhaps one would be obligated to be kadosh in the same sense G-d is, kah mashma lan “Ani Hashem,” that only “I am G-d” and you can never be the same.  Whatever that strange hava amina might mean, it certainly has nothing to do with separating from arayos, as that topic has no meaning when discussing imitating G-d. 

When I was learning this Ramban with my daughter on Shabbos, we defended Rashi by suggesting that the Toras Kohanim is a derash, but Rashi is concerned with peshuto shel mikra.  Rashi’s agenda here is to explain based on peshuto shel mikra the connection between “kedoshim” and the previous parsha that dealt with arayos.  The Toras Kohanim’s concern is developing through halachic derush the moral/halachic parameters of what the mitzvah of kedoshim entails.  Assuming this understanding of Rashi is correct, it begs the larger question of when (or even whether) Rashi concerns himself with explaining smichus haparshiyos and when he does not.  He does not, for example, try to piece together connections between the many mitzvos that open parshas kedoshim (as other meforshim do).  Be that as it may, what I still do not understand is if indeed Rashi is concerned only with the issue of smichus haparshiyos, why does he not just say kedoshim means “persuhim min ha’arayos” and leave it at that?  Why does he add the additional words “u’min ha’aveira?” 

2) On a different note: Aside from the categories of chovas hayachid and chovas hatzibur, mitzvos incumbent upon the individual and mitzvos incumbent upon the community as a whole, there exists a third category of mitzvos: a chovas ha’yachid that can be fulfilled only b’tzibur.  For example, the Ramban (Milchamos to first perek of Megilla) writes that although both the reading of megillah and the reading of the Torah must be done b’tzibur, there is a big difference between them.  Kir’as haTorah is incumbent on the tzibur as a whole; kri’as hamegillah is incumbent on the individual, but the reading done by the individual must take place in the presence of a tzibur.  (See this post). 

Chazal tell us that the mitzvah of kedoshim tehi’yu was said at a gathering of all of Klal Yisrael.  I would like to suggest that while there exists an obligation on every individual to try to infuse his/her life with kedusha, the Torah here is teaching that this mitzvah can only be fully achieved in the context of community – it is a chovas ha’yachid that must be done b’tzibur.  The hava amina of the Toras Kohanim, “yachol kamoni,” means to suggest that one might have thought that one can achieve kedusha by living in isolation; kah mashma lan the Torah Kohanim that this is impossible.  The path to kedusha lies through interaction with the community, growing with them, feeding off their energy, and contributing back to their growth and improvement.

Thursday, April 18, 2013

peer review

According to Midrash the pasuk uses the singular tense, “VaYikchu ish machtaso…” in describing the actions of Nadav and Avihu because “lo natlu eitzeh zeh m’zeh,” they did not consult with each other.  As a result, they erred and were punished.  This seems a bit difficult to understand.  It's clear from the Midrash that each one of the Bnei Aharon independently reached the same conclusion and acted of his own volition (though see Netziv 10:1).  Wouldn’t their consulting with each other only reinforce their mistaken belief?  Apparently not.  Though they may have each initially reached the same conclusion, the process of opening their thinking to critique, even (or perhaps especially) to a sympathetic listener, would afford the opportunity to reflect further and realize the error.  

This critique of Nadav and Avihu shows the importance of peer review.  "Aseh lecha rav u'knei lecha chaveir," we read in Avos.  One of the meforshim explains that the Mishna uses the term "knei," to acquire [even if it costs money], when speaking of a friend and not when speaking about a Rav because the input of a peer is even more valuable than that of a Rav and should be pursued at all costs.  We are social creatures.  Our avodas Hashem flourishes when undertaken in collaboration, not by dint of individual effort alone.

Wednesday, April 17, 2013

chachamim, hiza'haru b'divreichem


Someone pointed out to me a post on a  shul website in which the rabbi  addressed the same Ramban I mentioned in Sunday’s post about the issue of tumas leida.  His approach was somewhat different, as his main takeaway from the Ramban was that his science was off, and this is the yotzei min haklal that is melamed al ha’klal just how mistaken Chazal and Rishonim can be.    

There are so many challenges facing Klal Yisrael these days.  So many people need chizuk in their shmiras hamitzvos, in their emunah, in their emunas chachamim, and I am speaking of our camp of ma’aminim – kal v’chomer so much more chizuk is needed by the vast majority of Klal Yisrael who are not ma'aminim and who will probably, if nothing is done, vanish as Jews within two or three generations due to assimilation and intermarriage.  So of all the lessons one can communicate about parshas hashavua that can inspire the audience to appreicate the greatness of our Torah heritage,  the message chosen is that Chazal make mistakes?!  Rachma litzlan m’hai da’ata!

