Asked about the slow pace of approval, the IRS auditor on the case, Diane Gentry, said the application was taking so long because auditors were supposed to give special scrutiny to groups "connected with Israel." Ms. Marcus says Ms. Gentry further explained that many applications related to Israel had to be sent to "a special unit in D.C. to determine whether the organization's activities contradict the Administration's public policies."Sadly, this will only be seen as a positive by the vast majority of our brothers and sisters who will continue to vote Democat and thank Washington for reining in the "extremists" among us. I could write about this stuff day in and day out, but it's a bracha l'vatala.
Wednesday, May 29, 2013
targets
The Wall Street Journal headline wonders, "Did the tax agency [the IRS] also target groups that support Israel?" In one case:
why didn't Hashem warn Moshe that sending spies was a bad idea?
Rambam, Hil Rotzei'ach 12:14
וכן כל המכשיל עור בדבר והשיאו עצה שאינה הוגנת או שחיזק ידי עוברי עבירה שהוא עור ואינו רואה דרך האמת מפני תאות לבו הרי זה עובר בלא תעשה שנאמר ולפני עור לא תתן מכשול הבא ליטול ממך עצה תן לו עצה ההוגנת לו:
Rambam, Hil Rotzei'ach 1:14
כל היכול להציל ולא הציל עובר על לא תעמוד על דם רעך. וכן הרואה את חבירו טובע בים. או ליסטים באים עליו. או חיה רעה באה עליו. ויכול להצילו הוא בעצמו. או ששכר אחרים להצילו ולא הציל. או ששמע עובדי כוכבים או מוסרים מחשבים עליו רעה או טומנין לו פח ולא גלה אוזן חבירו והודיעו. או שידע בעובד כוכבים או באונס שהוא בא על חבירו ויכול לפייסו בגלל חבירו להסיר מה שבלבו ולא פייסו וכל כיוצא בדברים אלו. העושה אותם עובר על לא תעמוד על דם רעך:
There is an issur of standing by idly and watching your friend come to harm. There is an issur of providing bad advice and of abetting someone who is on the wrong path. So how is it, asks R' Noson Gestetner (link), that Hashem allowed Moshe to send spies into Eretz Yisrael? Hashem surely knew that no good would come from the mission, so shouldn't he have warned Moshe that it was a bad idea and would lead to harm?
I'm struggling to understand the question. If Hashem were to intervene in that way, would it not rob us of our free will?
Perhaps this case is different because Moshe directly asked Hashem whether he should send the spies; however, R' Gestetner does not mention that factor as being crucial in formulating the question, and if indeed there was a moral obligation to save Moshe from harm like the moral obligation to save a drowning person, what difference does it make if he asked or didn't ask? Even if the person drowining doesn't cry out for help (or can't cry out for help), that doesn't absolve you of the obligation to save him.
Perhaps you could argue that Hashem has already given us all the clues we need to make the right decisions; it's our own shortcoming if we can't follow directions. However, Moshe had no way to determine whether sending spies was the correct course of action or not, so Hashem should have intervened. I don't buy this distinction. The fact that someone should have learned how to swim better doesn't absolve you of the obligation to jump in and save him if he is drowning. Secondly, there are plenty of decisions where people are at a loss of what to do and they even daven for Hashem and ask for help -- according to R' Gestetner's reasoning, where are the answers?
וכן כל המכשיל עור בדבר והשיאו עצה שאינה הוגנת או שחיזק ידי עוברי עבירה שהוא עור ואינו רואה דרך האמת מפני תאות לבו הרי זה עובר בלא תעשה שנאמר ולפני עור לא תתן מכשול הבא ליטול ממך עצה תן לו עצה ההוגנת לו:
Rambam, Hil Rotzei'ach 1:14
כל היכול להציל ולא הציל עובר על לא תעמוד על דם רעך. וכן הרואה את חבירו טובע בים. או ליסטים באים עליו. או חיה רעה באה עליו. ויכול להצילו הוא בעצמו. או ששכר אחרים להצילו ולא הציל. או ששמע עובדי כוכבים או מוסרים מחשבים עליו רעה או טומנין לו פח ולא גלה אוזן חבירו והודיעו. או שידע בעובד כוכבים או באונס שהוא בא על חבירו ויכול לפייסו בגלל חבירו להסיר מה שבלבו ולא פייסו וכל כיוצא בדברים אלו. העושה אותם עובר על לא תעמוד על דם רעך:
There is an issur of standing by idly and watching your friend come to harm. There is an issur of providing bad advice and of abetting someone who is on the wrong path. So how is it, asks R' Noson Gestetner (link), that Hashem allowed Moshe to send spies into Eretz Yisrael? Hashem surely knew that no good would come from the mission, so shouldn't he have warned Moshe that it was a bad idea and would lead to harm?
I'm struggling to understand the question. If Hashem were to intervene in that way, would it not rob us of our free will?
Perhaps this case is different because Moshe directly asked Hashem whether he should send the spies; however, R' Gestetner does not mention that factor as being crucial in formulating the question, and if indeed there was a moral obligation to save Moshe from harm like the moral obligation to save a drowning person, what difference does it make if he asked or didn't ask? Even if the person drowining doesn't cry out for help (or can't cry out for help), that doesn't absolve you of the obligation to save him.
Perhaps you could argue that Hashem has already given us all the clues we need to make the right decisions; it's our own shortcoming if we can't follow directions. However, Moshe had no way to determine whether sending spies was the correct course of action or not, so Hashem should have intervened. I don't buy this distinction. The fact that someone should have learned how to swim better doesn't absolve you of the obligation to jump in and save him if he is drowning. Secondly, there are plenty of decisions where people are at a loss of what to do and they even daven for Hashem and ask for help -- according to R' Gestetner's reasoning, where are the answers?
