segulos, mysticism, and fundementals of faith

From a comment to the previous post:
"If I recall correctly, you are not a fan of rational taamei hamitzvot, but rather believe that they are beyond our ability to understand, and may all have mystical ends rather than rational ends. If so, please explain the difference between a segulah and not eating a cheeseburger. I can't see any."

The point of the previous post (as I clarified in the comments) was not that I reject segulos because they are irrational. Rather, I reject the mass advertising of “get spiritually rich quick” ideas of any sort. Avodas Hashem, as the words literally mean, is about work – there are no shortcuts and no quick fixes. Preying on people’s naïve beliefs and offering these fixes packaged with all the gloss of what appears to be frumkeit misrepresents Judaism and borders on stealing.

The Torah makes no claim that not eating a cheeseburger alone guarantees any tangible reward in this world (see Chulin 142), neither in terms of health, longer life, or even spiritual protection from harm. This is a case in point illustrating one reason why I am not a pure rationalist when it comes to explanations for mitzvos. We do find claims in the Rishonim that not eating a cheeseburger will keep you healthy, which undoubtedly made sense in the Middle Ages, but given the health and vigor of a great many Jews who eat cheeseburgers, lobster, etc. without suffering immediate cardiac arrest these claims lead to greater doubt than understanding. The well meaning people who tout any study that comes out “proving” the health benefits of mitzvos just continue this same sort of wrong thinking. Physical reward of any sort should never be the motivation to do mitzvos, and is not even a guaranteed byproduct. If this is true of a mitzvah commanded by G-d, it would certainly seem spurious to think reciting 40 chapters of tehillim or saying Shir haShirim in and of itself produces some sort of physical reward or gain.

The mistaken thinking driving these quick fixes is based on a false concept of reward and punishment people pick up early in life. In first grade we learn G-d rewards good people and punishes bad; G-d controls our destiny and watches us from harm. We also learn about the tooth fairy, the boogie man, and listen to fairy tales. Fortunately, we eventually come to realize the tooth fairy is false (or we run out of teeth to lose in any case), but unfortunately, the naïve beliefs about G-d cling to many people for a lifetime. The net result is people who walk around thinking G-d never causes bad things to happen to good people (not true – see Chulin 142), he will suspend the forces of nature to protect the innocent from hardship and harm (see Shabbos 156), he will assure that true believers suffer not when their enemies choose to harm them (see here), and who will come to the rescue miraculously if a single good deed is done to tip the scales to a person’s favor. My five year old who still believes the tooth fairy leaves money under her pillow (her sisters have since learned better) will undoubtedly accept the notion that tying a red string around her arm would protect her from harm. But adults should know better.

The point was made that it is hard to challenge firmly held beliefs (or to convince people to challenge their own thinking) because once doubt and uncertainty have been unleashed, they become difficult forces to reign in and control. But if we can teach kids to read a pasuk in a more sophisticated less-literal manner than they learn in first grade without concern, I don’t see why we can’t teach kids to have a more sophisticated understanding of Jewish belief than they develop in first grade. The problem, of course, is that no yeshiva curriculum does this. The system, as students mature, focuses more and more narrowly on the legal hairsplitting of gemara learning and lomdus (which anyone who reads this blog knows I appreciate as well) without ever exposing students to thinking about belief in a systematic and mature way. At best, a narrow channel of a specific thinker is emphasized, be it the Rav, Rav Hutner, Rav Kook, Slabodka mussar, etc. but no broader appreciation of Jewish thought is ever developed. So we remain fixated on and reinforce the same level of faith we had in first grade, and those who challenge these core beliefs come to reject the system they have been raised on as foolish, unsophisticated, immature, and unsatisfying.

I don't think we need to pass judgment on mysticism as a whole to reject its misuse. Sadly, the syetem as it exists does reinforce the type thinking that validates these ads, but I don't look for anyone in the "establishment" to tackle this issue any time soon. I have no fear that critical thinking will endanger the halachic system, but it may indeed bring down a great number of false idols that the "establishment" has come to rely on.

segulos for sale?

An ad in a local Jewish paper boldly offers “Well known proven segulahs!” You can have someone pray at the kosel for 40 days for $40 (yes, folks, that’s only $1 a day!), recite Shir haShirim for 40 days for $40, have 10 talmidei chachamim learning mishnayos & say kaddish $30 for 30 days, etc. All that’s missing is a money back guarantee, but I guess you can’t have everything.

Some days I wonder just why I am slaving away here at work (I have a regular job in corporate America). Were I more enterprising I would incorporate as a non-profit and send out my rate card for segulos and zechuyos for all your life problems. Just how much is a blatt gemara worth? What about a blatt Yerushalmi (can’t get that just anywhere!)? Or maybe the better way to do it is a daily auction on e-bay, where the highest bidder gets a portion of the zechuyos?

Giving tzedaka to support people learning is a great thing, but it seems to me that there is something wrong here.

chareidi and chiloni: a thought from Rav Kook

"One who is a 'chareid', that is one who identifies with the group known as 'chareidim', looks down at the group of 'chofshim' from a position on high. In thinking of tikkun, of mending ways and doing tshuvah, he looks with wanting eyes at this second group who are so distant from Torah and mitzvos and thinks that tshuvah in its fullest sense is needed only from them, the words are directed only to the other camp, but apply not to himself. And the 'chofshi', that is one who identifies with the group known by this modern term, he certainly things the entire concept of tshuvah belongs only to the world of the 'chareidi', but has no relavance for his life at all. So on both ends we come up short, and we are left wondering from whence will come healing for the pains of our souls?"
--Koveitz Ma'amarim of R' Kook, cited by Tzvi Yaron in Mishnato shel haRav Kook, p. 359

shabbos candles and chanukah candles

I am going to piggy back on R’ Chaim Markowitz’s posting again. He raises the question (link) of whether the time for lighting candles on Erev Shabbos was fixed to be before shkiya, or the time still theoretically stands as after shkiya, but since we have no way to fulfill that option, we light beforehand.

The Rashba writes that Chanukah candles can always be lit early, not just on Erev Shabbos, as long as they burn from after shkiya until the time of “tichleh regel min hashuk”. Rambam disagrees and holds the early lighting on Friday is a choice made for lack of a better option. What is striking is the Rashba’s proof: Shabbos candles must burn into Shabbos, ideally for the Shabbos meal, but the halacha allows them to be lit well before shkiya or the start of Shabbos. So too, claims the Rashba, although Chanukah candles should burn from after shkiya into the night, there should be no reason why they cannot be lit earlier.

According to the Rambam, what is the difference between the mitzvah of lighting Shabbos candles and lighting Chanukah lights?

I’m not going to finish an answer today… something to think about over Shabbos.

the order of lighting menorah and shabbos candles: tadir vs. pirumei nisa

I thank R’ Chaim Markowitz for calling to my attention yesterday (and hopefully I did not steal his thunder) to an interesting machlokes regarding hadlakas menorah tonight. The BH”G (quoted by the Tur) writes, and this is the common practice, to light the menorah first and afterwards shabbos candles, because lighting shabbos candles is effectively accepting shabbos. Tosfos argues and holds that kabbalas shabbos is distinct from the act of lighting shabbos candles. If one holds like Tosfos, is there any reason to insist on lighting Shabbos candles first, or is it a toss-up between both mitzvos with no real preference? Tosfos writes that the shabbos candles are lit first but does not say why, leading achronim to write that b’dieved the order does not matter - it sounds like a toss-up. The Rashba, however, insists that Shabbos candles should be lit first because of the rule that “tadir v’she’aino tadir, tadir kodem”, a mitzvah which is performed more frequently always comes first. It seems to me that perhaps Tosfos deliberately omits this reason – perhaps a mitzvah of pirsumei nisa outweighs a mitzvah which is tadir. Two other cases relevant to Shabbos Chanukah may hinge in part on this question:

1) While many people will light menorah at home and then go to shule for mincha today, the Birkei Yosef holds that mincha should be said before lighting menorah. He explains that in the Bais haMikdash, the korban tamid, which our tefila of mincha corresponds to, preceded the mitzvah of lighting menorah. Without that sevara, one might argue that the mitzvah of tefilah should take precedence, as it is tadir – but then again, perhaps pirsumei nisa comes first! (I have not researched this issue, but it seems to me that if one accepts this Birkei Yosef, which is cited in the Sh’arei Tshuvah as well, there is good room to argue that it is better to daven mincha b’yechudus before hadlakas menorah than to daven b’tzibur after hadlaka).

2) There is a great debate among achronim whether to make havdalah first or light menorah first on Motzei Shabbos. Here the competing factors are delaying declaring Shabbos over, tadir, and pirsumei nisa. One other note with respect to Motzei Shabbos: I believe Ma’aseh Rav quotes GR”A as rushing to end Shabbos immediately at the zman in order to do hadlakas menorah as soon as possible after Shabbos. This perhaps is tied to the GR”As opinion (based on Rambam) that hadlakas menorah should rightfully be done immediately after what we call shkiya. In any event, whether before or after havdalah (depending on your minhag), the hadlakah should be taken care of ASAP.

Sam Harris' "Leap of Faith"

“Whatever its stigma, “intuition” is a term that we simply cannot do without, because it denotes the most basic constituent of our faculty of understanding. While this is true in matters of ethics, it is no less true in science. When we can break out knowledge of a thing down no further, the irreducible leap that remains is intuitively taken. Thus the traditional opposition between reason and intuition is a false one: reason itself is intuitive to the core, as any judgment that a proposition is “reasonable” or “logical” relies on intuition to find its feet…"

"The point I trust is obvious: we cannot step out of the darkness without taking a first step. And reason, without knowing how, understands this axiom if it would understand anything at all. The reliance on intuition, therefore, should be no more discomforting for the ethicist than it has been for the physicist. We are all tugging at the same bootstraps.”
--Sam Harris, “The End of Faith”, p. 183

So let me get this straight: Sam Harris, an outspoken atheist, is telling us that science can be reduced to first principles which themselves are not provable, but which we know to be true based on intuition alone. Without the bootstraps of intuition, all thinking would be impossible. This is in contrast to religion, which is reducible to core principles of belief that can never be proven, but which require an intuitive “leap of faith” to accept.
See the difference?
Neither do I.

torah authority and frustration with the system

Some questions I have no answers to... How is it that:

…A conference of a major Orthodox organization devotes a forum to attacking the excesses of scandal mongering in blogs and on the internet, but cannot clarify how they intend to deal with the issue of criminal allegations against Rabbinical figures in a way that is transparent, fair, and which would restore confidence in the system?

…A woman can be physically beaten in the zeal to prevent immodesty simply because she failed to surrender her seat to a man and move to the back of a public bus, but the Rabbinic establishment squashes a conference to consider how to help agunos trapped by recalcitrant husbands?

