shome'a k'oneh and a question that stumps me

If you’ve been following the past two posts, you have a nice piece of Brisker lomdus distinguishing a chovas yachid which one fulfills through shome’a k’oneh from a chovas tzibur. By a chovas yachid, e.g. hallel, each individual has an independent obligation to recite hallel which can be fulfilled by listening to someone else – shome’a k’oneh – provided that both parties share the same level of obligation. Since through shome'a k'oneh someone is acting as me, that person must be obligated in the same manner that I am.

By a chovas hatzibur, a communal obligation, no one person has an individual obligation to do the mitzvah. All that needs to happen is for the community to see that the mitzvah is performed, irrespective of who the performer is or their level of obligation.

The Rav used this to explain why someone with a non-Biblical obligation can form a zimun with someone who has a Biblical obligation to bentch - since zimun is a chiyuv on the group rather than the individual, we look at the mitzvah act, not the level of obligation of the one bentching. We now also easily understand the gemara (Megillah 23) that a minor or woman can read k’riyas hatorah on behalf of the tzibur. Even though they have no personal obligation in talmud torah, a minor or woman can create a cheftza shel mitzvah of k'riyas hatorah.

And now I arrive at my question and no answer: How can k’riyas hatorah be a paradigmatic case of a chovas hatzibur that does not need to fit into the rules of shome’a k’oneh when the very source of the principle of shome’a k’oneh is k’riyas hatorah!? See Sukkah 38 which derives from the fact that Shafan read the Torah before King Yoshiyahu, but the Navi ascribes that reading to Yoshiyahu himself, that shome’a k’oneh!

As easy answer would be that shome’a k’oneh defines King Yoshiyahu as the reader, but being a reader is itself not the mitzvah – the mitzvah is on the tzibur as a whole to listen to the reading, and for that we do not need shome’a k’oneh. But this answer is wrong, as the Rosh (Megillah ch. 3) writes that one called to the Torah must read along with the shaliach tzibur because shome’a k’oneh does not suffice to define one as the reader – if the Rosh is right, the only reason the gemara would invoke shome’a k’oneh is to explain how the tzibur fulfills their obligation!

So how does k’riyas hatorah work – is it a chovas hatzibur which does not involve shome’a k’oneh, as the Rav’s approach and the gemara in Megillah indicates, or must it involve shome’a k’oneh on some level, as the gemara in Sukkah indicates? Anyone have any ideas – I’m stuck!

shome'a k'oneh and the concept of zimun (II)

Continuing the previous post, aside from R’ Akiva Eiger’s question, the Rishonim reject Rashi’s assertion that someone who ate a k’zayis can be motzi someone who ate to the point of satiation because of a more fundemantal reason: from the Torah perspective, eating a k’zayis is the same as not eating, so what empowers such an individual who has no obligation to be motzi someone who does?

R’ Soloveitchik (Shiurim l’Zecerh Abab Mari vol. 2) suggested that the key to Rashi is understanding the concept of zimun. When three people become obligated to join together to fulfill the obligation of zimun, which in the days of Chazal was done by one person reciting all of birkat hamazon aloud and the others listening, it does not mean that each person has an individual obligation to bentch which is fulfilled by listening to the leader. Zimun means, rather, that the entire group as a whole is obligated in a single act of bentching. Just as elsewhere in halacha there exists a concept of a chovas hatzibur, a communal obligation, here too, the obligation is for one communal bentching, but instead of a tzibur of 10 the obligation rests on a group of 3 for zimun.

When each individual member of the community has a personal obligation to perform a mitzvah, e.g shofar, megillah, etc., we need to invoke the principle of shomea k’oneh to ascribe the mitzvah act of shofar blowing or megillah reading by one person to others. Shomea k'oneh means hearing someone blow the shofar is the same as individually blowing, but only if both the listener and doer are obligated in the mitzvah. This requirement stems from two seperate needs: 1) the need to define the act performed as a mitzvah, meaning here is an obligation to perform it; 2) the exclusion of a non-bar chiyuva from being motzi others. Ascribing the act of person A who has no Biblical obligation to fulfill a mitzvah to person B who does simply does not work.

The same is not true with respect to the mitzvah of zimun. Each member of the zimun is not obligated individually to bentch - all that is necessary is that the group as a whole share a single mitzvah act together. Shomea k'oneh is not needed; all that is needed is a shared mitzvah act. What defines a mitzvah act? Even though being obligated m’derabbanan does not make one a bar chiyuva on the Biblical level, it does suffice to define the bentching as a mitzvah act. According to Rashi, even a birchas hamazon recited by an individual who is only obligated to bentch m'derabbanan suffices to serve as the cheftza shel mitzvah to fulfill the communal chiyuv of zimun.

With this we can resolve R’ Akiva Eiger’s question. The gemara’s dilemma regarding a woman's obligation in bentching was not whether she is a bar chiyuva or not. The gemara’s question was whether since certain portions of bentching (such as the mention of inheritance of the land, or bris milah) do not apply to woman, is her bentching a mitzvah act parallel with that of a man or not? Rashi's opinion that a valid mitzvah act can be used to fulfill a communal obligation regardless of the level of obligation of the performer is irrelevant to the gemara's question of whether a woman's birkat hamazon constitutes a Biblically valid mitzvah act! In Brisker jargon, the gemara's safeik is in the cheftza shel mitzvah; Rashi is discussing the chovas hagavra.

R’ Soloveitchik has many proofs to this concept of zimun as a communal obligation, but I want to cut to the chase and get to what I’m stuck on. More to come…

shome'a k'oneh and the concept of zimun

Over Shavuos I am supposed to say a shiur, and since the other shiurim over Y”T are going to be dedicated to issues of “dibbur”, I decided to be subversive and discuss shome’a k’oneh, speech without speaking. I ran into a difficulty that I can't yet resolve, and while I could avoid the topic in the shiur, it bothers me that I have no answer – maybe someone out there has some idea.

Before I get to my question, I need to first lay a little groundwork with a chiddush of Rav Soloveitchik's. There are a few proofs for the concept the Rav developed, so I'll take one from a sugya discussed before. The chiyuv to bentch requires (b’pashtus) eating to the point of satiation – "v’achalta v’savata u’berachta". Yet, the gemara (Brachos 48) relates that Shimon ben Shetach led a zimun for King Yanai even though Sb"S ate only a k’zayis of bread. One cannot be motzi someone else in a mitzvah unless one shares an obligation in that same mitzvah – for this reason, a minor who has no mitzvah obligation may not be motzi a gadol. If Shimon ben Shetach ate only a k’zayis and was not satiated, he was not obligated in the Biblical mitzvah of bentching; King Yanai, however, was. How could Sb"S have been motzi King Yanai in his chiyuv d’oraysa of bentching if Sb"S did not share his Biblical obligation to bentch?

The Rishonim offer numerous answers to this question. Rashi writes that a gadol who ate a shiur derabbanan can in fact lead a zimun for a gadol who ate a shiur d’oraysa of satiation. One who ate a kzayis, although not satiated, is still obligated on some level to bentch.The case of a minor is different because a minor has no obligation whatsoever – the chiyuv of chinuch rests on the father to educate his child to bentch, but does not transform the child into a bar chiyuva, someone obligated in mitzvos.

R’ Akiva Eiger challenges Rashi's answer based on the following gemara (Brachos 20): the gemara raises the question of whether a women is obligated min hatorah or only m’derabbanan in the mitzvah of bentching, and says that this question impacts whether a women can be motzi a man in the mitzvah of bentching. If a man eats to the point of satiation and has a Biblical obligation to bentch, only if a woman has a parallel Biblical obligation could she be motzi him.

Doesn’t this gemara contradict Rashi’s answer? According to Rashi, even though a man ate only a k'zayis and is not Biblically obligated to bentch, he may lead a zimun for someone else who is satiated and Biblically obligated. Shouldn’t a woman who therefore has at least a Rabbinic obligation in bentching (like someone who ate a k'zayis) also be able to be motzi a man, even though his chiyuv is d’oraysa?

Stay tuned for R’ Soloveitchik’s chiddush…

v'ahavta l're'acha kamocha - a rashi question

On the pasuk of "v'ahavta l're'acha kamocha" Rashi cites Rabbi Akiva's famous teaching that "zeh klal gadol batorah". Presumably Rashi is concerned with explaining textual difficulties and pshuto shel mikra, not to collect famous Midrashim (actually, I wouldn't want to have to defend that thesis, but many people seem to accept it as a given). What is the textual difficulty in the words "v'ahavta l're'acha kamocha" that prompts Rashi's comment?

[Update: see AddeRabbi’s discussion here.]

standing for a talmida chachama vs. standing for the wife of a talmid chacham

In the book “The Legacy of R’ Ahron Kotler” by R’ Yitzchok Dershowitz, the author records the advice of R’ Ahron given to someone who was going to teach in a Bais Ya’akov. I had to return the book to its owner so I cannot quote word for word (the exact story is around p. 215 or so if you want to check), but the gist of it was that although the halacha demands that one stand in respect for an eishes chaveir, the wife of a talmid chacham, there is no obligation to stand for a girl who herself may know every Ramban in chumash. The implicit message as to the goals of B”Y education are clear, but what left me perplexed was the halachic source for the statement. While the gemara clearly states (Shavuos 30b) that there is an obligation to stand for an eishes chaveir, I could not think of a source or understand why indeed there should be no chiyuv to stand for a woman who knows every Ramban. Since the mitzvah appears in parshas hashavua I checked the Minchas Chinuch last night and discovered he writes based sevara alone that the definition of “zakein”=zeh shekanah chochma or talmid chacham applies only to those obligated to learn Torah, to the exclusion of a women who may be learned or avadim, such as Tevi, the slave of Rabban Gamliel who the gemara says was a chacham. The footnotes of the new edition of the M.C. quote a dissenting view. Interesting.

While on the topic, the M.C. points out that while a talmid chacham can be mochel on his kavod and tell people not to stand in his honor as toraso dilei hu, the Torah being honored is his, an eishes chaveir does not have this option, as the Torah being honored is not hers to be mochel but rather belongs to her husband. Based on the same logic, many Rishonim write that after the death of the talmid chacham, there is no longer an obligation to honor the eishes chaveir, as the honor afforded to her is just an extension of the honor due her husband but not a separate din.

nega'im and kedushas arei chomah

The gemara (Brachos 5b) writes that negaim are yisurim shel ahavah in Bavel but not in Eretz Yisrael. Rashi explains that in Eretz Yisrael the affliction of negaim was more severe because the leper had to be send out of his home in a walled city; in Bavel where there is no kedushas ha’aretz a leper could stay at home. Tosfos disagrees, as the gemara (Archin 29) tells us that the law of batei arei chomah (walled cities) was not in effect once the count of yoveil ceased, meaning there was no longer a kedushah to the walled cities (see Rashash). Certainly by the days of R’ Yochanan the yoveil was no longer being counted and the law of shiluach machaneh was not in effect even in Eretz Yisrael. Tosfos explains the gemara to mean that negaim in Eretz Yisrael were a more severe punishment because the laws of taharos were more strictly observed there than in Bavel.