Friday, May 24, 2013
seeing in the dark
א"ר חנינא אמר הקדוש ברוך הוא עינים שיש בך יש בתוכן לבן ושחור ואין אתה רואה מתוך
הלבן אלא מתוך השחור ומה אם עיניך שיש בתוכן שחור ולבן אין אתה רואה אלא מתוך השחור
הקב"ה שכולו אורה הוא צריך לאורה שלכם
We expect that we will see Hashem from the lavan, the white and bright parts of life, the areas we put our kochos into, and I am speaking even of avodas Hashem. However, writes the Sifsei Tzadik, the truth is that we see best from the shachor, from the amidst the darkness. That's where we will experience growth and closeness to Hashem. Hashem doesn't need our ohr; he can find us amidst the darkness as well.
A few weeks ago by Lag b'Omer I mentioned the yesod of the Ch. haRI"M that there is a nekudas chein that every Jew has in G-d's eyes. Whatever you think that nekudah is, you are guaranteed to have it wrong, as "ha'adam yireh l'ynayim v'Hashem yireh l'leivav," so whatever we see, Hashem is looking at something even deeper.
When Bnei Yisrael start complaining in our parsha, Moshe grows angry and then he turns to Hashem and asks, "Lamah lo matzasi chein b'einecha..." (11:11 - easy to remember). What Moshe was asking was why it is that he not able to also see that nekudas chein which Hashem can see with his eyes.
We expect that we will see Hashem from the lavan, the white and bright parts of life, the areas we put our kochos into, and I am speaking even of avodas Hashem. However, writes the Sifsei Tzadik, the truth is that we see best from the shachor, from the amidst the darkness. That's where we will experience growth and closeness to Hashem. Hashem doesn't need our ohr; he can find us amidst the darkness as well.
A few weeks ago by Lag b'Omer I mentioned the yesod of the Ch. haRI"M that there is a nekudas chein that every Jew has in G-d's eyes. Whatever you think that nekudah is, you are guaranteed to have it wrong, as "ha'adam yireh l'ynayim v'Hashem yireh l'leivav," so whatever we see, Hashem is looking at something even deeper.
When Bnei Yisrael start complaining in our parsha, Moshe grows angry and then he turns to Hashem and asks, "Lamah lo matzasi chein b'einecha..." (11:11 - easy to remember). What Moshe was asking was why it is that he not able to also see that nekudas chein which Hashem can see with his eyes.
Thursday, May 23, 2013
ger she'nisgayeir k'katan she'nolad
The gemara (Zevachim 101b) raises the question of who could
examine Miriam’s tzara’as. Moshe? Can’t be, says the gemara, because Moshe was
not a kohen. Aharon? Also can’t be, says the gemara, because
Aharon is a relative and you can’t pasken on this issue for a relative. The only choice left is Hashem.
Secondly, t he Chasam Sofer in his chiddushim and al haTorah (in last
week’s parsha) writes that his whole life he wondered what the makor for this
din of ger she’nisgayei k’katan shenolad is.
The Meshech Chocha in Parshas VaEschanan has an answer. Bnei Yisrael were told to separate from their
wives in preparation for mattan Torah. Immediately
afterward, Hashem commanded, “Shuvo lachem l’ohaleichem,” allowing them to
return to their previous marriages. Says the Meshech
Chochma: what would happen if someone was married to a woman who is an ervah by
Torah law but was permitted to a ben Noach?
How could this person return to his wife who is now an issur arayos to
him? It must be, says the Meshech
Chochma, that the heter of “shuvo lachem l’ohaleichem” is mechadesh that ger
she’nisgayeir k’katan shenolad and therefore issues of arayos are moot.
Question: why did the gemara exclude Moshe because he is not
a kohen, forcing the gemara to pose the question with respect to Aharon and
then come up with a new answer – why not exclude Moshe on the basis of his being a
relative, and m’meila we wouldn’t even have to raise the question about
Aharon because the same reason obviously would apply? Why not kill two birds with one
stone if you can?
We once mentioned (link - see hesber there) the chiddush of the Maharal (quoted by the
Shev Shmaytza in his intro) that the principle of ger she’nisgayeir k’katan she’nolad
does not apply to a forced geirus, which includes the geirus of mattan Torah
since kafah aleihem har k’gigis. This is
why in our parsha Bnei Yisrael were crying (as interpreted by Chazal) over the
arayos that became prohibited. Even
though m’doraysa a ger has fewer issurei
arayos, as he is like a newborn severed from all his part familial
relationships, this din did not apply to the geirus of mattan Torah.
Based on this, the Kotzker (see R’ Wahrman’s She’eiris
Yosef here) suggests a brilliant explanation of the gemara in Zevachim. Aharon had Sinai held over his head
– he was part of the forced geirus of mattan Torah. The rule of ger she'nisgayei k'katan she'nolad did not apply to him, and therefore his relationship with Miriam was not severed. Moshe, however,
was on the mountain – his geirus was not forced. The din of l'katan she'nolad would apply in his case, and therefore the gemara needed to offer an
alternate explanation as to why he could not treat Miriam’s tza’ra’as.
Two other points worth noting:
What’s the hesber for this chiddush of the Maharal? The Kli Chemdah in Parshas VaYigash explains that
the concept of geirus means divorcing oneself from one’s previous allegiance to
nation and family and joining a new people. Conceptually, it makes no sense when applied to geirus en masse of the Jewish people. We did not leave some other nation to become
Klal Yisrael at mattan Torah; we were and always will be the Jewish nation. We simply affirmed our identity and
relationship to the Avos. According to
this approach, it is not the element of coercion which negated the din of ger
she’nisgayeir k'katan she'nolad at mattan Torah; it’s the fact that the experience of mattan
Torah was unique in occurring to the Jewish people.
This same logic would apply to Moshe Rabeinu as well.
If the Maharal is right that the din of ger
shenisgayeir k’katan she'nolad did not apply by mattan Torah, then the Meshech Chochma’s proof
does not hold water.
a protest without a plan
Some people are good with just rolling with the punches; I
prefer to at least have some idea of a plan before running with an idea. You can read this post as a criticism if you
like, but I prefer to say I simply don’t understand what the present chareidi
leadership in Israel is thinking. Let us
imagine for a moment that the chilonim were all gone and out of the equation –
that Israel was a theocracy, with the chareidi leadership in full control. Could such a state succeed? How would it defend itself when the entire
population claims exemption from army duty?