…hundreds can close their gemaras and take time from learning to protest, both through civil disobedience as well as more violent means, a parade which is seen as an affront to the sanctity of Yerushalayim, but this same community is conspicuously silent and offers no protest when thousands of Jews are expelled from their homes in the “territories”?

…Rabbinic figures sermonize about the need to place spiritual values above career and pursuit of wealth, but run yeshivos which require many times the average salary to afford with no oversight on finances by independent auditors or concerned parents?

This is not an exhaustive list, but a sampling based on current events. I am sick of reading the apologetics, the excuses, the justifications, the explanations, none of which are satisfying, and hearing the deafening silence from the "establishment" at the wrongs perpetuated by the system either directly or by creating an environment which tolerates them.

I do not applaud the gross anti-Chareidi bashing out there – the brush used is too broad and the paint applied with too much vigor and sheer ferociousness. But the excesses of the messengers should not obscure the kernel of underlying truth in the criticism. And were the establishment more responsive, who knows how much more muted and respectful the attacks might become in turn? Instead of invoking "Torah authority" to dismiss complaint, perhaps the system would be better served through more open dialogue between community and leadership to discuss what problems exist, what approaches to solving them are best and why, and how to act on them "l'shem shamayim". If transparency is seen as a threat, people rightly begin to wonder just what is being hid behind closed doors.

Perhaps my blog too can be dismissed as just another undermining of Torah authority in the blogsphere. I guess that is an easier response that dealing with the issues at hand.

when is it assur to sing shalom aleichem?

One of the issues the Dvar Avraham is known for is his many tshuvos addressing the order of precedence when one must perform a milah b’zmanah and milah shelo b’zmanah on the same day. He concludes the milah shelo b’zmanah takes precedence - the milah b’zmanah is done early only because of the din of zerizus, but for the post-8th day baby the father is oiver mitzvas milah “b’chol yom” according to the Rambam, which the D.A. is mechadesh means every single moment of delay (yom=lav davka) is a seperate issur, so it should be done first.

In the context of defending his chiddush the Dvar Avraham cites the recent daf yomi gemara (Rosh haShana 6a) that one is over an issur of bal t’acher for any delay in fulfilling a pledge of tzedaka – since the poor are present and ready to accept the charity, there is no excuse for delay. In a footnote he adds an amazing comment: he heard from R’ Yisrael Meir haKohen of Radin (I guess he was not yet known as the Chofetz Chaim) that if a poor person is invited to eat at one’s home on Friday night, since the seudas Shabbos is a kiyum of mitzvas tzedaka, one is not allowed to sing Shalom Aleichem and zmiros, as delaying the start of the meal would violate the issur of bal t’acher!

I have heard this idea in story form, and dismissed it as mussar or tzidkus. However, the Dvar Avraham held it makes sense l’halacha and was forced to offer a limud zechus on behalf of most of us who he assumes are not makpid on this issue. He suggests that since the poor assume they will be fed in the context of the bal habayis’s own meal, it is as if a set time was designated for the tzedaka, and until that set time is reached there is no issur of bal t’acher.

What a testimony to the sensitivity of true gedolei yisrael not only to every nuance of halacha, but to every nuance of chessed and human kindness.

klalei hora'ah and rabbinic authority

In a discussion elsewhere, the notion was advanced that the klalei hora’ah were a recognition of the blanket authority of certain chachamim. While this formulation probably is extreme – after all, there are exceptions to the klalei psak, and it is hard to imagine that we would cling to these rules if a sugya is overwhelmingly weighted to the contrary position – there is something to be said for such an approach. R’ Elchanan (Koveitz Shiurim, Baba Basra #499) poses the chakira: are the klalei hora’ah a statement on the gavra, i.e. the capability or thinking of one chacham outweighed his peers and therefore the halacha is determined in his favor, or are the klalei horaha’h descriptive of a pattern which happened to emerge when the cases addressed were reviewed on a one by one basis.

Tosfos (Shabbos 70b d”h Noda) writes that the rule (Yevamos 36) that the halacha follows R’ Yochanan in any dispute with Reish Lakish (with 3 exceptions) applies only to cases that came to a decisive vote in their time; however, we cannot draw conclusions to a case that will be relevant only after Moshiach arrives. Were klalei hora’ah reflective of a consensus regarding R’ Yochanan’s ability in hora’ah as superior to Reish Lakish, Tosfos distinction would be difficult to understand. It seems that Tosfos takes the rules of psak as descriptive of the results of case by case review, and cases that have not yet been subject to debate remain undecided. R’ Elchanan quotes achronim who attribute the counter-position to the Rambam.

Tosfos (Yevamos 14) is troubled by the apparent contradiction between the gemara’s acceptance of the declaration of a bas kol that the halacha follows Bais Hillel against Bais Shamai and the gemara’s rejection of the various miraculous proofs of Rabbi Eliezer that the halacha is in accordance with his opinion. Tosfos answers that the support of Rabbi Eliezer came only to protect his honor, but not because his position was correct. Secondly, Bais Hillel was the majority opinion, and the bas kol was consistent with the normative halachic rule of following majority; in R’ Eliezer’s case he was the minority opinion, and the bas kol subverted the normative rule. The Ohr Sameiach (end of Hil Yesodei haTorah) points out that this question is difficult only within Tosfos understanding that the rules of psak are the results of a case by case review. If one adopts the Rambam’s approach, one can distinguish between the bas kol in Rabbi Eliezer’s case, which was in support of a specific case ruling and therefore has no standing, with the bas kol supporting Bais Hillel, which was not a ruling on case law, but a ruling on the gavra of Hillel, that his skill in hora’ah was superior to that of Shamai.

"shema yigrom hacheit" - can a navi have doubts?

Ya’akov approached his encounter with Eisav with fear and trepidation, “Vayirah Ya’akov m’eod vayetzer lo.” Although he had been given an explicit promise of protection from G-d, which Ya’akov invokes here in his prayer, “V’atah amarta heitev eitiv imach v’samti es zaracha k’afar ha’aretz”, Chazal say this even an explicit promise from G-d is insufficient as a guarantee of protection, as “shema yigrom hacheit”, G-d's promise is ultimately predicated on the continued goodness of the recipient, which may change over time. As discussed previously, the Rambam distinguishes between personal promises to a Navi, whose fulfillment depends on the Navi’s level of righteousness, and prophecy which the Navi is told to openly declare, which is guaranteed to be fulfilled.

The Rambam in Shmoneh Perakim (ch 7) writes that a Navi need not have perfect middos, as we find in Tanach many examples of Nevi’im who do fall victim to sin and spiritual shortcoming (albeit minor points in the scheme of their overall personality). One of the Rambam’s examples is the fear Ya’akov displayed in his encounter with Eisav – given a direct promise of protection from G-d, Ya’akov’s actions reflect on some level a shortcoming of belief in this Divine Protection.

Achronim are struck by the contradiction in the Rambam: on the one hand, the principle of “shema yigrom hacheit” indicates that Ya’akov’s fear was justified, and he could not rely on a private promise of protection, yet on the other hand, the Rambam sees such doubt as a shortcoming of Ya’akov and a lack of bitachon. Which approach is correct?

Two suggestions, one easy, one hard. The Bais haLevi asks, if indeed the promise of G-d is not guaranteed, why does Ya’akov invoke it in his prayers? He answers that Ya’akov was not appealing to the terms of his personal promise but he was appealing to the concept of chilul Hashem. True, fulfillment of G-d’s words ordinarily should depend on personal merit, but here, if Eisav were to win out it would not just mean a loss of face personally for Ya’akov, but a repudiation of the entire Torah lifestyle which Ya’akov represents. This Ya’akov finds intolerable. Perhaps this solves the discrepancy in the Rambam as well. Ya’akov’s personal fear was indeed justifiable, “shema yigrom hacheit", as one can never be sure that one is on the level of meriting fulfillment of Divine promise, but to fear and doubt that the Torah lifestyle would ultimately somehow emerge victorious should not have been part of Ya’akov’s response and was on some level a shortcoming.

An easier answer might be that the promise to Ya’akov, as he states in his prayer, included a guarantee to his children – “v’samti es zaracha k’chol hayam”. While Ya’akov may have been justified in fearing his personal merit was insufficient to guarantee fulfillment of G-d’s promise to himself, there is no reason for him to have assumed that his shortcomings would affect the fulfillment of G-d’s guarantee to his children and to doubt their safety and security.

mar'is ayin on issurei derabbanan: non-dairy creamer with meat

There is another gem buried in this machlokes Tosfos and Ramban (see yesterday’s post). While the issue of lifnei iveir may or may not apply to issurei derabbanan, it seems that none of the Rishonim had a problem with the sugya's assumption that mar’is ayin applies to issurei derabbanan. R’ Shimon ben Elazar prohibits renting a filed to a kusi; since the field is known to belong to a Jew it gives the mar’is ayin appearance that a Jew is working on chol hamoed, which according to Tosfos is an issur derabbanan, and even Ramban only is forced to say melacha on chol hamoed is an issur d’oraysa because he held an issur derbbanan is incompatible with lifnei iveir, not because it was incompatible with mar’is ayin. The point is notable because of a psak of the Rama in hilchos basar b’chalav. Rama (Y.D. 87) writes that if non-dairy creamer made from nuts is served with a fleishig meal of beef, the nuts should be placed next to the creamer container to avoid a problem of mar’is ayin. However, if served with a chicken meal, which is only basar b’chalav derabbanan, there is no concern for mar’is ayin (take a look in poskim for practical applications like caterers serving non-dairy creamer in serving cups with no label to indicate it is not real milk). The Shach attacks the Rama – who says mar’is ayin does not apply to issurei derabbanan?! While the Shach does not specifically reference this sugya, he brings other proofs and writes in general that this principle is supported from many places in shas. In defense of the Rama, one can perhaps distinguish between mar’is ayin on a public act and something like a meal which takes place in a private setting. While the gemara often quotes Rav’s dictum “kol ha’asur m’shum mar’is ayin afilu b’chadrei chadarim hu assur”, rejecting such a distinction, Tosfos (Kesubos 60a) writes that Rav’s principle applies only where the potential issur is an issur d’oraysa. It is also worth noting that the RIF (see Ran to Beitzah daf 9) may reject Rav completely, as is the opinion of the Yerushalmi (as noted by the Gilyon in a recent daf in Shabbos – I did not get a chance to track down where I saw this, so if anyone else is learning the daf yerushalmi and recalls where it is, please remind me!)