The Tzla”ch offers a novel defense of Rashi. Although the kedusha of walled cities was no longer in effect without a yoveil count, Yerushalayim has an additional level of kedusha because it was the makom Shechina, and a leper would have to move outside its city walls. The simplest proof to this contention is that the parsha of metzora was given in the desert (and practiced there, as we see from the episode with Miriam) before the conquest of Eretz Yisrael and before the yoveil count ever started. Since the desert camp surrounded the Mishkan, it had the kedusha of makom mikdash. Furthermore, the Rambam (Bias Mikdash 3:8) writes that a leper who enters a walled city violates the mitzvas aseh of “badad yeishev m’chutz lamachaneh”, but if he enters the boundaries of Yerushalayim it violates a lav as well. Even though the kedusha of arei chomah was not in effect when R' Yochanan lived, the law of metzora still was practiced with respect to Yerushalayim.

yisurim shel ahavah - does G-d bring suffering to those who are innocent?

"R’ Yochanan said nega’im and the death of children are not yisurim shel ahavah (Brachos 5b)."

Before getting to the meat and potatoes of why and which negaim are excluded, this whole concept of yisurim shel ahavah, afflications of love, needs explanation and is the subject of a fascinating machlokes. Rashi (Brachos 5a) writes that yisurim shel ahavah are pains G-d brings on the righteous in this world even though they have not sinned so that their reward in the World to Come will be greater than their deeds alone. The Ramban in Toras haAdam (p. 270-272 in the Chavel edition) does not cite Rashi by name, but takes issue with this whole concept of suffering without sin. Ramban writes that G-d does not afflict any person unless they have done something wrong to deserve punishment - “Ain yisurim b’lo avon”. But if all suffering is brought upon sinners alone, why are these pains called yisurim shel ahavah? G-d does not love sinners – he is, after all, punishing them! Ramban explains that G-d’s punishment cleanses the righteous from whatever minor iniquity they may be guilty of (Ramban writes that even sins done b’shogeg, of which the doer may be completely unaware, still blemish the soul and require expiation) so they may merit their full portion of the World to Come. Precisely because of G-d’s love He sometimes visits suffering on righteous people so that they may fully enjoy their portion after death.

The gemara (Sanhedrin 101) writes that when R’ Eliezer was sick his students came to visit him and all except R’ Akiva were upset at the state of pain they found him him. R’ Akiva explained that they were worried for naught, for as long as R’ Eliezer’s wine never spoiled and grain was bountiful, it might have been presumed that he was receiving all his reward in this world – now that we see his suffering, we know that he will receive reward in the World to Come as well. R’ Eliezer asked, “But Akiva, have I not kept any precept of the Torah?”, meaning, why would you think I would not get reward in the next world just because I did not suffer? To which R' Akiva replied, "There is no righteous person who has never sinned". Ramban offers a very convincing proof to his position from this episode. Why according to Rashi should R’ Akiva have ascribed the suffering of R’ Eliezer to sin and not yisurim shel ahavah done out of G-d's desire for R’ Eliezer to accrue even more merit? It seems from the gemara that ALL yisurim, even those occurring to the most righteous, must be the result of sin. Aside from this proof, I find Rashi very difficult to understand philosophically – doesn’t reward earned through suffering alone circumvent the entire idea of earning reward only through bechira? The Ramban builds a very convincing case - tzarich iyun on how to understand Rashi.

yerushalmi - no machlokes in metziyus

The Yerushalmi in Pesachim has a machlokes whether karmis, some type of millet-like grain, can become actual chameitz or not (similar to the more well known machlokes Rabbi Yochanan ben Nuri and Rabbanan by millet and rice). Asks the Yerushalmi (17a), why not simply test it and see? The gemara answers that a test was in fact done and what the results were is precisely the point of machlokes.

I seem to recall the Yerushalmi in other places asking similar questions when a debate focuses on issues of fact rather than interpretation – if all that is in question is fact, then we should be able to settle the machlokes. Bnei yeshiva usually operate under a similar assumption that "there cannot be a machlokes in metziyus" and all issues boil down to conceptual disagreements. Interestingly, I cannot recall offhand anywhere that a similar question is raised in the Bavli, but if anyone remembes otherwise, let me know.

Torah or the Land?: R' Elchanan Wasserman vs. R' Ahron Soloveitchik

R' Elchanan Wasserman, "Ikvesa d’Meshicha", #40

Another analogy: a person’s survival depends on air to breathe and food to eat. What if a person’s lacks both – which do we provide first, food or air? Obviously, without air, there is no one to give the food to! The Jewish people need the Land of Israel, but have not yet merited it. The Jewish people also need Torah, and we are all witnesses to the diminution of Torah, as most of the younger generation is removed from it. Let us ask then, the same question – to what shall we attend first: the need for Torah, or the need for the Land? The Land is necessary, but without Torah, we will not have a Jewish people. First we must assure that there is a Jewish people, and only afterwards, that they have a land.

R’ Ahron Soloveitchik, "Logic of the Heart, Logic of the Mind", p. 184:

Now the question arises, why did Y’ravan ben Yoash, certainly no greater tzadik than Ben Gurion, merit such a great privilege? In answering this question, we will also be able to answer the question of how relief, any form of geulah, can take place for the Jewish people when the Jews have not prepared themselves for it through universal repentance?...
The answer is, “And G-d had not said that he would erase the name of Israel from under the Heavens, so he saved them by the hand of Y’ravan ben Yoash” (Kings II: 14:27). During the reign of Y’ravan ben Yoash, had this deliverance not been realized by G-d then the name of Israel could have been wiped out. Similarly, 800 years ago, in the time of the Rambam, and 500 years ago in the time of the Shulchan Aruch, a Jewish state was not indispensable for the survival of the Jewish people. The Jews survived very well; they suffered, but they survived. And they blossomed intellectually and spiritually without a state. But after the Nazi Holocaust, the Jewish people cannot survive any longer without a state.

religious nationalism - R' Elchanan Wasserman vs. Rav Kook

R’ Elchanan Wasserman, Ikvesa d’Meshicha #34

After time, the nationalist idea gave birth to an offshoot – "religious nationalism". The name alone indicates that the term “religious” alone is incomplete unless accompanied with the term “nationalist”. This name alone is kerfirah [apostasy] against one of the fundamentals of faith, that “Toras Hashem temimah”, i.e. the Torah is lacking nothing and has no defect… If the idea of nationalism is avodah zarah [idolatry], the idea of religious nationalism is avodah zarah b’shituf [joining idol worship with worship of G-d].

R’ Kook, Orot Yisrael, ch. 6

The practical nationalistic drive of the Jewish people is just the external manifestation (levush) of its inner spiritual drive. The latter is the light and soul of the former. Both stem from the Living G-d, and from the spring of truth and belief.

kiddush Hashem - those who fought for Eretz Yisrael

The Chasam Sofer (Shu"t Y.D. 239) cites the gemara (Sanhedrin 47) that any Jew murdered by a gentile, even a wicked evildoer, is called holy. Certainly, the same is true of those who sacrificed their lives for our Land. "R' Shimon said: come see how beloved is the Land of Israel. All those who go to war run and then walk and then their feet stop and tremble under them as they draw close to battle. The Jewish people are not like this; when they come close to the Land their feet carry them faster, and they say one to another if we were to enter the Land and immediatly perish, it would still be worth it for the privilige of entering the Land promised to our forefathers." This is what was done by those holy ones who gave their lives fighting the Arabs - can there be any doubt that they merit Olam haBa?! Is it not a clear testimony that even if they did not see, their souls - the Jewish soul in their breast - saw, and yearned to return to its roots. "All who live in the Land are as if they have G-d" (Kesubos 110) - meaning, even those who do not understand or articulate the call to G-d, their soul still stirs and feels this need and calling. That is the meaning of "it is as if..." - even if their outward behavior does not reflect [this acceptance of G-d, it surely is within them].

-Eim haBanim Smeicha, p.121

Ikvesa d'Meshicha and Zionism: R' Kook vs. R' Elchanan Wasserman

R’ Elchanan Wasserman, Ikvesa d’Meshicha, #36 –

These [people] have caused a confusion of mind and distorted concepts. Before they came on the scene, it was known to all that a Jew is only one who accepts the yoke of Torah. One who is a denier of Torah is an apostate and has no ties to us. The religious Zionists argue otherwise: though he be an apostate, since he shares our national identity, he is one of us. The halacha states, “One who has no fear of Heaven may not be appointed to any position [of authority] among the Jewish people.” Yet, they sanction the heretics becoming leaders.

Rav A. Y. haKohen Kook, Orot, 84 –

The nefesh-soul of the sinners of Israel in the time of “ikvesa d’meshicha” [i.e. just before the Messianic era], those who cling with love to the Jewish people, to the Land of Israel, and to the rebirth of our nation, is even greater than the nefesh-soul of the faithful believers who lack this elevated quality of personal concern for the community, for rebuilding the nation, and for the land….
Yet, the ruach-soul is far more perfected in those who fear G-d and observe his commandments…
Just as wine cannot be made without sediment, so too, the world cannot exist without the wicked. And just as the sediment preserves and protects the wine, so too the untamed desires of the wicked can help preserve the spirit of life…The return of the Jewish people to its homeland for its survival is a necessary occurrence, and this event will lead to the creation of “sediment” – the wickedness and chutzpa of “ikvesa d’meshicha” which troubles the heart when mentioned...

R' Kook concludes that the nefesh of the faithful will ultimately be improved by the nefesh of those who though not-observant identify with the national aspirations of the Jewish people and work to establish the State, while the ruach of those who are not-yet-observant will be uplifted by those who do believe so that ultimately they find their way to return to G-d.

R' Kook: “Gam mitoch hachol yegaleh hakodeh”.
R' Elchanan: "M'maga b'kedusha bilvad ain miskadhim, aval m'maga b'tumah nitmeyim".

Two completely different approaches, and it is devarim ha'omdim b'rumo shel olam, the most profound questions that face Judaism in our time, that hang in the balance. More to come, bl"n...

when is yom ha'atzmaut celebrated?

The knee-jerk reaction to the question titling this post is “5 Iyar”, but knee-jerk reactions are often wrong. The Israeli Rabbanut policy is not to celebrate Yom ha’Atzmaut on 5 Iyar when the date falls immediately before/after Shabbos so as to minimize the risk of chilul Shabbos. This year, although 5 Iyar is Monday, since Yom ha’Atzmaut always follows Yom haZikaron and Yom haZikaron would fall out immediatly after Shabbos, the Rabbanut pushed Yom haZikaron to Monday, 5 Iyar, and Yom ha’Atzmaut will be celebrated Tuesday, 6 Iyar. This also somewhat obviates the problem for those who will fast BH”B on Monday and feel that adding a celebration and/or hallel to tefillah would be inconsistent with the spirit of the ta’anis (I seem to recall this issue coming up in the YU Bais Medrash).