How would the economy function when the vast majority of the population requires
government assistance to survive? How
would there be doctors, accountants, engineers, etc. if all secular studies are
off-limits? In short, what’s the
plan?
Simply protesting any change to the status quo is not an answer. The status quo is untenable and unsustainable. If we are being called upon to listen to da'as Torah, then da'as Torah must articulate a vision of how a society can be built and function given the constraints chareidi leaders are imposing.
R’ Moshe Shternbruch spoke recently (link) at a protest and posed the following question: “The authorities today are not threatening to draft the Arabs or scheming against them. What is the difference between the chareidim and the Arabs? Legally speaking, their status is identical: both groups are citizens who are not drafted.” B’mechilas kvodo, the Rosh Yeshiva may be correct as far as the legal argument goes, but it is incredible to me that he does not see the moral distinction. Our obligations to the State do not stem from legal status, but rather stem from the chiyuvim of yishuv ha’aretz, of ahavas yisrael and living in harmony with our brethren (secular and religious), of fighting milchemes mitzvah. How can one dream of comparing the loyalty and love a Jew should feel toward the State to that which an Arab feels?
Simply protesting any change to the status quo is not an answer. The status quo is untenable and unsustainable. If we are being called upon to listen to da'as Torah, then da'as Torah must articulate a vision of how a society can be built and function given the constraints chareidi leaders are imposing.
R’ Moshe Shternbruch spoke recently (link) at a protest and posed the following question: “The authorities today are not threatening to draft the Arabs or scheming against them. What is the difference between the chareidim and the Arabs? Legally speaking, their status is identical: both groups are citizens who are not drafted.” B’mechilas kvodo, the Rosh Yeshiva may be correct as far as the legal argument goes, but it is incredible to me that he does not see the moral distinction. Our obligations to the State do not stem from legal status, but rather stem from the chiyuvim of yishuv ha’aretz, of ahavas yisrael and living in harmony with our brethren (secular and religious), of fighting milchemes mitzvah. How can one dream of comparing the loyalty and love a Jew should feel toward the State to that which an Arab feels?
I cringe when I see the word “shmad” applied to the Jewish
state. That word should have no place in
our internal debates. Disagree with
everything the government does, but I don't see how you can compare asking for a few
years of service in Tzahal with the forced conscriptions into Czarist armies
that our people suffered a hundred years ago.
Yet, R’ Shternbruch goes even a step further and quotes the Brisker Rav as
saying (and I even hate to write this!), “…the Zionists were worse than the SS.” Yes, I have taken the words out of context,
but b’mechilas kvodam, and afar anochi tachas raglam, but I simply cannot
fathom any context in which those words can be justified.
The whole situation is a sad mess.
Wednesday, May 22, 2013
two quick points on the mitzvah of aliya la'regel and the mitzvah of viduy
Over Shavuos I dabbled a bit in the Sefer haMitzvot of the
Rambam, which Rav Kook recommended learning on leil Shavuos. Two quick observations:
1) In mitzvas aseh 52, the Rambam writes that, “This commandment is that each man, together with each male child capable of walking on his own, must travel to the Temple…” (translation taken from the Chabad website). The Rambam in S”hM usually seems to give just a bare bones formulation of each mitzvah. Why then would he include here that “each male child” must be brought on aliya la’regel? That's just a din in chinuch, not part of the mitzvah d’oraysa of aliya laregel (see Rashi Chagiga 2a d”h eizehu katan)?
2) In mitzvas aseh 73, the mitzvah of viduy, which we read in last week’s parsha, after proving that viduy must be said even outside the context of bringing a korban, the Rambam quotes another derasha from Chazal: “We still only know of the obligation of vidui in Israel. How do we know it applies even in exile? This we learn from what Daniel said, 'They will then recite vidui for their sins and the sins of their fathers,' and from the verse, 'To You, G‑d, there is charity, and to us there is shame' " (again, translationfrom Chabad). This is a very interesting hava amina. The mitzvah of viduy is a mitzvah sheb’gufo. Why would we even entertain the thought that it applies only in Eretz Yisrael? (Were the mitzvah to do teshuvah, I would say it by definition it entails coming closer to Hashem, and that can only fully be achieved in Eretz Yisrael. But the Rambam formulates the mitzvah as viduy – not teshuvah – and so I think that argument is a little harder to make.)
1) In mitzvas aseh 52, the Rambam writes that, “This commandment is that each man, together with each male child capable of walking on his own, must travel to the Temple…” (translation taken from the Chabad website). The Rambam in S”hM usually seems to give just a bare bones formulation of each mitzvah. Why then would he include here that “each male child” must be brought on aliya la’regel? That's just a din in chinuch, not part of the mitzvah d’oraysa of aliya laregel (see Rashi Chagiga 2a d”h eizehu katan)?
2) In mitzvas aseh 73, the mitzvah of viduy, which we read in last week’s parsha, after proving that viduy must be said even outside the context of bringing a korban, the Rambam quotes another derasha from Chazal: “We still only know of the obligation of vidui in Israel. How do we know it applies even in exile? This we learn from what Daniel said, 'They will then recite vidui for their sins and the sins of their fathers,' and from the verse, 'To You, G‑d, there is charity, and to us there is shame' " (again, translationfrom Chabad). This is a very interesting hava amina. The mitzvah of viduy is a mitzvah sheb’gufo. Why would we even entertain the thought that it applies only in Eretz Yisrael? (Were the mitzvah to do teshuvah, I would say it by definition it entails coming closer to Hashem, and that can only fully be achieved in Eretz Yisrael. But the Rambam formulates the mitzvah as viduy – not teshuvah – and so I think that argument is a little harder to make.)