Whether Chazal and/or Rishonim used outdated scientific models is beside the point.  It’s the obsession – not discussion, but obsession -- with pointing out the perceived shortcomings of our Sages which is the issue.  I don’t know about this particular Rabbi, but there are people who take this as their regular theme on their blogs and websites.  

We know from Pirkei Avos, for example, there is an idea “Hu haya omeir…. ,”there are teachings that individual Sages would constantly reiterate because they were so crucial.  For some people, the “hu haya omeir” of their writing and teaching is the fact that Chazal and Rishonim were in error.  They want to go down in history as the ones to correct the gravest threat facing yahadut today – that people give too much credence to Chazal (ha’levay).  It would be as if, to paraphrase the famous gemara in Shabbos of the ger who came to Hillel and asked to be taught the whole Torah on one foot, their whole Torah on one foot is, “Chazal and Rishonim made mistakes – everything else is commentary.” 

The Steipler in his Chayei Olam has a whole list of mareh mekomos, which is not exhaustive, about “nifla’os Chazal,” the wonder of our Sages.  He cites sources that show the extreme degree of piety of Chazal, the gadlus of their tefilah, the fact that had prophetic insight to some degree, etc.  This was the Chazal that the Steipler lived with.  It’s no wonder, given this appreciation of the wisdom of our sages, that he become the Steipler Gaon, admired for his own piety and learning.  If all you have to write and speak about is what a mistake this Rishon made or how silly that gemara sounds to our “sophisticated” modern mind, then is it any wonder that you are marginalized and are not a Steipler gaon?  Why would anyone listening to your message want to spend yomam v’layla, day and night, immersed in sha”s and poskim let alone committed to Torah and mitzvos if they felt that so much of the social, philosophical, scientific worldview of Chazal is anachronistic and chauvinistic?  Were that c”v what Chazal’s worldview amounted to, maybe it would make for an interesting academic study like history, but who would want to pledge “ki heim chayeinu” to that? 

Now, some will claim that these type articles are only a reaction to the move in the opposite direction by the right-wing world, where mesorah is viewed as infallible.  You would think from the attention that it is given on the internet that Rabbonim are literally forcing the hashkafa that Chazal are infallible down people’s throats day in and day out.  My personal experience has not borne this out.   The topic is simply a non-issue for most of the world of sitting and learning Torah.  The fact that certain people dwell on it only illustrates the disconnect between reality and the virtual reality they have created.

Of course the world has moved to the right.  But the (modern) orthodox world has moved to the left as well.  I don't recall seeing shiurim that the Rav critiqued views of Rishonim or Chazal.  I don't think R' Hershel Shachter harps on this topic, or do any of the other YU Roshei Yeshiva.  Yet, now in some quarters it is accepted as a given that modern orthodoxy accepts (not just tolerates, but celebrates) critical and historical approaches to talmud study, that ordination of women, aliyos, etc. are all in-play as topics to be debated, and the word "mesorah" is just a construct designed as a tool to preserve the hegemony of fundamentalist Rabbis over their followers but lacking in any real meaning.  

Does all this mean we should "hide" the truth?  Of course not.  But the truth is not discovered by reading one Ramban.  Read the Ramban al haTorah every week, study his chiddushim, sweat your way through a Milchamos, learn the Toras haAdam.  I can guarantee you the Ramban you talk about after that will be a different Ramban than a medieval Rabbi who didn't know science.  

Sunday, April 14, 2013

the dual kedusha of Eretz Yisrael

Ramban (Tazri'a 13:47) writes that the punishment of tzara'as described in Parshas Tazri'a was a miraculous manifestation of Hashem's hashgacha, not a natural disease, and therefore, even though it is not a mitzvah hatelu'ya ba'aretz, it only occurred in Eretz Yisrael, the "nachalas Hashem," where Hashem's presence is most manifest. The Ramban continues and writes l'halacha that tumas tzara'as on houses did not apply until after the fourteen years of conquest and division of Eretz Yisrael by Yehoshua were completed.  If you stopped reading there you might guess that this din is related to the previous idea.  Since the kedushas ha'aretz was incomplete until after the fourteen years of kibush v'chiluk, as we see, for example, from the fact that terumos and ma'asros did not apply until after that fourteen year period, you might guess that the halachos of tumas tzara'as follow the same pattern and are absent when a full kedushas ha'aretz is absent.  But that's not what the Ramban says.  The reason nigei batim did not apply during those fourteen years is because to witness the hashgacha of Hashem in an open and revealed way requires having a tremendous degree of G-d consciousness.  You have to be thinking of G-d and aware of his presence to deserve to see its effects.  Such a high mental state of awareness is impossible while one is simultaneously engaged in fighting a war.  