Whether or not American (or other diaspora communities) should schedule their celebrations for 6 Iyar or keep to the date of 5 Iyar always seems to be a matter of debate (there seems far less concern for celebrations creating chilul Shabbos here, esp. with respect to Yom haZikaron). I noticed the OU website lists the dates as matching the Rabbanut’s decision, and after a bit of googling I found that the last time this occurred (2004) R’ Gedalya Dov Schwartz originally said to celebrate on 5 Iyar (Monday) but then in response to a request from a Rabbanut advised the RCA to celebrate on 6 Iyar. I heard in the name of R’ Ahron Soloveitchik that 5 Iyar should always be celebrated. Of course, this entire discussion is moot if you don't celebrate in some way or other and see no theological significance to the re-establishment of the State, but that’s a discussion for another post.

saying one's own bracha vs. listening to the shaliach tzibbur (shomea k'oneh)

R’ Akiva Eiger questions the common practice of the chazzan reciting a bracha on sefira, the tzibur answering amein and listening to his count, and then each member of the tzibur reciting his/her own bracha and counting – why should each individual recite his/her own bracha and not simply have in mind to be yotzei with the bracha of the chazzan, fulfilling b’rov am hadras melech? Although various achronim suggest reasons for the practice, the question seems to me to be far stronger than the answers offered (is it really so hard to concentrate on a short bracha while bearing in mind what night of the count it is?)

The same issue may be raised with respect to the bracha before k'rias hallel. The common practice is for the shat”z to recite the bracha, the tzibur answers amein, and then each individual again recites his/her own bracha. Especially on Rosh Chodesh where there is a major dispute in Roshonim whether a bracha should be recited at all, why not simply listen to the bracha of the shat”z having in mind to be yotzei and answer amein, accomplishing b’rov am hadras melech as well as minimizing the chance of bracha l’vatalah?

If I recall correctly, Rav Soloveitchik opposed each individual reciting his/her own bracha after hearing the shat”z (I recall hearing this with respect to hallel in particular) based on a different consideration. The Rav held that once one answers amein to the bracha of the shat”z, it is as if one has recited his/her own bracha because of the principle of shomea k’oneh and repeating the bracha would constitute a bracha l’vatalah. I believe I heard from my rebbe, R’ Y. Sacks, a proof to this position from Brachos 54. The gemara records that R’ Yehudah was sick; when he recovered and was visited by other Rabbis they praised Hashem for sparing his life and he answered amein – R’ Yehudah then remarked that by responding amein he fulfilled his obligation to recite birchas hagomel. The Shita Mekubetzet notes that those reciting the bracha clearly did not have in mind to be motzi R’ Yehudah – the “shomea k’oneh” which answering amein invoked seems completely independent of kavanah to be motzi or to be yotzei by that means. With respect to hallel, answering amein to the shat”z would similarly be the equivalent of reciting one’s own bracha even without specific kavanah. It was not clear to me in looking back at the Shita Mekubetzet whether the same holds true if one has specific kavanah not to invoke "shomea k’oneh" (IOW: does shomea k’oneh work as a mechanical principle outside any kavanah considerations, or does the shita mekubetzet simply mean there is a level of "stam" kavanah that is assumed sans specific intent to the contrary, but kavanah is still a necessary ingredient?). If one accepts this chiddush, it would seem that it is certainly preferable to listen to the shat”z and be yotzei with his bracha or to recite one’s own bracha word by word simultaneously with the shat”z’s rather than to repeat a new bracha after answering amein.

a guide to tosfos for those learning b'kiyus

The KBY website has what looks like a nice resource here for those who want to cover ground in b’kiyus but still see some of the key Tosfos’ on a masechta. R’ Meir Orlian has put together lists that highlight the Tosfos by daf which are most crucial and he provides a one line summary of the content or issue discussed. Y’yasher cheilo and I hope he continues on other masechtot as well.

the minhag of women not to work on rosh chodesh

The Rishonim (see Rashi, Tosfos, Meg 22b) record the minhag of women to refrain from doing work on Rosh Chodesh based on the Midrash that the day was given to them as a holiday in reward for not giving their jewelry for use in the eigel. (Worth thinking about: what does Rosh Chodesh in particular have to do with the eigel?) The Biur Halacha (O.C. 417) writes that the implication of these Rishonim is that the minhag is not simply an optional practice that women can elect to adopt or not adopt, but it is a “minhag tov” that has already been adopted generations ago, and women are obligated to follow the accepted practice.

The achronim discuss whether the minhag applies to both days of a two day Rosh Chodesh or only to the second day. Mishna Berura (417:4) cites the Rokeach who held that the minhag applies to both days, while the Shibolei haLeket and Pri Chadah held it applies only to the second day, but the first day is optional and dependent on minhag hamakom.

Exactly what types of work cannot be done is not clear from the Rishonim - it is hard to imagine that the issur should be stricter than chol hamoed, where many types of work are permitted. Biur Halacha cites R’ Ya’akov Emden’s opinion that only public work is prohibited (i.e. the issur is melacha b’farhesya), and therefore all work done at night is permitted, but the B.H. concludes that he does not know if the minhag as practiced is in accordance with this view. It seems to me that those who prohibit doing laundry with a washing machine (as some practice) do not accept the parameters suggested by RYE, as a private washing machine does not seem to me to be a melacha b'farhesya.

sefira, she'hechiyanu, and zecher l'mikdash

Given the ground covered in the past 2-3 posts on the idea of zecher l’mikdash, we can now begin to understand Ameimar’s opinion (Menachos 66) that counting weeks of sefira is unnecessary because the count is merely a zecher l’mikdash.

As we have seen, when a zecher l’mikdash is simply a symbolic act to remember what had been done in the past, the obligation to recite a bracha is not binding. The Ba’al haMaor (end of Pesachim) asks why there is no bracha of she’hechiyanu recited over sefira and answers that something which is only a zecher l’mikdash does not obligate a she’hechiyanu being recited – in the framework of the Brisker Rav’s analysis, the Ba’al haMaor is an indication that the mitzvah of sefira is less significant in terms of bracha than a true takanah.

And if the mitzvah is defined as a symbolic act alone, the tzuras hamitzva can change as well – non-shemurah matzah is acceptable b’dieved for koreich, pesulim of the 4 minim become acceptable after the first day, etc.

While Abayei understood (according to Tosfos) that the mitzvah of sefira is a Rabbinically mandated continuation of the same mitzvah of sefirah that had existed pre-churban and hence follows the same formula, Ameimar held of the more radical formulation of zecher l’mikdash – the original mitzvah of sefirah no longer applied, and all that we fulfill is a mere symbolic counting, which does not necessarily bind us to the same details in performance.

zecher l'mikdash and the shiur of mitzvas maror

The Biblical mitzvah of maror was fulfilled by eating the maror vegetables with the korban pesach, which we no longer have. The Chachamim nonetheless instituted that we continue the mitzvah even sans korban. The Rosh (perek arvei pesachim) writes that a minimum of a k’zayis (an olive-size piece) of maror must be eaten because we say a bracha of “al achilas maror”. The Sha’agas Arye raises a number of difficult questions on this explanation of the Rosh. For any mitzvah or issur, whether the term “achila” is used or not, the definition of eating is always assumed to be a k’zayis sized portion. For example, one does not violate the Biblical commandment of eating basar b’chalav unless one has eaten a k’zayis portion, even though the Torah never uses the term “achila” in the context of the issur. The fact that the bracha on maror (which the Rosh refers to) contains the term “achila” seems entirely irrelevant to consideration of the amount that must be consumed to fulfill the mitzvah. Secondly, one clearly fulfills the mitzvah of maror even if the bracha is omitted – why then should the recitation of the bracha be the criteria which defines the mitzvah itself? Finally, the Rosh simply begs the question of why the Chachamim formulated the bracha as "al achilas maror", obligating us to eat a k'zayis, instead of simply formulating the bracha as "al mitzvas maror", avoiding the term "achila" entirely.

Rav Hershel Shachter in his sefer Eretz haTzvi offers an explanation of the Rosh that is consistant with the thinking of the Brisker Rav. Since we no longer have a korban, the mitzvah of maror is a remembrance to the mitzvah that was, a type of zecher l’mikdash. As we saw yesterday, one could very well argue that a mitzvah which is celebrated as a zecher l’mikdash should not require a blessing – recall the gemara (sukkah 46) that RYb”L held that one can not say a bracha of “al netilas lulav” because taking the lulav fulfills a new mitzvah of zecher l’mikdash, not the old mitzvah of lulav, and Rabeinu Yerucham held that an independent bracha on counting weeks of sefira is not recited because counting weeks is only a zecher l’mikdash.

Furthermore, if zecher l’mikdash is indeed a new form of mitzvah, the entire tzuras hamitzvah, the format of the mitzvah’s performance, need not conform exactly to the rules that governed the old mitzvah. Perhaps this is precisely why many of the disqualifications that render an esrog unfit on the first day of Sukkos are suspended during the remaining days – it is not merely that the mitzvah is only Rabbinic in nature on those days, but that the mitzvah being fulfilled is not one of lulav and esrog but of zecher l’mikdash. The Ran writes that in cases of extreme need the mitzvah of koreich done on the seder night need not be done with matzah shemurah because it is a zecher l’mikdash (as we recite in the haggadah) - even if non-shemurah matzah is disqualified as matzah, it is not disqualified from being used as a zecher.

Is the mitzvah of maror a true zecher l’mikdash mitzvah like these other examples? This is exactly the issue the Rosh was addressing. The Rosh never meant to prove the requirement of eating a k’zayis from the text of the bracha, as the Sha'agas Arye understood. What the Rosh meant is that the very fact that a bracha of “al achilas maror” is recited proves that the mitzvah of maror is not just a fulfillment of a new concept of zecher l’mikdash, but is a fulfillment of the same old mitzvah of maror which we continue to practice even though we no longer have a korban. And since the mitzvah is not a new enactment of zecher l’mikdash, but is an extension of the same old mitzvah of maror which always existed, the tzuras hamitzvah, the format of the mitzvah in terms of what must be eaten and the quantity which must be eaten (a k’zayis) remains unchanged.

bracha on a zecher l'mikdash

The Biblical mitzvah of lulav applies outside the Mikdash for only the first day of Yom Tov, but as a zecher l’mikdash, in remembrance of the Mikdash which we no longer have, we take lulav for all 7 days of the holiday. The gemara (Sukkah 46) quotes R’ Yehoshua ben Levi that only the first day is “mitzvas lulav”, but the remainder of the days are “mitzvas zekeinim”. Rashi explains that RYbL held that the bracha on lulav should be recited only on the first day of Yom Tov, but the bracha of netilas lulav should not be recited on the days instituted as a zecher l’mikdash. Rav disagrees, and holds that the bracha of lulav should be recited on all 7 days.