Tuesday, May 21, 2013
givers and takers
Rashi explains the smichus haparshiyos between the parsha of
bringing matnos kahuna and the parsha of sota (Bamidbar 5) as a warning that if
you withhold from the kohen his due, then you will end up having to come to the
kohen to deal with the tragic circumstance of sota.
If the idea is a midah k’neged midah, that failing to come
to the kohen for the positive end of bringing matnos kahuna will lead to coming
to the kohen for some negative consequence, then why illustrate the point specifically
with the parsha of sota? Why not the
parsha of metzora, which was a severe punishment that required the intervention
of the kohen? The Shem m’Shmuel’s answer
should be required reading for all married folks and those who plan to be
married.
Life is filled with transactions between givers and takers,
mashpi’a and mekabel, tzurah imposing itself on chomer. It’s usually very easy to spot which side of
the equation is which. Not so when it
comes to matnos kahuna. Even though the
farmer must surrender part of his crop to the kohen or levi, it is the kohen
who is the mashpi’a, the tzurah. The
farmer receives far more from the relationship than what he gives up in
material goods.
If someone doesn’t get the message and thinks that relationships
are only measured by tangible net gain/ loss, if a person thinks he gets
nothing in return for what he gives to the kohen and therefore keeps his matnos
kehuna, then he will inevitably have a shalom bayis / sota problem to deal
with. A husband who, for example, brings
home a bouquet of flowers, is not the mashpi’a – he is the mekabeil, because he
will receive the benefit of an improved relationship with his spouse that will
help be mashlim him as a person. The
return is far more valuable than the few dollars invested in the roses that are
gone a week later.
Monday, May 20, 2013
week of tashlumin for korbanos of Shavuos
The gemara (Rosh Hashana 6) records that Rav Papayus offered
a cow as a korban shelamim on Pesach and then offered it’s calf as a shelamim on
Sukkos. The gemara wrestles with the
question of why Rav Papayus delayed so long – why didn’t he bring the calf as a
korban on Shavuos, the first opportunity for aliya l’aregel after Pesach? Isn’t there a mitzvah to not delay bringing a
korban?
The Turei Even wonders why the gemara did not entertain the
possibility that Rav Papayus was talking about a year in which Shavuos fell on
Shabbos. Since the Yom Tov of Shavuos is
only one day, and it would have been impossible to offer a voluntary korban offering
on that one day if it fell on Shabbos, that would cancel any penalty for delaying. You can’t be liable for bal t’acher if there is an issur of bringing the
korban!
The Turei Even answers that since with respect to korbanos
there is tashlumin for seven days, i.e. if someone did not bring
their olas re’iya on Shavuos, they still get a week to make it up, viz a viz
voluntary korbanos as well, the entire week, not just the first day, counts as
being part of the regel.
R’ Wahrman in his She’eris Yosef (vol 2) points out that the
shakla v’terya of the Turei Even raises a fundamental question about the nature
of tashlumin: is tashlumin an opportunity to bring korbanos ha’chag once the
chag has passed, or is tashlumin an indication that to some degree the cheftza
of Yom Tov, the kedushas ha’chag, lingers and has not passed, even though there
is no issur melacha?
If the chag is over, then then bal t’acher should not apply
to korbanos which could not be brought on the first day. But if tashlumin is an extension of Yom Tov,
then even if one could not bring korbanos nedava on the first day, one would be
liable for bal t’acher for failing to do so on the remaining tashlumin days, as it still counts as if one had the opportunity to bring the korban on Y"T.
This question may be behind the different minhagin as to
whether tachanun is said in the week after Shavuos. If the chag is over and tashlumin is just a
korbanos make-up opportunity, then tachanun should be said. If tashlumin means the chag itself continues,
then it would seem that there is more license to omit tachanun.
Friday, May 17, 2013
what the nazir can teach us about celebrating isru chag
Why does the nazir bring a korban chatas when he completes
his nezirus?
Ramban answers that a korban chatas is required because the nazir’s
return to everyday life is a step down from the spiritual heights he reached
during his nezirus. A return to the
everyday world is a surrender to the drives and desires that the nazir avoided
while in his higher spiritual state of nezirus.
Rabeinu Bachyei disagrees.
We never find, he writes, a korban chatas offered for future sins that
have not yet been committed; a chatas is only brought after one has already
sinned. When the nazir steps back into the
mundane everyday routine that may include drinking wine, taking a haircut,
etc., he has not yet done anything wrong.
The korbanos of the nazir, explains R’ Bachyei, are not
brought because of any sin (he does not say it explicitly, but it seems that
this chatas is an exception to the norm because it is brought together with the
olah and shelamim). The root of the word
korban is k-r-v, to draw closer; the
purpose of the nazir’s korbanos is to draw him closer to the source of his spiritual
energy, to give him a final boost that he can carry into his regular day to day. “V’achar yishteh ha’nazir ya’yin” – the Torah
ends the parsha by telling us that the nazir should return to his everyday life
of the past. The purpose of nezirus is
not to escape from the mundane world, but to learn how to live in it properly.
Hopefully your Shavuos was celebrated with intense immersion
in talmud torah and kabbalas haTorah, and so it’s only natural to feel a bit
letdown on isru chag. Rabeinu Bachyei’s
perspective reminds us that islands of spirituality are not meant as an oasis
of temporary escape from the day to day, a momentary high from which we must fall, but are meant to
give us the spiritual vitamins we need so our day to day becomes infused with that spiritual intensity and energy as well.
Tuesday, May 14, 2013
amoni v'lo amonis and the definition of modesty
The gemara (Chagiga 4b) writes that when Shmuel was raised from
the grave by Shaul, he thought he was facing din in shamayim and so he brought
Moshe Rabeinu wih him to testify on his behalf.
Moshe did not know every detail of Shmuel’s life, but, says Tosfos (d”h
d’leika), Shmuel wanted was Moshe’s confirmation that his derasha from pesukim
and his actions on that basis were justified.