lifnei iveir on issurei derabbanan

The gemara (Avodah Zara 22) quotes R’ Shimon ben Elazar that a field should not be rented to a kusi because the kusi will work the field on Chol haMoed, and since the field is known to the public as belonging to a Jew, there is a potential issur of maris ayin. The gemara writes that there is an additional potential issur of lifnei iveir not mentioned by RSb”A, assuming the kusi is a true ger. According to Tosfos, the issur of doing work on chol hamoed is an issur derabbanan, and from this gemara we can conclude that lifnei iveir applies even to causing a person to violate issurei derabbanan. Ramban, however, writes that there is no issur of lifnei iveir on issurei derabbanan, and concludes from this gemara that the issur of working on chol hamoed is an issur d’oraysa.
The Minchas Chinuch (232) questions why lifnei iveir, which applies even to mundane matters like giving bad business advice, should not apply to causing someone to violate an issur derabbanan. Perhaps one can distinguish between bad advice or issurei Torah which are inherently detrimental, and issurei derabbanan, which are prohibited because they are an act of rebellion against the authority of Chazal – if done inadvertently, no rebellion against Chazal’s authority has occurred, and no issur has been caused. The dispute between Tosfos and Ramban may revolve around this very point – is an issur derabbanan done b’shogeg defined as a ma’aseh issur or not?
To be fair, I made two other assumptions here: 1) lifnei iveir only applies when the person being led astray acts b’shogeg, but if he/she intentionally chooses to act in a manner she/she knows is wrong or intentionally follows what she/she knows is bad advice, there is no lifnei iveir (violating a derabbanan b'meizid would be an act of rebellion and my hesber fails); 2) lifnei iveir must lead to a ma’seh issur; an attempt to lead someone astray which fails because it is not acted upon or no issur occurs is not technically a violation. Both points are raised by various achronim.
One could possibly explain the machlokes Tosfos and Ramban as relating to how to understand lifnei iveir – is it a broad overarching prohibition, or is it a way of extending each issur on an individual level. If the latter is the case, perhaps extending issurei derabbanan amounts to a gezeirah l’gezeirah type of situation. This approach leaves the M.C.’s question unanswered.

is a book review a violation of lashon hara?

My wife sometimes writes book reviews on her blog as well as on the jblogbookmom’s blog and a recent e-mail she received gave rise to some halachic consideration. After offering some critical comments about a new book, the author e-mailed back that offering such negative comments violates hilchos lashon hara and may cause a loss to the person’s parnasa. Additionally, in this case the proceeds of the book are directed to tzedaka, so by causing any diminution of the book’s sales the tzedaka indirectly suffers. There were other comments in the e-mail explaining the reason for the author’s umbrage, e.g. the author claims the book was written for altruistic reasons – as far as I can tell, altruistic intentions are not a substitute for actual writing skills, so I'm not sure what the point there was. But the halachic question is at least interesting – is a religious author or artist protected from receiving a critical reviews of his/her work because of the laws of lashon hara? I find this idea hard to swallow. By the author’s reasoning there is no place in the Jewish world for restaurant reviews (who would eat at a place where the food is bad?), reviews of cars, clothes, travel, etc. (who would buy inferior products?), or any discussion of whether a product has merit because if the answer is negative, the producer inevitably suffers a loss of business. Never mind the fact that such a loss may be deserved or that the consumer bears the brunt of supporting what may be inferior goods or services that he/she would never have purchased had he/she known better. I think what the author misses is that the author or producer’s gain has to be balanced against the to’eles of the public being made aware of the quality of a work so they may make an informed decision as to whether to invest time and money in it. And while to a certain degree reviews are a matter of subjective taste, a reviewer should be able to defend his/her arguments for or against a work with examples, analysis, etc. There is a big difference between a statement of opinion with no justification and the type of critical review one might read in the NY Times or London Review of Books (and I guess I take for granted that my wife’s writing is closer to the latter than the former!) Secondly, it seems to me that anyone who makes a statement in the public arena through a work of art, a book, or some other medium implicitly surrenders his/her right to immunity from reasonable criticism. That is part and parcel of exposing one’s opinion to the world, and I think it inherent in the gemara’s principle of “chvrach chavra is leih”. Lastly, the loss of tzedaka funds is nothing more than a red herring – no one purchases a book simply because the author has pledged proceeds to tzedaka, and no impediment to buying the book stops someone from writing a check to the tzedaka if they wish to support it. Is a book store obligated to carry the book in question simply because not doing so restricts the possibility of funds going to a tzedaka? So much for my rough thoughts on the matter – I wonder if anyone has written up something more formal on the subject?

why Ya'akov did not daven for Rachel to have children

Rachel reacted to her inability to have children while by beseeching Ya’akov Avinu to daven for her. Rather than respond with compassion, Ya’akov turns her away and refuses. How, asks the Ramban, are we to understand Ya’akov’s refusal to daven for his own wife when in Tanach we find tzadikim who opened their hearts to daven for women who were complete strangers? The Taz answers that tefillah has the power to overcome spiritual obstacles like a gezeirah preventing a person from having children. Rachel, however, was physically unable to have children – Chazal tell us she was born without a uterus. Correcting this situation required not just overturning a gezeirah, but a “beriyah yesh m’ain”, a completely new act of creation, and according to the Taz, that lies outside the scope of what tefillah can accomplish. This is what Ya’akov meant in responding “Hatachas Elokim anochi”, “Am I in place of G-d” – the necessary remedy in this case was outside the scope of a tzadik’s power, but rested only in G-d’s hands. What this tells us about the nature of tefillah is discussed by my wife on her blog, so I will just add one additional point. In light of this Taz we can better understand Moshe Rabeinu’s response to Korach’s rebellion – “Im briya yivra Hashem…”, if Hashem will create a new opening in the earth to punish Korach, it proves definitively the error of the rebellion. Had Korach been punished through some change of the natural order, one might conclude that the punishment was a result of Moshe’s power as a tzadik to redirect nature. However, if the punishment comes through a new creation, this could only be a response directly from Hashem, as it is not something within the scope of a tzadik’s power to bring about.

tefilas arvis and arvus - a connection?

While on the topic of arvus, if you missed reading it last year, it is worth revisiting this post. Chazal derive from this week’s parsha that Ya’akov Avinu instituted tefilas arvis, which the Tiferes Shlomo connects with the concept of arvus, each member of klal Yisrael sharing collective responsibility. My wife once suggested that the minhag of women not davening arvis may go hand in hand with their being excluded (according to the Dagul m’Revava) from the concept of arvus.

hirhur k'dibbur by kiddush and more on the topic of arvus

The Tur (O.C. 273) quotes an opinion of the Geonim that one who has already said kiddush may not recite kiddush for someone else, with the caveat according to the BH”G that the other people know how to say kiddush. The Tur disagrees based on the principle of arvus which tells us “yatzah – motzi”, even someone who already fulfilled a mitzvah can be motzi someone who has not. The Sha’agas Arye (#13) explains that this dispute is l’shitasam of the dispute Tosfos and BH”G discussed yesterday. According to BH”G, one who ate a k’zayis (whose chiyuv in bentching is derabbanan) cannot be motzi someone who ate k’dei seviya (whose chiyuv is d’oraysa) in bentching because arvus does not work on a chiyuv bracha d’oraysa, only on chiyuvim derabbanan. Tosfos disagrees. The S.A. argues that since kiddush is a bracha d’oraysa, the opinions line up - the Geonim and BH”G do not extend arvus to brachos d’oraysa, and the Tur following the view of Tosfos that arvus applies across the board. (I am unclear on how the Sha’agas Arye explains the BH”G’s distinction between the case of listeners who know how to say kiddush and those who don’t – arvus according to BH”G and Geonim should be categorically excluded.) The Sha'agas Arye proves from this machlokes that we do not apply the principle of “hirhur k’dibbur” to kiddush - the words of kiddush must be articulated, and merely thinking about kedushas shabbos does not fulfill the mitzvah of “zachor es yom haShabbos”. If one could be yotzei kiddush through hirhur, then reciting the bracha would only be a kiyum derabbanan, and the principle of arvus should apply according to all.
In light of the Pri Megadim that we started this whole discussion with, is this proof of the Sha'agas Arye convincing? If one does not get a kiyum d’oraysa for a mitzvah unless done in the format which the Chachamim specified (the PM"G's chiddush), or as Chaim Markowitz put it, dinim derabbanan are extensions of the din d’oraysa and become an inherent part of their kiyum, then how do we know that the Geonim and Tur assume reciting kiddush is a d’oraysa because one does not apply “hirhur k’dibbur”? Maybe m’doraysa we do say “hirhur k’dibbur”, but once the Chachamim instituted a specific nussach habracha, one does not gain a kiyum mitzvah d’oraysa unless the format and nussach specified by the Chachamim is followed?!

educational malpractice

My wife left me a message today after receiving my daughter’s IOWA test results in the mail. A few years ago we had a major battle with a principal of a certain school regarding my daughter’s placement. She has a late December birthday, and the school insisted she should be in the lower grade, i.e. she will be turning 9 this December, so they would have placed her in 3rd grade. Fortunately she is in 4th grade in her current school, where she scored in the 97th percentile on her IOWA, meaning she is in the top 3% of 4th graders in NYS. I can vouch for the fact that she cares nothing about school performance, in part (I think) because she is not being challenged. I don’t write this to brag (OK, maybe just a little bragging : ), but to reflect on the misguided advice of her former school which is symptomatic of what schools do. I can’t recall who made this point – I think Herbert Kohl, but I may be wrong – but it is simple and obvious. If someone came to your workplace and decided to do a corporate re-org and assign job function and responsibility by people’s age, that would be construed as unfair, discriminatory, and downright stupid. But when a school takes children and assigns them to classes based purely on birthday cutoff without any discrimination as to ability, that is viewed as a sensible rule to be enforced as a yehareig v’al ya’avor. Let me just head the pedants off at the pass – true, developmental stages roughly correspond to chronological age, but the key word is roughly. Chazal say 40 se’ah are a kosher mikvah, but 40 se’ah chaseir kurtav is pasul, but children’s developmental stages are not mikvaos! Not that her current school is perfect – one teacher suggested her poor penmanship is a sign of a potential learning disability which could interfere with her school performance and therefore we should ask the district for testing. Glad we turned that advice down as well. I guarantee that if you walk into a doctor’s office and subject yourself to endless tests, something wrong will turn up somewhere. Yet, your doctor would be guilty of malpractice if a single test or cutoff was used to determine your prognosis without taking a holistic view of your medical history and overall health. Too bad schools don’t take the same approach, and too bad they can’t be held accountable for the educational malpractice that occurs all too often.
One other point while I am ranting on the sad state of education. My older daughter last week needed some help with her math homework, which involved factoring. While helping her I asked her why she needed to know how to factor. Answer: because the teacher gave us this work. And why did the teacher do that? Answer: because it is in the math book. Ah Ha! That explains it – there is a conspiracy of math book publishers to crowd kids’ minds with useless information! How can anyone feel motivated to learn anything if it is presented as useless trivia which does not enhance one’s comprehension of the world or provide a practical benefit? (I am too afraid to ask her teacher if she can answer my question as to why kids need to learn factoring, but if I’ve made you curious, take a look here for starters).