Perhaps the gemara’s debate can be explained in light of the Brisker Rav’s (Menachos 66 stencil) suggestion of two different possible understandings of the concept of zecher l’mikdash: 1) despite the loss of the Mikdash which would nullify certain mitzvos, the Rabbis instituted that the nullification be ignored and the same mitzvah continue for posterity as a remembrance; 2) the destruction of the Mikdash did nullify the original mitzvah, but the Rabbis instituted new acts that were similar to the original nullified mitzvah to serve as a remembrance of what was.

If one adopts the first approach, then the same mitzvah of lulav which was in force for 7 days at the time of the Mikdash continued even post-destruction and the same bracha of netilas lulav should be recited. However, if one holds that that the mitzvah of lulav was cancelled with the destruction of Mikdash and all we have left is a new mitzvah to remember what once was, then this new mitzvah of zecher l’mikdash should not require a bracha of netilas lulav, as the mitzvah being fulfilled is not one of netilas lulav, but simply the mitzvah of making a zecher l’mikdash.

sefirah: counting days and counting weeks

Even though we reject the opinion of Rabeinu Yerucham that distinguishes the sefirah count of weeks as being only a zecher l’mikdash from the count of days, which is a Biblical obligation, that does not necessarily mean the count of days and weeks should be viewed as a single unit. While Ameimar’s opinion in Menachos 66 to count days and not weeks clearly separates between the two, it is unclear how to interpret Abaye’s position that both the count of days and weeks are obligatory. Does Abaye reject Ameimar's fundamental point that these two counts are separate mitzvot, or does he agree that the count of days and the count of weeks are separate obligations, but holds that both still apply in our time?

The Bais haLevi suggested that if one forgot to count a day of sefira, one may still count the units of weeks at each week's end, i.e. one may count day 7, 14, 21, etc. with a bracha. Clearly, the assumption of the Bh”L is that the count of days and the count of weeks function as separate units, and losing the opportunity to fulfill one with a bracha does not affect the opportunity to fulfill the other.

sefiras ha'omer and zecher l'mikdash

Menachos 66 records Abaye's opinion that it is a mitzvah to count both days and weeks of sefirah, which the gemara indicates was accepted l’halacha. Ameimar disagrees, and holds only the days but not the weeks need to be counted because “zecher l’mikdash hu”, the mitzvah of counting is only a reminder of the practice which was done at the time of the Bais haMikdash when an omer offering was brought.

Ameimar’s opinion is at first glance very difficult to understand – just because a mitzvah is only a zecher l’mikdash, why should the way in which it is performed change? For example, taking a lulav during 7 days of sukkot is only a zecher l’mikdash – no one holds that since it is only a zecher one needs to take only 2 minim and not 4. Why then should we dispense with counting weeks and only count the days of sefirah because it is a zecher l'mikdash?

R’ Yerucham asks why we do not recite two brachos on sefira, one for counting days and one for counting weeks, just as we recite two separate brachos on tefillin, one for the shel rosh and one for the shel yad. R’ Yerucham answers that the mitzvah of counting days is still Biblically in effect today and warrants a bracha; the mitzvah of counting weeks only applied when there was a Bais haMikdash, and hence in our times, when it is only a zecher, it does not warrant a bracha.

Why there should be a distinction between days and weeks is left as a “sod Hashem” by R’ Yerucham, but the Ohr Sameiach (Hil Temidim) reveals the secret. The gemara in Rosh haShana (5) writes that even though Shavuos is only a one day holiday, one has tashlumin for the korbanos of Yom Tov for seven days, just like other regalim. Since we count weeks leading up to the holiday, and the holiday is in fact called the “Holiday of Weeks”, it indicates that the period of time open to bring korbanos is one week. Even though we also count days, notes the O.S., we see from the gemara that the count of weeks specifically is associated with korbanos. Therefore, post-Bais haMikdash, this count is not Biblically mandatory.

Based on R’ Yerucham, the dispute in the gemara is clear. Abaye held that the count of weeks is Rabbinically in force even though there is no longer a Biblical obligation; Ameimer held that we are left only with the Biblical count of days but no count of weeks is required.

Most RIshonim do not accept R’ Yerucham’s split – either they hold that the count of both days and weeks is still Biblically mandatory (Rambam) or entirely Rabbinic (Tosfos). According to these approaches, further explanation of the gemara is needed.

pesach recovery - two ideas from the Ishbitza

Getting back to business is always hard to do after Yom Tov. Two thoughts from the Ishbitza:

1) After keriyas yam suf, the Torah tells us that Moshe forced Bnei Yisrael to leave the riverbank, “vaysa Moshe es Yisrael m’Yam Suf”. Of course collecting the booty and spoils of Egypt was an enticement to linger, yet all we find mentioned in the text mentions is the shirah itself. The Ishbitza explains that shirah was a spiritual boost of energy that affected all of Bnei Yisrael, from Moshe Rabeinu down to the lowest maidservant – ra’asa shifcha al hayam mah she’lo ra’ah Yechezkel ben Buzi. It is very hard to walk away from a spiritual plateau once reached. Yet, not walking away poses a great danger – Torah demands constant growth and hischadshus, not leveling off and becoming satisfied with having reached any level. Precisely because shirah already had such a powerful affect on the entire nation, Moshe realized nothing more would be gained by simply lingering at the same location. After appreciating an accomplishment, one must be willing to walk away and move on to the next set of challenges.

2) After leaving Yam Suf, Bnei Yisrael walked in the desert for three days with no water. In response to the people’s murmuring, Hashem showed Moshe a branch which turned the bitter waters which were found into sweet potable water. When walking away from a spiritual plateau, we should not fool ourselves into thinking we will immediately experience the same spiritual energy that brought us to past accomplishments – we may find ourselves thirsting for the water of Torah and spirituality and not find any to drink. This too, writes the Ishbitza, is part of the process of growth. Eventually those bitter waters can be turned into a sweet oasis, but what appears to be spiritual “downtime” is an inevitable part of journeying to greater heights.

chag sameiach

If you have the strength to blog today, then you have far more kochos than I or you are going away for Pesach : )
Have a chag kasher v'sameiach everybody!

bedikas chameitz (IV) and tashbisu

The gemara (4b) tells us that bittul alone is sufficient to remove any issur of chamietz, but Rashi and Tosfos disagree as to why this should be true. Rashi explains that since the Torah uses the general term "tashbisu" instead of specifying any specific method of destroying chameitz, bittul suffices to fulfill the mitzvah. Tosfos disagrees and holds that tashbisu can only be fulfilled by destroying the chameitz or burning it according to Rabbi Yehudah. The reason bittul removes the issur chameitz is not because tashbisu has been fulfilled, but because bittul makes the chameitz hefker, and one is not responsible to destroy chameitz which is hefker.

The Minchas Chinuch suggests that Rashi and Tosfos disagree over the fundemental definition of the mitzvah of tashbisu. According to Rashi, the mitzvah is an issur aseh which is fulfilled so long as one avoids the possibility of owning chameitz. According to Tosfos, tashbisu is a real aseh that is fulfilled only through a kiyum b'yadayim of actually destroying chameitz.

Returning to R' Akiva Eiger's answer, according to Rashi, just like bal yera'eh is not violated by chameitz found during Pesach so long as one has made all ncessary efforts to remove chameitz beforehand, so too the issur aseh of tashbisu cannot be violated. Only according to Tosfos can one argue that if one discoveres chameitz, even though bal yera'eh has not been violated because one has already done bittul, there still exists a mitzvah b'yadayim to destroy the actual chameitz if one is unwilling to declare it hefker.

Perhaps another dimension to this machlokes revolves around the understanding of bittul as hefker. The Rambam in Hil Nedarim (2:14) famously writes that hefker works like a neder that one accepts not to benefit from the mufkar property. If bittul is just a form of hefker, R' Yosef Engel asks, why are we not concerned with the possibility of sha'aila which would revoke the hefker status - in fact, using the principle of ho'il, just the possibility of revoking the neder should render bittul ineffective (the Rambam writes that it is assur to revoke a neder of hekdesh, but many achronim hold that if one ignores the issur and does revoke the neder it can be undone)? According to the Rambam, one is forced to learn that bittul is far more than ordinary hefker - it is tanatamount to an actual destruction of chameitz, a fulfillment of tashbisu, just as Rashi explains.

lechem oni

One of my children asked: if matzah is "lechem oni" [poor man's bread], why does it cost so much?
A good question indeed.

bedikas chameitz (III)

Continued from Parts (1) and (II)

R’ Akiva Eiger answers his question on the Ran by contrasting bittul with other forms of kinyanim. The rule of devarim sheb’lev means that mental reservations have no legal impact on an act of a sale – actions speaks louder than words. However, bittul is itself fundamentally is a mental renunciation of ownership – the verbal declaration is just a means of announcing the change of status our decision has effected. The Ran later writes that bittul is actually even weaker than hefker. Since chamietz is assur b’hana’ah it is inherenly ownerless, but the Torah penalizes someone for keeping it in their possesson – bittul simply negates that penalty from setting in, but is not itself what imposes the status of hefker on the chameitz. Devarim sheb’lev cannot undo action – but they perhaps can undo other devarim sheb’lev and render the original bittul invalid.

R’ Akiva Eiger quotes a second answer from his son in law. Even though bittul suffices to remove the issue bal yera’eh and cannot be undone, if one finds chameitz and delays destroying it, one has violated the positive mitzvah of tashbisu, which commands one to destroy chameitz found in his possession.

This implicit assumption of this answer is that tasbisu is not just an issur aseh, a commandment to passively avoid owning chameitz, but rather demands that one actively and immediately destroy chamietz. This issue is a major debate in Rishonim and Achronim, with many consequences. See Minchas Chinuch, and maybe more later…

rectangular seder plate

Seen in a local store: an artistic seder plate which was retangular, with all the seder items lined up in a straight row. I have never seen anything like this - seder plates are traditionally round, with various minhagim as to how/where to place he items on the plate. Would you say there is a preference based on minhag to use a round plate, or is it just a matter of taste?

eilu v'eilu

R’ Chaim haKoton has started a discussion of eilu v’eilu and would welcome your feedback – ayen sham.

bedikas chameitz (II)

Rashi explained that the reason for bedikas chameitz is to avoid a potential issur of bal yera’eh. Why were Chazal concerned for bal yera’eh when everyone, even someone who has done bedika, must do bittul as well? The Ran explains Rashi by offering an interesting historical analysis of the gemara. Ran writes that min hatorah, either bittul or bedika suffices. At the time of the Mishna, it would have been perfectly acceptable to do bedika alone, which is why the Mishnayos that discuss the takanah of bedika never mention bittul. In that context, the reason for bedika is to avoid bal yera’eh, as Rashi writes. At a later point, the Amoraim made an additional takanah that even one who does bedika should also do bittul – there is a double-protection against owning or eating chameitz on Pesach.