If I were giving a women’s shiur this chag, this issue would
be a tempting choice to speak about. The
nation of Amon is excluded from intermarrying with Bnei Yisrael for failing to
extend food and drink to Bnei Yisrael when they passed through their territory. Doeg ha’Adomi argued that this
criticism applied equally to the men of Amon as well as the women and both
should be barred. The gemara (76b) asks:
but women normally do not go out to greet strange men – tzniyus!? The gemara answers that the
Amonite men could have gone to greet the men of Bnei Yisrael and the Amonite
women could have gone out to the women.
We could have put up a big mechitza!
If the women failed to go out, argued Doeg, they are equally to blame.
What derasha is Tosfos referring to? The Sefas Emes explained that we see from the
sugya in Yevamos 76-77 that there was tremendous debate whether David haMelech could
be appointed king or whether the fact that he was a descendent of Rus, an
Amonis, disqualified him. It was testimony
that the beis din of Shmuel had ruled that only Amoni, males of the nation of Amon, but not Amonis, females of that
nation, were disqualified, that settled the issue. As a
result of that ruling Shaul eventually lost the kingship and David was
appointed in his place. Shmuel haNavi
wanted confirmation that he was correct in making that derasha and acting to support David.
(According to this interpretation, the halacha of “Amoni – v’lo
Amonis” is based on a derasha. The
Brisker Rav reads the conclusion of the sugya that the din was a halacha l’Moshe
m’Sinai. Something to discuss another time maybe).
This question was the show stopper that would have disqualified
David haMelech if not for the fact that someone remembered that Shmuel’s beis
din had already paskened the issue otherwise.
However you understand why Shmuel’s beis din was the final word in the
matter (halacha l’Moshe m’Simai or an irrefutable derasha), the gemara grants
the point. But what of Doeg’s tremendous
kashe – how do you respond to his argument?
The gemara answers: “Kol kvuda bas melech pnima.”
One way to read the gemara’s conclusion is that mechitza or
no mechitza, it’s still unreasonable to expect women to go out and greet strangers. If this is correct, the whole shakla v'terya can be reduced to simply a matter of metziyus, a debate about the facts on the ground:
is the expectation that the Amonite women should go out and bring food to their
Israelite sisters reasonable or not? Originally
the gemara thought Doeg had a great kashe and the expectation was not
unreasonable, kah mashma lan that it was.
I prefer to avoid making a debate about an issue of metziyus. Instead, I think the gemara’s shakla v’terya gets
to the root of what modesty is all about.
There are two elements to modesty: 1) avoiding promiscuous behavior,
especially intermingling of the sexes; 2) behaving with restraint and
reserve. The Midrash
(BaMidbar
Rabbah
1:3) tells us that before there was an Ohel Moed, G-d spoke to Moshe from a burning
bush in Midyan,
G-d spoke to Moshe in Egypt, G-d spoke to Moshe from Har Sinai.
However, now that there was an Ohel Moed G-d spoke only privately from that
tent to fulfill the ideal of "hatzne’ah
leches". Obviously we
are not speaking about the intermingling of the sexes here. When the Midrash speaks of hatzne’ah leches,
it means comportment, a certain type of behavior, a “madreiga pnimis,” as the
Maharal describes it. See this post for more. So often we get caught up in issues of skirt and sleeve length that we forget all about this very important second element.
Doeg thought that given the need to do chessed, it is enough
if the Amonite women were sensitive to that first element of modesty, avoiding intermingling of the sexes, but they
should have put aside that second element in order to help Bnei Yisrael. So long as that mechitza was in place, there was no excuse for their
inaction. The gemara in the end
rebuts this argument. “Kol kvudah bas
melech pnima” means that this second aspect of modesty, modesty of character,
is primary. If the Amonite women chose
to modestly stay indoors rather than go out and greet strangers, their behavior
cannot be condemned, even if it meant the sacrifice of an opportunity to do
chessed.
Perhaps this gemara alerts us to another possible reason for
the reading of Megilas Rus on Shavuos. Chazal
(see Rashi Shmos 34:3) tell us the fanfare and public spectacle involved in the
giving of the first luchos led to their being shattered, which teaches us “ain
lecha yafah min ha’tzeniyus,” there is nothing nicer than modesty. On the first day of Shavuos we relive the
lightning and thunder of Sinai, the public display of awesomeness. The second day of Shavuos reminds us that as
great as that experience was, there is yet a greater value – the value of modesty.
vayichan yisrael -- what's even better than finding chein in each other's eyes?
Rashi famously comments that the pasuk “VaYichan sham
Yisrael neged ha’ar…” uses the singular tense because Klal Yisrael was united “k’ish
echad b’lev echad,” like one person with one heart in preparation for kabbalas
haTorah. R’ Yitzchok of Vorke explained the
word “vayichan” comes from the word “chein.”
If every person can see the chein in his or her neighbor, then we can be
united as ish echad b’lev echad.
Beautiful vort, right?
But the Shem m’Shmuel (5762) is not satisfied. Sure, it’s easy to get along with your
neighbor if you see their chein. The
trick, though, is to get along with your neighbor even when you don’t see that
chein, even when you disagree and don’t see eye to eye. This is the level that Bnei Yisrael rose to
at mattan Torah. The Shem m’Shmuel gets
this from Chazal’s statement that “Moshe hosif yom echad m’da’ato,” Moshe used
his “da’as” and added an extra day to the waiting period before mattan
Torah. Here’s how:
The word “da’as” seems to have two opposite meanings. On the one hand, da’as means to connect on
the deepest level, like the connection between a husband and wife, “V’ha’adam
yada es Chavah ishto…” On the other
hand, da’as refers to the ability to discriminate and distinguish. The Yerushalmi writes that we say havdalah in
the bracha of “chonein hada’as” because without da’as there would be no
havdalah, we could not draw distinctions.