more on arvus and whether it applies to women

The principle of arvus means that person a who has already fulfilled his/her (assuming arvus applies to women, see previous posts) mitzvah can still be motzi someone else, e.g. someone who has already said kiddush may recite kiddush for someone who has not. The gemara (Brachos 48) qualifies this with respect to birchas hamazon – the motzi has to have eaten a k’zayis of food. Rashi and Tosfos both question how this din works. The gemara elsewhere (Brachos 20) tells us that someone who is not a bar chiyuva d’oraysa, e.g. a katan, cannot be motzi a man who is mechuyav m’doraysa in bentching. Arvus seems to require parallelism between the chiyuv of the person being yotzei and the person being motzi him/her. How then can someone who ate only a k’zayis, who is only mechuyav mderabbanan in bentching, be motzi someone who ate to the point of satiation, k’dei seviya, who is chayav min hatorah - why is this case different than the case of a katan who cannot be motzi a gadol who ate k'dei seviya?
The simplest answer to this question is that of the BH”G, who denies the whole premis. Perhaps one who ate a k’zayis cannot be motzi someone who ate k'dei seviya - perhaps he can be motzi only someone else who ate a k’zayis! Rashi and Tosfos both reject this chiddush and offer other answers. Rashi explains that a katan is not a bar chiyuva at all – the obligation of chinuch rests entirely on his father (see previous discussion), but someone who ate a k’zayis becomes at least a bar chiyuva on a derabbanan level. Tosfos points out that this begs the question of how a katan can ever be motzi someone considering that he is never a bar chiyuva. Tosfos argues that chinuch does create a chiuv on the child m’derabbanan to do mitzvos, but a katan is still categorically different than a gadol who ate a k’zayis. A katan can never be rise to the level of bar chiyuva d’oraysa no matter how much he eats; a gadol has the potential to be a bar chiyuva d’oraysa if he eats the necessary shiur.
I am still mulling over in my brain what the hesber of the machlokes BH”G and Rashi and Tosfos is and what it tells us about how arvus works (any suggestions?), but for now I wanted to get back to the issue of arvus for women. R’ Akiva Eiger points out that the gemara (20b) lumps together women with ketanim (assuming their chiyuv in bentching is derabbanan). According to Rashi a katan may not have an independent chiyuv derabbanan to bentch, but a woman certainly does – if so, why should the principle of arvus not allow her to be motzi a gadol?! To play devil's advocate, this is only a problem l'shitaso of R' Akiva Eiger, but the Dagul m'Revava might take it as a proof that he is correct in excluding women completely from the principle of arvus.
(For more on the issue of whether a katan is a bar chiyuva, see Koveitz Shiurim of R’ Elchanan, # 30)

shabbos kiddush - does arvus apply to women

The gemara in Brachos has a safeik whether women are chayavos in birchas hamazon min hatorah or not. The Rosh writes that since this issue is unresolved, a woman may not be motzi a man in bentching because her chiyuv may be derabbanan and his chiyuv is d’oraysa. Asks the Rosh, why should this distinction in the levels of chiyuvim matter? – just like a man who ate a k’zayis (chiyuv derabbanan) can be motzi a man who ate k’dei seviya (chiyuv d’oraysa) because of the principle of arvus (i.e. even if I have no chiyuv, I have to help someone else fulfill their chiyuvim), even if a woman’s chiyuv is derabbanan, she could be motzi a man through arvus?! (Arvus would theoretically work even if the one being motzi his/her friend ate nothing, e.g. someone can be motzi a friend in kiddush without drinking the kos, but there is a special din derabbanan by bentching that the motzi has to have eaten). The Rosh answers with a tremendous chiddush that the principle of arvus does not apply to women. The Dagul m’Revava raises a number of questions all based on this yesod of the Rosh, the most well known (O.C. 271) relating to the mitzvah of kiddush. According to the Magen Avraham, a man is yotzei his mitzvah of kiddush m’doraysa by reciting kiddush hayom in ma’ariv of Shabbos. How can a man be motzi his wife, who is chayeves in kiddush min hatorah, when he has already fulfilled his kiddush m’doraysa and the principle of arvus does not apply to women?!
R’ Akiva Eiger completely disagrees with the Dagel m’Revava’s reading of the Rosh. The Rosh never meant that arvus does not extend to women – what the Rosh meant is in a case where the status of chiyuv is a safeik, like the question of a woman’s obligation to bentch, we do not extend the principle of arvus. Perhaps the reason many women who ordinarily do not daven ma’ariv have the minhag of doing so on Shabbos and Y”T night is to avoid this issue raised by the Dagul m’Revava. Depending on how low you define the threshold for mitzvas kiddush, perhaps a woman wishing her husband “Good Shabbos” suffices on a d’orasya level (R’ Akiva Eiger). Furthermore, the Minchas Chinuch (again, thank you Bill Selliger) challenges the whole premis of the MG”A based on the gemara in Pesachim which says that zechiras yetziyas mitzrayim is an integral part of kiddush, which is lacking in ma’ariv. But unless I am missing something, there is another answer available based on yesterday’s discussion. Even though m’doraysa kiddush can be accomplished with a minimal statement mentioning kedushas shabbos, once Chazal added the obligations of kiddush being said al hakos b’makom seudah, then a failure to meet the derabbanan criteria should also mean the d’oraysa kiyum is not fulfilled either.

where failure to fulfill a din derabbanan negates a kiyum d'oraysa

The Pri Megadim (Pesicha haKolleles 3:8) questions whether in a case where the Chachamim added extra criteria to the performance of a mitzvah and one failed to meet those criteria, is the kiyum d'oraysa of the mitzva also negated? One of the proofs to this issue comes from the case of a small sukkah which can fit a person’s head and body but not a table – although this sukkah is kosher m’doraysa, Tosfos (sukkah 3, brachos 11) writes that since it is pasul m’derabbanan one would not get any kiyum d’oraysa by using this sukkah. This chakira perhaps explains the debate in the first Mishna in Brachos. The Chachamim hold that keri’as shema should be recited only until chatzos – even though m’doraysa the mitzvah can be fulfilled until morning, the Chachamim set up a safeguard so people do not delay performing the mitzvah and come to forget about it. When Rabban Gamliel’s children came home past chatzos from a party, they asked their father whether they should recite kerias shema or not. Explains the PM”G, even though one cannot gain a kiyum mitzvah d’oraysa done deliberately not in accordance with the parameters set up by the Chachamim, here R’ Gamliel’s children missed the cutoff of chatzos only b’ones, unintentionally. R' Gamliel's children argued that violating a d'rabbanan b'ones should not negate a kiyum d'oraysa. I would just add two points: 1) the qualification for situations of ones perhaps points to the fact that lo tasur cannot be violated b’ones (whether that is the pshat here is admittedly debatable); 2) perhaps one could distinguish between different types of dinim derabbanan – is violating a seyag the same as violating other dinim derabbanan? To borrow another case from the PM”G, if someone recites birchas hamazon but leaves out the term “melech” from the bracha, which fails to meet the bracha formula set by the Chachamim, is that parallel to the other cases?

p' toldos - Yitzchak's reaction to having been tricked

Upon discovering that someone has usurp’s Eisav’s brachos, Yitzchak cries out (27:33), “Mi eifoh hu hatzad tzayid va’yavei li va’ochal m’kol b’terem tavo va’avaracheihu” – “Who was it that trapped food, brought it to me, I ate all of it before you came, and I blessed that person…”
The pasuk seems to stress the ancillary details of trapping, cooking, bringing the food, and Yitzchak's eating before getting to what we expect is the true focal point - the fact that the brachos have been stolen. Perhaps the wordiness serves to emphaisze that this was no casual pop-in who Yitzchak mistakenly blessed, but someone who had devised a careful plan with deliberate intent to deceive. My wife suggested a clever reading: perhaps the word “tzad” is a double entendere, referring not just to the trap laid for animals, but the trap laid for Yitzchak himself!

brachos from a tzadik - parshas toldos

Before getting to the hard questions, I just want to underscore one simple point in the parsha: a righteous person can bestow a bracha on someone that can radically affect that person’s life. A bracha is not just an expression of hope for the future, or good wishes, because were that the case why would Yitzchak not hope the best for both of his children, and why would Ya’akov risk so much to receive that bracha? The parsha only makes sense if we assume there is some tangible benefit to receiving a bracha from a tzadik. Now for the hard part – how does this bracha work? If a bracha is a type of prophetic revelation of future events, then whether or not Ya’akov did anything or stood before Yitzchak, the same future should have been foretold. If brachos are a tefillah asking Hashem to bestow certain gifts, how could Ya’akov have hoped to benefit from the tefillah of Yitzchak when Yitchak’s kavanah was on Eisav? – if I say a “borei pri ha’eitz” on a tomato, it obviously does not turn the fruit into an apple! The Rishonim grapple with these issues (see Derashon haRan, Ibn Ezra, Abarbanel). The simple answers assume that Yitzchak did not really have kavanah for Eisav but suspected someone else before him, or that Ya’akov’s being present merely thwarted Eisav’s receiving the brachos even if it accomplished nothing for himself. I don’t find these answers very satisfying and was drawn to the Abarbanel’s more substantive approach, but I am still trying to digest what he says. Going back to an idea discussed in a previous posting, the idea of bracha is perhaps related to the idea of dibbur being a “poel”. A women can become mekudeshes thorugh dibbur; we create a chalos of kedushas korban through dibbur; kiddush done through dibbur sanctifies shabbos; bais din’s declaration is “mekadesh” the new month – these are not just legal fictions, but the force of speech literally causes a change in state. The Abarbanel writes that Yitzchak’s bracha was like a carpenter who builds a window through which light now enters a house – once the window is there, the fact that the carpenter built it by mistake or wants the sun to shine elsewhere has absolutely no effect. Mashal l’mah hadavr domeh (l’aniyus da’ati): compare with Bais Shamai’s opinion that hekdesh b’ta’us is still hekdesh. Hekdesh bestows a status on the animal which makes it ra’uy for korban, but the fulfillment of the ma’aseh mitzvah is in the actual offering of the korban on mizbayach. Similarly, a bracha’s power is in the potential it invests in an individual to become the recipient of shefa from Hashem, but much still hinges on the individual’s efforts to bring that potential to fruition.