If bittul alone suffices, why did the Chachamim make a takanah that every person must do a bedika? Ran explains that bittul depends on the willingness of the owner of chameitz to declare chameitz ownerless and void. Faced with valuable chameitz or an appetizing piece of chameitz found in the middle of Pesach, who can insure that the owner of that chameitz remains steadfast in his willingness to renounce ownership? Perhaps the owner will regret, and mentally accept ownership of this newly found piece of chameitz, thereby violating bal yera’eh. Therefore, Chazal instituted bedika to try to insure all chameitz is removed and will not be found.

R’ Akiva Eiger asks on the Ran: bittul is not merely a decision the owner of the chameitz comes to, but is a verbal declaration through which the chameitz becomes ownerless. We have a rule in halacha that devarim sheb’lev ainam devarim – lit. words in the heart are meaningless, e.g. if I sold my car but had in the back of my mind that if I can’t find a better one the sale is invalid, unless I formally express that condition as part of the contract, it has no validity. The world of commerce does not recognize intent or thought as having legal standing. If so, asks R’ Akiva Eiger, why according to the Ran are we concerned lest someone might find chameitz in the middle of Pesach, mentally regret his bittul, and come to violate bal yera’eh – the mental regret of bittul is simply devarim sheb’lev, and devarim sheb’lev cannot undo an action! Once one has declared chameitz hefker through bittul, how can mental regret alone reverse the process and make one the owner of that chameitz?

R’ Akiva Eiger gives two fascinating answers – bli neder more to come…

bedikas chameitz (I)

The first Mishna in Pesachim discusses the mitzvah derabbanan to do bedikas chameitz. Rashi writes that teh reason for the obligation of bedika is lest one violate “bal yera’eh u’bal yimatzey”, the prohibitions against ownsing chameitz. Tosfos disagrees, citing the gemara that even if one does bedika, one is still required to do bittul, declaring chameitz ownerless and like dust [bl”n more on how bittul works later], which effectively eliminates any possibility of violating bal yera’eh. The reason for bedika, says Tosfos, is not bal yera'eh, but lest one find chameitz and come to eat it during the chag.

Two issues that are consequential to the dispute: 1) whether one must do a bedika after Pesach if one forgot to do one before Pesach – there is no longer a risk of bal yera’eh, but there is still a risk of eating chameitz she-avar alav haPesach; 2) whether one must do a bedika for chameitz noksha, which according to many Rishonim cannot be eaten, but is not subject to bal yera’eh.

The Aruch haShulchan (633:12) writes that although the common practice is to do bedika in a shule or bais medrash, one should not recite a bracha or say bittul afterwards. If the reason for bedika is bal yera'eh, then there should in fact be no obligation of bedika at all as no one person is the formal owner of the shule and its chameitz; although we do bedika because of the reason of Tosfos, the bracha should not be recited m'safeik. Additionally, since only the owner of chameitz has the power to do bittul, the bittul of the gabai or shamash has no effect.

The gemara (4a) raises a question regarding someone who rents an apartment on 14 Nissan - does the obligation of bedika rest on the landlord who possesses the chameitz, or on the tenant who now possesses the dwelling? R’ Elchanan Wasserman points out that the gemara’s question may hinge on the dispute regarding the reason for bedika. If the reason for bedika is to avoid bal yera’eh, then the obligation of bedika should rest upon the owner of the chameitz. However, if the reason for bedika is lest one come to eat chameitz, then the obligation of bedika should rest upon the person using the dwelling, regardless of whether he is the formal owner of the chameitz or not.

What still needs explaining is why Rashi was concerned with the whole issue of bal yera’eh, if, as Tosfos points out, bittul removes the whole problem. Stay tuned…

korban pesach and aseres y'mei tshuvah

Last week in Parshas haChodesh we read that Bnei Yisrael on Rosh Chodesh Nissan were given the instructions to take the korban Pesach. Shemos 12 ends “vayeilchu va’ya’asu Bnei Yisrael”, which implies immediate action in response to the command, which was impossible – the command was given on Rosh Chodesh, but the taking of the korban was not until the 10th of the month. I spoke about this at the bar mitzvah last week. Rashi quotes the Mechilta that once one makes a kabbalah to perform a mitzvah it is as if the deed were done already. The effect of such a kabbalah is powerfully illustrated in the story (B.M. 84) of Reish Lakish, who was a famous robber before becoming the great student of R’ Yochanan. The gemara describes how he leapt across a river to attack R’ Yochanan, but R’ Yochana was able to turn him to tshuvah. Once Reish Lakish agreed to join the yeshiva, he found he could not leap back across the river he had just crossed. The kabbalah of Torah and mitzvos literally transformed him on the spot. This kabalah and the transformation it produces is what the celebration of bar mitzvah is all about.

The question remains, however, why the command to take the Korban Pesach was given on Rosh Chodesh when it could have just as easily been given on the 10th of the month. What purpose did these 10 days serve? “Mishcha u’kchu” meant Bnei Yisrael first had to separate themselves from the idolatry of Egyptian culture, and only then could they properly offer the korban pesach. Even though we are aware of the Talmudic dispute whether the world was created in Tishrei or Nissan, we usually think of these time periods as sharing a common theme. However, if Rosh Chodesh Nissan is really a Rosh haShana, we can appreciate the Shem m’Shmuels’ chiddush that these 10 days between Rosh Chodesh and 10 Nissan correspond to the aseres y’mei tshuvah which culminate in the kabbalas pnei Hashem (like we find on Yom Kippur) in the korban Pesach and the leil haSeder.

more on parshas parah, Rabbi Eliezer, and Moshe Rabeinu

I discussed in a previous post the Midrash that Moshe desired a son named Eliezer when he heard R’ Eliezer, the tanna, cited in Mishnayos Parah, and Josh weighed in on the same at parshablog. I happened across a R’ Tzadok that touches on the issue, but he does not elaborate in detail. From what I am able to gather, R’ Tzadok draws a dichotomy between the development of torah she-ba’al peh through human reasoning, which demands that we draw our own conclusions, and the giving of torah she-b’ksav which comes with pre-packages “right” answers. In the famous story of tanur shel achna’i (B.M. 59), the Chachamim argue with Rabbi Eliezer based on their interpretation of torah sheba’al peh, and declare “lo bashamayim hi”, that the process of interpretation guided by human intelligence, is supreme. Rabbi Eliezer, however, called on miraculous signs from Heaven to try to prove that his position was correct – he looked toward pre-packaged “right” answers, duplicating the torah sheb’ksav process. This story exposes the affinity between the “soul” of Rabbi Eliezer, and that of Moshe, the primary giver of torah sheb’ksav. Parah Adumah is the paradigm of the “chok”, a law which is unfathomable, which seems to prove that as great as man’s intellect is, there is a limit beyond which torah sheb’al peh cannot take us and we must rely on Heavenly revelation alone. Moshe Rabeinu saw all of Torah through the lens of the torah sheb’ksav process. When Moshe Rabeinu heard the shiur of Rabbi Akiva he was discomforted until hearing that all is really based on “halacha l’Moshe m’Sinai”. When Moshe Rabeinu heard the laws of Parah Adumah, especially as expressed by Rabbi Eliezer, who also typified that same torah sheb’kav approach, he wanted to preserve this paradigm of limud for future generations, and therefore called his son Rabbi Eliezer as well.

learning hilchos Yom Tov 30 days before the chag

Getting back to the topic, does the shiur of learning hilchos Yom Tov 30 days before the chag contradict the shiur of learning hilchos chag the day of the chag? Most of the comments to the previous post intutited the answer my son said over at his siyum, but which interestingly is not found in the classical earlier achronim - I guess we have all been brainwashed by lomdus to think more immediatly in these terms.

The Ramban writes that the pasuk “VaYidaber Moshe es moadai Hashem el Bnei Yisrael” refers to the takanos of learning hilchos Yom Tov on Yom Tov and reading the Torah parsha of the day, citing the last gemara in Mes. Megillah. The Ramban continues that this same idea is conveyed in Onkelus’s explanation, which he quotes - Onkelus writes that Moshe taught the Jewish people the calculations of the calendar that fix the precise day when each holiday will occur. Isn't this Ramban self-contradictory? What do the instructions of how to calculate a calendar have to do with the takanah of learning hilchos Yom Tov? How can these both be called the same interpretation?

Rav Soloveitchik (in Shiurim l'Zecher Aba Mari) explained that both interpretations convey the same fundamental point. “VaYidaber Moshe es moadei Hashem” means that Moshe and every future Bais Din is charged sanctifying Yom Tov as a special day. How does Bais Din do that? One way is by fixing a calendar which demarcates certain days as special holidays. Another way is by dedicating those days to special activities – to studying the Torah laws of those days and reading Torah parshiyos that are special.

Based on this idea, we better understand the role of learning hilchos Yom Tov. There are two separate functions to studying hilchos Yom Tov: firstly, fulfilling the mitzvah of talmud Torah; secondly, fulfilling the mitzvah of “vaYidaber Moshe es moadai Hashem el Bnei Yisrael”, of creating and enhancing kedushas Yom Tov. The obligation to study the halachos 30 days before Yom Tov is purely a function of the mitzvah of talmud Torah, to know the halachos. The obligation to study halacha on Yom Tov itself fulfills that added dimension of “vaYidaber Moshe es moadai Hashem el Bnei Yisrael”.

bar mitzvah thanks

My son made it through his leining and siyum, and we owe a great debt of gratitude to a lot of people: neighbors and friends who helped with preparations and finding places for our guests over Shabbos; my brothers-in-law R’ BenTzion Unger and R’ Yosef Bechhofer and who always make me feel special and shared some beautiful divrei Torah with us; my BIL Ben Tzion who managed to find a musician for the melaveh malkah at 3:00 on Friday when we found out the one who was supposed to come was snowed in; my parents; my in-laws (thank you to Edna for working on the music problem despite being in aveilus and not even being able to listen); my mother-is-law, whose follow up phone call yesterday was very very much appreciated; Rav Friedman for hosting the whole event in the yeshiva, and so many other people who just made us feel good by coming over to say mazel tov, offering to help if we needed anything, and whose sincerity and warmth made the bar mitzvah boy and his parents enjoy the day.
I'm not sure how many of them read my blog, but to those who do, thank you.

shmuel hanavi's me'il katan and a special thank you

The Navi tells us that Chanah davened for a son who became Shmuel haNavi, and after his birth, she brought him to the Mishkan to grow up. The Navi tells us, “U’me’il katan ta’aseh lo imo v’ha’also lo m’yamim yamima…” (2:19), Chana would make a “little coat” for her son and bring it to him every year. What is this “little coat” and why was it so important? The Koznitzer Maggid writes on the Mishna “Moshe kibeil Torah m’Sinai” that Sinai, the lowest mountain, exemplifies humility, which is the prerequisite for all learning – one cannot grow in Torah without first recognizing that there is more than where "one is holding" to aspire to. Explains the Koznitzer, this was the gift that Shmuel haNavi’s mother gave him – the me’il hakatan is the levush of katnus, this trait of humility and good midos which empowers and unlocks all learning and growth.
The seifa of the pasuk continues, “…ba’alosa es isha lizboach es zevach hayamim”, meaning Chanah gave the coat when she went up to offer the annual korban with her husband. Although in pshuto shel mikra the word “es” here means “im”, with, I think the Navi deliberately uses “es” and not “im”. The word “es” indicates a transitive verb – not going up, but bringing up, causing others to go up. I would like to suggest that Chanah did not just for make a me’il for her son, but “ba’alosa es isha”, she caused her husband to go up in ruchniyos and Torah as well.
My son got through is bar mitzvah with flying colors, and although there are many people who deserve thank you’s (more to follow), a special thank you goes to my wife, the one who fashioned the me’il katan which made the bar mitzvah boy what he is, and who “ba’alosa es isha” inspires me as well.

quantum theory, "biocentrism", and belief

From an article by Robert Lanza, a noted scientist and professor, published in The American Scholar, the journal of the Phi Beta Kappa Society:

Modern science cannot explain why the laws of physics are exactly balanced for animal life to exist. For example, if the big bang had been one-part-in-a billion more powerful, it would have rushed out too fast for the galaxies to form and for life to begin. If the strong nuclear force were decreased by two percent, atomic nuclei wouldn’t hold together. Hydrogen would be the only atom in the universe. If the gravitational force were decreased, stars (including the sun) would not ignite. These are just three of more than 200 physical parameters within the solar system and universe so exact that they cannot be random. Indeed, the lack of a scientific explanation has allowed these facts to be hijacked as a defense of intelligent design.