A long time ago we discussed (here and here) Rav Soloveitchik's idea that there are two dinim in kedushas ha'aretz: 1) The sanctification of the land through conquest (by Yehoshua) or chazakah (by Ezra) on our part, which served to define the boundaries in which certain agricultural mitzvos and mitzvos hateluyos ba'aretz applied; 2) The sanctity of the land as that place chosen by G-d as special.  I think we see this distinction reflected in this Ramban.  Nigei batim apply only in Eretz Yisrael because of that second type of sanctity which the land has -- it is Hashem's chosen place -- irrespective of how and when we are mekadesh it through our efforts.  Therefore, the Ramban must invoke a psychological explanation as the basis for the din of nigei batim applying only after the fourteen years of kibush v'chiluk, as it has nothing to do with whether that first type of kedusha exists yet or doesn't.

Ibz Ezra (14:33) also writes that nigei batim only apply in Eretz Yisrael, but he explains the reason is because "godel ma'ales ha'aretz ki hamikdash b'tocham v'haKavod b'toch hamikdash."  I'm a little confused by his meaning.  Kedushas hamikdash and kedushas ha'aretz are two different things entirely.  Eretz Yisrael had kedusha even before there was a mikdash; according to the Rambam, even when kedushas ha'aretz was nullified, kedushas Yerushalayim, the makom mikdash, remained intact.  Why does Ibn Ezra need to invoke the importance of the mikdash as the place of Hashem's presence as a justification for the significance of Eretz Yisrael in this regard -- doesn't the kedushas ha'aretz stand as significant in its own right?  Perhaps he is simply giving a siman, not a sibah, i.e. the kedushas ha'aretz does have independent significance, and one indication that this is true is the fact that the land is the makom mikdash, where the Shechina is most manifest.  

I would probably have done this post anyway, but I made a point of putting it up now because I don't see how you can not spend 5 minutes tomorrow, 5 Iyar, not thinking about and pausing to appreciate the ideas of kedushas ha'aretz, appreciating the land which is "nachalas Hashem," appreciating the tremendous gift we have been afforded.  It would take another whole post to fully discuss, but my opinion for what it's worth is that to simply dismiss the day as a political event with no religious meaning is completely off the mark.  Can anyone truly doubt that the hashra'as haShechina of Eretz Yisrael is enhanced not only by the limud haTorah that goes on there, which is of course important, but also by the land being under autonomous Jewish control, no matter what degree of religiosity the government currently is at or not at?  So whether you say hallel or don't say hallel, whether you do baha"b or say tachanun or whatever -- these are technical details -- take a moment to at least have a thought of hakaras hatov for what we have.  Just think of the thousands of Jews across centuries of history who wished they were in our shoes, having the freedom and kedusha of Eretz Yisrael accessible just a plane ride away. 

why the difference in time for tumas leida for boy vs. girl?

My daughter asked why is it that the tumas hayoledes for a girl baby is twice the length of that for a boy baby (2 weeks of tumah followed by 66 days of dmei taharah as opposed to 1 week of tumah and 33 days of dmei taharah for a boy)?  Ramban and other Rishonim (e.g. Ralbag, Abarbanel, R' Bachye) generally take one of two approaches: 1) There is some relationship between tumas yoledes and the time it takes for cells to go from an embryonic stage to become a fetus, which is 40 days for a boy and 80 for a girl; 2) The recovery time for the birth of a girl is longer and more difficult than that for a boy.  I think we would all agree that neither of these answers are scientifically accurate (see the first Ramban on the parsha, who seemed to be concerned enough with scientific accuracy to quote the doctors of his time and the philosophers on an issue that Chazal had already weighed in on) and I doubt an intelligent person would be satisfied with either approach.  So how would you answer the question?  The Netziv writes that the father always really wants a boy, so he draws closer to his wife faster after the birth of a boy than after the birth of a girl.  (I challenge you to give that answer to your daughter, if you have one.)  That may explain the difference between the 7 and 14 day wait, but does not explain the difference between the 33 vs. 66 days.  Without resorting to a mystical explanation of tumas yoledes, what would you say?  