The truth is that there is no contradiction between the meanings;
they supplement each other. No matter
who it is, if you look at every detail of a person, there is going to be
something there you don’t like. The
person is great, but they like chocolate ice cream and everyone knows vanilla
is better, or vica versa. That person is
a great ba’al chessed, but wears an ugly tie.
We can all come up with a million examples. How can you ever have the da’as of connection
and companionship if everyone is flawed in some way? Answer: by having the da’as of distinction, knowing
how to put to the side those nitpicky details and focus on the good that there
is.
I put it in language that we can relate to; the Shem m’Shmuel
says it a little deeper. The bad taste
in ice cream, the ugly ties, etc. – all these are superficial details. If you dig into the core of a person, you are
going to find a G-dly neshoma, and what’s not to like and be able to connect to
about that? If we want the da’as of
connection, we need da’as to discriminate between the pnimiyus, the G-dly core,
and all the other chitzoniyus that we see on the outside.
“Moshe hosif yom echad m’da’ato” – Moshe introduced this
factor of da’as into the process of mattan Torah. K’ish echad b’lev echad means that Klal
Yisrael dug into the pnimiyus of who they were and what their mission was, and
through that, they realized that all the differences really don’t
matter at the end of the day, they are just superficial distractions.
Anochi Hashem Elokecha -- even if only one individual gets the message
Rashi explains that the first of the Aseres Hadibros, “Anochi
Hashem Elokecha…,” is written in the singular, as if Hashem was speaking only
to Moshe, so that Moshe would have an argument in Bnei Yisrael’s defense when
they sinned in the cheit ha’eigel and be able to claim the command was given
only to him.
Of course the mitzvah of “Anochi Hashem Elokecha…” was given
to all of Klal Yisrael. What Rashi
means, explains the Sefas Emes, is that the singular tense is used to show that
even if an entire generation has sinned, so long as there is even one
individual who does what’s right, Torah still has meaning.
Monday, May 13, 2013
kabbalas haTorah as a mechapeir
An amazing Yerushalmi (Rosh haShana 4:8): By all the korbanos of the chagim it says "se'ir izim echad l'chatas," except for Shavuos, where there is no mention of cheit -- it just says "se'ir izim echad l'chapeir aleichem." (Bamidbar 28:30) The Yerushalmi explains that as a result of kabbalas haTorah Hashem wipes away all previous sins, so it is as if there was no cheit to speak of.
ר' משרשיא בשם ר' אידי בכל הקרבנות כתיב חטא ובעצרת אין כתיב חטא אמר להן הקב"ה מכיון שקיבלתם עליכם עול תורה מעלה אני עליכם כאילו לא חטאתם מימיכם:
ר' משרשיא בשם ר' אידי בכל הקרבנות כתיב חטא ובעצרת אין כתיב חטא אמר להן הקב"ה מכיון שקיבלתם עליכם עול תורה מעלה אני עליכם כאילו לא חטאתם מימיכם:
anticipation for kabbalas haTorah
The Zohar’s (VaYikra 97b) writes that one of the goals of
Shavuos night is “l’natra dachya ila’ah d’mati aleh b’hahu ley’lya.” The word “l’natra” is the equivalent of the
Hebrew word “lishmor,” but, says the Shem m’Shmuel, don’t think it means “to
guard” in a passive sense, like a shomer takes care of an item entrusted to his
care. Rather, it should be understood in the same sense the Torah uses the word when describing Ya’akov’s reaction to Yosef’s dreams: “v’Aviv
shamar as ha’davar,” i.e. he waited with eager anticipation. Contrary to popular behavior, Shavuos night is
not about downing enough coffee and cake to be “yotzei” staying up all night so
that one re-experiences mattan Torah with a full belly, albeit a somewhat fuzzy
mind. The korban Pesach is ne’echal al
ha’sova, but I don’t think the same din applies to mattan Torah. It's all about anticipation
and enthusiasm.
The Sm”S writes that this idea helps answer a question
raised by his father, the Sochotchover. The
Sochotchover assumed that there is no din of simchas Yom Tov on the night a Yom
Tov starts because simcha is elicited by the performance of the mitzvos
of the chag. It’s only after Pesach has
started that we can eat matzah; it’s only after Sukkos has started that we can eat
in the sukkah -- the simcha kicks in the next day, after we have had a chance
to do the mitzvos. But what about on
Shavuos – there are no mitzvos to do; nothing is missing when Yom Tov starts,
so why does the din of simcha not apply immediately?
Shem m’Shmuel answers that there is something we need to do: “l’natra
dachya ila’ah” is an active, eager waiting, not a passive lack of activity.
If you
want to see the difference then take note on your way to work as you pass by
kids waiting at their bus stop for the schoolbus to arrive on a spring day. The kids will be joking with each other,
talking, eating, etc.; in short, they will be doing anything and everything
short of looking down the road to see if the bus is close. As far as they are concerned, the further away
the bus is the better! Now take a look at adults waiting by the bus stop or
subway stop on their way to work. Their
necks crane every 30 seconds as they peer anxiously down the road or down the
track to see when the next bus or train is coming, they tap their feet and
shuffle around anxiously, they listen to every traffic report or announcement
with trepidation lest there be some unanticipated delay. That’s the “natra” the Zohar is
talking about.
The Maharal writes on the pasuk “U’Moshe alah el ha’Elokim
va’yikra eilav Hashem min ha’har leimor…” that Moshe had to make the first move
and ascend the mountain before Hashem came down to speak with him. Kabbalas haTorah starts by our demonstrating the desire to receive Torah; one cannot wait passively for it to drop in one’s
lap.
Friday, May 10, 2013
Netziv on what we can learn from how the klei hamishkan were wrapped for travel
Ramban notes that Sefer BaMidbar does not contain many
mitzvos; it’s mostly the story of Bnei Yisrael’s travels through the
midbar. Chasam Sofer writes that if
there are few halachos l’doros in nigleh that we can take away from the sefer,
it means there is a hidden nistar meaning that we are meant to take away. I
guess we could also say that we need to take away hashkafa, midos,
mussar, deyos, etc. Just as we darshen every detail in the text to extrapolate halacha, so too,
we need to invest the same effort in attending to the details of the text to find
the messages that are being taugh to us in those other areas as well.