Minchas Chinuch - darkei emori

Since it is Thanksgiving (actually, the day after), special thanks to Bill Selliger for making my Minchas Chinuch learning that much easier – and on that note…
The gemara (B”K 83a) writes that someone who is “misaper kumi”, gets a specific type of haircut that shaves the forehead, has violated the issur of chukos ha’akum (darkei Emori) because that haircut was a specific non-Jewish practice (see Rashi). However, the gemara notes that someone who is “karov l’malchus”, who represents the Jewish people before non-Jewish kings, is permitted to take this type of haircut to conform with the societal norm. The Minchas Chinuch (262) asks how this can be permitted – how can the Chachamim allow a violation of an issur d’oraysa for the sake of appearance? The Bais Yosef answers that “hatzalas yisrael” is different. Minchas Chinuch quotes a second answer from achronim that the entire issur of darkei emori is b’geder “masaro hakasuv l’chachamim”, defined by the limits set by the chachamim, who in this case excluded krovim l’malchus from the issur. This is implied by Tosfos in B”K who writes that kerovim l’malchus were not included in the original gezeirah. Minchas Chinuch does not elaborate further, but there seems to be a significant difference between these answers: if “hatzalas yisrael” is the heter, the permissibility for kerovim l’malchus to get this haircut should apply only to the narrow range of cases where Jewish life is threatened unless represented before the Kings court.

chukos ha'akum - the issur of copying non-Jewish practices

I assume this is the inyana d’yoma …
The gemara (Avodah Zara 11) discusses the practice of burning the belongings of a dead king, which was both the practice for Jewish kings as well as non-Jewish kings. Why does this not constitute a chok of avodah zarah which the Torah prohibits copying? The gemara answers “sereifa lav chukah elah chashivusa”. There are two possible ways to read the gemara’s answer: 1) even though burning was a practice of idolatry, since it also practically served the function of honoring the dead kings, it was permitted; 2) the burning was done simply to honor kings and was never an idolatrous practice, hence it is permitted. A very important nafka minah between the two readings is whether a practice used for idolatry is permitted to be duplicated if done for some practical function – the Ran, based on this gemara, holds this is not a problem, but Tosfos disagrees. Support for Tosfos comes from the sugya in Sanhedrin 52 which quotes a pasuk to justify using a sword to carry out the punishment of misas sayif, as that was the method also used in idolatry – if using a sword is functionally the best way to carry out this penalty (the gemara tells us other ways constitute “misa minuveles”), why does the gemara need a pasuk as a matir? Therefore, Tosfos argues that there are two types of practices the issur of chukos ha’aku”m relates to: practices that are used in the worship of avodah zarah, which would be prohibited even if they serve a useful function unless we have a pasuk as a matir, and practices which aku”m do which are not used in avodah zarah worship but are just customs or social norma – here a matir is also needed, but finding a functional use for the practice or behavior suffices. In a nutshell, the machlokes Tosfos and the Ran may boil down to a simple definition of terms: is chukkas ha’aku”m a prohibition against idolatrous practices, or practices done by idolotors (with the caveat that they serve no greater function). What if all non-Jewish doctors and hospitals have doctors wear white robes – is that prohibited because of chukos ha’aku”m? The Mahari”k addressed this very question and held that unless there is a breach of tzniyus, based on the Ran unless the manner of dress is used in the practice of idolatry there is no issue, which is how the Rama paskens. The GR”A (Y.D. 178:7), however, favors the opinion of Tosfos, which leads to far greater stringencies – even in matters of social norma, a matir based on functionality or practical benefit is needed if a gentile practice is duplicated. Does a tie serve a function other than imitating the social norma of the gentile society? If not, then wearing one might not be permitted! From celebrating Thanksgiving (and soon to be inyana d’yoma: office holiday parties) to yalmukahs in the workplace, determining where to draw the line in issues of chukos ha’aku”m is an inevitable dilemma of living in a free society that encourages “blending in” with the crowd. Tosofos and the Ran are the starting point for working out the details.

would they have banned the printing press?

I mentioned to my wife that blogs were going to be a topic of discussion at the Agudah convention. Her response – “Would they have banned the printing press?”
Nothing I can add to that.

the mitzvah of kevurah and sarah's burial

Avraham approached the people of Bnei Cheis and asked for a burial plot for Sarah, ‘v’ekbira es meisi milfanei’, so that her body could be removed from before him for burial.
1) Ramban infers from the words “before him” that had Avraham not been able to purchase a burial plot, he would have carried Sarah’s body with him interred in a coffin. The Chavel edition of the Ramban notes that this contradicts the Ramban’s position in Toras haAdam that burial must be done in the ground. The Klei Chemdah suggests that there are 2 reasons for burial in the ground: a) because the human body comes from the ground and needs to be returned to its rightful place; b) so that the body does not suffer bizayon, disgrace, by lying in the open. The Ramban took Avraham’s words to mean that even if he was denied a burial plot in the ground, he would still fulfill the aspect of the mitzvah of kevurah of preventing the body from coming to disgrace by interring the body in a coffin.
2) The gemara (Sanhedrin 46b) debates whether the reason for the mitzvah of burial is “m’shum bizyonei”, so that the body is not disgraced, or “m’shum kapparah”, so that the dead receives kapparah by the body decomposing. The nafka minah would be if a person requests that his body not be buried – if the reason for burial is to avoid disgrace, to some degree it is the family who suffer disgrace by their relative not being buried, and a person has no right to inflict this situation on others; however, if the purpose of burial is for person kaparah, a person has a right to forgo the process. The gemara asks if the reason is kaprah, why do tzadikim who have not sinned need to be buried? The gemara answers “ain tzadik b’aretz”, everyone needs some degree of kaparah. The Yismach Moshe writes that given Rashi citation of the Midrash that Sarah was untainted by sin like a 20 year old, she indeed was a perfect tzadeikes and perhaps did not need the kaparah of kevurah. Therefore, Avraham pleaded for a burial plot “milfanei”, so that his bizayon at not burying his wife should be removed from before him, but not for her sake, as she transcended the need for kaparah.

hiddur mitzvah - ner chanukah, ner shabbos

This is a follow up based on some of the comments to this post. We know that if one does not have an adequate number of candles, ner shabbos takes precedence over ner chanukah (is it almost that time of year?). What would be the din in the following scenario: Erev Shabbos Chanukah falls out on the first day of Chanukah and a person has only 3 candles - since Erev Shabbos will be the second night of Chanukah, 2 menorah candles need to be lit, but on the other hand, the minhag is to light 2 candles for neiros Shabbos. You only have 3 candles, so which mitzvah gets shortchanged?
My 2 cents upfront: ner Chanukah wins, but that’s all I’ll say for now – what’s your sevara to agree or disagree?

yafeh sichasan shel avdei avos

If sicha is a “lower” level fo speech, e.g. sichas chulin, al tarbeh sicha im ha’isha (my wife pointed that one out), and dibbur is a”higher” level speech reserved for Torah, e.g. divrei Torah (see previous post), how do we make sense of the statement yafeh sichasan shel avdei avos yoseir m’torasan shel banim? One approach (which seems the most popular from my quick glance around in some seforim) is that the message is akin to gedolah shimusha yoseir m’limuda or yafeh sha’ah achas b’olam hazeh m’kol chayei olam haba– middos and derech eretz can only be taught through observing behavior, and derech eretz itself is a prerequisite for Torah, hence the sicha of Eliezer which is part of the whole behavioral lesson of the Avos takes on a significance that exceeds halaca itself. But in line with R’ Tzadok (jf you see both pieces inside the parallel is striking), the Sefas Emes offers a different explanation. Sefas Emes (like R’ Tzadok) draws a dichotomy between sicha—tefilla—eved on one hand and dibbur—torah—ben on the other. However, the dichotomy is not linear, i.e. unlike other meforshim understood, there are not mutually exclusive stages of eved/tefilla/sicha vs. dibbur/torah. Rather, every stagein life is both an opportunity for both sicha and dibbur, eved and ben, chayei olam of torah and chayei sha’ah of tefila, a chance to bask in the accomplishment of reaching new heights, but also a chance to strive to that next hihest rung that now stands just a small jump away. Yafeh sichasan shel avdei avos – the tefila that expresses the desire to grow to that next level, the feeling that one’s accomplishment is still just sicha and one must still work as an eved, is of greater import than the feeling of torasan shel banim, the feeling of attainment and accomplishment that are the divrei Torah of the stage reached.

sicha vs.dibbur

Tonights chaburah in R’ Tzadok will focus bl”n on the difference between tefillah and Torah. R’ Tzadok notes that tefilah is associated with the word sicha, e.g. in this week’s parsha Chazal darshen "vaYeitzei Yitzchak lasuach basadeh" to mean Yitzchak davened mincha; Torah, however, is associated with dibbur, e.g. divrei Torah. This is not just a semantic point, but tells us about the relative value of each activity – sicha is used for lighter matters, e.g. sichas chulin shel talmidei chachamim, but dibbur indicates serious speech; tefillah is relatively less important that engaging in Talmud Torah (see Kedushas Shabbos for greater elaboration). However, it seems that this yesod is belied by a statement of Chazal from this week’s parsha – yafeh sichasan shel avdei avos yoseir m’torasan shel banim - the conversation of Eliezer is recorded in elaborate detail, demonstrating its superior value to the halachos of Torah which are not spelled out, but must be derived from minute details of sparsely worded text. How indeed can it be true that the value of Eliezer's common speech outweighs the value of Torah, even if it is torasan shel banim? If you’re curious and live in the 5T, chaburah tonight at 7:30 bl”n, 26 Columbia.

l'olam bahem ta'avodu (III) - Eliezer eved Avraham

Anon1 has not let me off the hook yet, pointing out Gittin 40 where the gemara allows inheritors to fulfill their father's death bed instructions to free a shifcha. Isn’t this a violation of l’olam bahem ta’avodo? True, mitzva l’kayeim divrei hameis and fulfill a last request, but presumably not at the cost of violating an issur d’oraysa! Tosfos (38a d”h kol) answers that since the inheritors of the estate cannot use this eved for work because they are bound to fulfill the deathbed request of their father, there is no violation of freeing the slave. There are two possible ways to understand Tosfos' answer: most achronim understand Tosfos to mean that the father had already freed the slave with a verbal declaration, and that prevents the inheritors from using the slave; the children in this case are merely finalizing matters with a shtar shichrur, the formal emancipation contract. One could also possibly learn Tosfos as saying that the children cannot use the slave because of mitzvah l'kayeim divrei hameis; once the slave cannot be used for work, the prohibition of l'olam bahem ta'avodu categorically no longer applies (this possibility is raised in the Rashba). Does being blocked from enjoying the labor of a slave automatically give license to grant freedom - is the issur fundementally designed to preserve the slave's burden of labor, which in this case is inapplicable, or designed to maintain the status of servitude, which applies irrespective of the burden of work? Be that as it may, as Anon1 pointed out, the Rashba offers an alternative answer more in line with the Ramban’s approach to the whole sugya. The issur of emancipating a slave applies only if freedom is granted as a free gift with nothing received in return. In the gemara’s case, the freedom was in exchange for the great benefit the slave had given the master during his lifetime.
Minyan l’inyan: according to many meforshim, Eliezer served as the shliach of either Avraham or Yitzchak to be mekadeish Rivka, and although an eved is pasul for shlichus of gittin and kiddushin, Eliezer (based on Pirkei d’Rabbi Eliezer) was freed for the mission. One can use some combination of the above sevaros to how Avraham (or Yitzchak) could do that without violating any issur.