Parenthetically, I saw pointed out that the question of why a yoledes bring a korban chatas (what did she do wrong?) should not even get off the ground, as the chatas of a mechusar kippurim as nothing to do with sin.  See Rashi Kerisus 8b, "Mevi'im chatas v'lo al cheit elah le'echol b'kodhsim." 

Thursday, April 11, 2013

avoiding lashon ha'ra as a meta-value


The punishment of tzara’as is the result of the sin of slander and gossip.  We all know the famous pasuk in Tehillim, “Mi ha’ish hachoftez hachaim.. netzor leshoncha me’ra… sur me’ra v’aseh tov…”  David haMelech tells us that if you want  long life all you have to do is guard your tongue from evil speech, avoid doing wrong, and do good.  (Simple, right?)  If we look carefully at the formula the pasuk provides, it seems that the entire first half is redundant.  “Sur me’ra v’aseh tov…” seems to cover it all; it encapsulates kol haTorah kula, the whole shulchan aruch of what it means to be a Jew.  So why did David haMelech add as a preface “netzor lishoncha me’ra?”  Isn’t guarding one’s tongue included already in the idea of “sur me’ra v’aseh tov?” 

Yesterday we discussed the idea that there are certain meta-values and principles that define the essence of Judaism.  These particular mitzvos, midos, principles, are not just one more idea among 613 equals, but are umbrellas that encompass the whole system; they are far greater than any one individual part of halacha and even of all the parts combined.  R’ Chaim Shmuelevitz explained that even though Ya’akov Avinu kept the entire Torah, all tarya”g mitzvos, in Lavan’s  home, he still was nervous that he would not merit Hashem’s protection against Eisav because one can keep kol haTorah kula and still be on the wrong path entirely by missing if one ignores the meta-values.

Explains the Shem m’Shmuel, this is the great chiddush David haMelech wanted to teach us.  “Sur me’ra v’aseh tov” covers the entire shulchan aruch, but even if you have the whole sulchan aruch in your back pocket, if you are missing the preface, the glue that keeps the whole system together, then you are missing everything.  Even if you know kol haTorah kula and keep kol haTorah kula, if your speech is improper, if you are a gossip, if you can’t control what you say and how you say it, then everything else is tainted as well.  “Netzor leshoncha me’ra” transcends the “sur me’ra v’aseh tov;” it is the meta-value that gives character to the system as a whole.

With this we can appreciate the meaning of a famous story brought in the Midrash.  Rav Yanai met a peddler who was hawking a promise of long life.  Rav Yanai was curious as to what this magic elixir might be, so he followed the peddler around,  When a crowd gathered, the peddler finally revealed what his secret “product” was.  He quoted this pasuk in Tehillim, “Mi ha’ish hachoftez hachaim.. netzor leshoncha me’ra… sur me’ra v’aseh tov…”  Rav Yanai remarked that he had never understood this pasuk properly until he heard it from the peddler.  What did Rav Yanai find so remarkable in the peddler’s presentation?  Surely Rav Yanai had been familiar with this pasuk beforehand?!  

The Shem m’Shmuel explains that what caught Rav Yanai’s attention was the peddler’s use of the word “sam,” literally, a spice.  You can’t make a meal of spices alone, but any regular meal served without spice is bland and not satisfying.  “Netzor leshoncha,” guarding against lashon ha’ra, is not just another dish on the menu of Torah, item number whatever of 613 possible choices.  It’s the spice that goes into every dish that makes every dish more  satisfying.  It’s a defining value of the system as a whole.   

Wednesday, April 10, 2013

the meta-values of halacha


A few nights ago our community had the privilege of hosting R’ Warren Goldstein, the Chief Rabbi of South Africa.  One of the points he made when he spoke is that there are certain meta-values to halacha, which, if ignored, can render the entire observance of halacha worthless (I do not recall if he used that exact word).  One can punctiliously keep the entire shulchan aruch cover to cover, yet still not be following the derech haTorah.