As we have seen, the world appears to be designed for life not just at the microscopic scale of the atom, but at the level of the universe itself. In cosmology, scientists have discovered that the universe has a long list of traits that make it appear as if everything it contains—from atoms to stars—was tailor-made for us. Many are calling this revelation the Goldilocks principle, because the cosmos is not too this or too that, but just right for life. Others are calling it the anthropic principle, because the universe appears to be human centered. And still others are calling it intelligent design, because they believe it’s no accident that the heavens are so ideally suited for us. By any name, the discovery is causing a huge commotion within the astrophysics community and beyond.

At the moment, the only attempt at an explanation holds that God made the universe.

Of course, Lanza is not satisfied with that answer and instead proposes a theory of “biocentrism” based on quantum mechanics. His argument is that physical reality is created by the mind, and that is why it so perfectly conforms to our expectations. If that’s the best a rational scientist can come up with, I think G-d is getting the best of the skeptics these days.

hilchos chag b'chag or thirty days before?

I was listening to a shiur by R’ Hershel Shachter on P’ VaYakhel and he referenced an interesting Yalkut Shimoni at the beginning of VaYakhel (here) which notes that this is the only parsha which begins with Moshe calling a gathering of all the people together. The purpose of the gathering was to publicly teach hilchos shabbos, which served as a lesson for future generations that shabbos should be spent gathered together in the bais medrash learning the inyana d’yoma, hilchos shabbos. This takana is an extension of the takana of Moshe Rabeinu mentioned at the end of Mes. Megillah to study the halachos of each Yom Tov on that respective Yom Tov, .i.e. hilchos pesach b’pesach, hilchos chag b’chag – according to the Midrash, inyanei shabbos should be learned on shabbos as well. (I was wondering if this is the source of the practice of gedolim like the GR"A and R' Tzvi Pesach Frank who would finish Masechet Shabbos each Shabbos).

By coincidence my son is also making a siyum on Mes. Megillah, and IY”H will be speaking about this takanah. Chazal teachesthat it is a mitzvah to study (shoalin v’dorshin) the laws of each Yom Tov thirty days before the chag (Pesachim 6a). The Sha’gas Arye (and others) ask, if there already exists a takanah to study the halachos thirty days before Yom Tov, why is an additional takanah to study the halacha on the day of Y”T itself necessary?

The Ran is medayek in the words shoalin v’dorshin, we ask about the halachos and explain them. Ran writes that this takanah is not an obligation to study halacha, but a direction to poskim and Rabbis as to how to prioritize questions. Within thirty days before a Yom Tov any query that relates to the upcoming holiday takes precedence over other questions and research. The takanah referred to at the end of Mes. Megillah is a separate din that teaches that one should study the laws of Yom Tov on the day of the holiday itself.

The majority of Rishonim (see Biur Halacha, O.C. 429), however, do not learn like the Ran and explain shoalin v’dorshin simply as an obligation to study halachos. According to this reading, the question of overlapping takanos remains. Stay tuned for more...

not building the mishkan on shabbos

Rashi explains that the reason the Torah prefaces the command to build the Mishkan in Parshas VaYakhel with a repetition of the mitzvah of Shabbos is to tell us that building the Mishkan, albeit being a mitzvah, cannot be done on Shabbos. The Netziv has an interesting chiddush based on the Torah’s use of the passive voice (niphal) in the pasuk, “sheishes yamim te’aseh melacha…”, six days work shall be done, but on Shabbos it must cease. The Mishna in Shabbos writes that according to Hillel it is permitted to start a process on Friday that will continue autonomously on Shabbos, e.g. although it is prohibited to dye wool on Shabbos, it is permitted to place wool in a dye pot before Shabbos and let the wool continue to soak on Shabbos; although it is prohibited to do laundry on Shabbos, one can place clothes in the washing machine and set it running before Shabbos. We do this all the time – we set a time before Shabbos, and the work we need done occurs on Shabbos. Says the Netziv, by the Mishkan all work shall be done (passive voice) before Shabbos, meaning even if you are not the one doing the work but just set a timer or put wool in the dye pot etc. so the work continues automatically, this too can not be done for the purpose of building the Mishkan because of its higher level of kedusha.

In addition to the prohibition of building the Mishkan on Shabbos and Yom Tov, the Rambam tells us (Bais haBechira 1:12) that Mishkan can be built only by day and not by night. In the very same halacha the Rambam tells us that both men and women are obligated in the mitzvah of building a Mishkan. The Marcheshes asks: if the Mishkan can only be built during specific time periods, why is it not categorized as a mitzvas aseh she’hazman gerama from which women are exempt? A whole range of answers are possible, some of which my son will hopefully speak about this Shabbos.

parshas parah and Eliezer, son of Moshe Rabeinu

I have never succeeded in understanding this Midrash on Parshas Parah - maybe someone out there has an idea. The Midrash teaches that Moshe Rabeinu began learning the halachos of parah adumah with Hashem. Hashem kavyachol recited the Mishnayos b’shem omro, beginning with the first Mishna in Parah, “R’ Eliezer omeir…” that a parah refers to a cow that is 2 years old. When he heard that Mishna, Moshe was so impressed by R’ Eliezer’s statement that he said he hoped to have a son just like him. This, according to the Midrash, is why Moshe Rabeinu’s son is named Eliezer.

Maybe it bothers me because my son is also named Eliezer, but whatever the reason, I am baffled. There is a piece in the Piecezna’s sefer Aish Kodesh that explains how Moshe Rabeinu wanted to pass to his children davka the message of Parah Adumah, but this strikes me as missing the main point. The Midrash seems to be highlighting some aspect specifically of the words of Rabbi Eliezer which captivated Moshe Rabeinu. Why was Moshe captivated by Rabbi Eliezer and this halacha in particular more than any other Mishna or meimra in shas???

interesting safeik of r' akiva eiger

The halacha is that a person over bar-mitzvah who ate to the point of satiation (kdei seviya) is obligated min haTorah to say birchas hamazon and a katan who only has a chiyuv derabbanan cannot be motzi such a person in bentching. R’ Akiva Eiger (O.C. 186) has a fascinating safeik regarding the case of a katan who ate k’dei seviya for dinner (as my son regularly does : ) just before the night of his bar mitzvah, bentched, and then while he still had that satiated feeling it turned dark and he was bar mitzvah – does he have to repeat birchas hamazon? R’ Akiva Eiger writes that his son-in-law told him the Chochmas Adam raised the same safeik regarding an onein who ate and still felt satiated after the burial of the meis. As R’ Akiva Eiger notes, these two issues are not exactly the same. By the case of onein, the person is a bar chiyuva, but because oseik bamitzvah patur min hamitzvah, he is exempt from bentching while he has the onein status. By the case of katan, the person was not a bar chiyuva at all when he ate.

It seems from R’ Akiva Eiger that the issue here is how to define the role of seviya. Is it the act of eating which triggers the obligation of bentching, and satiation is just a condition (a tnai) in the definition of eating, or is it the state of being satiated itself which obligates bentching, provided that state occurs through an act of eating.

Another possible way to view the safeik here is whether a katan, though he has no chiyuv, can have a kiyum mitzvah. R’ Soloveitchik brought a proof to this issue from the case of a katan who becomes bar mitzvah in between Pesach rishon and Pesach sheni. The Rambam paskens (K.P 5:7) that as long as a katan was counted in a group that brought the first korban pesach, he need not bring a pesach sheni. Even though the katan had no chiyuv to participate in the first korban pesach, he still gains a kiyum mitzvah from doing do which exempts him from pesach sheni (this proof is cited by R’ Reichman in Reshimos Shiuirim, Mes. Sukkah; however, see GR’Ch al haRambam there). Perhaps by birchas hamazon as well, though the katan had no chiyuv to bentch, his birchas hamazon counts as a kiyum mitzvah min haTorah. This safeik is relevant to many other areas as well, including the famous case of a katan who becomes bar mitzvah during sefira.

zerizus vs. hiddur when performing a mitzvah

The Torah uses the words “chachmei leiv” to describe those who made the curtains for the Mishkan. How did these people demonstrate the great intelligence the Torah notes? The Netziv writes that when Moshe gave the instruction to make the Mishkan, each person had a choice of what project to work on. The achronim discuss whether it is better to do a mitzvah b’zerizus, at the earliest possible moment, or b’hidur, delay the mitzvah until later if doing so would enable it being performed in a more beautiful or perfect fashion. The vessels of the Mishkan were clearly of greater import and greater sanctity than the curtains and walls. Yet, as Rashi in Parshas Pekudei writes, the building tent itself had to first be erected before starting work on the kelim. The builders were faced with the dilemma: is it better to seize the opportunity b’zerizus to work on the curtains of the Mishkan, or is it better to wait for the hiddur of working on a kli which has more kedusha? The Netziv writes that in this case, the correct answer, which the “chachmei leiv” intuited, was to work on the first project available. The safeik of achronim applies only where a single mitzvah can be done either b’zerizus or b’hiddur; here, the choice is between different projects. Also, the task of building the kelim was not even on the table as an option until the tent of the Mishkan was built.

new issue of magazine

To top off the hectic season, my wife just put out the latest edition of Kallah Magazine. You should be able to find a print copy over the next few days if you live in the 5T, Queens, and parts of Brooklyn, or you can just read the whole thing in .pdf format here: http://kallahmagazine.com/spring7.pdf I have an article on the role of Tziporah and galus hadibbur on p. 15. If you take a look and call any of the advertisers, please mention where you saw the ad.

when did ahron become a kohein?