girls lighting shabbos candles from age three

When Rivka comes to Yitzchak’s home the Torah tells us “Vayive’ha Yitzchak ha’ohela Sarah imo vayikach es Rivka vat’hi lo l’isha vaye’ehaveha”, Yitzchak first brought Rivka into the tent of his mother Sarah, and then he married her and loved her. Rashi explains that there were three miracles that were always present in the tent of Sarah – the dough was blessed, the candles remained lit from erev Shabbos to erev Shabbos, and a cloud enveloped the tent. Despite all the miracles which Eliezer related as having occurred on his journey, Yitzchak did not take Rivka as his wife until she proved capable of duplicating the miracles of his mother Sarah.
The Lubavitcher Rebbe (Likutei Sichos vol.15, see here) notes that the assumption of Rashi seems to be that Rivka performed the mitzvah of hadlakas neiros Shabbos even before marriage (see the footnotes of the sicha which discuss whether an arusa is chayeves in hadlakas neiros), even (according to Rashi’s chronology) from the young age of three years old. I have not noticed it lately, but I do recall years ago Lubavitch actively campaigning to have all women, even little girls, participate in the mitzvah of lighting neiros Shabbos.
Regardless of the merits of this proof (might the hadlakas neiros here have been a test of some sort and not simply a kiyum of ner Shabbos?), there is a custom in many homes of having girls light Shabbos candles. The minhag is brought by the Aruch haShulchan, and I have seen quoted in a number of places that this was the practice of the Brisker Rav. My older daughters (11, 8) do light candles, but not my 5 year old. Assuming the hadlakah is a kiyum of mitzvas chinuch, I am not sure a three or five year old is ready for the mitzvah yet (especially using matches and a candle), so in our house we wait for the girls to get a little bigger.

more on lo techaneim and l'olam bahem ta'avodu

The gemara Gittin 38a tells us that one who frees an eved kna’ani violates a mitzvas aseh of l’olam bahem ta’avodu. Assuming this is a real derasha and not an issur derabbanan (as most rishonim hold), how is it that we do find cases where a slave may be freed? The Mishna itself tells us that in a case of a chatzi eved chatzi ben chorin, e.g. a slave owned by to masters who was freed by one and is now caught in between being a slave or a full yisrael, there is a mitzvah on the second owner to free the slave. The gemara Brachos 47b also tells us that R’ Eliezer freed his slave to make a minyan – how could that be permitted? The gemara in Brachos asks this very question and answers that a mitzvah is different, i.e. freeing a slave for purpose of fulfilling a mitzvah is permitted. The gemara continues and asks isn’t this mitzvah a mitzvah haba’ah b’aveira, and answers that “mitzvah d’rabim” is different and overrides the aveirah. Tosfos in Gittin uses this same concept to explain freeing the chatzi eved – in the state of half-eved the person cannot fulfill peru u’revu, which is a fundamental mitzvah, and therefore the greater mitzvah overrides the issur of freeing the eved. However, the Ramban in Gittin suggests a completely different approach. According to Ramban, the mitzvah of freeing a slave is patterned after the issur of ‘lo techaneim’, not giving a free gift to a non-Jew. Yesterday’s comments by anon1 suggested that the benefit received by the master by the slaves years of hard work render his release not a free gift, but a gift in exchange for services provided. If this is what the Ramban meant, the problem is (as asked by the Magen Avraham and Turei Even) why does the gemara in Brachos need to invoke the idea that the slave of “mitzvah d’rabim” to obviate the problem of mitzvah haba’ah b’aveirah– as long as the release is not a free gift there is no issur?! It seems that a release on the basis of past service provided is not sufficient – there has to be some pressing need to release the slave into freedom, a need like “mitzvah d’rabim” which is strong enough to override the prohibition. The disagreement between Tosfos and the Ran is whether that need is doche “l’olam bahem ta’avodo”, or is the issur of releasing the slave “hutra” because it is no longer a free gift.
Returning to the original question of how Avraham could give matanos to the children of the pilagshim, the gemara in Sanhedrin asks what these matanos were and answers that they were the magical “shem tumah”. The Margolias haYam in Sanhedrin quotes a source as saying the reason the gemara asked what the matanos were and did not take the word at face value (as meaning some type of presents) is precisely because of this issur of “lo techaneim”! I don’t get the punchline, and the Margolias haYam does not explain further – does “lo techaneim” only apply to concrete gifts and not to abstractions like a “shem tumah”?

the excesses of fundamentalsim

The critique of “fundamentalist” atheism which I excerpted yesterday (which I would extend to any form of fundamentalism) begs the question of what exactly is meant by the term fundamentalist. A comment even questioned the applicability of the term outside the realm of religion. Is anyone committed to an ideology a fundamentalist? Were that the case, the term would be meaningless, as we are all fundamentalists with respect to certain issues/beliefs. It seems to me that what defines a fundamentalist (as the term has come to be used) is the inability to step outside one’s own perspective and see things from the "others" point of view, the inability to recognize that being committed to a position does not demand deprecating and dismissing the other side's arguments as completely without merit or validity, or denying that one’s own position might suffer deficiencies that require refinement and better explication. A fundamentalist looks down from the pinnacle of having arrived at the TRUTH, and truth brooks no compromise and requires no nuance. No matter what the argument or evidence to the contrary, the fundamentalist has a response that affirms the superiority of his/her position - there is no such thing as an unresolved dilemma, a challenge that cannot be met, or even a weakness in an argument, for to acknowledge any of these is to surrender debating points to the other side. The religion/atheism debate is a classic case in point. I want to focus on the side of religion because I am admittedly biased in favor of belief, and therefore the excesses here trouble me more than the excesses of the likes of Richard Dawkins. Much written in defense of religion bothers me as failing to be honest in recognizing the weak as well as strong points in arguments for belief. When learning a sugya a lamdan worthy of that title can distinguish a chiluk that has the ring of emes, and an answer which b’dochak may solve a problem but is unsatisfying, and a kashe that remains b’tzarich iyun because no answer has been discovered. Religious fundamentalism of the Torah variety has lost sensitivity to these gradations in the zeal to defeat the opposition and “defend the faith”. There is no sense of humility, no recognition that sometimes the challenge is stronger than the teirutzim proposed, no acknowledgement that sometimes it is OK to say tzarich iyun or recognize a position as a dochak, and worst of all, there is a cavalier dismissal even of objective evidence that poses a challenge, replacing ‘ain l’dayan elah mah she’einav ro’os’ with a solipsistic denial of what is before one’s own eyes. Yes, when R’ Akiva Eiger said tzarich iyun he did not have someone waiting in the wings to pounce and say “Aha! If you can’t solve that it proves your religion is defective”, which is very much the case in the charged debates on religion and atheism. But in the long run, the extremism of the opposition does not excuse tone deafness to what constitutes a reasoned argument and what constitutes intellectual gymnastics, hair splitting, or worse. Tzarich iyun is not surrender, but a recognition that the struggle for answers is an ongoing process of learning. The same holds true in the debate of science vs. Torah - sacrificing mesorah to the god of science is not the best approach, but neither is glibly asserting truisms that contradict reason or evidence. What is the answer? It is the claim by anyone to know THE answer which troubles me - perhaps for many individuals there is an answer of one sort or another, but that is not the same as a total resolution of the issue with no nettlesome details that need to be worked out (at least I haven't discovered one yet, which will inevitably draw the critique that I have either not read enough science or my emunah is lacking otherwise I would see the truth.) The argument for religion is not that faith provides neat and simple answers to all life's questions, but that in spite of lacking answers to a great many questions, a life of religious faith is a far better choice than a life of disbelief.

chazon ish on basar b'chalav with neveilah

The gemara derives from the 3x repetition of the issur of basar b’chalav in the torah that there are 3 prohibitions associated with the issur: cooking, eating, and deriving benefit from basar b’chalav. If one cooks neveilah meat with milk, since the meat is already assur to eat because of the issur neveilah, we apply the rule of “ain issur chal al issur” (you can’t prohibit something already prohibited) and the issur of eating basar b’chalav has no effect. The Rambam (Peirush haMishnayos, Krisus) adds what he calls a “nekudah nifla’ah”, an amazing point. Not only does the issur of eating basar b’chalav not apply to this neveilah cooked in milk, but according to the Rambam the issur hana’ah does not apply either. Even though neveilah is not assur b’hana’ah so it would seem “ain issur chal al issur” does not apply, since the issur hana’ah is derived from the same pasuk as the issur achilah, the two always go hand in hand. Hana’ah is just an extended form of the issur of eating.
What is the din regarding drinking the milk in this neveilah b’chalav mixture? Since the milk is not neveilah and there is no issue of "ain issur chal al issur", one might conclude that the milk does become prohibited because of basar b’chalav. However, many achronim assume that the milk itself does not become assur either. The Chazon Ish (Y.D. 22) offers a fascinating hesber (which I’m not sure I fully grasp) which sounds very much like the Rogatchover’s distinction between “harkavah mizgit” and “harkavah shichnit”. A composite can consist of multiple items simply located in proximity, or can consist of a synthesis into a new whole. Basar b’chalav according to C. I. is a harkavah mizgit – both food items must form a new synthesis, a cheftza in which both parts adopt a new identity of issur basar b’chalav. Since in our case the meat cannot attain the status of issur basar b’chalav because it is neveilah, the milk also will never become assur because this new harkavah mizgit is missing a necessary component part of the synthesis. What stands out in this case is that the harkavah mizgit is being prevented not by the physical absence of meat, but by the meat being unable to change its halachic status to a different state – to me that sounds like quite a chiddush!

lo techaneim - avraham's gifts to the pilagshim

Last night after Ma'ariv a friend asked me why the matanos (gifts) Avraham gave to the Bnei haPilagshim (25:6) were not a violation of the issur of 'lo techaneim', which prohibits giving a free gift (for which one receives nothing in return) to a non-Jew. I am not familar with anyone who asks this question and have never thought about it - so far, no ideas have come to mind.

fundementalist atheism

From an article in Wired Magazine on New Atheism, the radical form of atheism espoused by Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Daniel Dennett:
"The New Atheists will not let us off the hook simply because we are not doctrinaire believers. They condemn not just belief in God but respect for belief in God. Religion is not only wrong; it's evil..."
"My Pilgrimage is about to become more difficult. On the one hand, it is obvious that the political prospects of the New Atheism are slight. People see a contradiction in its tone of certainty. Contemptuous of the faith of others, its proponents never doubt their own belief. They are fundamentalists. I hear this protest dozens of times. It comes up in every conversation. Even those who might side with the New Atheists are repelled by their strident tone…The New Atheists never propose realistic solutions to the damage religion can cause…The New Atheists care mainly about correct belief. This makes them hopeless, politically."
(I'm less interested in the critique of atheism than with the critique of fundementalism, which is definitely something those of us in the religious community should bear in mind.)

outreach - pardes or pundak?