1) All
the kelim are described as being wrapped in techeiles and then covered with some
other outer covering, with the exception of the aron, where techeiles was shown
on the outside. Techeiles reminds us of
heaven; it represents G-d’s revealed hashgacha.
The klei hamishkan, the shulchan, the mizbeiach, etc. serve as symbols
of malchus, wealth, kehunah, etc. (the details are not important). In all of these areas G-d’s presence lurks
beneath the surface. The casual observer
thinks a king holds real power; he does not realize that Hashem is the one who
behind the scenes directs the affairs of state. The casual observer sees wealth and thinks
the rich man is lucky in business; he does not see that it’s all because of
Hashem’s bracha. The only exception in
the aron. When it comes to Torah, Hashem’s
hashgacha and bracha are obvious in what makes a talmid chacham who he
is.
2) Usually the pesukim first refer to the kli being taken and then the techeiles covering, e.g. “V’al shulchan hapanim yifrisu begged techeiles…” (4:7), “V’al mizbach ha’zahav yifrisu begged techeiles…” (4:11) The exception is the menorah, where the pasuk says “V’lakchu begged techeiles v’kisu es menoas ha’maor…” (4:9) In most areas of life you have to work hard until you get somewhere and then Hashem will respond in kind with his extra hashgacha. In talmud torah, which is what the light of the menorah represents, one needs that special siyata d’shemaya before becoming a gadol or a big talmid chacham. Without it, one can never get there.
3) The kelim of the mizbeiach were all wrapped separately from the mizbeiach itself, but not so the menorah, where everything was wrapped together in one bundle. A leader must often stand alone, apart and above the crowd. A rebbe, however, must be inseperable from his talmidim.
Look at what the Netziv was able to find in the details of how
the klei hamishkan were packed up for travel:
2) Usually the pesukim first refer to the kli being taken and then the techeiles covering, e.g. “V’al shulchan hapanim yifrisu begged techeiles…” (4:7), “V’al mizbach ha’zahav yifrisu begged techeiles…” (4:11) The exception is the menorah, where the pasuk says “V’lakchu begged techeiles v’kisu es menoas ha’maor…” (4:9) In most areas of life you have to work hard until you get somewhere and then Hashem will respond in kind with his extra hashgacha. In talmud torah, which is what the light of the menorah represents, one needs that special siyata d’shemaya before becoming a gadol or a big talmid chacham. Without it, one can never get there.
3) The kelim of the mizbeiach were all wrapped separately from the mizbeiach itself, but not so the menorah, where everything was wrapped together in one bundle. A leader must often stand alone, apart and above the crowd. A rebbe, however, must be inseperable from his talmidim.
Thursday, May 09, 2013
she'hechiyanu on Yom Tov candles
The majority of poskim frown on the practice of reciting she’hechiyanu
when lighting Yom Tov candles despite the fact that (as far as I can tell) this
is what most women do. The problem is that it creates a hefsek.
The bracha of she’hechiyanu has nothing to do with the mitzvah of
lighting candles (women do that every week for Shabbos, so no new she'hechiyanu is needed), but rather goes on the
kedushas hayom of the Yom Tov (see Mikrai Kodesh, Pesach vol 2 #28). Since the she’hechiyanu is not directly
related to the hadlakah, it is an unnecessary interruption between the bracha and
the act of lighting.
The same is not true of the she’hechiyanu said between kiddush
and drinking the kos. Chazal instituted
that the bracha of she’hechiyanu be recited over a kos, therefore, adding she’hechiyanu
in that context does not constitute a hefesk. No such takanah was ever made with respect
to candlelighting. (Rav Shternbruch says a huge chiddush. Chazal instituted saying she’hechiyanu over a
kos to add to the chashivhus of the bracha.
For women, lighting candles has the same chashivus as kiddush does for a
man, and therefore, they are justified in saying the bracha then.)
R’ Ovadya Yosef (Yechaveh Da’as vol 3) adds that kiddush
on the second night of Rosh hHShana, where we insert a she’hechiyanu on a new
fruit into the nusach of kiddush, is also no proof to anything.
M’ikar hadin we pasken that even if someone did not have a new fruit, he
would still recite a she’hechiyanu on the kedushas Yom Tov. This kiddush is no different than any other.
The one source that I found that seems to open the door to
the argument for there being no problem of hefsek is a Mishna Berura in Hil Yom
HaKippurim 425:5. Although the Beis
Yosef holds that there never recites the bracha on besamim in
havdalah on motzei Y.K., the majority of Achronim disagree. The M.B. sides with their view and adds that
there is no danger of bracha l’vatalah because the bracha is a birchas ha’nehenin
and bottom line, one does enjoy the fragrance of the spices. What the M.B. does not directly address is
that fact that if the bracha is unnecessary, it should be a hefsek. Does that mean hefsek is not an issue, so long as the bracha is not levatala? Or maybe the M.B. is just not overly concerned here because he thinks the
other Achronim are right and the Beis Yosef wrong anyway?
As a way to have her cake and eat it, to say the she’hechiyanu
at the time of hadlakah but to also avoid any problem of hefsek, my wife was
given an eitzah years ago by her great-uncle, R’ Yosef Holzberg. Instead of saying the she’hechiyanu in
between the bracha on hadlakas neiros and the lighting, she says the she’hechiyanu
immediately after lighting. I thought this was a brilliant idea, but had two cents to add: you can get even closer to keeping the minhag of saying she’hechiyanu
before lighting by sandwiching the she’hechiyanu in between lighting the first
and second candles. Since m’ikar hadin you
only need to light one candle, once you are past that point the issue of hefsek is gone, but at the same time, the she’hechiyanu is still on the act of candlelighting. (I haven't asked anyone what they think of the idea.)
Wednesday, May 08, 2013
masah u'matan b'emunah?