A comment to last week’s post suggested that Moshe did not become kohein because he had slain a Mitzri; Ahron had never taken anyone’s life. I replied that Chazal (Zevachim 102, cited by Rashi) comment on the words “ha-lo Ahron achicha haLevi” (Shmos 4:14) that Moshe had in fact been destined to be a kohein, but because of his reluctance to accept the mission of Redeemer, his brother Ahron was chosen in his stead – not because Moshe shed blood. The counterargument is that the election of Ahron was determined by multiple causes.

Chazal (Sanhedrin 7) justify Ahron’s choice to fashion the eigel by citing the pasuk promising destruction “Im yehareig b’mikdash Hashem kohein v’navi”, if a kohein and prophet be killed. Chur, the son of Miriam, who was a prophet, had already been killed by the mob as he tried to oppose them. Had Ahron stood in the way and been killed as well, the punishment to the nation would have been far worse. Therefore, Ahron decided to play along and fashion an eigel, doing his best to stall the people and mitigate the damage.

The Maharasha asks: why does the gemara consider Ahron as having the status of kohein? His election as kohein does not occur until later parshiyos. Maharasha answers that Ahron was a bechor, a first born, and before the election of Levi’im the avodah was entrusted to the bechorim.

We can perhaps answer the Maharasha’s question if we assume that Ahron’s election occurred earlier during the episode described in Parshas Shmos referenced above (Margoliyas haYam). Ahron was not just the kohein in-waiting, but actually had the status of kohein from that early moment onward. This would also resolve the question according to the Midrashic sources that say Miriam was the first-born and not Ahron.

bar mitzvah

Today is my son’s Hebrew birthday and therefore his official bar mitzvah. Those of you who are regular readers and are in the 5 Towns for Shabbos are invited to drop in for kiddush at Mesivta Rambam; 8:30 start for davening. My son plans to lein both VaYakhel-Pekudei and Parshas haChodesh (fortunately for the olam he tends to go too fast, because done at typical bar-mitzvah boy speed the leining has the potential to make for a l o n g davening : ) and IY”H make a siyum on mesechet megillah, so he has had his work cut out for him the past few months.

As to why the minhag is to celebrate bar mitzvah on Shabbos and not on one’s birthday, well I guess you will just have to show up to hear some of the divrei Torah that may answer that question.

cheit haeigel and the election of the levi'im

Moshe commanded the Levi’im who gathered to kill the eigel worshippers, “milu yedcham hayom laHashem” (22:29). Rashi interprets the term “milu’im” as a reference to initiation into service in the Mishkan. Although the first born were supposed to have served in the Mishkan, they were removed because of their participation in the eigel and the Levi’im who followed Moshe took their place. I think there might be more between the lines here. The halacha is that a kohein who kills someone is not permitted to do avodah or duchan. We know that David haMelech was prevented from building the Mikdash because his life was spent fighting wars. The concept of spilling blood, even when justified, seems to be antithetical to the idea of Mikdash. Moshe assured the Levi’im that contrary to the norm, the killing of those who engaged in the worship of the eigel would not preclude their having a role in the Mishkan – to the contrary, it would sanctify the Levi’im and they would become the primary agents of avodah.

cheit haeigel, mishkan and the order of the parshiyos in sefer shmos

Anonymous comment yesterday wondered why the Torah places the sin of the eigel in the middle of the discussion of the Mishkan, with some of the Mihskan material before it and some afterwards. Let me take the easy way out – what’s the problem? According to the Ramban the order of the Torah is chronological (see his comments at beginning of Parshas Terumah and VaYakhel). After accepting some of the major precepts of the Torah, Moshe gave the command to construct the Mishkan – hence parshiyos Terumah and Tetzaveh follow after Yisro and Mishpatim. Moshe then went up to Har Sinai to receive the rest of the Torah, during which time the eigel was made – Parshas Ki Tisa. Hashem threatens to distance himself from Bnei Yisrael, but Moshe’s prayers are effective and the bond between G-d and people is restored. The Shechina once again returns to the Mishkan, as related in parshiyos VaYakhel and Pekudei, completing Sefer Shmos.

Of course, I am cheating a bit because I ignored Rashi, which is what prompted Anonymous' comment. Rashi writes (see 21:18) that “ain mukdam u’muchar baTorah”, the Torah parshiyos are not in chronological order. The command to build a Mishkan came only after Yom Kippur, after the completion of the entire process of receiving the Torah and being granted atonement for the cheit haeigeil. According to this view, the parshiyos of Terumah and Tetzaveh, which are read before Ki Tisa, actually chronologically occurred afterwards.

It seems to me that Ramban and Rashi differ on two fundamental issues. Firstly, the Ramban in many places writes that the principle of “ain mukdam u’mecuchar” should not be invoked unless there is a very compelling reason to do so – without strong evidence to the contrary, we assume the Torah does follow a chronological order. The Ibn Ezra, and perhaps Rashi, do not assume a chronological framework – they are much more liberal in applying “ain mukdam” and rearranging timelines. Secondly, this dispute perhaps relates to the function of the Mishkan, as discussed in previous posts. According to the Ramban, the Mishkan was an extension of the experience of Har Sinai, part of the process of kabbalas haTorah. It makes perfect sense that the original command to build a Miskan (P’ Terumah-Tetzaveh) should occur in the context of the initial occurrence of mattan Torah. Rashi, however, focuses on the role of the Mishkan as a means of atonement for the eigel. Therefore, he assumes it could only have been commanded after the sin of the eigel occurred.

But, as Anonymous asked, according to Rashi, why indeed should the Torah chop up the Mishkan parshiyos and place Terumah-Tetzaveh before the eigel and vaYakhel-Pekudei afterwards – even if the Torah's order is not chronological, thematically doesn’t it make sense to group all the Mishkan material together?

The Targum explains the word “anveihu” in the pasuk “zeh K-li v’anveihu” as stemming from the root n-v-h, to dwell. Even as early as the week after escaping Egypt, Bnei Yisrael did not want Hashem to pop into their lives for a miracle and then depart – they wanted the Shechina to dwell with them. The parshiyos in Sefer Shmos are the story of this desire and its fulfillment and tie together thematically. Yetziyat Mitzrayim introduced the bond between G-d and Bnei Yisrael; Yam Suf forged the desire for a permanent Mishkan; Yisro/mattan Torah was a prerequisite; finally, Terumah-Tetzaveh is the culmination of the ideal. The chronological reality of events was that the process was never finished. The sin of the eigel interrupted events, and instead of a Mishkan which was an ideal fulfillment of Redemption, we received a Mishkan which was a kapparah. The break in the Mishkan parshiyos, I think, was necessary to reflect two different roles of the Mishkan: one the one hand, the ideal thematic relationship of Mishkan with the process of Redemption, on the other hand, the reality of events as they transpired, which led to a lesser fulfillment of that aspiration.

tax season

On another mundane note, today’s Wall Street Journal (the article is not available in the free online section) reports that about 60% of all Americans use a professional tax preparer to do their income taxes, with mixed results – even professionals miss deductions and miscalculate. Special thanks to my wife Ariella who once again has performed this task of drudgery which I have no patience for or skill at. We (or actually, she) always prepares our own return, which we always file on time. The one year we hired a professional we gave this person all our paperwork a few weeks in advance only to receive a phone call literally the night before the taxes were due explaining that he had fallen behind, he had other personal issues, etc. and could he file an extension for us. We adamantly insisted he finish our relatively simple return that night and have never used a tax preparer again. For those of you who are accountants, good luck over the next few weeks of sleepless nights.

Interview with Lemony Snicket

For those of you who do not know who Lemony Snicket is, please do yourself a favor and get to a library or bookstore ASAP and start reading “A Series of Unfortunate Events” (though once you taste greatness, you may never want to return to that mediocre Harry Potter series again). You don't need to be a child to enjoy Snicket's marvelous dark humor. Fans of the series know that scattered among the books are allusions to Jewish ideas and Hebrew words that give no doubt as to the author’s religion. Moment Magazine has an interview entitled “The Jewish Secrets of Lemony Snicket” with more on Lemony's Jewish background.
(P.S. you may want to read the author’s humorous “Unauthorized AutoBiography” to learn more.)

m'cheini na m'sifricha - the mishkan and the sin of the eigel

Moshe pleads with Hashem in our parsha, “Micheini na m’sifricha”, if you, Hashem, deliver a harsh penalty to Bnei Yisrael, erase my name from your sefer. There are many interpretations of this enigmatic dialogue between Moshe and G-d. The Chasam Sofer explains that we find that each of the parshiyos dealing with korbanos, e.g. the parsha of olah, the parsha of chatas, etc., opens with the phrase “VaYidaber Hashem el Moshe leimor”, Hashem spoke to Moshe and related that particular parsha. Each specific korban, explains the C.S., constitutes a unique type of kapparah which was taught to Moshe on a korban by korban basis. Had the Jewish people not sinned, the parshiyos of the Mishkan should have been taught the same way – each kli, e.g. the menorah, the shulchan, the mizbayach, etc., served its own unique function which would have been taught to Moshe on a kli by kli basis. The instructions of how to make each kli would have been prefaced with, “VaYidaber Hashem el Moshe…”. However, now that the Jewish people had sinned so grievously, the Mishkan as a whole served one purpose and one purpose only – as a kapparah. Moshe said to Hashem, “micheini na”, erase my name, meaning the phrase “VaYidaber Hashem el Moshe” is no longer needed before each item because the parts of the Mishkan are now subsumed under the more global function of achieving kapparah for the eigel.

Although he does not mention it, it seems to me that the pilpul of the Chasam Sofer should depend on the machlokes Rambam and Ramban discussed in previous posts. According to the Ramban, since each kli functioned as a hechsher mitzvah for a specific type of avodah, we would have anticipated a phrase like “vaYidaber Ashem el Moshe leimor” introducing it. However, according to the Rambam, the kelim are not hechsheirim, but chalakim of the larger mitzvah of building a Mishkan, and one introductory statement should suffice for all the parts.

the mitzvah of bigdei kehunah (II)

The pasuk describes the bigdei kehunah as “l’kavod u’l’tiferes”, something which adorns and brings honor to the wearer. The Lev Sameiach writes that had the Ramban been right that bigdei kehunah are not an independent mitzvah but just a necessary ingredient to performing avodahm their function should have been described as “l’amod u’l’shreis”.

Be that as it may, the Ramban in his commentary to the Torah writes on “l’kavod ul’tiferes” that the bigdei kehunah had to be made lishma, with the proper kavanah that these garments would be used as bigdei kehunah. The Rambam, as the Minchas Chinuch notes, nowhere cites such a requirement. (The point seems to be a machlokes in the Yerushalmi).