There is a difference of opinion in the Midrash as to what the “eishel” Avraham set up was – a pundak (inn), or a pardes (orchard). If taken literally, the Midrash seems to be offering unnecessary details that don’t add much to our appreciation of the text. The Maharal, however, suggests that these two views symbolically represent two very different approaches to kiruv. The term pardes is used by Chazal to represent higher wisdom, e.g. the story of four Tana’im who were “nichnisu l’pardes” to experience some high level of giluy Shechina. The term ‘pundak’ is a simple inn that the average person can sit down in and have a meal and drink. One approach to outreach is to present the world of Torah in all its complexity, with all its demands of intellectual rigor and thought, despite the fact that this may appeal only to an intellectually sophisticated audience. A different approach is to present a Shabbos meal, a tisch, a niggun – the menu of the pundak that even the average Joe can appreciate – and attract the masses to the Torah way of life. The pundak approach seems to have far more populist appeal – it seems to me that more stories of ba’alei tshuvah focus on being attracted to the sense of family and community of Judaism and the beauty of a religious lifestyle than on intellectual arguments for religion or the depths of Talmud Torah. On the other hand, I find myself drawn to the pardes more than to a hot cholent (maybe that’s why the R’ Tzadok chaburah has such a low attendance – no refreshments) or any aesthetic beauty of mitzvos. Eilu v’eilu…

the redemption of Lot - r' tzadok on tzedaka

The Midrash and Yerushalmi refer to tzedaka as stam “mitzvah”. R’ Tzadok offers two reasons for this: 1) Each particular mitzvah “corrects” a specific aspect of Creation. Only tzedaka, however, brings about a global uplifting of the entire world because it does not effect just a part of the person (e.g. tefillin relates specifically to the arm), but effects the entire person who is a microcosm of reality. 2) Tzedaka is ingrained in the Jewish persona – no matter how far a Jew has strayed, he/she is apt to perform some charitable act in their lifetime that reflects their Jewish roots. Chazal tell us that Avraham, the paradigm of chessed, stands at the threshold to Gehennom waiting to pull back any Jew who falls there, for every Jew has some merit of charity.
With this idea we can perhaps explain why Rashi focuses on Lot’s merit in not revealing that Avaraham and Sarah were husband and wife but does not mention Lot’s hachnasas orchim. A Jew does not become a ba’al chessed because he/she does a lot of charitable acts; a Jew is born a ba’al chessed almost as a genetic aspect of his/her personality. However, Chazal (Baba Basra 10) tell us “chessed l’umim chatas”, the chessed of non-Jews is not ingrained in their personality, but a non-Jew becomes a ba’al chessed because he/she engages in acts of charity. The difference is these acts are considered to always be tainted by ulterior motive (Michtav M’Eliyahu I:191), even something as subtle as responding to the emotional need to do good. For this reason, a Jew who pledges tzedaka on the condition that his child be healed is considered a tzadik, as he/she would have given the money anyway, but the same assumption is not make about a non-Jew (Tos Pesachim 8b). The gemara (B.B 4) tells us that Daniel was punished for advising Nevuchatnezer to perform tzedaka to aver an decree against him. At first glance this is hard to understand – if tzedaka would make Nevuchadnezer less of a rasha, then why would there be any objection to it, and if he would be guilty despite his charitable acts, why should the decree against him be mitigated? Perhaps the explanation is that the superficial act of charity does weigh in a person’s favor, but where chessed l’umin chatas the core of the person remains the same. The superficial covering over of sin is not something to strive for. Various Midrashim contrast the wickedness of Sdom with that of Yerushalyim at the time of the churban – in both cases people engaged in Avodah Zarah, murder, and licentious relationships, but Yerushalyim is credited with fulfilling tzedaka (Sanhedrin 104), while Sdom’s fate was ultimately sealed because they did no charitable acts (Ch. haRan Sanhedrin 56b). It is not the superficial act of charity which is the distinction, but the underlying personality – a Jew, even one who engages in the most vile behavior, is still assumed to have a core the descends from Avraham and marked as a ba’al chessed. Lot may have engaged in acts of chessed, but these acts did not form the core of his personality. When push came to shove, it was the simple act of silence that saved Avraham which was considered his greatest merit.

the zechus and rescue of Lot

As the city of Sdom is destroyed, the Torah tells us “vayizkor Elokim es Avraham,” Hashem remembered Avraham and saved Lot from the destruction. The simple reading of the pasuk perhaps gives the impression that Lot was saved in the merit of Avraham. However, Rashi interprets the clause to refer to Lot’s own merit. When Avraham was travelling through Egypt with Sarah, he professed that she was his sister. Lot obviously knew that they were husband and wife, but nonetheless kept quiet and went along with the ruse. In repayment for his silence, Hashem rewarded Lot with rescue.
The Alter m’Slabodka (I could not find this last night in Ohr HaTzafun – if anyone digs it up, please let me know) asks why Rashi calls our attention specifically to this merit. Lot was Avraham’s nephew, and as depicted in the various episodes of Braishes, was consistently the beneficiary of rewards based on that relationship. It would have been truly callous of Lot to turn in his own uncle! Surely a much greater zechus for Lot is the remarkable feat of hachnasas orchim he performed in the midst of the wicked city of S’dom itself, taking in the wandering angels despite great risk to himself and his family. Yet, that entire parsha is overlooked – why?
I hate to do it, but I’m leaving you with a teaser to think about (or find the hidden [pun intended] Ohr Tzafun) because I intend to try to deal with this in the R' Tzadok chaburah and can't risk giving the game away in advance. However, in response to a much appreciated comment yesterday, here are some mareh mekomos for those who can’t attend. I try to connect R' Tzadok's theme to the parsha; the piece we are up to relates to the mitzvah of tzedaka, which ties into S'dom's guilt and can shed some light on the Alter's kashe. Bl"n summary next week.
1) R’ Tzadok haKohein, Kedushas Shabbos p.2 d”h vahapashut
2) Baba Basra 10a “chessed l’umim chatas”
3) Baba Basra 4a “Daniel lama ne’enash”
4) Pesachim 8b, Tosfos d”h “sheyizkeh”
5) Michtav m’Eliyahu I p.291 (lishma)
6) Parashas Derachim, Derush 18, esp the Midrash in the opening
7) Yechezkel 16:49 “Hinei zeh haya avon S’dom achoseich…v’yad ani v’evyon lo hechzika”
8) Chiddushi haRan Sanhedrin 56b (note the proof from S’dom)
9) Sanhedrin 104b
Question: does giving a lot of charity make you a “ba’al chessed”, or is someone who is a “ba’al chessed” motivated to give a lot of charity? What comes first – chicken or the egg?

was avraham a yisrael or a ben noach?

Was Avraham a Yisrael or a ben Noach? Before you get to essays in the Parashas Derachim (who made the question famous) and fancy questions of whether Avraham kept Shabbos (mitzvah on a yisrael, but assur for a ben Noach), take a look at this Rashi in Avodah Zarah daf 3a d”h Nimrod, my rough translation: “Nimrod threw Avraham Avinu in Ur Kasdim because Avraham refused to accept the worship of idolotry which is prohibited to a ben Noach. Avraham was a ben Noach, for he was not present at mattan Torah…”

Sarah's laughter

After hearing the blessing/promise (see meforshim) of the visitor/angels that she would have a son, Sarah Imeinu cannot restrain herself from laughter, albeit “b’kirba”, in the depths her heart. Nonetheless, Hashem immediately rebukes her for having the slightest doubt that such a promise or prophecy could come true. Yet, in last weeks’ parsha we read that Avraham also laughed when he was told that he would have a son, and surprisingly he receives no rebuke. Why the difference? The classical approach (Rashi) is to distinguish different types of laughter – the laughter of Avraham was one of joy, the laughter of Sarah was one of doubt. The Meshech Choma offers a brilliant insight based on a Rambam we discussed in the past. The Rambam writes in Into to Peirush haMishna that what Hashem privately promises a Navi may not be fulfilled – it is subject to terms and conditions, such as the Navi being required to remain at a high level of tzikdus, e.g. although Hashem promised to protect Ya'akov, Ya’akov was fearful of encountering Eisav because he thought his sins would negate the promise. Yet, continues the Rambam, nevuah, words that a prophet is instructed to publicly proclaim, are guaranteed to come to fruition (see Rambam Yesodei HaTorah ch 10 that a Navi can be tested by seeing whether his words are fulfilled). When Avraham heard the private promise told to him that he would have children, he laughed as he could not conceive of his being worthy of such a zechus coming to fruition. However, Sarah heard the promise of children uttered by a Navi – Avraham was told to change her name to Sarah (17:15-16) and tell her she would have a son. A promise proclaimed by a Navi is unconditionally guaranteed. Therefore, Sarah’s laughter was inappropriate.
(See Maharal, Gevuros Hashem ch 7 for more on this yesod fo the Rambam)

Highlights - chaburah in R' Tzadok haKohein

The Ishbitza asks why Avraham did not perform the mitzvah of milah before it was given, considering that he observed all other mitzvos? The Ishbitza writes (see here for other approaches) that the mitzvah of milah was a chiddush, as our a priori perspective is that a perfect G-d should create perfectly formed creations – it smacks of chutzpa to suggest that G-d created mankind with a ‘defect’ of orlah. Therefore, Avraham waited for the tzivuy of Hashem. As we learned in the past, the Ishbitza sees man as placed in an existential state of “incompleteness” so that he can earn schar though his own efforts; the tzivuy of milah underscores this mission. Continuing that theme, we have been learning in R’ Tzadok that this concept of perfecting the world is the role of tzelem Elokim and can be accomplished through derech eretz, e.g. farming, physical work, or through learning Torah, which is the ideal. Just as G-d created the world through speech, through speech of Torah one emulates G-d and impacts the world. R’ Tzadok elsewhere (Tzidkas haTzadik #90) elaborates: the physical world, the nefashos of klal Yisrael, and the Torah are mapped directly to each other. The change in the nefashos of each dor causes a change in the way the chachamim of the generation perceive the Torah, which in turn alters and builds the physical world. A machlokes over whether something is a treifa or not means that for chacham X who paskens treifa the physical reality is such that the animal is a treifa, and for chacham Y who paskens kosher the physical reality is such that the animal is kosher (this is understood if you work with a constructivist theory of truth, not a correspondence theory). The gemara (Avodah Zarah 3) tells us that in the future day of judgment the non Jews will claim that all their constructive works like building bridges and markets was for the sake of Torah. In light of R’ Tzadok, we can understand this claim (see the Brisker Rav al haTorah for a similar analysis) – although the intention of the non Jews was obviously not to benefit Torah, any physical change in the world, be it a new building, an improvement in technology, etc. ultimately stems from a change in the understanding of Torah which directly remaps to a changed, improved physical reality . The non Jewish construction is just a fulfillment of the new map of Torah being expressed on a physical level. With this concept, it becomes very clear how limud haTorah brings about not just a ruchniyus benefits, but is also a building of the world and fulfillment of being tzelem Elokim.
This week: Friday night, 7:45, Tiferes Tzvi Yeshiva Minyan, 26 Columbia Ave, Cedarhurst.