I have no problem with anyone espousing a philosophy
of pure Torah lishma, but if that's your agenda then come clean about it and don’t pretend you are about
anything different just to get a buck, or in this case, 10.6 million bucks from the taxpayers of the State of NJ.
[Name omitted by me] vice president of administration at Beth Medrash Govoha, said although the college may be rooted in Talmudic and related studies, its students excel in many other areas.
"BMG graduates have a leading track record in establishing successful new businesses that create jobs and contribute to the economy of New Jersey," Gleiberman said, noting graduates have successful careers in food manufacturing, retailing, green technologies and other industries.
Gleiberman said there is no "religious test" for admission, but it does have rigid education standards.
BMG -- a model of higher education, encouraging its students to pursue careers and start businesses to benefit their home state of NJ. Who ever knew? I know someone out there is going to comment and darshen every kutzo shel
yud in these quotes to prove they are technically accurate, so let me say
in advance, if you need to parse quotes like a lawyer to make your case, you
may win the battle, but you've lost the war. The actions of bnei Torah have to not just be correct, they have to also be perceived as correct (see Yoma 86). I don't think the public outcry in this case is rooted in antisemitism; it's rooted in a sense that fair play has not won out.
(I felt I could post about this because it was in the newspaper already. I have nothing against BMG; I'm not smiling or gloating over it. I find the whole thing rather sad. My wife thinks I shouldn't write about it and she's usually right.)
(I felt I could post about this because it was in the newspaper already. I have nothing against BMG; I'm not smiling or gloating over it. I find the whole thing rather sad. My wife thinks I shouldn't write about it and she's usually right.)
why don't our chutz la'aretz schools teach more about Zionism?
We do a horrible job we in chutz la’aretz of educating
our children about the modern State of Israel.
My kids would not even know today is Yom Yerushalayim if I did not tell them. We teach our children Tanach, Torah, gemara, all kinds of secular
subjects, there are now required classes in “churban Europa,” as it is known,
but I know of few yeshivos/yeshivot that require students to study the history
of Zionism and the modern State of Israel, much less make an effort to explain
the theological significance of Jewish sovereignty and the meaning of religious nationalism and the varying hashkafic
attitudes toward the State. I mean a serious discsussion of the issues and a study of history, not eating a blue and white cookie and having a chagiga. Why is this
so?
1) Fear – we are afraid to teach subjects where there is a controversy or a diversity of legitimate views. Issues always have to be boiled down to black vs. white and for all else, ask your Rav. As a result, we produce students who see things in black and white, who are intolerant of other viewpoints other than the one they learn as "correct," who cannot weigh the pros and cons of issues without being spoonfed a "right" answer. You can’t reduce any discussion of Eretz Yisrael to simple dichotomies.
2) Ignorance – teachers know little more than their students about certain topics, this among them, in part because they came though the same broken system that they are now perpetuating.
3) It
doesn’t matter enough – we equate love for Eretz Yisrael with love for Am
Yisrael, in the sense of caring about Jewish life. That is certainly important, but that should not eclipse a discussion of Jewish nationalism as an independent value (or whether you agree with such a thing or not and why). When people talk about “existential issues”
in the context of discussing Israel, they mean, for example, the threat Iranian
missiles, not “existential” in the philosophical sense. Questions like, for example, whether you view
the State as aschalta d’geulah and what that term means, are great for armchair
philosophizing, but are not pressing for a solution any time soon, so think
this tzad is right or think that side is right, it can all be cavalierly
dismissed as not really relevant.
1) Fear – we are afraid to teach subjects where there is a controversy or a diversity of legitimate views. Issues always have to be boiled down to black vs. white and for all else, ask your Rav. As a result, we produce students who see things in black and white, who are intolerant of other viewpoints other than the one they learn as "correct," who cannot weigh the pros and cons of issues without being spoonfed a "right" answer. You can’t reduce any discussion of Eretz Yisrael to simple dichotomies.
2) Ignorance – teachers know little more than their students about certain topics, this among them, in part because they came though the same broken system that they are now perpetuating.
hallel as a reading of pesukim
In order to escape the dilemma of wanting to recite hallel
to commemorate Yom ha’Atzmaut and/or Yom Yerushalayim but wanting to avoid the
problem of there not being a takanah which would license it, some add the hallel
without a bracha only at the conclusion davening after the last kaddish. This way, the recitation of hallel is not
formally part of tefillah, but counts only as reading pesukim. If someone wants to say tehillim and just
happens to read the perakim that we recite for hallel, there is no need for a
takanah and no problem in doing so.
One thing that bothers me about this solution is that if one
is just reading pesukim, then one would not add “hodu” responsively after “yomaru
na …” and “yomar na…” and one would not
double pesukim like we do in the section before/after “ana Hashem…” These are features particular to kri’as
hallel (see Sukkah 38b). From what I
have seen done, no one changes how the hallel is read -- I'm not sure why.
na'aseh v'nishma - a statement of bitachon
Speaking of bitachon and since we are getting close to Shavuos, R’ Binyamin Finkel from the Mir in
Yerushalayim spoke in my son’s yeshiva earlier this week on the relationship
between bitachon and kabbalas haTorah.
At first glance, agreeing to a deal with the terms of “na’aseh v’nishma”
makes no sense. Imagine someone offered
to sell you what they promise is outstanding merchandise at some incredibly discounted
price, a once in a lifetime opportunity.
The only catch to the deal – you can’t see what you are buying before
you agree to the terms. Who in his right
mind would fall for that? You don’t need
to have business sense to recognize a swindle like this.
Now imagine the same deal, but instead of it being offered
by a shady looking guy in a back room, it is offered to you by a parent or a
rebbe. Same terms, but this time, you
would take it. What’s the difference? The difference is trust. You know your parent or your rebbe would not
offer you a losing proposition. “Na’aseh
v’nishma” demonstrated our trust that whatever was in Torah, it was for our
best because it came from Hashem.
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