This is pure speculation which may not make sense, but perhaps this machlokes is also l’shitasam. If bigdei kehunah are a hechsher mitzvah to avodah, perhaps they take on the requirement of lishma just like avodah itself. But if it is an independent mitzvah, like the Rambam holds, the requirements need not match.

the mitzvah of bigdei kehunah

I previously posted on why the making of individual kelim such as the shulchan, menorah, etc, are not counted as separate mitzvos. The Ramban writes that making these items are just hechsheiri mitzvah; e.g. making the menorah is not an independent mitzvah, but is just a necessary ingredient to fulfilling the mitzvah of lighting menorah lamps; making a mizbayach is not an independent mitzvah, but is just a necessary ingredient to performing the mitzvah of offering korbanos. The Rambam opined that the making of kelim is not counted as independent mitzvos because these are all just parts of the larger mitzvah of making a Mishkan.

Is making and wearing bigdei kehunah a mitzvah? The Rambam (aseh #33) counts it as one, but the BH”G disagrees. Ramban explain l’shitaso that the wearing of bigdei kehunah is not itself a mitzvah, but is just a hechsher mitzvah to performing avodah. BH”G only counted doing avodah without bigdei kehunah as an issur. The Megillas Esther defends the Rambam l’shitaso as distinguishing between a hechsher mitzvah and a cheilek of a mitzvah. There are many hechsheiri mitzvah which do count as independent mitzvos, e.g. shechting the korban pesach, preparing the ashes of parah adumah – and, according to the Rambam, bigdei kehunah. What does not count as an independent mitzvah is when something is just a part of the broader mitzvah, a cheilek of the mitzvah, e.g. making kelim for the mikdash. It is easy to impose this distinction on mitzvos after the fact based on what the Rambam did or did not count, but I am unclear as to what exactly defines the difference between the two categories. Why indeed is shechting the korban pesach an independent mitzvah and not just a cheilek of the larger mitzvah of properly offering the korban pesach? What rule does one use to determine hechsher or cheilek?

shushan purim

I once heard from R' Ahron Kahn shlit"a that Shushan Purim is a celebration of the achdus of Klal Yisrael. Even though the events of that day affected only the Jews of Shushan, all of Klal Yisrael celebrates the day as one people.

R' Ahron Lichtenstein on morality and destroying Amalek

R’ Ahron Lichtenstein on the problem of morality and the command to destroy Amalek:

...Subsequently, I heard that a leading Religious Zionist rabbi in a prominent yeshiva had taken thirty minutes out of his Gemara shiur in order to attack what I had said. I called and asked him, “What did I say that merits this great wrath?” He replied, “I think it is a terrible thing to speak in this way, describing the divine command to destroy Amalek as asking a person to do something which ordinarily is not moral. This poses an ethical problem.”

I said to him, “Wiping out Amalek does not conform to what we would normally expect a person to do. Normally, you should not be killing ‘from child to suckling babe.’ But I’m not saying, God forbid, that it is immoral in our case, where God has specifically commanded the destruction of Amalek—‘A faithful God, without iniquity, righteous and upright is He’ (Devarim 32:4). Although generally such an act would be considered immoral, it assumes a different character when God, from His perception and perspective, commands it. The same holds true of the akeida—it demanded that Avraham do something which normally is immoral. But in the context of the divine command, surely it partakes of the goodness and morality of God. We must admit, though, that there is a conflict in this case between the usual moral norm and the immediate tzav given here.”

I recall in my late adolescence there were certain problems which perturbed me, the way they perturb many others. At the time, I resolved them all in one fell swoop. I had just read Rav Zevin’s book, Ishim Ve-shitot. In his essay on Rav Chayim Soloveitchik, he deals not only with his methodological development, but also with his personality and gemilut chasadim (acts of kindness). He recounted that Reb Chayim used to check every morning if some unfortunate woman had placed an infant waif on his doorstep during the course of the night. (In Brisk, it used to happen at times that a woman would give birth illegitimately and leave her infant in the hands of Reb Chayim.) As I read the stories about Reb Chayim’s extraordinary kindness, I said to myself: Do I approach this level of gemilut chasadim? I don’t even dream of it! In terms of moral sensibility, concern for human beings and sensitivity to human suffering, I am nothing compared to Reb Chayim. Yet despite his moral sensitivity, he managed to live, and live deeply, with the totality of Halakha—including the commands to destroy the Seven Nations, Amalek and all the other things which bother me. How? The answer, I thought, was obvious. It is not that his moral sensitivity was less, but his yirat Shamayim, his emuna, was so much more. The thing to do, then, is not to try to neutralize or de-emphasize the moral element, but rather to deepen and increase the element of yirat Shamayim, of emuna, deveikut and bittachon.

I have subsequently thought of that experience on many occasions. I recall once hearing someone, regarded as a philosopher of sorts, raise moral criticisms of various halakhic practices. When asked about these criticisms, I said, “I know that particular person. He doesn’t look for a foundling on his doorstep every morning.”

So what we need to do, I think, is not to weaken our moral sense or that of our children and students. Rather, we need to deepen and to intensify our commitment, our faith, our sense of obedience, our yirat Shamayim. We need to deepen our sense that God has nothing in this world besides yirat Shamayim, and that our moral conscience needs to develop within its context.

R' Tzadok on Amalek - gadol shimusha yoseir m'limuda

R’ Tzadok haKohein (Resisei Layla #52) explains that there is a gate of Torah that corresponds to each nation of the world, and through the power of each gate’s Torah the goodness of that nation is redeemed and becomes part of the Jewish nation. The 50th gate of wisdom, which was not revealed even to Moshe, is the gate which corresponds to Amalek. There has not yet been revealed in the world the chochmas haTorah that can redeem Amalek, and hence they must be destroyed. Moshe Rabeinu, who embodies the chochmas haTorah, could not lead the battle against Amalek because he lacked this 50th level, and therefore appointed Yehoshua to do so. Yehoshua was the meshameish of Moshe, the attendant who clung to his master and exhibited the selfless dedication of a pure desire to learn. Gadol shimusha yoseir m’limuda, R' Tzadok explains, means that the desire to learn is more powerful than the act of study itself, and through that power, Amalek can be destroyed.

I think what R’ Tzadok is telling us is that Amalek preaches to our own shortcomings. Amalek feeds our sense of despondency and yeiush with the knowledge that as Torah and Hashem are one, as surely as we are human and can never attain that 50th gate of Torah, we can never truly have a relationship with Hashem. On the pasuk “Vayelech Agag ma’adanot” the Ishbitza writes that Agag professed a “givun tov”, an outer daintiness that concealed his inner evil. Amalek tells us that we are all just pretenders wearing a “givun tov”, a mask of goodness, for even people we consider models of righteousness still fall short in G-d’s eyes. If so, why bother to try?

Gadol shimusha yoseir m’limuda means that closeness to G-d does not come only from achievements and ability, but comes from desire as well. And where ability and achievement fall short, desire can more than make up the difference. The battle against Amalek, writes R’ Tzadok, was always carried on by descendents of Rachel – by Shaul, by Mordechai, by Esther, who embodied the tzniyus of Rachel. Leah gave birth to the majority of shevatim in Klal Yisrael, but Rachel had within her the burning desire to be able to fill that role.

On Purim we don masks because, as the Ishbitza writes, a Jew is the opposite of Amalek. Whereas Amalek proclaims that goodness is just a mask over man’s inherent shortcomings, a Jew says that shortcoming is just a mask over the inherent goodness of each of soul.

frumkeit

Aside from checking the usual venues, one of the ways I discover blogs I like to read is when people leave comments here and I then go start reading their blog. That happened this week, and I found someone who managed to encapsulate a mouthful of truth in a single sentence. "Tmeishar" writes, “I don't think that it is a positive phenomenon that we view frumkeit independent of halakha as a value.” Very very well put.

ta'anis esther and megillah reading at night vs.during the day

I just saw this essay of Rav Yonasan Sacks on ta’anis esther and megillah and thought it fit well with the idea of the Rav in the previous post. The gemara derives from derashos that megillah can be read by villagers on 11 and 12 Adar, and notes that it obviously can be read on 13 Adar because that day is a “zman kehilah”. The Rosh interprets zman kehilah as a reference to gathering for the fast. Why, asks R’ Chaim Turtzin, should this be a mechayeiv of kerias megillah? What does the fast have to do with the celebration of the miracle of being saved?

R’ Sacks quotes the Rambam in the conclusion of his intro to the Yad that the theme of the megillah emphasizes Hashem’s bringing redemption from danger in response to our prayers. Rav Sacks concludes that, “On Purim, we do not merely celebrate the miracles themselves, but rather, the metamorphosis from disaster to tranquility. The contrast is what is critical.” That being the case, ta’anis Esther, whose fasting marks the potential tragedy Haman planned, is an essential component of the pirsumei nisa of Purim itself.

Perhaps this is the difference between the keriah at night, which the Rav saw as preparatory to the actual mitzvas hayom of Purim, and the kerih during the day, which Tosfos’ holds is the primary reading. During the reading of the night, coming immediately at the close of the ta’anis, we are captivated by the danger of the story, as the tragic plans of Haman unfold before our eyes. This reading stands in contrast to the reading during the day, when we already know how the story will end, and focus our attention more on the happy conclusion to be celebrated through seudah and mishloach manos.

the takanah of reading megillah at night

Tosfos’ opinion (Meg 4) is that a bracha of she’hechiyanu is recited before reading megillah during the day even though it has already been recited on the reading of the previous night. The Rambam disagrees, and holds that since she’hechiyanu has been recited at night it is not repeated. I offered a few approaches to understand this machlokes last year, but wanted to add two new ideas this year. The gemara quotes R’ Yehoshua ben Levi as saying one is obligated to read the megillah at night and repeat it during the day, but no mention of this night time reading appears anywhere in the Mishna. Perhaps, some intriguingly suggest, the original takanah of megillah was to read only during the day, with the full set of brachos. The night reading was only a later takkanah made by R’ Yehoshua ben Levi. This idea is consistent with the Turei Even’s chiddush that the reading by day is a chiyuv m’divrei kabbalah, but at night is only a takanah derabbanan. (This idea makes for a difficult reading of a gemara on daf 20 that I don’t want to get bogged down in, so I’ll just leave you with the mareh makom).

Tosfos proves that the day reading is primary from the fact that Purim seudah is done during the day but not the night before. R’ Soloveitchik (quoted in Moadei haRav) used this as a springboard for another interesting distinction between the two readings. The Rav suggested that other Yamim Tovim have a kedushas hayom from which stems all the associated mitzvos of the day. The kedushas hayom of each Yom Tov begins with sunset the previous night. Purim, however, does not have a kedushas hayom which obligates mitzvos. There are mitzvos hayom - mishloach manos, matanos l’evyonim, kerias hamegillah - which must be done on the day of Purim, to the exclusion of the previous night, but nothing more. The reading at night is not part of the mitzvos hayom of Purim, but is just a preparatory act in anticipation of the day of Purim itself.