good chinuch does not treat kids like pavlov's dogs

“Skillful teaching involves facilitating the process by which kids come to grapple with complex ideas—and those ideas, as John Dewey has told us, have to emerge organically from the real-life interests and concerns of the kids. "Which is bigger, 5/7 or 9/11?" The correct answer is, "Who cares?" But kids care very much about how fast they are growing. Within that context, the skills necessary to figure it out become interesting to most kids. "What's the difference between a simile and a metaphor?" Same answer; few members of our species would find that distinction intrinsically motivating—but kids are highly interested in writing a story about dinosaurs or how a spaceship carries them away. In the context of a task that matters to students, the specific skills we care about can be taught naturally without sugarcoating, without games, and above all without offering kids little doggie biscuits for doing what we tell them.” (Alfie Kohn)
So how should gemara or chumash be taught? Is it about memorizing a list of unknown words or terms, spitting back concepts on a test, all in the hopes of a pizza party, raffle ticket, or good grade? Or should students be engaged by challenging to think about issues and ideas because they are inherently valuable, interesting, and worth discussing? And how do you create a lesson that does that? More importantly, are the schools that are charging an arm and a leg for tuition striving for the excellent teaching that draws students to think and learn through discovery and curiosity, or do schools settle for enforcing compliance to a rigid curriculum and behavior code that reinforces rote learning of fact with external reward systems like pizza parties and raffles?
Warning: thinking about these questions may cause the desire to rip your hair out of your head when your older kids tell you about their school day.

davening for the donuts

My son came home from school last week and told me that the principal announced in the middle of davening that he bought donuts for all the boys, but he expects them to finish davening nicely so they can earn their reward. My son commented that 1) everyone who started davening well from that point was just davening for the donuts, so what’s the point; 2) the principal was obviously not going to return or throw out boxes of donuts that he already purchased, so why make conditions?
Too bad the principal of the school is not as intelligent as my 7th grade son.

(If you are interested in the abused system of reward by incentive (or as my wife puts it, jumping through hoops to earn the fish), the man to read is Alfie Kohn, author of Punished by Rewards, or see http://www.alfiekohn.org for some interesting articles. I can’t say I’m persuaded by everything he writes, but it is certainly worth considering. He hits the nail right on the head in claiming schools stress short term compliance with expected behaviors over long term inculcation of values - external compliance wins out over internal motivation. Reinforcing good davening with extrinsic rewards gets kids to daven better for the moment, but unless time is taken to build some internal motivation and understanding of davening, why should a kid daven when there is no reward? And if a school run minyan is not the place for that internal value of tefillah to be developed and nurtured, what is?)

mar'is ayin

1) Beitzah 9 – the Mishna records a machlokes Bais Shamai and Bais Hillel whether a ladder can be carried from one bird coup to another. The gemara writes that the issur here is one of mar'is ayin because a ladder is used to repair roofs. Rashi (d”h haro’eh) explains that carrying the ladder gives the appearance that one is violating the issur of working on Yom Tov.
2) Krisus 21 – Even though there is no issur of eating the blood of a fish, the gemara says that it is prohibited to gather the blood in a cup to drink. Rashi (d”h she’kinso) explains that should someone see blood being drunk, he/she will come to the mistaken impression that it is permitted to drink any blood, i.e. even animal blood, which is an issur d’oraysa.
From these two snippits it seems that there are two different reasons for the issur of mar'is ayin: Rashi in Beitzah focusses on the onlooker having the misimpression that the person engaged in some act is violating an issur (see also Rashi d”h kol makom Avodah Zarah 12a “haro’eh choshdo b’dvar aveirah”), while Rashi in Krisus focusses on the onlooker him/herself perhaps being led to err in halacha based on what he/she witnesses. Interesting that the Badei haShulchun (Hilchos basar b’Chalav 87:4 Beiurim d”h Davka) cites these sources, but fails to mention another relevant case from Hilchos Basar b’Chalav:
3) Chulin 107 – One is not permitted to eat meat at the same table as someone eating a dairy meal. The gemara questions whether this would be permitted if the two eaters are ‘makpid’ not to share food with each other. The gemara answers ‘yomru kol hasrikim assurim u’serikei Baysus mutarim?’, an expression borrowed from Pesachim meaning that we do not distinguish between someone like Baysus who is a very fast baker and other people. Explains Rabeinu Gershom: it would not be apparent to an onlooker that the two people eating together are makpid not to share food, which would lead the onlooker to think it is permitted for any two people to eat basar b’chalav together. Rabeinu Gershom’s concern is not that the onlooker might think that the two people eating together are violating an issur, but that the onlooker him/herself will be led to violate an issur based on his/her misunderstanding the situation.
It seems to me that Rashi stressed the need to avoid appearing doing something wrong only where the gemara explicitly uses the phrase mar’is ayin. Perhaps one could argue that there are two types of issurim: a separate independent issur of mar’is ayin, which the sugya in Beitzah and A”Z addresses and which revolves around the doer becoming suspect of violating issurim, and cases like the cup of blood or not eating meat and dairy at the same table, which are just extensions of the larger issurim of dam and basar b’chalav and the issue of misunderstanding is just an explication of why Chazal extended these issurim so broadly.

tzedaka as the root of emunah

Not much time to write today, but a quick mareh makom that is worth thinking about -
V’He’emin b’Hashem, VaYachsiveha lo tzedaka (15:6) – Avraham believed in G-d, and he considered it an act of charity. Who considered what an act of charity? Based on the context of the parsha, which discusses the promise of Eretz Yisrael to Avraham, Rashi explains that G-d considered Avraham’s belief in the promise without asking for proof an act of tzedaka. Ramban disagrees and says that Avraham’s belief without proof was not extra meritorious considering that Avraham was a prophet; rather, the pasuk means that Avraham considered G-d’s promise to give him the Land of Israel an act of tzedaka, charity, that exceeded his merit.
Says the Maggid m’Koznitz:
V’He’emin BaHashem – Avraham believed in G-d;
VaYachshiveha Lo Tzedaka – And he considered this belief, which we think resulted from pondering nature or burning birahs, not a result of intelligence, persistence, insight, his value system, culture, etc., but simply a result of G-d’s tzedaka. There is no a priori reason to think that a finite human being could ever have any intelligence of an invisible, incomprehensible, all powerful being. G-d's perhaps greatest charity is creating us with the ability to believe in Him.
Short vort, but a powerful idea - maybe more on it another time. Good Shabbos!

the institution of ba'al korei

People who brought bikkurim were often ignorant and unable to read the parsha of arami oveid avi themselves, so they avoided performing the mitzvah. The Chachamim at first instituted reading the parsha for those who could not do so themselves, but people still avoided the mitzvah out of embarrassment. Therefore, the Mishna at the end of Bikkurim tells us that the Chachamim instituted that the parsha be read for everyone. Rabeinu Tam writes that this practice of reading the parsha for someone who cannot do so is the same function performed by the ba’al koreh who leins on Shabbos. The Rosh (Megillah perek 3) disagrees with this comparison. By the case of bikkurim, Chazal had to institute a ba’al koreh otherwise people would not perform the mitzvah d’oraysa of bringing bikkurim. When it comes to getting an aliya on Shabbos, there is no mitzvah to get an aliya – argues the Rosh, let those who can read be called up and those who can’t simply not be oleh! Therefore, concludes the Rosh, the oleh should only be someone capable of reading, and the oleh should in fact read along with the ba’al koreh to properly fulfill the mitzvah.
Why according to the Rosh does it seem like the institution of ba’al koreh is only a b’dieved? Just as someone can recite kiddush to be motzi someone else who may or may not be able to read, or someone can recite a bracha and listen to someone else’s tekiyas shofar even if he does not know how to blow tekiyos (assuming the mitzvah is blowing tekiyos), why does it not follow that someone can say a bracha and listen to someone else lein the parsha on his behalf? Floor is open for comments….

Highlights - chaburah in R' Tzadok haKohein

Last week we explained that humans are created unaware of G-d’s infinite presence so that they can earn schar by using bechira to independently come to a recognition of G-d. Humans are created b’tzelem Elokim, which R’ Tzadok interprets as humans possessing the creative capacity to change the world. This week we discussed the enigmatic gemara (Sanhedrim 99) which darshens the pasuk “adam l’amal yulad”. What type of ameilus are humans charged with? - the gemara debates whether it is ameilus of work or speech, and after concluding it is ameilus of speech debates whether it is speech of sicha or Talmud Torah, concluding it is the latter. Why is ameilus so critical to mankind’s existence? “Adam rotzeh b’kav shelo yoseir m’tisha kabin shel chaveiro”, a person desires one portion of his own more than nine portions of his fellow (Bava Kamma 38). Rashi explains that the one's own portion provides more pleasure because it has been earned through ameilus. Ameilus thus is the key to fulfiiling humankind's mission of earning schar and removing the stigma of nahama d’kisufa (see Michtav m’Eliyahu III:13). Anu ameilim u’mekablom schar – it is precisely because we engage in ameilus, which creates this sense of ownership, that our reward is called schar and not nahama d’kisufa. The debate of the gemara in Sanhedrin seen in this light is a debate over the mechanism by which mankind expresses the creative energy of being tzelem Elokim and acheiving this goal. Does our independence express itself only in the way we physically transform the world, or is its ultimate expression when we engage in Talmud Torah? We saw a distinction (see Sefas Emes 5640) between the attitude of the generations leading to Noach, who focussed on engaging in the physical building of the world, and the approach of Avraham Avinu, whose focus became ameilus in Torah.
For those who can attend the chaburah, we will IY”H this week finish discussing the significance of ameilus b’torah in this light, and discuss how Torah itself has a transformative effect even on the physical world. For a sneak preview, see the Ishbitza’s (vol 2) answer to the famous question of why Avraham did not perform milah before receiving the mitzvah. NEW TIME: Friday, 8:00, Tiferes Tzvi Yeshiva Minyan, 26 Columbia Ave. in Cedarhurst.