R’ Chaim Shmuelevitz brings proof to this point from Ya’akov Avinu.  Despite assurances from Hashem that he would be protected from harm, Ya’akov was filled with dread at the prospect of meeting Eisav.  Why was he so afraid?  Chazal explain that Ya’akov was worried “shema yigrom ha’cheit.”  Yet, one of the things Ya’akov tells his brother when they meet is, “Im Lavan garti,” which Chazal interpret as a hint that he faithfully kept all 613 mitzvos (garti = numerical value of tarya”g) in Lavan’s house.  If Ya’akov indeed kept all the mitzvos, then why was he worried that Hashem would withdraw his promise of protection because he did something wrong?  He kept kol haTorah kula!  R’ Chaim Shmuelevitz answers that we see from here that one can in fact observe kol haTorah kula, yet still be on the wrong path and be found wanting. 

The follow-up question of course is how you identify what these meta-values are, but that’s another discussion.  

After the talk someone asked a very good question.  Why is it that in our generation, when we have so many people learning Torah as never before, we seem to have lost sight of those meta-values, the overarching principles of halacha?  Rabbi Goldstein suggested that we not lose sight of the fact that we are a dor of yesomim.  Even if we do not have direct relatives who were killed in the Holocaust, we still all lost access to a large chunk of the collective mesorah of Torah in the deaths of so many talmidei chachamim and leaders.  The living embodiment of Torah values that these people represented cannot simply be replaced by book knowledge.

Tuesday, April 09, 2013

Shiurei Da'as: Can we compare our avodah to that of Eliyahu haNavi or David haMelech?


“Rosheich alay k’Karmel v’dalas roseich k‘argaman…” (Shir haShirim 7:6) taken literally is a description of the beauty of someone's head and the braids of hair.  The Midrash, however, reads the pasuk as describing the beauty in G-d’s eyes of even the worst members of Klal Yisrael.  “Rosheich” is read by the Midrash as “reishech,” from the word “rash,” meaning poor person – not poor financially, but poor in good deeds; “dalas” is taken by the Midrash as a hint to the word “dal,” another synonym for a person who is wanting.  The pasuk is telling us that even the poorest miscreant in Klal Yisrael is as valuable as Eliyahu haNavi, who challenged the idolators of Ba’al at Mt. Carmel; even the poorest no-goodnik is as great as David haMelech, as Zecharya haNavi tells us (12:7), that one day even the “nichshal,” the one who is weak and stumbles, will be like David haMelech. 

R’ Bloch (in Shiurei Da’as, “Rishonim K’Malachim”) asks how it can be that Hashem values someone who is spiritually impoverished as much as he values Eliyahu haNavi or David haMelech.  Imagine there is some kind of big scale where we can weigh people’s merits.  If you were to put me on one side of that scale and David HaMelech or Eliyahu on the other side, there is no question in my mind that their merits would outweigh mine.   So where is the fairness in Hashem saying that in his eyes it’s all the same?

R’ Bloch answers with an analogy.  Imagine there is a race course that stretches thousands of miles long and you have two runners racing along the course.  Even if one person has travelled 2 miles and the other has travelled only 2 yards, does it really make a difference when measured against the total distance that needs to be covered?  Kal v’chomer if the distance that needs to be covered stretches to infinity.  It’s true that Eliyahu HaNavi, David haMelech, accomplished so much more than any of us could dream of accomplishing in our own avodas Hashem.  But that does not mean we should despair or that our avodah has no value.  When measured against the scale of infinity, the tremendous gulf of difference between our achievements is insignificant.

Afar ani tachas kapas raglav, but I cannot help but find R’ Bloch’s answer here less than satisfying.  Even if one grants the validity of the question, it seems that the far simpler answer is “l’fum tza’ara agra.”  Hashem does not judge our net accomplishments alone; he judges us according to our abilities.  What little we accomplish given our circumstance and limitations may indeed be as precious as what greater people were able to do given their specific gifts and talents.  What we see with our limited perspective is far from the complete picture.

But there is an even simpler answer I think, and perhaps it appeals more to a chassidic mindset than a mussar mindset.  The whole question R’ Bloch raises is predicated on the assumption that Hashem should value less those who achieve less.  It seems to me that the whole point of the Midrash is to undermine that very assumption.  Hashem’s love is unconditional.  He extends it freely to the lowest sinner as well as the greatest saint.  He is the ultimate rachaman who is willing to overlook all our failures, all our shortcomings, all our deficiencies, and accept us all equally.  As parents, most of us pay lip service to this idea of loving all our children equally, even those who aggravate and annoy us to no end (trust me, I have a few).  If we can recognize the value of turning a blind eye to the faults of our children and loving them all equally, surely we can appreciate the concept of G-d turning a blind eye to our faults and extending unconditional love to each of us equally.